Bédard v. Dawson

From that judgment the present appellants appealed to the Court of King's Bench for Quebec.

That court seemed to be divided on the questions raised. The majority held that it was not quite satisfactorily proven by the mere production of a registrar's certificate shewing title in appellant that she was in fact the owner at the time of the trial.

Indeed there was evidence tending to the contrary and hence the court sent the case back to the Superior Court to hear evidence and determine that question.

The Court of King's Bench, however, by a majority, there being a dissenting judge on the question, upheld the constitutionality of the Act and dismissed the appeal as to that issue, with costs to the responding intervenant. Then the appellants brought this appeal here. A question was raised as to the case so disposed of, being ripe for appeal here. The majority of this court held, however, that as between appellant and intervenant the judgment appealed from was final and decided that this court had jurisdiction and should hear the case as to the said issue. I confess as to some doubt as to that course being entirely the best for if the issue between the other parties should, in the court below, result in the appellant's success on the reference back there, perhaps they should not be subjected to the costs of this hearing. I rather think the case is unique in this regard. The appeal, however, has been taken here by appellants and the question raised is a very important one to have determined if there can exist doubt when applied only as herein.

I have long entertained the opinion that the provincial legislatures have such absolute power over property and civil rights, as given them by section 92 of the B.N.A. Act, item 13 thereof, that so long as they did not in fact encroach upon the powers assigned by the said Act to the Dominion Parliament it would be almost impossible to question any such exercise of power so given unless by the exercise of the veto power given the Dominion Government. That veto power was originally designed to prevent an improper exercise of legislative power by the provincial legislatures.

I, therefore, do not see that if properly interpreted and construed the said Act now in question herein can be said to be ultra vires.

There is, however, one aspect of it which rather disturbs me, and that is this: The Act takes certain sections of the Criminal Code as the basis of its subject matter and then proceeds to apply convictions thereunder as the basis of its application.

And if, as might well happen, the keeper of the disorderly house so penalized should also be the owner thereof, and this Act applied in such a case, it would look very much like adding as a matter of course to the penalties imposed by Parliament for the offence in question, when Parliament alone is endowed with the power and has imposed on it in so doing the sole responsibility of determining what is the proper measure of punishment.

That, however, is not the case presented on the facts in question herein. I point it out as being the possible cause of future embarrassment and would have preferred to see its enactment somewhat differently framed.

S.C.R.

As to the argument addressed to us that the local legislatures cannot legislate to prevent crime, I cannot assent thereto for in a very wide sense it is the duty of the legislature to do the utmost it can within its power to anticipate and remove, so far as practicable, whatever is likely to tend to produce crime; and yet not produce worse forms of it, or tending thereto.

Sometimes we may doubt the wisdom of what is done in that direction and find it in fact productive of crime or a lowering of the usual standard observed by mankind. That possibility may exist in regard to many phases of social life. What we are concerned with herein, however, is merely the question of the power of the legislature so far as the relevant facts raise same. It certainly has, I think, the power called in question herein so far as the relevant facts require. Indeed the duty to protect neighbouring property owners in such cases as are involved in this question before us renders the question hardly arguable.

There are many instances of other nuisances which can be better rectified by local legislation within the power of the legislatures over property and civil rights than by designating them crimes and leaving them to be dealt with by Parliament as such.

Mr. Justice Maclennan and others in the court below have so well presented the exposition of the law as it has been expounded in many well known cases relative to the overlapping of the powers of Parliament and local legislatures, that I need not repeat the citation of cases here. I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs to the intervenant.

J.-The legislation impugned seems to be aimed at suppressing conditions calculated to favour the development of crime rather than at the punishment of crime. This is an aspect of the subject in respect of which the provinces seem to be free to legislate. I think the legislation is not invalid.

J.-This litigation began on the 4th of June, 1920. The right of the appeal to this court is therefore governed by the Supreme Court Act as it stood before the amendments which became effective on the 1st of July of that year.

By the judgment of the Court of King's Bench the main action between the plaintiff and the defendant is remitted J. to the Superior Court to permit of further proof being adduced in regard to the ownership of the property in question. That is not a final judgment and is therefore not appealable here.

The judgment of the Superior Court maintaining the intervention of the Attorney General on the other hand was confirmed and in that proceeding there is a final judgment upholding the constitutionality of the Quebec Statute (10 Geo. V, c. 81). Substantially for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Greenshields, I am of the opinion that this statute in no wise impinges on the domain of criminal law but is concerned exclusively with the control and enjoyment of property and the safeguarding of the community from the consequences of an illegal and injurious use being made of it-a pure matter of civil right. In my opinion in enacting the statute now under consideration the legislature exercised the power which it undoubtedly possesses to provide for the suppression of a nuisance and the prevention of its recurrence by civil process.

The appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs. J.-Nous avons A d6cider sur cet appel si la loi provinciale de 1915 concernant les propridtaires de maison de prostitution est inconstitutionelle.

Le parlement f6ddral, dans sa loi criminelle, a d6jh puni par l'amende et l'emprisonnement les propri6taires qui permettent sciemment que leurs maisons soient employdes comme maisons de prostitution. (Art. 228 a Code Crim.) La l6gislature provinciale de Qubbec, sachant que ces maisons affectaient consid6rablement la valeur des propri6t6s du voisinage et rendaient plus difficile la r6glementation policibre, a jug6 A propos d'ordonner leur fermeture si, aprbs avis, les propriitaires ne voyaient pas A y faire cesser le commerce immoral qui s'y faisait.

La jouissance d'un immeuble est une matibre concernant "la propri6t6 et les droits civils " qui, par les dispositions de Particle 92 ss. 13 de l'acte de la Conf6ddration est du ressort des provinces; et la lgislature provinciale a le pouvoir exclusif de faire des lois sur cette matibre.

Vouloir enlever aux provinces ce pouvoir lgislatif parce j. que le parlement fid6ral d6clare criminelles les tenanci6res d'une maison de prostitution me parait 6treabsolument contraire & l'esprit de notre constitution. Nos lois provinciales fourmillent d'exemples et de cas les lois criminelles sont invoquees pour d6terminer les droits et les obligations civiles des citoyens. Certains contrats sont d~clar6s illgaux par nos lois civiles parce qu'ils violent des dispositions du code criminel. Les articles 984 et 990 du code civil en sont des exemples typiques quand ils d6clarent qu'un contrat est fait sans consideration et est ill6gal, si cette consid6ration est contraire aux bonnes moeurs et h 1'ordre public, ou si elle est prohib6e par la loi. La jurisprudence consacre 6galement ce principe quand elle declare illigale tout contrat de nature A favoriser la prostitution.

Je pourrais A ce sujet citer-Fuzier-Herman vo. propri6t6 no. 88, oa il dit:- Il est incontestable que si une personne maintient une maison ou fait une chose qui constitue une nuisance, et que cet acte soit consid6r6 criminel par le parlement f6d6ral, nos tribunaux peuvent 6tre autorisis par des lois provinciales A 6mettre une injonction pour mettre fin A ces violations du droit public. La coop6ration des deux pouvoirs l6gislatifs est desirable dans ces cas-l.

J'aurais bien du doute de savoir si le parlement f6d6ral pourrait ordonner la fermeture d'une maison de prostitution; mais je suis bien convaincu que ce pouvoir r6side dans la l6gislature provinciale. Le parlement f6d6ral peut declarer criminelle une action quelconque; mais cela ne saurait empicher les provinces de 16gif6rer sur la m~me matibre en tant que les droits civils sont concern6s.

Je n'h6site done pas h conclure que la l6gislation attaquie par l'appelante est constitutionnelle et que l'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

J.-Il s'agit d'un appel contre un jugement de la cour du Banc du Roi en date du 20 d6cembre 1921. Je tiens h dire que le long d6lai qui s'est 6coul6 depuis ce jugement est entibrement le fait des parties. Cette cause paraissait sur nos roles depuis plusieurs termes, mais on en demandait toujours la remise. Si enfin elle a 6t6 plaid6e c'est que nous avons cru devoir y insister.

La cause d'ailleurs n'est appelable ici qu'en tant que l'intervention du procureur g6ndral est concern6e; quant a Faction de la demanderesse, la cour du Banc du Roi l'a renvoy6e devant la cour sup6rieure pour preuve additionnelle et ce n'est pas 1& un jugement final dont on puisse interjeter appel A cette cour.

L'intervention du procureur g6n6ral a pour but de cornbattre la pr6tention de la demanderesse que la loi 10 Geo. V (Qu6.) ch. 81 (1920), est inconstitutionnelle. Cette loi declare qu'il est ill6gal pour toute personne qui posshde ou occupe une maison de l'utiliser ou- de permettre qu'on en fasse usage cormme maison de d6sordre.

On peut obtenir A cette fin une injonction d'un juge de la cour sup6rieure pour prohiber cet usage, et si le juge constate que cette maison continue

6tre employ6e comme maison de d6sordre, il peut en ordonner la fermeture pour toute fin quelconque pendant une p6riode n'excidant pas un an. C'est cette loi que I'appelante attaque pr6tendant qu'elle empikte sur la juridiction du parlement canadien sur le droit criminel.

A mon avis, il n'y a pas lgislation criminelle. La l6gislature veut empicher qu'on ne se serve d'un irnmeuble pour des fins immorales; elle ne punit pas l'offense elle-m~me par l'amende ou l'emprisonnement, mais elle ne fait que statuer sur la possession et l'usage d'un immeuble. Cela rentre pleinement dans le droit civil. Les jugements des honorables juges de la cour du Banc du Roi sont trbs complets et j'y adh~re pleinement. Je renverrais l'appel avec d~pens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.