IDINGTON J.-The respondent sued the appellant for damages to his buildings on the corner of Cadieux and De- *PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. (1) [19221 Q.R. 33 K.B. 458.
S.C.R.
Montigny streets in said city, on the 25th April, 1919, by reason of the water pipes used by appellant on DeMontigny street in front of respondent's said building having burst and through the rupture so produced poured millions of gallons of water upon said buildings or the ground adjacent to the foundation thereof.
The learned trial judge maintained the respondent's claim and assessed the damages at $3,000.
The Court of King's Bench unanimously upheld the said judgment.
Each of the five members thereof who heard said appeal gave written reasons in support of their said judgment founding the action upon the obligations resting upon appellant by virtue of Art. 1054 of the Civil Code.
The appellant's counsel admitted in answer to a question I put to him that he did not deny that the burden of rebutting a presumption created by the relevant law and fact against the appellant rested upon it.
I fail to see how that can be held to have been discharged by the evidence upon which he relied.
I do not propose going into a detailed account thereof and of the evidence adduced by the respondent.
I have considered same and the arguments adduced by counsel on each side resting respectively upon that class of evidence given on behalf of their respective clients. If as the witnesses for appellant pretend that they cannot account for the repeated bursting of parts of said pipe and. we are asked to allow this appeal because the appellant's employees cannot find anything to account for such bursting, I respectfully submit that they have not duly investigated the possible causes.
One of these witnesses admitted there had been water pipes in the city which lasted for forty years without bursting. No attempt was made to compare such enduring water pipes with those in question and to learn how it came about that the one set lasted so well and so long without bursting and this later structure had a dozen ruptures within ten years.
Is it conceivable that such a state of things is to continue and owners of property to suffer loss at such a rate because appellant's employees will not listen to what others say and are blind to what experience demonstrates? oF Such a case as appellant sets up does not present anything upon which we should say that it had discharged the burden cast upon it by law.
Nor do I find any error in the law as presented by the several judges below.
The question of damages, concurrently agreed upon by both courts, is one with which we should not interfere in such a case.
I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Brodeur.
J.-The impression left on my mind by a study of the somewhat voluminous record in this case cannot be better expressed than in the sentence in which the lamented Chief Justice Lamothe stated his conclusion:
Having regard to the history of the conduit-twelve breaks, many of them serious, within ten years in the other two sections-I am not so clearly convinced that the defendants were unable by any reasonable means to prevent the act (le fait) which caused the damage to the plaintiff's property (City of Montreal v. Watt & Scott (1) ), that I would feel justified in reversing the judgment of the Superior Court unanimously affirmed by the Court of King's Bench, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the learned judges of the latter court appear to have proceeded on a view of the effect of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Quebec Ry. L.H. & P. Co. v. Vandry (2), which must, in the light of the " addition " made to it in the later judgment in City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott (1), now be deemed somewhat exaggerated.
While proof of fault dans locum injuriae is certainly lacking, the burden thrown on the defendants by the Vandry decision (2) of bringing themselves within the exculpatory clause of article 1054 C.C., even as tempered by the " addition " made by their Lordships in the Watt and Scott S.C.R.
Case (1), remains so onerous that I am not satisfied it has been discharged.
That burden is, of course, enormously increased where, as here, the cause of the accident is unknown.
It would require a very strong case indeed to justify interference with the assessment of the plaintiff's damages, unanimously confirmed by the Court of King's Bench. Such a case has not been made out.
The appeal in my opinion fails.
J.-L'article 1054 du Code Civil, apr~s avoir 6nonc6 le principe qu'une personne est responsable du dommage caus6 par la faute de ceux dont elle a le contr8le, ajoute qu'elle est aussi responsable du dommage caus6 " par les choses qu'elle a sous sa garde."
L'article 6numbre ensuite quels sont ceux qui sont sous contr8le au sens de cet article, et ajoute:
Le dommage caus6 par une chose n'a pas donn6 lieu d'abord dans notre jurisprudence A l'application du principe que celui qui en avait la garde pouvait 6carter la responsabilit6 en prouvant qu'il n'avait pu emp&cher le fait qui avait caus6 ce dommage. Mais la thiorie du risque professionnel, qui a td favoris6 par certains auteurs, et surtout par Saleilles, h la fin du sidcle dernier et au commencement de celui-ci, a donn6 lieu h une certaine ind6cision dans la jurisprudence frangaise et dans la n~tre. Cette cour, dans cette c6l6bre cause de Shawinigan Carbide Co. v. Doucet (1), a 6t6 6galement divis6e sur la question de savoir s'il y avait pr6somption de faute contre le propri6taire dans le cas ot le dommage 6tait cause par sa chose. Cette opinion de la cour supreme a 6t6 savanment examin6e dans la Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Civil, Vol. 10 (1911), page 23.
En 1915, cette question de la responsibilit4 fut discut6e devant nous dans cette c6l6bre cause de Vandry v. Quebec Ry. L.H. & P. Co. (2), et encore nous voyons une grande divergence d'opinion.
En 1918, la mime question a 6t6 soulevie de nouveau devant nous dans une cause de Norcross v. Gohier (1), et crry nous avons d6cid6 que le dommage caus6 par une chose cr6e contre le propri6taire une prisomption de faute qu'il "^"' est tenu de repousser.
En 1920, le Conseil Priv6 a tranch cette question d'onus probandi en d6cidant dans la cause ci-dessus mentionn6 de Vandry v. Quebec Ry. L.H. & P. Co. (2),
Et dans une cause encore plus r~cente, d6cid6e par le conseil priv6, savoir celle de City of Montreal v. Watt & Scott (3), le conseil priv6 a maintenu le principe qu'il avait 6nonc6 dans la cause de Vandry (2), en y ajoutant cependant ceci:- Je n'ai pas besoin de faire une revue de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine en France sur cette question de la responsabilit6 de la chose et sur l'onus probandi; mais nous constatons qu'il y eut aussi pendant un grand nombre d'ann6es une grande incertitude.
Dalloz, 1897.1.433; Le centenaire du code civil p. 33; Dalloz, 1900.2.289; Dalloz, 1904.2.257; Dalloz, 1905.2.417; Dalloz, 1906.2.249; Dalloz, 1908.1.217; Dalloz, 1909.1.73 (note de Planiol); Dalloz, 1910.1.17 (note de Desmain); Dalloz, 1913.1.427; Dalloz, 1914.1.303; Laurent, vol. 20, no. 475; Planiol, vol. 2, no. 930; Saleilles, Revue de Jurisprudence, 1911; Colin & Capitant, vol. 2, p. 291.
Le principe est maintenant parfaitement bien 6tabli tant dans notre jurisprudence que dans la jurisprudence frangaise que le dommage caus6 par le fait des choses qu'on a sous sa garde 6tablit une prisomption de faute.
Il s'agit maintenant de savoir quelle preuve est exig6e pour faire disparaitre cette prisomption de faute.
D'abord, quelle est la faute dont le d6biteur doit 6tre tenu responsable?
La doctrine enseigne que la faute la plus ligbre suffirait pour faire rejeter l'excuse d'impossibilit6 6nonc6e.
La loi ne peut balancer entre celui qui a commis une faute mime l6gbre et celui qui a souffert sans en avoir commis aucune. Quiconque suivant la doctrine a caus6 ou occasionn6 du dommage doit le r6parer. Toullier, vol. 11 no. 264; Laurent, vol. 20, no. 475.
On enseigne g6ndralement en France que l'excuse d'impossibilit6 peut s'appliquer dans le cas oi' il y a eu cas fortuit, force majeure, ou faute de la victime.
Le Conseil Priv6, dans la cause de La Citg de Montr6al v. Watt & Scott (1), aprbs avoir d6clar6 que le d6biteur, pour s'exon6rer, doit montrer d'une manibre raisonnable qu'il n'a pu empicher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage, ajoute que le cas fortuit et la force majeure pourraient en cons6quence produire cette exoneration.
Je considbre que si le d6biteur n'apporte pas une preuve formelle et d6cisive, s'il se contente de prouver qu'il ne connaft pas la cause de l'accident, il ne d6truit pas la pr6somption de faute 6dict6e contre lui.
Dans le cas actuel, la cit6 de Montr6al a tent6 de prouver qu'elle ne connaissait pas la cause de l'accident. Mais en mime temps il est d6montr6 que les conduites d'eau qui se sont bris6es et qui ont caus6 les dommages n'6taient pas placbes assez profond6ment dans la terre et qu'elles 6taient soumises A 1'action de la gel6e, pour partie du moins, la partie sup6rieure 6tant en contact avec la terre gel~e pendant que la partie inf6rieure reposait sur une couche plus chaude. II pouvait se produire alors une diff6rence de dilatation qui a pu affaiblir la conduite et occasionner la rupture. Cela est d'autant plus possible que plusieurs ruptures ont eu lieu dans ces dernibres annies et qu'elles se sont toutes produites, & l'exception d'une, A l'6poque oit la terre gelait ou digelait.
De plus, on n'a pas suivi les devis. Ces devis avaient 6t6 faits avec beaucoup de soin par les officiers techniques de la cit6 de Montrial. Pourquoi ne pas avoir pourvu alors ce que ces sp&cifications soient en tous points observ6es? Maintenant plusieurs accidents semblables se sont produits et je ne vois pas que la cit6 ait pris des mesures 6nergiques pour tAcher de pr6venir ces accidents dans l'avenir. II parait 6galement que des conduites avec un diambtre oF aussi consid6rable que celui dont on s'est servi offrent une source de dangers plus consid6rables.
Pour ces raisons, je considbre que la cit6 de Montr6al n'a pas 6tabli qu'elle n'a pas pu empicher le fait qui a engag6 sa responsabilit6. En consequence le jugement qui l'a condamn6e doit 6tre maintenu et l'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.
J.-The Court of King's Bench in deciding this case followed the decision of the Privy Council in Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Vandry (1), the majority of the learned judges being of the opinion that under that decision, where damage is caused by a thing under the care of the defendant, the latter cannot claim the benefit of the exculpatory paragraph of Art. 1054 of the Quebec Civil Code unless he shews that the act (le fait) which caused the damage amounted to a cas fortuit or force majeure. Since the judgment of the Court of King's Bench was rendered, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in City of Montreal v.- Watt & Scott, Limited (2), explained the meaning of their decision in the Vandry Case and said at p. 563:- While the reference to the storm there in question might appear to give some support to the opinion expressed in the court below that the defendant cannot claim the benefit of the exculpatory paragraph of article 1054 C.C. unless he shews that the act which caused the damage can be described as a cas fortuit or force majeure, it seems to me that the language of their Lordships should not be so construed.
For were the defendant constrained to go the length. of proving that the accident which caused the damwas a cas fortuit or the result of force majeure, he would be obliged to establish " an absolute inability " to prevent .A the damage complained of, and their Lordships are very careful to state that " unable to prevent the damage " does not denote such an inability, but means " unable by reasonable means," which of course excludes the idea of irresistible force as a necessary element of exculpation. It follows that I cannot agree with the view expressed by the majority of the learned judges of the Court of King's Bench that the defendant here was obliged to shew that the damage was caused by a cas fortuit or resulted from force majeure. Nevertheless the question remains whether the city of Montreal has established that it could not, by reasonable means, prevent the bursting of the pipe which caused the damage complained of. It is certainly no defence to say that the cause of the bursting is unknown.
Under all the circumstances it can reasonably be inferred that there was a flaw in the pipe which burst, for of course the bursting was not without a cause. This pipe formed part of a water distribution system carrying the water by means of a thirty-inch main pipe which extended some 18,000 feet from Aqueduct street to DeLorimier avenue. It was manufactured by the Canada Iron Corporation, Limited, of Three Rivers, in 1910 and was laid down in that year. This distribution system had three distinct sections however, manufactured under separate contracts, and in the section where the accident occurred this was the first case of the bursting of a pipe. There were, it is true, blow-outs in the other sections, but as they may have happened through causes that are not disclosed I do not think that they should be considered here. So we have the mere fact of this accident, without any similar occurrence in this section to indicate a weakness in the pipes:
That the appellant was at considerable pains to secure proper pipes for its water distribution system is shewn by the following " considrant " of the learned trial judge: The learned trial judge had in a preceding " consid6rant," placed the liability of the appellant upon article 1054 C.C., but perhaps as to this " considerant," I may say that in my opinion the mere use of a thirty-inch pipe, which was no doubt necessary to carry a sufficient supply of water in a city of the size of Montreal, does not appear to be a safe ground for a judgment condemning the city to pay damages when, as the learned trial judge finds, the civic authorities took all the precautions which science, art and experience could suggest, and when the pipes were submitted to serious tests showing that they could be used with safety. But the weakness of the appellant's case under article 1054 C.C. is that, in relation to the accident which caused the damage, its evidence, apart from proof of the precautions to which I have referred, is chiefly of a negative character, the attempt being to shew that the accident could not be explained.
What was neccessary was to prove that the accident could not have been prevented by reasonable means. And to my mind, after carefully reading the appellant's evidence, one fact stands out as a possible cause of the bursting. The pipe in question was placed in a trench and was covered only by two feet four inches of earth and asphalt paving. Frost, it is shewn, extends much deeper than that, and in winter the top of the pipe was in frozen earth, while the bottom was probably below the line of frost, thus causing a tension which tended to weaken the pipes. Accidents did not take place for several years, but as time went on and the pipe was winter after winter exposed to these strains, its force of resistance was no doubt decreased. In cross-examination, Mr. Vanier, the appellant's principal expert witness, admits the possibility of an accident under these circumstances. I will quote a short passage from his testimony:
A It is not sufficient to say " ga n'est pas demontr6," for the respondent did not have to explain the bursting, the burden being on the appellant to shew that it could not have prevented it. And here is an admitted possible cause of the accident which the appellant has not excluded by the evidence which it adduced, as the quotation from Mr. Vanier's testimony shews.
There is no doubt that article 1054 C.C. as now construed imposes a very serious responsibility on municipal corporations which in the interest of their citizens have installed public services. But this is really a question of policy for the consideration of the legislature, for the law, however rigorous it may seem, must be applied to public bodies as well as to private individuals. I therefore think that the evidence adduced by the appellant does not entitle it to claim the benefit of the exculpatory paragraph of article The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.