In 1909, the respondent, carrying on on his own account the practice of a civil engineer, employed the appellant as his assistant. On the 1st September 1912, the respondent entered into a contract by private writing with the appellant and one H6roux to carry on the same undertaking under the name of "Marius Dufresne."
The agreement provided inter alia that the profits realized ("b6n6fices r~alis6s") at the expiration of each year should be divided, 80 per cent to the respondent and 10 per cent to each of the others. The agreement was silent as to what was to become of the fruits of work done during the term of the partnership that should remain uncollected upon its expiration. On the 31st of December, 1912, all moneys received during the four months of the existence of the partnership, including those paid on account of work done by the respondent before the 1st September, 1912, were distributed between the partners.
At the date of the dissolution of the partnership, on the 31st December, 1916, a new agreement was passed between the appellant and the respondent by which the former was hired by the latter for the year 1917 at a salary of $150 a month plus per cent of the "b6ndfices realis6s" during that year. The appellant, over two years after the first agreement had terminated, claimed 10 per cent of the moneys collected by the respondent after the dissolution of the partnership for work done during its existence.
Held, that, as the meaning of the provisions of the written agreement is not free from obscurity, the intention of the parties may be ascertained by taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and by examining the conduct of the parties themselves in so far as it throws light on the interpretation they have placed upon their contractual rights. The contract so interpreted gives the appellant no claim on the profits realized after the expiration of the agreement.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court at Montreal, Duclos J., and dismissing the appellant's action.
The material facts of the case are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported. *PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. Chs. Laurendeau K.C. and Arthur Brossard K.C. for the appellant.
Eug. Lafleur K.C. for the respondent.
J.-The respondent had carried on his business of a civil engineer, land surveyor and architect for some years in the town of Maisonneuve.
The appellant served him as an assistant in 1909, and up to the formation of the contract presently to be referred to, getting such compensation from time to time as his services were mutually agreed to be worth.
On the 1st September, 1912, respondent and appellant and one H6roux entered into a contract by private writing to carry on the said business under the name of respondent and, unfortunately, the said writing was so ambiguously expressed that it has given rise to this action of the appellant, in February, 1919, over two years after the said agreement had terminated as it did, and at the end of 1916 everything seemed to have been settled to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned and the appellant had entered into and served respondent, under another agreement in writing, for over a year, without making the claim now set up.
The mode of compensation of the appellant and said H6roux, by said respondent, was expressed in said first mentioned writing, as follows:- A The salaries thus provided for were paid and, at the end of each year, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915 and 1916, respectively, a settlement was made on the basis thus specified, and of the account book kept by the respondent, or rather a competent person whom he was bound to employ for the purpose of keeping said book.
Statements were made out at the end of each of the years 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, and 1916, which included all the receipts which had come into the hands of respondent for j. each of said years derived from the earnings of his business, not only for each current year but the previous years as well, and settlements made on that basis.
The appellant pretends herein that, notwithstanding that mode of dealing and the said express language of the agreement, he is entitled to an accounting by respondent for anything earned during said period and to share therein.
The learned trial judge acceded to such pretension, but upon appeal to the Court of King's Bench that judgment was reversed.
If ever there was a case in which the interpretation and construction of the agreement could and should be helped by steps leading up to the contract and that done by the parties concerned therein after the business provided for by the contract had been entered upon, I think this is one. We find that those so concerned in this contract began by a literal adherence to its terms at the end of the year 1912, and that the cash received by respondent during the entire year of 1912, for work previously done as well as for the year 1912, was brought into the account and the percentage allowed and paid appellant and H6roux respectively, as provided by the above quotation from the agreement, though the time they had worked under same had only been for four months of the said year.
The Court of King's Bench was guided largely by this conduct of the parties as the correct interpretation of their contract and in doing so was, I think, absolutely right. Numerous other like features of this case which appear in the evidence, and especially the yearly settlements in subsequent years as if final up to the respective times when made, tend to confirm me in the opinion that the judgment appealed from is right.
The appellant in argument and in his factum especially seems to incessantly repeat that as this agreement used the word "socigtg" therefore all that appears relative to what the bargain governing this socidtg really was, must be discarded because usually the terms of such an agreement in fact are different and the law relevant thereto would work out a different result.
The law does not prohibit parties from making any Idington J. agreement they choose, even for a socidtd. And as this agreement even if taken to be for such a contractual relation was terminable by either of the three parties thereto giving three months' notice, it was the duty of the appellant to have taken, at the end of 1912, the objection he is now taking.
Parties can measure the share they are to receive out of the operations of a partnership by any rule they choose to lay down and to alter same if they see fit, and their conduct is often in any case the evidence of a contract. The clear intention of the parties so manifested herein was that all the appellant or H6roux ever were expected to get out of the business in question was the $150 a month each, and the percentage of net receipts as settled at the end of each current year in the manner provided for and adopted.
In justice to H6roux I may say that we are told he makes no pretension to the contrary.
Any other claim such as made herein might by virtue of the mode of reasoning put forward, as well have been made to a third of the profits beyond that specified and in the way specified.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs throughout. J.-The agreement of the 1st September, 1912, unquestionably is framed in such a way as to give rise to difficulties of construction. The respondent Marius Dufresne had been carrying on on his own account practice as engineer, surveyor and architect and the document before us was brought into existence for the purpose of recording the arrangement between himself and the appellant Dufort and another engineer H6roux whom he was associating with himself in his practice.
The document begins with a declaration that all parties consent
*
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA is agreed that each shall give his whole time to the affairs of the "sociftg" that each is to receive a salary of $150 a month and that at the end of each year "les bnfces rgalisis" shall be divided, the respondent receiving 80 per cent, and each of the others 10 per cent of such "bindflces." It was stipulated that the partnership should continue for an indeterminate period with the right of any one of the partners to retire upon giving three months' notice and finally it was agreed:
The furnishings of the office and the professional instruments were to be supplied by the respondent and were to be his property. On the face of it the instrument appears to deal only with the cash receipts from the business during the partnership period. The instrument is silent on the subject of partnership accounts in respect of work done during the partnership period, but not collected until the expiration of it and does not explicitly deal with moneys received on account of work done by Dufresne before the date of the so-called partnership.
I think it may fairly be said that as regards these points the provisions of the written instrument are not so unequivocal as to be entirely free from obscurity.
The rule of interpretation for such a case (in substance it is the same in the province of Quebec as in France), seems to be well settled. Where the language of a private convention is doubtful or obscure, to quote Huc, Commentaire du Code Civil, vol. 7, Art. 175,
The authorities recognize in the most explicit way the principle adverted to in the concluding words that the conduct of the parties in the execution of a contract expressed in doubtful language affords a very important clue to their real intention. Thus Demolombe, Code Civil, vol. 25, par. DuFonR 36:
36. Il faut encore mettre au rang des rbgles les meilleures d'interpr6- Duff J. tation, quoique notre code ne la mentionne pas, celle que fournit l'6x6cution qui a t donn6e par les parties de la clause de leur convention, dont le sens est maintenant controvers6 entre elles.
L'ex6cution de la clause, c'est I'interpritation vivante et anim6e. C'est, en quelque sorte, I'aveu de la partie, et h moins qu'elle ne prouve que 1'ex6cution, qu'elle y a donn6e, a 4t le r6sultat d'une erreur, il est logique et 6quitable qu'elle ne soit pas, en g6ndral, admise b, revenir contre son propre fait:
Talis enim prasumitur prcecessisse titulus, qualis apparet usus et possessio.
Tels sont les termes, dans lesquels on pourrait, d'apris Dumoulin, poser notre r6gle.
To the same effect is Laurent, vol. 16, no. 504:
504. Toullier remarque, d'apris Dumoulin, que le moyen le plus sqr de fixer le v6ritable sens d'une convention est de s'attacher A la possession, A I'interpr6tation que les parties ont faite elles-mmes de l'acte, par la manibre dont elles Pont ex6cut6.
La jurisprudence a consacr6 cette maxime.
"Lorsque les actes pr~sentent quelque incertitude, dit la cour de cassation, I'interpr~te le plus str en est I'excution volontaire, formelle et r6it6rie que leur ont donn6e les parties int6r6ss&es, qui se rendent ainsi non recevable A miconnaitre ensuite leurs propres faits." Dans I'espice il s'agissait de fixer la contenance d'une fort soumise h des droits d'usage. Cette contenance, mal pr6cise dans le titre de concession, se trouvait d6termin~e dans les plans et cartes topographiques post6rieurs, dress6s en pr6sence des usagers at approuv6s par leur ex6cution volontaire et ritr6e. La cour de Metz adopta cette d6limitation. Pourvoi en cassation fond6 sur le violation du titre constitutif.
Le pourvoi fut rejet6, parce que la cour n'avait fait qu'interpr6ter le titre par I'ex6cution que les parties contractantes lui avaient donnee.
The passage in Toullier to which Laurent refers is in vol. 6, no. 320. In 1840, it may be added, la Cour de Cassation (S., 40. 1. 789) laid it down that lorsque les actes prsentent quelque incertitude l'interprite la plus str en est I'excution volontaire, formelle et rit6r6e que leur ont donn6 les parties int6r6ss6es, qui se rendent ainsi non recevable A m6connaitre ensuite leurs propres faits.
The passage cited above from Demolombe was quoted and applied by Mr. Justice Girouard in The City of Quebec v. The North Shore Railway Co. (1), and this principle was the basis of a judgment of this court in Cliche v. Roy (2) where Mr. Justice Girouard, speaking for the court, adopted (1) [18961 27 Can. S.C.R. 102, at
(2) [1907] 39 Can. S.C.R. 244. pp. 124 and 125.
53558-4 the reasons for judgment given by Lacoste C.J. of the Court of King's Bench which proceeded upon the ground that I agree with the finding expressed in the consid6rants the Court of King's Bench in the following words:
The fair meaning of the document of the 31st December, 1916, is, I think, that under the agreement expressed in that document the cash receipts from the 31st December, 1916, were to be divided as therein specified. The fact that the parties entered into this arrangement taken together with the disposition of the proceeds received during the partnership term for services rendered and business done by the respondent before the partnership arrangement was made sufficiently, I think, support this consid6rant embodying the unanimous opinion of the Court of King's Bench.
The appeal should be dismissed.
J.-It may be conceded that the parties to the agreement of the 1st September, 1912, contemplated a partnership of some description.
Nevertheless the terms of that partnership and the rights of the partners to share in its profits are defined, with more or less exactitude, in their agreement.
The distribution of profits realized-"bindfices rgalisgs,"-which I would translate "net cash receipts," is explicitly provided for. The agreement is silent as to what is to become of the fruits of work done during the term of the partnership that should remain uncollected upon its expiry. Taking into consideration, however, as I think we should, the clause of the contract which deals with the rights of a retiring partner or the representatives of a deceased partner and the agreement made between the parties to this action to take effect from the 31st of December, 1916, the date of the dissolution of the partnership constituted by the agreement of September, 1912, I find enough doubt as to the meaning of the parties to the latter agreement to bring it within the purview of Art. 1013 C.C. I know of no better means of solving that doubt than the conduct of the parties themselves in so far as it throws light on the interpretation they have placed upon their contractual rights. The inclusion in the "bndfices r6alisis" distributed amongst the partners between the 1st September, 1912, and the 31st of December, 1916, of all monies received during that period on account of work done by Marius Dufresne before the former date makes it reasonably clear why no provision was made as to the distribution of monies due for work done during the term of the partnership but uncollected when it expired. Such monies were not meant to form part of the funds to be divided between the partners, but were to belong to Dufresne, no doubt to offset the monies earned by him before the partnership began but included, by arrangement of the parties within the "bn6feces rdalisis" in which they participated. Mr. Justice Dorion has expressed views very similar to those which I entertain and have endeavoured to state. The appeal, in my opinion, fails.
s'agit dans cette cause d'une convention que Dufort appelle un acte de soci6t6 et que Dufresne d6signe un contrat de louage de services.
Dufresne exergait seul depuis plusieurs ann6es sa profession d'ing6nieur civil et d'arpenteur, et il avait a son service le demandeur Dufort et un nomm6 H6roux qui 6taient aussi tous deux ing6nieurs civils. Disireux d'am6liorer la situation de ses aides et profitant d'une grande prosp6rit6 dans ses affaires, Dufresne d6cida de les faire participer dans ses b6n6fices, et ils firent tous les trois A cette fin la convention qui nous est soumise et qui est faite sous seing priv6.
Ce contrat, qui est dat6 du ler septembre 1912, comporte que Marius Dufresne, Dufort et H6roux "consentent" A se mettre en soci6t6 comme ing~nieurs "sous la raison sociale de 'Marius Dufresne,'" que chagun des associds pr6lvera sur les recettes de la soci~t6 A titre de salaire "$150 par mois," que les b6n6fices r6alis6s en donnant trois mois d'avis, que le mobilier du bureau et les instruments d'arpentage seront fournis par Dufresne et seront sa propriet6, que ce dernier verra seul aux finances j. et signera les ch6ques; et le contrat se termine par la clause suivante, qui est la plus importante pour la decision du litige et qui se lit comme suit:
A la fin de la premiere ann6e, les parties ont rig16 les b6n6fices r6alis~s et on a fait entrer dans les recettes non seulement l'argent pergu pour la valeur des travaux ex6cut6s depuis le ler septembre 1912, date de la convention, mais aussi les deniers pergus pour les travaux ex~cutis avant le ler septembre 1912. En d'autres termes, on a fait entrer en ligne de compte des travaux dont Dufresne, sans la convention, 6tait incontestablement le seul et unique b6n6ficiaire. Dufort et H6roux se sont trouv6s par ces riglements de fin d'ann6e A profiter non-seulement des travaux qui avaient 6t6 faits depuis leur convention, mais aussi de ceux faits ant6rieurement.
Les op6rations financi~res de l'annie ont donc td accept6es par les parties pour d6terminer les b6n6fices r6alis6s par la "soci6t6."
La convention a pris fin en d6cembre 1916, sur notification de Dufresne. Ce dernier a voulu d6terminer les "b6n6fices r6alis6s" suivant les recettes et les d6penses de 1'ann6e. Mais Dufort demande par sa pr6sente action de faire entrer dans ces b6ndfices la valeur des travaux qui ont 6t6 ex6cut6s depuis la convention de 1912 et pour lesquels aucun argent n'a encore 6t6 vers6 dans la caisse.
Afin de d6cider ce litige, il s'agit d'abord de savoir si la convention doit 6tre consid6r6e comme un acte de soci6t6. Il me semble que les parties ont bien voulu consid6rer leurs conventions comme constituant un acte de soci6t6. Ils ont form6 une raison sociale et ils ont A diverses reprises au cours de 1'acte parl6 de relations qu'ils ont qualifi6es de relations sociales. Le contrat r~unit les 616ments essentiels de la soci~t6, c'est-h-dire qu'il est pour le bin6fice common des associ6s et que chacun d'eux y apporte son habilet6 et son industrie et qu'il y a participation dans les profits (Arts. 1830-1831 C.C.)
Je sais que la nature d'un contrat ne doit pas 6tre d6ter- DEumN min6e par la qualification que les parties ont donn6e a un acte quand il est certain que cette qualification est contraire au vritable caractbre de la convention; mais nous ne devons nous 6carter du sens litt6ral des mots que lorsqu'il est certain que les parties les ont pris dans une acception impropre.
(Baudry-Lacantinerie, 26me 6dition, nos. 556- Dans le cas actuel, les parties, ce me semble, ont bien entendu exprimer leur volont6 de former une soci6t6; et, en r6alit6, le litige ne porte que sur l'actif qui doit y entrer ou en 6tre exclu.
Cela nous ramine alors A examiner la question qui est de savoir si la valeur des travaux faits avant la formation de la soci~t6 mais pay6s durant son existence fait partie de la soci6t6; et si, par contre, les travaux faits pendant la soci6t6, mais non pay6s A sa dissolution, doivent 6tre pris en consid~ration pour d6terminer les "b6n6fices r6alis6s" dont parle le contrat.
S'il y a doute A ce sujet, nous trouvons dans la conduite des parties contractantes la v6ritable intention qu'elles avaient. Ainsi dans le premier riglement qui s'est fait en
1912 et dans les annies subsiquentes, on a calcul6 les
"b6n6fices r6alis6s" sur les recettes et les d6penses de chaque ann6e sans rechercher si ces recettes et ces d6penses couvraient la valeur des travaux ex6cutis avant 1'existence de la soci6t6 ou non. Si Dufresne a perdu le b6n6fice des travaux qu'il avait ex6cutis lui-m~me, il me semble juste et
6quitable qu'il ait 6galement A la dissolution, le b6n6fice des travaux qui ont 6t6 ex~cut6s pendant la soci6t6 mais dont cette dernibre n'avait pas pergu la valeur.
D'ailleurs l'intirt du demandeur serait bien minime, car un contrat de louage de services fait entre Dufort et Dufresne en 1917 donne & Dufort de nouveau 10 pour cent sur les honoraires pergus durant l'annie par Dufresne, d6duction faite des d~penses et salaires pay6s.
Si plusieurs comptes sont rest6s impay6s pendant 1'ann6e 1916, il est prisumer qu'ils ont da 6tre pergus en 1917 en grande partie et que Dufort aura alors sa part dans ces comptes. Pour ces raisons 'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d~pens. J.-Les parties sont des ing6nieurs civils et arpenteurs-g6om6tres et elles ont pris cette qualit6 dans le contrat du ler septembre, 1912, invoqu6 par chacune d'elles. Elles paraissent aussi avoir agi comme architectes, avec ou non le droit de le faire, peu importe. Le ler septembre, 1912, 'appelant et l'intimb ont sign6, avec M. Joseph P. Hiroux, un contrat pr6par6 par eux.
Une des questions soulev6es est de savoir si ce contrat constitue un contrat de soci~t6; l'appelant le soutient, l'intim6, au contraire, dit que c'est un contrat de louage d'ouvrage. L'appelant avait 6
1'emploi de 1'intim6 avant le ler septembre 1912. L'arrangement de cette date a dur6 entre les trois parties jusqu'au 31 dicembre 1916. Aprbs cette date il y a eu un contrat de louage d'ouvrage pour une ann6e entre 1'appelant et 1'intim6, le premier louant ses services au second.
Apris avoir examin6 le contrat du ler septembre 1912, je suis d'avis que c'est un contrat de soci6t6.
Les parties d6clarent express6ment qu'elles consentent h se mettre en societe, et les mots "soci~t6" ou "associ6s" sont rip6tis presque h chaque clause.
Sans doute les termes dont les parties se servent pour d6signer le genre de contrat fait par elles ne constituent pas toujours un indice infaillible de la nature juridique de ce contrat, mais cela aide beaucoup h d6couvrir quelle a r6ellement 6 leur intention, et si les conventions peuvent se concilier avec la description que les parties en ont faite, cet indice peut 6tre accept6 comme d6cisif par les tribunaux.. Le contrat en question renferme tous les 616ments du contrat de soci6t6, car la convention de partager dans les pertes, qui manque ici, d6coule de la stipulation de partage dans les b6n6fices, et la loi la sousentend (Art. 1831 C.C.).
Il y a done eu soci6td.
La solution de cette premidre question en faveur de l'appelant n'entraine pas n6cessairement la cons6quence que son action 6tait bien fondie. II reste h determiner quelle part l'appelant devait retirer dans cette soci6t6. Si cette part, outre le salaire qui a td pay6, est seulement dix pour cent des bin6fices r6alis6s pendant la soci6t6, 1'appelant a regu tout ce qui lui revient et 1'action en reddition de compte qu'il intente A l'intim6 se trouve sans objet. Une difficult6 m'a d'abord frapp6. Dans la clause il est question du partage des b6ndfices, les trois associ6s sont placs sur le m~me pied, sauf que l'intim6 regoit quatrevingt pour cent de ces b6n6fices et l'appelant et H6roux dix pour cent chacun, les sommes h 6tre retir6es par les trois associ6s pour leur salaire 6tant 6gales.
On n'a pas pourvu au partage de ce qui pourrait 6tre pay6 apris la fin d'une ann6e pour l'ouvrage fait pendant cette ann6e. Tant que la soci6t6 a dur6 il ne pouvait y avoir de difficult6, car les sommes ainsi pay6es pour services ant6rieurs comptaient parmi les bin6fices r6alis6es pendant l'ann6e oii elles avaient 6t6 pergues et la clause de partage s'y appliquait. Mais la pr6tention que soulive l'appelant est de partager dans les sommes regues pat l'intim6 depuis la dissolution de la soci6t6 pour des ouvrages faits pendant son existence. II dit que chaque fois que la soci6t6 faisait un ouvrage pour le compte d'un de ses clients, elle acquirait un droit de cr6ance contre ce client et chaque associ6 avait le droit de partager dans cette crdance quand elle 6tait paybe, que ce fLt pendant la soci6t6 ou apres sa dissolution.
On r6pond que par les partages annuels que les parties ont faits, elles ont autrement interpr6t6 leur contrat; que dans les quatre derniers mois de 1912, la soci6t6 ayant commenc6 le ler septembre de cette annie, on a divis6 parmi les associds tous les b6n6fices regus sans 6gard au temps oii 1'ouvrage avait 6t6 fait, donnant ainsi A 1'appelant dix pour cent pour des travaux ex6cut6s par l'intim6 avant le commencement de la soci6t6; et que cette m6thode a 6t6 suivie durant toute 1'existence de la soci~t6, les associ6s n'ayant partag6 que les sommes actuellement reques pendant I'ann6e. Et on dit que les parties ont ainsi d6montr4 que dans leur intention rien que les b6n6fices actuellement regus ou r6alis6s durant I'existence de la soci6td ne pouvait entrer dans la masse A partager entrer entre les associ6s.
Ce raisonnement qui a pr6valu devant la cour d'appel neme satisfait pas. I est probable que l'intim6 a laiss6 entrer dans la somme partagde en d~cembre 1912 quelque chose ""
qui n'aurait pas dfi y figurer, mais il n'en r6sulte pas, A mon avis, que les parties aient eu 1'intention d'interpriter leur acte de soci6t . Les autres partages annuels ne fournissent aucun argument a intime, car on n'a partag6 que ce qui seul pouvait 6tre divis6, c'est-h-dire le surplus des recettes aprbs le paiement des d~penses.
Mais un argument bien plus formidable rsulte du contrat que 1'appelant a fait avec 1'intim6 apris la dissolution de la soci6t6.
Ce contrat, qui devait durer une annee h compter du 31 dicembre 1916, n'est pas dat6, mais l'intim6 dit qu'il a tb fait A la fin de janvier ou au commencement de fivrier 1917; il y est d6clar6 que
L'appelant, en vertu de ce contrat qui est un louage de services, devait recevoir de l'intim6, outre son salaire, dix pour cent des b6n6fices r6alis6s durant 1'ann6e, c'est-h-dire dix pour cent du surplus, d6duction faite des d~penses, des honoraires pergus durant 1'annie. Il devait 6tre 6vident, quand ce contrat a t6 fait, que ce surplus d'honoraires coinprendrait des honoraires pay&s, durant l'ann6e 1917, pour des travaux ex~cuts auparavant, c'est-A-dire pendant 1'existence de la soci~t6.
La stipulation par 1'appelant, comme employ6 de l'intim6, d'un pourcentage sur les recettes de 1917 sans distinguer les honoraires pour travaux anciens de ceux pour travaux nouveaux, indique h mon avis qu'il reconnaissait qu'il n'avait plus rien h r~clamer, comme associ6, sur des honoraires qui seraient pays apris la dissolution de la soci~t6 pour des travaux ant6rieurs. Et un tel contrat fait imm6diatement aprbs la dissolution de la soci6t6 est h mon avis une interpr6tation des conventions sociales qui lie 1'appelant, et un abandon par lui de toute pr6tention A autre chose que les b~ndfices r6alis~s pendant l'existence de la soci6t6.
Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que c'6tait toujours le bureau de l'intim6 qui continuait avant, pendant et apris la soci6t6. En d'autres termes, l'intim6, qui avait 6tabli un bureau pour 1'exercice de sa profession, s'est associ6 l'appelant et H6roux pendant un certain temps, mais c'6tait toujours le bureau "Marius Dufresne" qui subsistait. Cela r6pond A l'objection de 1'appelant que s'il n'a pas droit aux sommes pergues aprbs la dissolution de la soci6t6 pour des travaux antirieurs, 1'intim6 lui-mme n'y a pas droit, car la clause de partage s'applique aux trois associ~s et ne leur donne le droit qu'aux b6n6fices r~alis6s durant Fannee.
D'ailleurs, si l'intim6 a pay6 l'appelant tout ce qui revient
A ce dernier comme associ6, peu importe ce qu'il fait du r6sidu, car ce r6sidu n'appartient certainement pas h l'appelant. Ce serait quelque chose qui n'aurait pas 6t6 mis dans la soci~t6.
Je crois que 1'appel doit 6tre renvoye.
Appeal dismissed with costs.