Stevenson v. Florant

.926

BENJAMIN STEVENSON

(RESPONDENT). .APPELLANT; *Jan. 5.

AND

*Jan. 11 * DAME FLORA FLORANT (PETITIONER).. RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

RINFRET J.-This application is for an order staying the execution of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada pending the hearing of the appeal herein to His Majesty's Privy Council.

This judgment was rendered on the 18th day of June, On the 25th day of the same month, it was ordered by a judge of this court in chambers that, upon the appellant giving, on or before the 6th day of July, 1925, security to the amount of $1,000 to indemnify the respondent from the costs incurred as well in this court as in the lower courts, to the satisfaction of the registrar of this court, all proceedings herein, except a settlement of the minutes of judgment, be stayed until the 31st day of July, 1925, to afford appellant an opportunity of applying to the Judicial *PRESENT:-Mr. Justice Rinfret in chambers.

Committee.of His Majesty's Privy Council for leave to appeal from the judgment rendered.

The above order is now spent, both for the reason that the period of time during which it was to remain in force -has expired, and because the purpose of the order has been served, since the appellant has obtained leave to appeal as appears from His Majesty's order dated the 12th day of October, 1925, and duly filed in this court.

When the present application was made, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada rendered on the 18th of June, 1925, had not yet been certified by the registrar of this court to the proper officer of the court of original jurisdiction, so that this court, or a judge thereof was still competent to entertain the application and make the order (In re Strathcona Fire Company, Lemire v. Nicol (1) ). An application for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and even the granting of such leave, do not, as a matter of law or by the rules of this court, ipso facto operate as a suspension of proceedings in execution.

Under s. 58 of the Supreme Court Act, so soon as the judgment of this court in appeal has been certified by the registrar of this court to the officer of the court of original jurisdiction and all proper and necessary entries have thereupon been made, all such proceedings may be taken thereon as if the judgment had been entered or pronounced in the said last mentioned court.

Pursuant to rule 136, it has been the practice of this court to make orders for stay of execution of its judgments pending the time necessary for applying to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for leave to appeal from the judgment rendered. Except however for very special reasons, such as no doubt existed in Schofield v. Emmerson Brantingham Implement Company (2), this court will be slow to exercise the wider discretion which the rule undoubtedly authorizes.

As a general rule, it is desirable, where special leave to appeal to His Majesty's Privy Council is granted, that the conditions attached to such special leave and the terms upon which it is allowed should be left to the Judicial Committee.