City of Montreal v. Bradley

the Supreme Court of Canada in the present case is to be looked for in the Bankruptcy Act alone and is not controlled Bomy by the sections of the Supreme Court Act dealing with its Mc TY. ordinary jurisdiction.

Rinfret 3. Under those circumstances, I am of opinion that the petitioner has made out a sufficient case to obtain leave to appeal to this court. Such appeal shall operate as a stay of proceedings until it has been finally determined by this court.

The appellant shall not be required .to provide security for costs; but if he should choose to do so, in order to found a claim to be awarded costs in the event of his success upon his appeal, I fix the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) for such security.

Motion granted. LA CITE DE MONTREAL (DEFENDANT).. APPELLANT; AND

*Feb. DAME ANNY BRADLEY (PLAINTIFF).

. RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

J.-The only question submitted by the appellant on this appeal is whether the notice which the respondent gave to the city of the accident for which she recovered damages, complied with the requirements of section 536 of the Monteal city charter. The appellant did not otherwise, before this court, question its liability for the accident.

The contention of the appellant is that the letter written to the mayor of Montreal by the respondent's husband, on March 19, 1925, two days after the accident, did not sufficiently specify the place where the accident occurred, when it stated that the respondent had been the victim of an accident on St. Catherine street, which is a street several miles long.

The mayor answered this letter on March 21, saying that he was referring the letter immediately to Mr. Jules Cr6peau, director of departments, with a request to give to the question his immediate attention. And on March 30, the respondent's husband wrote to Mr. Cripeau, enclosing a copy of the mayor's letter. He added that he would be grateful if Mr. Cripeau would be kind enough to let him know what steps he was taking in the matter. This letter was never answered.

In our opinion the learned trial judge could find on this correspondence that the conduct of the city authorities, and especially the letter of the mayor, were of a nature to lull the respondent into a sense of security and to give her cause to believe that the notice of her claim for damages was accepted as sufficient by the city. Under these circumstances and for this reason, the learned judge could come to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of section 536 which states that

The respondent was prevented from giving a more explicit notice by the conduct of the city officials, and this is a reason which we deem valid.

The appeal should be dismissed with costs, but the considdrants of the judgment of the Superior Court based on the absence of prejudice to the city, on its having been placed in a position to receive information as to the accident, and having refused to take advantage of its opportunities, and on the notice served on the city by the re-