The Mile End Milling Co. v. Peterborough Cereal Co.

A

*Oct. 25,26.

(DEFENDANT)

.......................

' APELLANT; *Dec. 21.

AND

PETERBOROUGH

CEREAL

COM- R

PANY (PLAINTIFF) ....................

S.E. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

The appellant contracted to purchase from the respondent five car-loads of flour to be shipped in the month of November, 1920. On the 29th of November, the appellant notified the respondent that delivery of the goods would not be accepted, unless, in accordance with an alleged custom of trade, the contract price should be reduced to the market price at the time of delivery.

The respondent refused to accede to the demand and had one car shipped on the 29th of November, two on the 30th of November and two on the 3rd of December. The appellant having definitely refused to take the flour on the 1st of December, the respondent held it in warehouse for a long time and resold it only on the 12th of January, 1921, on a falling market and at a price substantially lower than had been obtainable in the beginning of December. The respondent then brought an action against the appellant for breach of contract, claiming as damages the difference between the contract price and the price received on the re-sale.

Held that, in a contract of sale, if the buyer illegally refuses to accept the goods, the proper measure of damages arising from the breach of contract is the difference between the contract price and the market price on the date of the breach, and not the loss to the vendor on subsequent re-sale by him of the goods.

Held, also, that the refusal of the goods by the buyer for an unfounded reason did not, under the circumstances, prevent him from complaining, as to the goods shipped in December, that the shipment was too late.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, varying the judgment of the Superior Court and maintaining in full the respondent's action.

The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

I concur with the reasons stated by my brothers Anglin and Mignault for allowing this appeal, but I cannot accept the suggestion of my brother Anglin that by way of indulgence a reference back to the Court of King's Bench might be granted conditionally for a new assessment of

Pmdamages in respect of the three cars shipped in November. J.-The appellant in Montreal bought through a broker there, from respondent, then carrying on business in Peterborough, in Ontario, five cars of flour on the terms set forth in its letter of the 3rd November, which reads as follows:- ......................

ontreal......................

..................

In the course of a week or so later the parties concerned agreed to substitute two cars of Reindeer flour for two cars of said Saskatoon flour, at a price agreed upon.

The respondent failed to ship, without any excuse I can find in the evidence, two of said cars, one of Reindeer flour and the other of the Saskatoon brand, within the month of

November. I think, therefore, the appellant is not responsible for anything in way of damages for or in respect of said two cars which I eliminate from further consideration herein.

The appellant, on the 25th of November aforesaid, wrote a letter clearly indicating it did not wish to carry out the contract, and asserting a local custom of agreeing to reduce the price in certain cases and asking respondent to do like.

wise.

I do not see proof of any general custom of the trade binding respondent to assent thereto and would therefore eliminate that from the consideration of this case further than to say that respondent should have inferred therefrom that it was quite unlikely to expect that appellant would accept any goods so bought and certainly was Idington j. not justified in expecting it to extend the time for delivery. The question is thus reduced to a question of damages for breach of contract in so far as regards the shipment made of three cars of flour in November.

So far I am quite in accord with the findings of the learned trial judge and inclined to hold that his judgment allowing $720, being the difference between the price agreed upon and the market price in Montreal on the 25th of November, 1920, must be the measure of damages.

I cannot understand on what basis the freight and damage and commission are allowed by the Court of King's Bench.

As I read the contract the flour was to be delivered in Montreal, and if the word " freight " was not intended to include that it was such an ambiguous term in above contract as to call for explanation from the respondent, claiming same as part of its damages.

I am more puzzled as to the question of whether interest on the damages from the date of the breach of the contract should not have been added by the learned trial judge to said sum allowed by him.

Subject thereto I would allow this appeal with costs and restore the judgment of the learned trial judge with whose reasoning I agree.

J.-I have come to the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the trial judge restored. The point of substance appears to be whether the Court of King's Bench was right in holding that, the appellant having refused to accept the cars delivered on the 3rd December for the reasons given in its letter of the 25th November and repeated in its letter of the 1st December, in which the delay is not relied upon as respects the cars in question, it can now set up and rely on that delay in answer to the respondent's action.

I think there is nothing in the action of the respondent precluding the appellant from setting up in answer to the respondent's action non-performance of the contract on the respondent's part; consequently, for the purpose of determining the amount to which the respondent was entitled in the action, we may leave out of account the two cars sent on the 3rd December.

J. The case of Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co. (1) relied upon by Mr. Archambault cannot, in view of the comments upon it in the speeches of the Law Lords in British and Bennington Ltd. v. N.W. Cachar Tea Co. (2), be given effect to in the sense contended for.

As to the amount the respondent is entitled to recover, I concur in the reasons given by my brother Mignault for thinking that the view of the learned trial judge ought to prevail.

J.-The plaintiffs sue for damages for nonacceptance by the defendant of five car-loads of flour which it had contracted to purchase. The contract provided that the flour should be delivered at Montreal in November. One car was shipped from Peterborough on the 29th f November, two on the 30th of November and two on the 3rd of December. A change in the quality of two of the car-loads and a reduction in price of 30 cents a barrel on the entire contract by mutual consent arranged during November did not, in my opinion, postpone the date of delivery fixed by the contract. In a mercantile contract such a term is always of the essence of the vendor's obligation and upon the expiry of the time fixed the obligor is in default. Article 1069 C.C.

On the other hand I fully agree with the view of the learned trial judge that the buyer's attempt to establish a right of rejection because the vendors had refused to accede to its demand, based on an alleged custom of trade, that the price named in the contract should be further reduced to the market price at the time of delivery, involved a variation of the terms of a written contract which the law does not permit. Art. 1235 (4) C.C. The evidence of such a custom, even if admissible, was quite inadequate. Moreover, the defence based on that contention is not now open, the defendant having accepted the judgment of the Superior Court condemning it to pay $720 damages in re- Co.te2t n

0ho o spect of the three cars shipped on the 29th and 30th of November, while holding it not liable in respect of the two cars shipped on the 3rd of December on the ground that delivery of them was too late to meet the requirement of the contract. The defendant by its acquiescence is also precluded from relying on this latter defence in respect to the three cars first shipped. Its appeal from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, which awarded the respondents damages in respect to the whole five cars and for the full amount claimed, $4,495 ($3,450 loss on re-sale, plus $1,045 demurrage and expenses), is therefore restricted to two points, viz: that recovery should be had only in respect of the three cars shipped in November and that the measure of damages applied on appeal was erroneous. In fact the appellant asks that the judgment of the learned trial judge be restored.

Having elected not to treat the contract as terminated by the buyer's intimation of the 25th November that it should be cancelled if its demand for reduction in prices were refused, the vendors, insisting on the contract being carried out, were bound to observe its terms. The Braithwaite case (1), was relied on by Mr. Archambault in support of his contention to the contrary. As I read that case the Court of Appeal inferred an election by the buyers not to make the defence they sought to set up (p. 552). In so far as it may involve the proposition for which respondents' counsel cited it, I would, with respect, decline to follow it. Lord Sumner, who had been counsel in it, says in British and Benington, Ltd. v. N.W. Cachar Tea Co. (2), There can be no doubt that the two cars shipped on the 3rd of December were not delivered as contracted for. The Court of King's Bench does not suggest that the term of the contract requiring November delivery was ever varied. Its judgment is rested on " waiver " of the breach in this respect by the buyer said to arise from the facts that it based its rejection of the flour on the vendors' refusal to accept for it the market price at the time of delivery and that its manager, in his testimony, stated that the only reason for rejection was that the market price had gone down when the flour reached Montreal.

With great respect, I cannot accede to that view. The ground of rejection assigned by the buyer may have been Aglin j. quite untenable. Yet if it had another good ground for refusing to accept, though it was not communicated at the time of rejection, it is not thereby debarred from.setting it up as a ground of defence in answer to a claim for damages. The evidence of the buyer's manager amounts to no more than this, that the only ground of rejection present to the mind of the buyer when refusing to accept the flour was the vendors' refusal to take for it the then current market price-or perhaps merely that it had not stated any other ground in its letter of rejection. As to the two barrels shipped in December, the judgment of the learned trial judge, in my opinion, was right and should not have been disturbed. I find that the reasoning on which I have reached this conclusion has been fully stated by my brother

Mignault. There is no object in my repeating it. There is no evidence, on which a finding of renunciation or acquiescence, such as would operate as a fin de non recevoir excluding the defence based on dilatoriness in delivery, can be supported.

The vendors' recovery must therefore be restricted to damages in respect to the three car-loads shipped in November. What should be the measure of such damages?

The Court of King's Bench has said the loss on re-sale plus demurrage and expenses; the learned trial judge, the difference between the contract price and the market price at the date of breach.

Articles 1073 and 1074 C.C. declare that the debtor is liable for the amount of the loss sustained by the creditor and of the profit of which he has been deprived, so far as they have been, or might have been foreseen. Ordinarily the difference between the contract price and the market price

(Chouillou v. Johnson Co. (1); Genest v. Lger (2) ), plus any out-of-pocket expenses necessarily incurred is what is recoverable. Chapman v. Larin (1).

Only in exceptional MmiNa cases, as where there is no market for the goods, should any other basis of damages be considered. In such a case for the market price should be substituted the actual value of the goods at the date of the breach to be ascertained by the best means available. Samuel v. Black Lake Asbestos and Chrome Co.

The vendor is not entitled to re-sell the goods on account of the purchaser and to charge him with the deficiency. His right is to recover damages. Article 1065 C.C. The price realized on a re-sale is at the most some proof of the market price or value of the goods at the time of the breach, provided it is shown that the price realized was the best obtainable, the sale being properly conducted and taking place as soon as reasonably possible after the breach. Chapman v. Larin (1), at p. 359.

The buyer definitely refused to take the flour on the 1st of December, 1920. Dissolution of the contract of sale in favour of the sellers immediately ensued. Article 1544 C.C. Yet they held the flour until January, 1921, without making any attempt to dispose of it and re-sold it only on the 12th of that month. Notwithstanding what is now urged as to the difficulty created by the special branding of the bags, there is not evidence that that fact affected the saleability of the flour (though it may perhaps be inferred that to some extent it did), and certainly none that it entailed the delay of six weeks in effecting the re-sale. The evidence rather indicates that the re-sale of January was made on a falling market and that the current prices of flour were then substantially lower than they had been in the beginning of December. The re-sale price on the 12th January therefore does not afford satisfactory evidence of the value of the flour in question at the date of the breach.

On the other hand, I am not satisfied that the full market prices of Reindeer Flour and Saskatoon Flour at that date could have been obtained for this shipment because of the special branding of the bags; and the learned trial judge should, I think, also have made some allowance to cover such expenses as the respondents would necessarily have incurred in handling and effecting a re-sale of the flour with reasonable promptitude. The evidence does not enable me to determine what was the market value of the flour, branded as it was, on the 1st of December, or what price could with due diligence then have been obtained for CE it. If it could be sold to better advantage re-bagged, we are not informed as to the cost of re-bagging; neither does the record furnish the material requisite to fix a proper allowance for necessary expenses. The plaintiffs should have put in evidence all these matters, the burden being on them to prove their damages. Having failed to do so they cannot complain if this appeal be simply allowed with costs here and in the Court of King's Bench and the judgment of the trial judge restored.

While not dissenting from that disposition of the case, as an indulgence I would have been disposed, if the respondents should elect to take such an order within ten days, to direct that the action be remitted to the Superior Court for a new assessment, on the basis above indicated, of their damages in respect of the three cars shipped in November, the respondents to pay the costs of the appeal to this court to be set off pro tanto against the amount ultimately allowed for damages and their costs in the Superior Court and neither party to have costs in the Court of King's Bench; the costs of the new assessment of damages to be disposed of by the trial judge.

J.-Il n'est question dans cet appel que du montant des dommages que l'appelante doit payer h 1intimde pour 1'inex6cution d'un contrat

Le 3 novembre, 1920, 1'appelante a achet6 de 1'intimbe cinq " chars " de farine Saskatoon en sacs, h $11.60 le baril, chaque baril contenant deux sacs, les sacs devant porter l'6tiquette ou marque de 1'appelante conform6ment a une esquisse h 6tre fournie par elle, et la farine devant 6tre exp6dibe en novembre. Cette commande fut subs6quemment changde de manibre a comprendre deux " chars " de farine Reindeer cofitant cinquante cents de plus par baril et trois " chars " de farine Saskatoon, et le prix fut r6duit a $11.80 pour la farine Reindeer et h $11.30 pour la farine Saskatoon. Le 25 novembre l'appelante 6crivit A l'intim6e lui demandant, en raison d'une baisse consid6rable du march6, de r6duire le prix en cons6quence, ou si elle ne voulait pas faire cette r6duction, d'annuler la vente. L'intimbe ne voulut pas consentir A cette r6duction, et le 29 novembre envoya un " char " de farine Saskatoon et, le 30 novembre, deux " chars," l'un de farine Saskatoon et I'autre de farine Reindeer, A 1'appelante qui refusa, par lettre du ler d~cembre, de les accepter pour les raisons donnies en sa lettre du 25 novembre.

Le 3 d6cembre, 1'intim6e exp6dia deux " chars," l'un de farine Saskatoon et l'autre de farine Reindeer, A l'appelante qui ne voulut pas les accepter.

L'intim6e, pr6tendant avoir revendu les cinq " chars," le 12 janvier, 1921, au nommb Strachan, au prix de $9 le baril pour la farine Saskatoon et $9.50 pour la farine Reindeer, r6clame de l'appelante A titre de dommages-int6rits la diff6rence de prix, soit $3,450, et, pour le charroyage, les frais de surestarie pay6s au chemin de fer du Pacifique Canadien, les frais d'entrep6t et la commission sur la revente, la somme de $1,045, faisant en tout $4,494.

La cour sup6rieure accorda A 1'intim6e $720 de dom- .

mages-int6r~ts pour la diff6rence entre le prix de vente et le prix du march6, A la date du refus de l'appelante, sur les trois " chars " exp6dids en novembre.

Quant aux deux " chars " envoy6s le 3 d6cembre, elle d6cida que cet envoi 6tait tardif et non conforme au contrat et que l'appelante n'6tait pas oblig6e de les accepter. Elle refusa de condamner l'appelante A payer les frais d'entrep6t et de surestarie jusqu'au 12 janvier, 1921, comme ayant 6t6 encourus sans n6cessit6.

La cour du Banc du Roi accorda h 1'intim6e le plein montant de sa r6clamation, jugeant que le refus des deux " chars " exp6di6s en d6cembre avait eu pour motif non pas l'envoi tardif, mais la baisse dans le prix du march6, et qu'il y avait eu renonciation ou waiver A se plaindre du retard. Elle d6cida en outre que la seule base des dommages 6tait la diff6rence entre le prix du contrat et le prix obtenu sur la revente de la marchandise et que l'intim6e avait us6 de toute diligence voulue pour op6rer cette revente. E1le accorda tous les frais accessoires r6clam6s. De lh l'appel. Il n'y a qu'h d6terminer quelle est la base des dommages qui doivent 6tre accord6s h l'intim6e et aussi

A decider si cette dernibre peut r6clamer des dommagesintir~ts sur les " chars " qu'elle a exp6di6s en dehors du d6lai du contrat.

Pour juger le diff6rend, nous devons appliquer, quant au droit du cr6ancier de r6clamer des dommages lorsque le d6biteur refuse d'ex6cuter son obligation et aussi quant h

1'6valuation de ces dommages, les r~gles contenues dans le code civil de la province de Quebec.. Cependant, je regrette d'avoir A le dire, les avocats de l'intim6e, lors de l'audition de la cause, ont persist6 h ne citer, outre les articles du code, que des autorit6s tir6es du common law.

Ce n'est pas ainsi que l'on conservera dans toute son int6grit6 le droit civil dans la province de Quebec. Et j'ajoute qu'il est grandement temps que l'on se convainque que ce droit est assez riche en- doctrine et en jurisprudence pour fournir une solution conforme A son g6nie A toutes les difficultis qui se rencontrent dans la pratique.

Il n'est pas douteux que lorsque 'appelante 6crivit A l'intim6e, le 25 novembre, lui demandant de r6duire le prix stipul6 au contrat pour le faire correspondre au prix du march6, ou si elle ne le voulait pas, d'annuler le contrat, if y a eu de sa part contravention 'a l'obligation r6sultant du contrat. C'6tait une d6claration de l'appelante qu'elle ne remplirait pas son obligation contractuelle, et elle a donn6 effet & cette d6claration lorsqu'elle a refus6 d'accepter la farine. Or l'article 1065 C.C. explique en ces termes les consequences de cette contravention:

Cela veut dire que lorsqu'il y a eu contravention A l'obligation, le cr~ancier a en principe, et sauf les exceptions qui ne nous int6ressent pas ici, le choix ou bien de r6clamer des dommages-int6r~ts au d6biteur, en concluant A la r6solution du contrat, ou bien de demander l'ex6cution de

'obligation mame, sans pr6judice A son droit de r6clamer des dommages-int6rits h raison de la contravention du d6biteur.

Il n'y a aucun doute A cet 6gard dans la doctrine. Nous lisons en effet dans Aubry et Rau, 5e 6dition, t. 4, p. 128:- Dans 1'espice, sur r6ception de la lettre de 1'appelante, qui 6tait un refus d'ex6cuter le contrat, I'intim6e d6cida d'exiger l'ex6cution du contrat et d'exp6dier la farine h l'appelante. Et sur le refus de l'appelante d'accepter cette farine et de la payer, I'intim6e 6tait en droit de traiter le contrat comme r6solu de plein droit et de r6clamer des dommages-int6rits. En effet, aux termes de 1'article 1544 C.C.,

Cependant, si l'intim6e d6cidait d'ex6cuter le contrat elle devait suivre la loi de ce contrat et en observer toutes les conditions. Dans 1'espbce, toute la farine achet6e devait etre exp6di6e en novembre, et 1'intimbe, choisissant d'ex6cuter le contrat, devait I'envoyer en novembre. Il y avait toutes les raisons de le faire ici, car le march6 6tait en baisse. Et il a 6t6 jug6, et je crois h bon droit, que dans les march6s A livrer portant sur des marchandises dont le prix est sujet A de friquentes variations, le dilai convenu pour la livraison forme une partie essentielle du contrat (Besangon, 24 juin, 1919. Dalloz, 1921.2.115).

Mais le jugement dont est appel decide que 1'appelante ayant refus6 d'accepter I'envoi tardif pour les raisons qu'elle avait donn6es dans sa lettre du 25 novembre et r6p6t6es dans sa lettre du ler dicembre,

Ecartons imm6diatement la doctrine anglaise du waiver, qui est 6trang6re au droit civil, et demandons-nous si dans 1'espice il y a eu renonciation ou acquiescement, pour me servir du terme propre et bien frangais?

Si la cour d'appel, dans le passage de son jugement que j'ai cit6, a entendu 6noncer une rkgle de droit-ce que du reste elle n'appuie d'aucune autorit6-je suis tris respectueusement d'opinion qu'il n'y a pas de telle rigle. Le fait qu'une partie A une action justifie son acte par un motif, PERet lorsqu'on d6montre que ce motif manque de fondement, essaye de s'appuyer sur un autre motif qu'elle n'avait jamais invoqu6, peut quelquefois faire douter de sa sinc6rit6 ou m~me de sa bonne foi. En certaines circonstances, on peut y voir une raison de fait pour repousser la pr6tention de la partie, mais encore une fois il n'y a pas l r~gle de droit. La v6ritable rigle de droit, c'est qu'on n'est jamais cens6 renoncer h un droit, et alors que l'acquiescement peut 6tre tacite, il doit 6tre non-6quivoque, c'est-hdire l'intention d'acquiescer ou de renoncer doit Stre d&montrie. Dans 1'espice, l'acheteur pretend A tort que le vendeur est oblig6 de r6duire le prix stipul6 au contrat, parce que le prix du marchi a baiss6, et il refuse d'accepter livraison. Est-ce que cela implique que 1'acheteur consent a recevoir la marchandise en dehors des d61ais du contrat (car l'acquiescement est un consentement) mime dans le cas oi l'acheteur n'aurait donn6 aucune raison de son refus d'accepter livraison, sinon la raison mal fond6e que le prix du contrat devrait 6tre r6duit?

II faudrait plus que cela pour dire qu'il y a eu acquiescement ou consentement A 1'envoi tardif. Si 1'acheteur avait accept6 livraison de la marchandise en refusant de la payer plus que le prix du march6, je comprendrais qu'on pourrait dire qu'il avait acquiesc6 A l'envoi tardif. Mais lorsqu'il refuse absolument de la recevoir, en invoquant si on veut une mauvaise raison, cela implique-t-il qu'il consent quand m~me h la recevoir en dehors des d61ais du contrat? Je crois que non, car il n'y a aucun consentement, m~me tacite, A recevoir la marchandise, il n'y a qu'un refus de la recevoir.

D'ailleurs, je 1'ai d6ji dit, si l'intim6e choisissait d'exiger 1'ex6cution du contrat, elle devait, si elle voulait r6clamer des dommages A raison de la contravention de l'appelante, suivre la loi de ce contrat et exp6dier la marchandise dans le d6lai convenu. Ce serait bien 6trange qu'6tant elle m~me an faute par son envoi tardif, elle pfit encore s'autoriser de ,ette ex6cution fautive pour r6clamer des dommages l'intimbe. Voy. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, Vente et Echange, no. 602; Aubry et Rau, 5e 6d. tome 5, p. 143, Je crois done qu'on ne doit pas tenir compte des deux "chars"

envoy6s le 3 d6cembre dans le calcul des dommages-int6rits que l'appelante doit h l'intim6e. En cela je suis de l'avis du premier juge.

Mais comment doit-on 6valuer ces dommages?

Ici encore il n'y a qu'A appliquer les articles 1073, 1074 et 1075 du code civil. Les dommages-int6rits dus au crdancier sont en g6ndral le montant de la perte qu'il a faite et du gain dont il a 6t6 priv6.

importe peu que le d6biteur ait agi ici par dol-mais il n'est pas nicessaire de d6cider si r6ellement il y a eu dol-car les dommages dont il s'agit ont pu 6tre pr6vus et r6sultent directement de l'inex~cution du contrat.

La cour sup6rieure dit que pour d6terminer le montant des dommages il faut tenir compte de la diff6rence entre le prix du march6 au jour de la contravention et le prix du contrat.

Cette diff6rence est sans aucun doute 1'un des 616ments que le juge doit envisager lorsqu'il fixe le montant des dommages qui proviennent de l'inex6cution d'une vente, et surtout d'une vente commerciale.

Les marchandises ou denr6es ont ordinairement un cours ou une valeur qui varie suivant les circonstances, et surtout d'apris les lois 6conomiques de l'offre et de la demande. D'autre part, en vue du refus de I'acheteur d'accepter la marchandise vendue, le vendeur cherchera g6ndralement un autre acheteur, et son gain ou sa perte se mesurera d'apris le prix qu'il pourra en obtenir, c'est-a-dire par le prix courant au jour de la revente. De mime 1'acheteur, qui a achet6 pour revendre et non pas pour garder la marchandise, se la procurera ordinairement ailleurs et son gain ou sa perte se mesurera 6galement par le prix qu'il devra la payer, soit le prix du march6 au jour de son nouvel achat. Dire done que la difference entre le prix du marchi et le prix du contrat en matibre commerciale est la mesure de ces dommages, c'est 6noncer une rigle qui s'applique 6galement au vendeur et h l'acheteur, et qui est conforme h l'intention de l'un et de I'autre puisque tous deux ils faisaient une operation commerciale. Sans doute, lorsqu'il n'y a pas de march6 ou de cours pour la marchandise, le juge devra n~cessairement chercher d'autres 616ments de fixation des dommages, mais ordinairement la diff6rence entre le prix du contrat et le prix du march6 est le meilleur guide pour l'6valuation des dommages.

Ceri me parait si 616mentaire que je me contente d'indiquer une solution tirie de la jurisprudence frangaise et qui s'applique ici.

On trouvera plusieurs decisions d'espice dans le r6pertoire de Fuzier-Herman, vo. Dommages-int6r~ts, nos.

247 et suiv.

Je ne pense pas que la cour du Bane du Roi ait m6connu cette rigle puisqu'elle a accord6 h 'intimbe la diff6rence entre le prix de la revente et le prix du contrat. Je ne puis cependant m'empicher de croire que l'application que le premier juge en a faite est plus conforme A la justice.

II appert en effet que l'intimbe a attendu tout le mois de dicembre et une partie de janvier avant de chercher h revendre la farine. Son agent, Freeman, dit qu'il a regu ses premibres instructions de vendre la farine h la fin de d6cembre ou au commencement de janvier. Et pendant tout ce temps le march6 baissait.

Je ne crois pas que l'intimbe ait d6montr6 l'absence de march6 ou de possibilit6 de revendre la farine. On a produit au dossier des listes de prix se rapportant h diverses dates en dicembre et janvier, et le t6moin Turgeon dit que la cote du march6 de fleur paraissait journellement dans la

" Gazette " de Montr6al.

L'agent de l'intim~e, Freeman, ne nie pas l'existence d'un march6 pour la fleur, mais il dit qu'en d6cembre et janvier ce march6 6tait " brisky," mot d'argot ambricain que je crois signifier "incertain"ou "capricieux." S'il en 6tait ainsi, c'6tait une raison de plus de presser la revente. L'intim6e s'est adress6e pour la revente A un courtier qui n'achetait pas pour le commerce, mais seulement pour Strachan, qui 6tait boulanger. C'est elle qui avait la charge de la preuve, et elle ne me satisfait pas qu'elle 6tait justifiable d'attendre un mois et demi avant de revendre, et surtout de charger A l'appelante la somme considerable qu'elle lui r~clame pour frais d'entrep6t et de surestarie pendant ce long d6lai.

l'audition l'intimbe a pr6tendu que cette farine 6tant PERen sacs portant la marque et le nom de l'appelante, n'6tait pas aussi facile A vendre que si ces sacs n'6taient pas ainsi J. marqu6s. La preuve est silencieuse sur cette circonstance qu'on dit maintenant avoir t6 une entrave A la revente. Tout ce que je trouve c'est une remarque de Freeman: On ignore cependant si cette circonstance a influ6 sur le prix, et on ne sait pas non plus quel aurait 6t le cofst du chargement de la farine dans d'autres sacs.

L'intimbe 6tant demanderesse avait la charge de cette preuve et elle ne 1'a pas faite.

Sur le tout j'en suis arriv6 A la conclusion de r6tablir le premier jugement. Je puis ajouter que j'aurais beaucoup h6sit6 A intervenir dans cette question de 1'6valuation des dommages, si je n'6tais convaincu que dans cette cause on n'a pas eu suffisamment 6gard au retard inexpliqu6 de l'intimbe de faire la revente. Je ne vois du reste aucune justification au sujet de la condamnation de payer des frais d'entrep6t et de surestarie encourus par suite de ce retard. Mon opinion est donc d'accorder l'appel et de r6tablir le jugement de la cour superieure avec les frais de cette cour et de la cour d'appel.

Appeal allowed with costs.