Canada & Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Levesque

[19281 Avec beaucoup de respect, ma conclusion est que 1'appel doit Stre maintenu et que l'action doit 6tre renvoy6e, avec .

les frais de toutes les cours.

Per Anglin C.J.C. and Rinfret J.-In the eyes of the law and under the present conditions of modern life electricity is an industrial product, which is carried from one place to another.

In practice, it has a material existence independent of the metallic wires or conduits through which it is supplied.

It is legislatively recognized as susceptible of being measured, bought and sold, distributed and stolen. Per Anglin C.J.C. and Rinfret J.-Companies supplying electricity for lighting purposes have under their care the electrical current which they supply; and the responsibility under art. 1054 C.C. for a death caused by an excessive electrical current which has escaped from their primary wires and has found its way in the interior installation of the house of one of their clients rests with such companies and not with the consumer, even if the interior installation through which the excessive electrical current is carried is under the care of such consumer.

Per Anglin C.J.C. and Rinfret J.-The interior installation, comprising the electric current of 110 voltage, being the only "thing"

which the appellant had under its care, was not the cause of the accident; the "thing " which caused the death of the respondent's husband,, i.e., the excessive electric current of 2,200 volts, was entirely under the care of the power company.

Per Newcombe J.-There was evidence in the case upon which the trial judge might reasonably find as he did, and therefore his judgment should be restored (Supreme Court Act, s. 51).

Per Newcombe J.-If the lamp and the mysterious death-dealing agency, or force, or energy known as the electric current, can be considered as separate entities, it was the latter which was the direct operative cause-the fatal instrument, if it may be so described-and the lamp was no more than a sine qua non.

Per Newcombe J.-The burden of proof that the damage was caused by a thing which the appellant company had under its care was upon the respondent. Assuming that Claveau's death was caused by electric shock emanating from the wires by which the lamp was connected with the source of the electric supply, and seeing that the source of supply and the transmission were under the care and operation of the power company, and not under the care of the appellant, it follows that the burden of proof that the lamp caused the damage is not satisfied, and cannot be discharged, without evidence that the electric current which caused the death of Claveau did not exist apart from the lamp, and this has not been established.

.-The appellant company is responsible under art. 1053 C.C. in not having taken all the precautions which a reasonable and competent regard for the safety of its employees would require. The appellant company must be presumed to have known that, unless the transformer was grounded, the employees in the shop were exposed to serious risk of an invasion of the interior circuit by the high-tension current. That risk was created by the connection of the company's installation with the secondary coil of the transformer, and thereby, through the primary coil, with the hightension current as the source of energy. It was a risk arising from the tapping of that source of energy, and the connection of it with the shop, for the benefit and by the consent and direction of the appellant company.

Having regard to the gravity of the risk, the appellant incurred an obligation to exercise the highest degree of care; and this obligation was not performed by simply assuming that the power company had not been negligent. The appellant ought to have ascertained that the proper precautions had been taken before connecting their interior circuit with the transformer.

. The death of the respondent's husband was "caused"

by a thing under the care of the appellant, in the sense of article 1054 C.C.; and the appellant has failed to bring itself within the clause of that article, which, upon certain conditions being satisfied, exonerates it from responsibility.

The wires and other appliances of the interior circuit, constituted, in their totality, a thing in the care, and under the control, of the appellant. Its function was that of a conductor of electricity. The service it performed was to receive energy from the primary circuit, and to distribute that energy to the various points at which it was utilized in the production of electric light. It was by the act of the appellant and solely & by its act, that the connection was maintained, through which alone, electrical energy was, or could be transferred, from the high-tension circuit of the power company to the interior circuit. It was from this * circuit that Claveau received the discharge.

Whatever other causes may have co-operated, the interior circuit, as the instrument by which the diversion was effected and by which the energy diverted, was directed and conveyed into Claveau's body and was one of the factors which directly co-operated in bringing about the plaintiffs loss. Per Duff and Lamont JJ. dissenting: A statutory enactment, assigning responsibility, for damage "caused"

by a given act or thing, would not, in the absence of a controlling context, naturally be read as limited in its application to damage exclusively so caused; but would ordinary be considered to apply to damage caused by the designated person or thing functioning in conjunction with other co-operating causes. Charing Cross v. Hydraulic Power Co. ([19141 3 K.B. 772 at p. 782. There seems to be no good reason for limiting the application of article 1054 C.C., in such a way as to exclude from its scope all damages except such as are exclusively caused by the thing under the care of the person alleged to be responsible.

.

Whatever difficulties may be encountered in determining, for the purpose of applying it to other circumstances, the precise limits of the conception denoted by the word " caused " in the first paragraph of article 1054 C.C., there is no doubt that, where the damages are of such a character as to fall within the purview of risks which a person ought to recognize as arising from his maintenance of the thing which is in debate, then that paragraph comes into operation.

Judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Q.R. 43 K.B. 562) reversed, Duff and Lamont JJ. dissenting.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec (1) reversing the judgment of the trial judge, Pouliot J., and maintaining the respondent's action in damages resulting from the death of her husband.

The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

(1) (1927) Q.R. 43 K.B. 562.

6367"1j

ANGLIN C.J.C.-I concur with Mr. Justice Rinfret. &

.-The pertinent facts are stated R. Co.

from the point of view of the appellants for the purpose of supporting the appeal, in the following extracts from the appellants' factum.

In the machine shop

* * * there was an interior installation for electric lighting, which was the property of the defendant-appellant, and used solely for lighting purposes. This wiring was extremely simple and consisted of two wires running on insulators and with here and there what is known as rosettes from which lamps were hung. * * * Some of these lamps were furnished with wire sufficiently long to permit of their being used within a certain radius. These extension lamps were attached to insulated wire, had wooden handles, and the globe itself was protected by a sort of wire basket attached to a wooden handle

* *

*. At the entrance to the shop there was a cut out with fuses generally known as block switch with fuses, and was of the kind generally used in such installations.

The current contracted for and furnished for the lighting system was 110 volts * * *.

Outside the shop, the secondary or interior wires passed through the block switch mentioned, and from there lead to a post situated about forty feet away, and on which was installed a transformer for the purpose of reducing the high tension current of 2,200 volts to the voltage of required and habitually used for lighting. This transformer was the property of La Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas St. Laurent, who furnished the current, and whose property and under whose charge and control it was * * *.

Beyond such transformer were the primary wires which carried the high tension current to the transformer where it was reduced to volts and delivered to the defendant at the entrance to its shops. * * * The accident occurred in this way:

Claveau, the foreman of the machine shop was overlooking some repairs to an engine. The work was being done by Messrs. Lachance, father and son. They told Claveau that the portable lamp which they were using was too short and Claveau replied that he would lengthen it. He did not do this, however, but went to another part of the shop, where he picked up another portable lamp. The witnesses heard a cry and saw a flash of light, and Claveau fell holding the portable lamp in his hands. * * * Apparently he was holding it by the wire screen used to protect the globe. Death was practically instantaneous.

*

*

*

The expert evidence shows * * * and there is no contradictory evidence, that the end of one of the primary wires stretching from one of the insulators on the post which held the transformer, had broken and burnt, permitting the high tension current to enter the secondary system within the building belonging to the defendant-appellant, without passing through the transformer. The breaking and burning of this wire was caused by a stroke of lightning or some similar occurrence.

* * * The essential facts which have a considerable bearing on the present case may be resumed as follows:

The substantive view put forward in the factum is that, the rupture of the main line having been caused by a stroke of lightning, the high potential of that line was applied to the secondary circuit by direct contact of the broken end of the primary wire with the metal supports of the transformer, and that a current or electrostatic charge of abnormally high potential was thus communicated to the secondary circuit. This was the view advanced by Walsh, the only independent expert called by the appellants who negatived explicitly the suggestion that Claveau was killed in consequence of receiving a stroke of lightning. The other witnesss, M6th6, who maintained the opposite, was the engineer of the power company, and was obviously concerned to protect his own company from responsibility for its negligence in failing to take the necessary measures to prevent an escape of current from the main line into the secondary circuit.

Under pressure of cross examination, he affirmed he was not an electrician, and not competent to give expert evidence upon subjects within the domain of an electrician.

His evidence upon this point, should for these reasons, be disregarded. It should further be observed that the fair deduction from the evidence of the appellants themselves is that in order to protect the interior circuit from risk of invasion by the high pressure current in the main line, it is usual to ground the transformer, and furthermore that this precaution is as a rule effective, and would have been effective in the circumstances in evidence, if it had been, as it was not, observed.

I have been unable to convince myself that the appellants are not responsible under article 1053 C.'C. Nobody would dispute the obligation of an employer to take reasonable measures for the safety of his employees, and for that purpose to take all the precautions which a reasonable and competent regard for such safety would require. Particularly, if the employees in the course of their duties are brought into contact with or proximity to dangerous things, or things that may become dangerous in the absence of proper precautions, it is his duty to take all reasonable measures, for their protection. The employees are entitled to assume that they are not exposed to risks which do not present themselves to their observation, and which can be avoided, and are commonly and usually avoided by well-known precautions.

The appellant company must be presumed to have known that unless the transformer was grounded, the employees in the shop were exposed to serious risk of an invasion of the interior circuit by the high-tension current. That risk was created by the connection of the company's installation with the secondary coil of the transformer, and thereby, through the primary coil, with the high-tension current as the source of energy. It was a risk arising from the tapping of that source of energy, and the connection of it with the shop, for the benefit and by the consent and direction of the appellant company. It is quite true that the transformer was apparently not situated on the appellant company's premises, and it seems to have been the property of the power company; but the transformer could only function in relation to a circuit connected with its secondary coil, and existed only for the purpose of providing, by the permission of the appellant company, and under contract with it, a current for that circuit. The connection between the high-tension current and the wires and other appliances constituting the appellant company's installation, was, and could only be effected, by the act of the appellants. It was the appellant company's own act, therefore, which in part directly, in part through the instrumentality of the power company, established this potentially dangerous thing in its own shop.

It was held by the Privy Council in Toronto Power Co. v. Paskwan (1), that the duty of an employer to take reasonable care to provide a safe place for his work people, and a proper plant, is a duty which cannot be delegated. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to decide whether the performance of that duty in the circumstances before us could have been delegated to an independent contractor or an expert employee.

Proper precautions were not in fact taken, and that under the circumstances of this case is sufficient prima facie to establish that the employer's duty was not performed, and there is not the slightest evidence to show that the duty was by the appellants delegated to anybody, either contractor or servant. . Assuming that the appellants could have performed their duty by employing a competent expert to report upon the proper measures to be taken for the protection of their servants, with authority to take such measures, or by entering into a contract with an independent contractor undertaking to do the same thing, there is no evidence to show that anything of the kind was done by them. It is no answer to say that the power company in failing to take the nece*ssary precautions was guilty of fault, or that it was the duty of the power company to take such precautions.

Having regard to the gravity of the risk, the appellants incurred an obligation to exercise the highest degree of care; and I cannot agree that this obligation was performed by simply assuming that the power company had not been negligent. The appellants ought to have ascertained that the proper precautions had been taken before connecting their interior circuit with the transformer.

I now come to the consideration of article 1054 C.C. The wires and other appliances of the interior circuit, constituted, in their totality, a thing in the care, and under the control, of the appellants. Its function was that of a conductor of electricity.

The service it performed was to receive energy from the primary circuit, and to distribute that energy to the various points at which it was utilized in the production of electric light. It was by the act of the appellants and solely by their act, that the connection was maintained, through which alone, electrical energy, was, or could be transferred from the hightension circuit of the power company to the interior circuit. It was from this circuit that Claveau received the discharge. Whatever other causes may have been involved, the interior circuit, as the instrument by which the diversion was effected, and by which the energy diverted, was co. directed and conveyed into Claveau's body, was one of the factors which directly co-operated in bringing about the -plaintiff's loss. That seems to me to be only another way u of saying that Claveau's death was " caused " by a thing under the care of the appellants in the sense of article 1054 C.C.; and, as we shall see presently, the appellants have failed to bring themselves within the clause of that article, which, upon certain conditions being fulfilled, exonerates them from responsibility.

To this, the appellants' principal answer is that the true cause, that is to say, the only cause within the meaning of article 1054 C.C., was the escape of a high-tension electric current into Claveau's body, and that this high-tension electric current was a thing, not in the " care " of the appellants in the sense of article 1054 C.C. This contention of course involves the proposition that the circuit which was in the care and under the control of the appellants, and played the part just indicated in producing Claveau's death, was not a cause of it, in that sense. Now, neither in common language, nor in law, has the word " cause " a fixed meaning, which can be formulated in a strict definition.

Out of the numberless antecedents of a given effect, we are in the habit of selecting those which attract our attention from a particular point of view, and ascribing to those antecedents the character of cause. Lawyers, concerned only with assigning juridical responsibility, address themselves primarily to human acts or omissions and their consequences; and as a given effect may result from the co-operation of several such acts or omissions, each of them may serve as the foundation of legal responsibility, as the legal cause from one point of view. A statutory enactment, assigning responsibility, for damage " caused " by given act or thing, would not, in the absence of a controlling context, naturally be read, as limited in its application to damage exclusively so caused; but would ordinarily be considered to apply to damage caused by the designated person or thing functioning in conjunction with other co-operating causes. Charing Cross v. Hydraulic Power Co. (1). There seems to be no good reason for limiting the application of article 1054 C.C., in such a way as to exclude from its scope all damages except such as are exclusively caused by the thing under the care of the person alleged to be responsible. And indeed, this is not permissible in view of the decision in City of Montreal v. Watt (2).

Article 1054 C.C., envisages the "things"

to which it applies, as objects of care, and as potential instruments of harm, and interpreting the article in that light, we can without difficulty, arrive at at least one conclusion as to the scope of the word "caused."

Responsibility is displaced if the damage dealing act or event is shown to be something that the person having care of the thing, could not prevent by any exertions that might reasonably be required of him. There can be no doubt, that if the thing which is the subject of care, does, in the circumstances in which it is placed, give rise to a risk of harm, recognizable by a reasonably competent forethought, then any harm which actually supervenes from the realization of that risk, is damage " caused " by the thing within the contemplation of article 1054 C.C., and the person having the care of the thing, must, in order to escape responsibility, show that he could not by anything he could reasonably be called upon to do, have averted it. The scope of the word " caused " may be much wider, but for the present it is sufficient that it is broad enough to embrace all such cases. In the legal sense, you would be emptying the word " cause " of all meaning by holding that such cases are not within the intendment of article 1054 C.C.

The occurrence which led to Claveau's death was, as I have pointed out above, one which ought to have been anticipated by the appellants as within the risk created by the maintenance of the interior circuit in connection with the power company's transformer.

It is a little important in this connection not to be misled by descriptive epithets commonly found in legal treatises and even in judgments, which while they have their value for descriptive purposes, cannot, without grave risk of error, be treated as furnishing, even approximately, a criterium for differentiating the kinds of casual connection which the law does or does not recognize as entailing re- & GuLw sponsibility. In Weld-Blundell v. Stephens (1), Lord Sumner refers to some of these. Effective cause, he observes, is LEVEQUE. simply that which causes. Proximate cause has acquired a -~ special connotation through its employment in insurance f .law.

He suggests that direct cause is the least objectionable of all phrases because it is consistent with the possibility of the concurrence of more direct causes than one, operating at the same time and leading to a common result, and he refers to Burrows v. March, Gas & Coke Co. (2) and Hill v. New River Co. (3), which are not without a noticeable resemblance to the present case. In British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach (4), Lord Sumner, speaking for the Judicial Committee, which included Lord Haldane and Lord Parker, as well as himself, said: observed as to inquiries into responsibility for torts:

The inquiry is a judicial inquiry. It does not always follow the historical method and begin at the beginning.

Very often it is more convenient to begin at the end, that is at the accident, and work back along the line of events which led up to it. The object of the inquiry is to fix upon some wrong-doer the responsibility for the wrongful act which has caused the damage. It is in search not merely of a causal agency but of the responsible agent.

When that has been done, it is not necessary to pursue the matter into its origins; for judicial purposes they are remote. Till that has been done there may be a considerable sequence of physical events, and event of acts of responsible human beings, between the damage done and the conduct which is tortious and is its cause. It is surprising how many epithets eminent judges have applied to the cause, which has to be ascertained for this judicial purpose of determining liability, and how many more to other acts and incidents, which for this purpose are not the cause at all. "Efficient or effective cause," "real cause," "proximate cause," " direct cause," " decisive cause," " immediate cause," " causa causans," on the one hand as against, on the other, " causa sine qua non," "(occasional cause," remote cause,"

contributory cause,"

inducing cause," " condition," and so on. No doubt in the particular cases in which they occur they were thought to be useful or they would not have been used, but the repetition of terms without examination in other cases has often led to confusion, and it might be better, after pointing out that the inquiry is an investigation into responsibility, to be content with speaking of the cause of the injury simply and without qualification.

I repeat, however, that whatever difficulties may be encountered, in determining, for the purpose of applying it to other circumstances, the precise limits of the conception (1) [19201 A.C. 956, at p. 983.

(3) (1868) 9 B. & S. 303. (2) (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 96.

(4) [19161 1 A.C. 719, at pp. 727 and 728.

denoted by the word "caused" in the first paragraph of article 1054 C.C., of this there seems at least to be no room for doubt, that where the damages are of such a character as & to fall within the purview of those risks which the defendant ought to recognize as arising from his maintenance of the thing which is in debate, then that paragraph comes into

J. operation. This seems to be involved in City of Montreal v. Watt & Scott (1).

We may now examine a little more closely from this point of view, the facts with which we have to deal. The immediate agency in Claveau's death was the discharge of electrical energy into his body. The immediate cause of that discharge, so far as we know, was Claveau's own act in grasping the electric lamp.

From the point of view of responsibility, that is of no consequence, because Claveau seems to have had no reason to suspect the risk he was encountering, and there is no suggestion of fault on his part; but Claveau's act took effect in co-operation with two other things, first, the presence in the wire of an electrostatic charge of high potential, or an electrical current of high pressure, and moreover, as an equally essential thing, which such a state of the wire and its appurtenances as permitted the discharge. As concerns Claveau, or Claveau's representatives, either of these things might equally, that is to say, with no distinction from the juridical point of view, be the cause of the discharge. If the presence of the electric charge or electric current was due to the negligence of A, and the state of the appliances which made the discharge possible, was due to the negligence of B, then, from the point of view of A's responsibility, under article 1053

C.C. the first was the cause, in the legal sense, while in the same sense, the second was the cause from the point of view of B's responsibility. Neither A nor B could escape responsibility by attempting to cast it exclusively upon the other.

Then the transfer of electricity, under inordinate pressure, from the high voltage lines of the power company, to the interior circuit of the appellants, involved, first, a condition of the power company's wires, permitting its escape, then a condition of the interior circuit and of the appliances for tapping the high-tension current of the power company which permitted the application of a dangerously high potential to the circuit, and if the condition of the circuit which permitted this, or the condition of the transformer which permitted it, or the condition of the power company's lines, which permitted it, was due to the negligence of the persons severally responsible for each of these things, then each of them was, in its turn, from the point of view of responsibility, under article 1053 C.C., a cause of the respondent's damage. If the absence of grounding for the transformer, was due to the negligence of the appellants, as well as to the negligence of the power company, then they were jointly responsible, under that article, fot that state of affairs, and if grounding would have prevented the accident, the absence of grounding is, from the point of view of both of them, a cause.

It seems equally clear that from the point of view of the first paragraph of article 1054 C.C., any one of these things -the state of the interior circuit, and of the lamp attached to it, as conductors of electricity, in other words, the interior circuit and the lamp, in the state in which they were, permitted the discharge into Claveau's body; the condition of the circuit which permitted the high tension current to pass into the interior of the shop from the transformer; the condition of the power company's main line and the transformer, which permitted the escape of the current from the main line of the transformer's support, and thence to the interior circuit-any one of these things, it seems clear, was in the sense of that paragraph, a co-operating cause of the damage.

I will not dwell upon the effect of this conclusion as touching the responsibility of the appellants. The appellants could only exonerate themselves by showing that no reasonable precautions within their power, would, if taken, have prevented the damage. In this, they failed in three respects.

First, apart altogether from the matter of the grounding of the transformer, they failed to show-the evidence is silent upon it-that there was no available means by which they could have protected their interior circuit from such an invasion as that which occurred.

Second, the testimony adduced on behalf of the appellants themselves, shows that the lamp was not of the type commonly in use, and there was no evidence justifying the conclusion that, by a proper insulation, persons using the lamp could not have been made secure against the risk of such a discharge as that which Claveau received. And lastly, there is the matter of the grounding of the transformer, which has been sufficiently discussed already. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-The trial judge found that the defendant company was not guilty of any fault, and that it had not under its care the excessive electric current, found to be the thing which caused the death of the plaintiff's husband.

Upon appeal, the majority of the learned judges considered, as I interpret the judgment of the court, that the fatal occurrence was due to the fact that, accidentally, during a violent thunder storm, the portable extension lamp became charged with a current of 2,200 volts, which it was not intended to carry, and that death was caused by the shock communicated to the man's body when he grasped the lamp so charged; that although this electric current was not under the care of the defendant, the lamp was; that, while it was not shown that the defendant was negligent, there was room for the application of article 1054 of the Civil Code of Quebec, and that the defendant should have established that it could not have prevented the accident, which, in the view of the court, it had failed to do, because it was not shown that by the use of a better or safer lamp, or one more qualified to afford protection against the perils which were encountered, the accident could not possibly or probably (fort possible, sinon fort probable) have been avoided.

The ground of obligation found by the Court of King's Bench is thus the said article in its relation to the lamp, and the absence of proof of defeasance of the liability held to be thereby imposed, namely, proof of inability to prevent the act (le fait) which caused the damage.

I would interpret article 1054 C.C. in its application to this case as providing that every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by things which he has under his care, but only if he fail to establish (ne peut prouver) that he was unable to prevent the act (le fait) which caused the damage, and I shall assume for the purposes of what I am going to say that the word "person" in this context includes a corporation such & as the defendant company.

I would have upheld the judgment of the learned trial judge, and, therefore, in the discharge of what I conceive be the duty of the court under s. 51 of the Supreme Court Act, the appeal should, I think, be allowed. In my judgment there was evidence in the case upon which the .

trial judge might reasonably find as he did. I am not prepared to replace his finding by one of negligence against the defendant; neither apparently was the Court of King's Bench. Moreover, as to the thing which caused the accident, if it were a thing, I am persuaded that it was not the lamp, or at least it is not shown to have been the lamp. If the lamp and the mysterious death-dealing agency, or force, or energy, known as the electric current, can be considered as separate entities, it was the latter which was the direct operative cause-the fatal instrument, if it may be so described, and the lamp was no more than a sine qua non. There are many English cases which illustrate the principle of this conclusion; see for example Wilson v. Xantho (1); and Hamilton vs. Pandorf (2), which, though relating to very different conditions of fact, exemplify the application of a rule of causality which is common to both systems.

It is not necessary to go further, but, if it were, I should wish to consider whether the defendant would not escape liability under article 1054 for the reason that it was unable to prevent the occurrence which caused the damage. This means " unable by reasonable means"; City of Montreal vs. Watt and Scott (3).

If there had been negligence on the defendant's part it would have been liable under article 1053, but negligence is excluded by the findings; there was therefore, in that sense, no failure to adopt reasonable means, and I am in a frame of mind to question whether it does not appear to be unreasonable that the defendant should have anticipated what happened and provided extraordinary means of safety against such a combination of unforeseen occurrences, and the intrusion of a resulting current twenty times greater than that for which its works were constructed and equipped, if indeed it were possible to do so.

As to the burden of proof that the damage was caused co. by a thing which the defendant company had under its care, it was upon the plaintiff. Although the lamp may have afforded a passage for the electric current which caused the shock, it seems to be clear, upon the case as it stands, that La Compagnie du Pouvoir de Bas St. Laurent, the power company which supplied the electricity to the premises of the defendant company, produced the current and had the care of the apparatus and the exterior wires by which the current was transmitted, and would have been responsible for the damages upon an allegation of fault or negligence on the part of .that company. Assuming that the man's death was caused by electric shock emanating from the wires by which the lamp was connected with the source of the electric supply, and, seeing that the source of supply and the transmission were under the care and operation of the power company, and not under the care of the defendant, it follows that the burden of proof that the lamp caused the damage is not satisfied, and, I should think, cannot be discharged, without evidence that the electric current which caused the death of Claveau did not exist apart from the lamp. No attempt was of course made to establish this, but, to the contrary, the proof proceeds upon the assumption that the lamp and its attachments served only as the conductor of something foreign to the lampa source of power, not the lamp, possessing that inherent or latent capacity to produce the fatal result which was excited to action by contact with the man's hand. It is consistent with the absence of liability on defendant's part that electricity is not more intimately known to science than as a name applied to the source of its well recognized phenomena, while its material existence cannot be denied if, as in practice and legislatively recognized, it can be measured, bought and sold, exported, distributed and stolen. (See Electricity and Fluid Exportation Act, c. 16 of 1907; Criminal Code, s. 351; Electric Lighting Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII, c. 34, Imp., etc.)

Moreover in the judicial authorities to which my brother Rinfret refers the electric current is treated as an independent causative agent. It has the quality and habit of travelling by wire, but for the damage which it causes in transit, expressing my opinion with some diffidence and with the utmost respect, the Civil Code does not, in the circumstances of this case, attach liability to a person who has the care only of the wire, or of the lamp -b in which the wire terminates, when the damage is not caused his fault, even though he have failed to prove that he was unable, within the meaning of the article, to prevent the act which caused the damage.

J.-L'appelante, Canada and Gulf Terminal Railway Company, poss6dait h Mont-Joli une usine de r6paration. L'6clairage s'y faisait au moyen de 1'61ectricit6 fournie par La compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas St-Laurent. A cette fin, le r6seau de cette compagnie, compos6 de fils primaires charg6s d'un courant de 2200 volts, se rendait jusqu'a une distance d'environ cinquante pieds de 1'usine. Lh, le courant 6tait transform6 h 110 volts et, ainsi r6duit, suivait des fils secondaires jusqu'A 1'usine oii il rejoignait l'installation intirieure.

Le r6seau et le transformateur 6taient la propri6t6 de la compagnie d'6clairage, qui en avait la garde, le contr6le et la direction. Les file secondaires et 1'installation 6lectrique int6rieure 6taient sous la garde de la compagnie de chemin de fer Canada and Gulf Terminal.

L6on Claveau, l'6poux de la demanderesse et le pare des autres demandeurs, 6tait contremaitre A 1'emploi de la compagnie de chemin de fer. Le 9 juin 1925, dans l'usine, il surveillait la reparation d'une locomotive. C'6tait au cours d'un orage trbs violent, accompagn6 d'6clairs et de tonnerre. Les ouvriers eurent besoin d'6clairer l'int6rieur de la locomotive. Il y avait A proximit6 une lampe 6lectrique portative, attach6e h un long fil, et que l'on pouvait ainsi transporter d'un endroit h un autre. La lampe consistait en une ampoule dans un socle en cuivre, entour6e d'un grillage m6tallique, et fixie a une poign6e en bois.

Claveau traversa la salle de 1'usine pour aller chercher cette lampe. On entendit un cri et, en mime temps dans la direction d'oii venait le cri, on vit une grosse lueur, "comme un 6clair". Claveau 6tait tomb6 foudroy6. On le trouva avec la lampe portative dans la main gauche.

Le m6decin, Docteur J.

II attribua la mort A un choc 6lectrique et A la brfilure. L'dpouse et les enfants de Claveau ont voulu faire d6clarer la Compagnie Canada and Gulf Terminal Railway responsable de sa mort pour n'avoir pas tenu

Ils ont fait ainsi reposer leur demande sur une all6gation de faute et de n6gligence. Mais ils ont ajout6 que l'accident fut caus6 par la lampe et le courant 6lectrique dont, suivant eux, la compagnie Canada & Gulf Terminal avait le contr8le et la garde, et ils tentirent par d'appuyer leur r6clamation sur Iarticle 1054 du Code civil.

La Cour Sup6rieure a jug6:

Quant A l'application de Particle 1054 C.C., la cour a d6cid6, en fait, que la d6fenderesse n'avait sous sa garde que l'installation d'6clairage 6lectrique h l'int6rieur de l'usine; qu'il que la cause prochaine de cet accident fut une d6charge 6lectrique excessive et imprevue occasionnee par le fait que la foudre est tomb6e sur un fil primaire de l'installation extdrieure et l'a rompu.

Comme r6sulta-t: le fluide 6lectrique ainsi d6velopp6, ou le courant de plus de 2000 volts dont les fils primaires 6taient charg6s, s'est communiqu6 aux fils secondaires et a p6n6tr6 dans l'usine, o. il a provoqu6 la mort de Claveau. Cette mort a done 6t6 le fait ou des forces de la nature ou d'un courant 6lectrique dont la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas St-Laurent avait seule la garde. Les fils secondaires et la lampe ne furent que les agents occasionnels du dommage. En premibre instance, Faction fut done rejet6e.

La Cour du Banc du Roi ne fut pas d'avis diff6rent sur la fagon dont l'accident 6tait survenu.

Elle dit, dans son jugement:

a A Le majorit6 de la Cour du Banc du Roi, comme la Cour Sup6rieure, rejeta les alligations de faute contre la d6fenderesse. La preuve avait 6tabli que le transformateur n'tait pas "terr&" (i.e. en communication avec le sol par un fil conducteur ou "grounded"), ce qui aurait probablement empkch6 l'accident. Mais la cour d6cida que la compagnie de chemin de fer n'6tait pas sujette A reproche sur ce point. Elle n'6tait pas propri6taire du transformateur. Elle n'en avait pas la garde. Il n'est pas prouv6 qu'elle connaissait cette d6fectuosit6.

Cependant la cour fut d'avis que la mort de Claveau avait 6t6 caus6e par la lampe 6lectrique portative, alors qu'elle 6tait sous la garde de la d6fenderesse.

La majorit6 des juges d6cida, en consequence, que la compagnie Canada and Gulf Terminal 6tait 16galement responsable de cette mort parce qu'elle n'avait pas 6tabli qu'elle n'aurait "pu emp6cher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage".

Pour monsieur le juge Greenshields, au contraire, la preuve que 1'accident avait 6t6 caus6 par la faute de la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas St-Laurent, qui avait omis de "terrer" son transformateur, 6tait suffisante pour faire b6ndficier la d6fenderesse de la clause ''disculpatoire" de l'article 1054 C.C.

C'est dans ces conditions que la cause nous est maintenant soumise. Et, comme on le voit, le conflit entre la. Cour Sup6rieure et la majorit6 de la.Cour du Banc du Roi ne porte que sur l'application de l'article 1054 C.C. Les deux cours se sont accord6es pour absoudre la d6fenderesse de toute responsabilit6 en vertu de 'article 1053 C.C. Le jugement de la Cour du Banc du Roi signale que la lampe portative n'6tait pas irr6prochable, mais ce n'est que pour accentuer, dans son raisonnement, le d6faut de la d6fenderesse de se disculper.

L'emploi d'une lampe diff6rente (avee socle en porcelaine, poign6e recouverte de caoutchouc, etc.), de pr6f6rence h la lampe avec socle en cuivre qu'il y avait ici, est la seule pr6caution raisonnable que l'on a sugg6r6e comme pouvant 6tre adoptee pour empicher l'accident, par application du principe: "unable by reasonable means to prevent Rinfret J. the damage complained of" pos6 par le Conseil Priv6 dans la cause de City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott Ltd.(1).

Mais il est prouv6 que la lampe dont on a fait usage en l'esphce 6tait suffisante ("correcte") pour le voltage qu'elle devait normalement recevoir; et il n'est nullement 6tabli que, par 1'emploi d'une lampe diff6rente, telle que d6crite, l'appelante ekt "pu empicher le fait qui a cause le dommage" (art. 1054 C.C.).

L'appelante, pour privenir un fait de ce genre, avait d'ailleurs, comme la preuve le d6montre, employ6 un moyen plus efficace.

Elle avait fait installer dans 1'usine et tris

Lors de l'accident qui nous occupe, le coupe-circuit n'a pas fonctionn6 automatiquement. L'inspection qui a suivi n'y a cependant rien d6montr6 de d6fectueux; et la pr6sonption de 1'expert a porte sur les 6clairs.

L'accident s'est done produit malgr6 la protection du coupecircuit; et il fut instantan6, puisque le coupe-circuit n'a

"pas eu le temps de sauter", ce qui favorise davantage la thdorie qu'il fut caus6 par 1'6clair.

Aucune pr6caution additionnelle n'a 6t6 indiqu6e pour

6viter cet accident. Personne n'a signa16 un autre "moyen raisonnable" par lequel l'appelante aurait pu "empicher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage".

Nous serions done d'accord avec monsieur le juge Greenshields pour dire que at l'appelante, en assumant que ce ffit sa chose qui a caus6 la mOrt de Claveau, a r 6 ussi ' se disculper au sens de l'article &

1054 du Code civil.

Mais le d6bat se r6tr6cit encore davantage.

Nous ne pOUVOnS admettre que la mort de Claveau a 6t6 caus6e par Rinfre.

la chose de 1'appelante.

S.

Cette mort, comme nous 1'avons vu,-les deux cours qui ont eu jusqu'ici h se prononcer se sont accordies pour le decider et il est impossible d'arriver A une autre conclusion d'apris la preuve-fut le risultat direct du choc 6lectrique. Comment s'est. produit ce choc 6lectrique?

Voici 1'explication de M. Philippe M6th6, ing6nieur civil, dipl6m6 de 1'6cole polytechnique de Montreal, au service de la Shawinigan Water & Power Company pendant cinq ans, et, au moment oil il rendait son t6moignage, au service de la compagnie du Pouvoir du Bas St-Laurent, de Rimouski, depuis cinq ans.

Dhs le soir de l'accident, il s'est rendu sur les lieux et a examin6 1'installation prbs du transformateur. Il a constat6 que l'un des fils primaires 6tait coup6. On lui demande: Q. D'apris vous, qu'est-ce qui a pu couper ce fil?

R. C'est un are qui s'est produit entre le fil et la caisse du transformateur, le support du transformateur, sur lequel le transformateur est boulonn6.

Q. Qu'est-ce qui pouvait provoquer cet are-1A?

R. Une d6charge 6lectrique.

Un 6clair pouvait parfaitement provoquer cet are-11, dans les conditions oii c'6tait install6.

11 n'a pu constater d'autre cause et n'a vu rien "autre chose qui aurait pu provoquer ce coupement de fil". On lui pose alors la question:

D'apris ces constatations-lk que vous avez faites, par quoi croyez-vous que Claveau a pu 6tre tu6?

R. Par un 6clair.

Q. Par un 6clair. Est-ce que l'6clair pouvait le tuer directement? R. Oui. En frappant I l'endroit oii le primaire est coup6, et passant par le support du transformateur et la caisse du transformateur, et de 1b se transmettant sur le secondaire et en entrant directement dans l'usine. Q. Est-ce que, sans que le courant fasse ce trajet-lk, il pouvait 6tre tu4 directement par 1'6clair?

R. L'6clair pouvait frapper aussi directement sur les secondaires. Q. Vous avez entendu les timoins d6crire la lueur, le feu caus6, et A Ia switch d'entr6e, et b. la lampe, vis-A-vis de la lampe que tenait Claveau dans ses mains, lorsqu'il s'est fait tuer?

R. Oui.

Q. Voulez-vous dire si cette lueur-lk, d'apris votre expirience, pouvait &tre caus6e par le courant de 110 volts?

R. Non.

Q. Cette lueur semblait-elle d~noter du 2200, ou plut~t un 6clair, un courant produit par le tonnerre?

R. C'est plut6t un coup de tonnerre.

Q. Normalement, le 2200 ferait-il une d6monstration de flamme aussi consid6rable?

R. Je ne crois pas.

Q. Dites-vous, monsieur M6th6, que la mort pouvait 6tre caus6e par un coup de tonnerre, ou si elle a t6 rdellement causbe par un coup de Rinfret J. tonnerre?

R. Je dis que c'est mon opinion qu'elle a t6 caus6e par un coup de tonnerre.

Monsieur N. S. Walsh, examinateur 6lectricien h l'emploi du gouvernement provincial, t6moigne comme suit: Q. Vous avez entendu les timoins qui ont d~crit ]a flamme, le rideau de flamme b I'entr6e de l'usine et 6galement dans la figure de Claveau lorsqu'il a 6t6 tu6?

R. Oui, monsieur.

Q. D'aprbs votre exp6rience, cette flamme-lh pouvait-elle d6noter un courant de 110 volts?

R. Non, pas du tout.

Q. 2,200 volts?

R. Qa prendrait au moins 2,200 volts.

Q. Est-ce que l'6clair pouvait faire le mime travail?

*R. Non. L'6clair ne ferait pas le mime travail que ca.

Q. L'6clair ne ferait pas le mime travail?

R. II me semble pas toujours.

Q. Maintenant, vous avez entendu et vu la description qu'on a faite du fil qui raccordait du primaire, qui raccordait au poteau, de 1'isolateur sur le poteau au transformateur.

y avait une quinzaine de pouces de distance. Est-ce qu'un fil de cette longueur-11 peut se couper sans raison? R. Bien, dans ce bout-li, je ne pense pas. Ca doit Stre fait par quelque chose A I'extirieur, comme un 6clair comme ga th mentionn6. Q. Est-ce que ga pourrait avoir 6t6 fait par d'autres causes que le coupage du fil?

R. Bien, je ne pense pas que ga pourrait Stre fait par autre chose qu'un 6clair.

A la demande de la cour, il r6itbre qu'il attribue au choc ext6rieur de 1'6clair le fait que le 2,200 volts qu'il y avait dans les primaires serait pass6 dahs les secondaires et serait entr6 dans 'usine. M6th6 et Walsh sont les deux seuls hommes de l'art qui ont 6t6 appel6s dans la cause A fournir une explication scientifique de ce qui s'4tait pass6.

Il rsulterait de leurs t6moignages que l'accident a 6t6 plut5t provoqu6 par l'6clair. Mais la seule autre conclusion que l'on puisse en tirer est que l'6clair, en rompant le fil primaire, a fait 6chapper le courant de 2200 volts qui a d'abord "pass6 sur les 'braces' du transformateur" et de ih "s'est connect6 avec les secondaires", puis "est venu dans 1'usine m~me". Sous l'article 1054 C.C., c'est sur le demandeur que retombe indubitablement le fardeau de prouver que le dommage a 6t6 caus6 par une chose que le d~fendeur avait sous sa garde.

Si 1'enquite nous laisse dans l'incertitude A ce sujet, le d6fendeur doit en b6n6ficier.

J.

Dans la pr6sente cause, si nous admettons l'hypothise que 1'accident a t6 caus6 par 1'clair, il est 6vident que, dans ce cas, nous devons dire qu'il n'en r~sulte pour l'appelante aucune responsabilit6.

Si nous acceptons, au contraire, l'explication la plus favorable h l'intimbe, h savoir: que la mort de Claveau aurait 6t6 caus6e par le courant de 2200 volts 6chappi du fil primaire, 1'appelante est encore soustraite h toute responsabilit6 en vertu de Particle 1054 C.C.. parce que la cause du dommage ne peut dis lors 6tre attribu6e A une chose qu'elle avait sous sa garde.

Personne ne pr6tend que la lampe seule, ind6pendamment de l'61ectricit6 dont elle s'est trouvde charg6e, a caus6 la mort de Claveau. Tous les faits positifs qui out 6t6 relatSs s'accordent directement avec 1'hypothbse d'une mort par 6lectrocution.

La lampe par elle-mime n'a rien fait et n'aurait pu rien faire. D6fectueuse ou non, sans l'lectricith a laquelle elle a servi de v6hicule, cette lampe 6tait inoffensive. La declaration qui sert de base A l'action, les constatations faites lors du d6chs, l'avis donn6 par les experts sont d'accord pour 6tablir que cette mort a 6te causee par le "courant 6lectrique". Il s'agit done de d6terminer, h l'aide, bien entendu, des donn6es qui se trouvent au dossier, !a personne qui avait courant sous sa garde au moment de l'accident.

Quelles que puissent 6tre les discussions de la science au sujet des phinomines 6lectriques, nous n'avons pas ici A en rechercher l'explication m6canique, ni a nous inqui6ter de leur nature physique. Aux yeux de la loi, et dans les conditions de la vie moderne, l'6lectricit6 est un produit industriel, qui se transporte d'un lieu h un autre. Elle a une existence objective ind6pendante des corps ou fils m6talliques employ6s pour la transmettre h distance, puisque son producteur peut h son grb y provoquer ou en soustraire ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler la circulation du courant; puisqu'il n'est pas nicessaire d'ailleurs que le producteur soit en mime temps le propri6taire des fils et qu'il pourra tout aussi bien fournir son 6nergie 6lectrique au moyen d'un systime de distribution appartenant h un autre, ou allumer une lampe chez son abonn6 en se servant de fils et d'appa- & reils qui sont la propri6t6 de ce dernier.

Une soci6t6 d'6clairage est propri6taire de l'6nergie trique produite par ses machines g6n6ratrices de la mime Rinfret J. fagon qu'elle l'est du gaz qui circule dans ses conduites et tout autant que la compagnie d'aqueduc a la propri6t6 de 1'eau qui est dans ses tuyaux. Chacune de ces choses, du moment qu'elle est capt6e et rendue utilisable, devient une marchandise que la compagnie exploite commercialement et qu'elle fournit, en lui mesurant le courant au moyen d'un compteur, au consommateur qui en prend livraison. Les fils, les conduites, les tuyaux ne sont que les moyens de livraison.

sont susceptibles de possession et de propridt6 distinctes. Leur propri6taire n'a pas n6cessairement sous sa garde 1'61ectricit6, le gaz ou 1'eau qu'ils contiennent. Nous trouvons dans le dossier de cette cause tous les 616ments des donnies g~n6rales que nous venons d'6noncer. Nous savons que la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas Saint- Laurent produisait l'6nergie blectrique pour fournir 1'6clairage, entre autres h 1'usine de la d6fenderesse. En l'esp~ce, l'6lectricit6 dont il s'agit faisait done 1'objet d'un contrat de fourniture. Le contrat n'a pas 6t6 vers6 au dossier, mais il est constant que, dans le but de 1'ex6cuter, la Compagnie de Pouvoir transportait son produit h un voltage de 2,200 jusqu'A un transformateur pos6 h 50 pieds de 1'usine. A cet endroit, elle livrait a la d6fenderesse un courant de 110 volts, dont cette dernidre prenait possession au moyen de ses propres fils,-que nous avons d~sign6s plus haut sous le nom de fils secondaires. Ces fils et ce courant de 110 volts sont tout ce dont la d6fenderesse pouvait avoir le contr6le et la garde.

Ce courant de 110 volts est le seul pour lequel la d6fenderesse avait pass6 contrat avec la compagnie d'6clairage, le seul qu'elle pouvait s'attendre h recevoir dans son usine. Mais la preuve est indiscutable qu'il n'a exist6 aucun lien causal entre ce courant de 110 volts et la mort de Claveau. Comme nous I'avons constat6 plus haut, la conclusion la plus probable est que cette mort fut provoquie par '6clair qui a rompu le fil primaire.

La seule autre hypothise est qu'elle fut caus6e par le courant de 2,200 volts 6chapp6 du fil primaire. Dans l'un comme dans 1'autre cas, la cause du dommage ne peut 6tre attribu6e , une chose que la d6fenderesse avait sous sa garde.

& GtLF

Dans les circonstances, le fil secondaire et la lampe n'ont t6 que la voie accidentelle par laquelle le courant s'est LESQUE. 6chapp6.

11 aurait pu suivre tout autre conducteur m6tal- Rinfret J lique, comme, par exemple, le fil d'un paratonnerre. Va-ton dire que, dans ce cas, il se ffit identifi6 avec le paratonnerre au point de devenir l6galement la chose du propritaire de l'usine? C'est par hasard que, d6clanch6 dans les conditions impr6vues que 1'on sait, il a suivi d'abord les fils secondaires puis le treillis de la lampe. La " chose " meurtribre, si ce n'6tait pas l'6clair, fut ce courant de 2,200 volts et non la lampe ou son treillis protecteur.

Or, ce courant de 2,200 volts 6tait sous la garde de la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas Saint-Laurent. Ce n'est pas ici le prochs de cette compagnie; il se peut que, appelde A le faire, elle efit d6montr6 qu'elle n'efit " pu emp6cher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage ". Mais c'est elle qui avait le devoir de garder ce courant de 2,200 volts et d'empicher qu'il ne d6passAt la barribre du transformateur. Cette barriare ou ce transformateur 6taient 6galement sous sa garde. " Si ", comme le dit Demogue (Trait6 des Obligations, vol. 5, no 1128), " il y a devoir de garder, la responsabilit6 subsiste si on cesse de garder ". II ajoute (no 1129):

Pour les installations 6lectriques, 'la compagnie d'61ectricit6 r6pond de la chute des poteaux ou des fils le long de ses lignes. Elle est considir6e comme en ayant la garde (Toulouse, 9 f6v. 1910, S. 1910, 2, 275-Bordeaux, juin 1907.

Droit, 23 nov. 1907-Lyon, 25 avril 1899, Gaz. Pal., 1899, 2, 149-Trib. Vire, 22 juin 1922.

Gaz. Pal. 1922, 2, 395), car elle en avait la surveillance et le profit. De mime, si les cables passant A proximit6 d'un toit provoquent un incendie, sa responsabilit6 est engag6e, bien que, pour surveiller les fils au-dessus du toit de 1'abonn6 et son branchement sp~cial, elle ait stipuler le droit de panitrer chez lui. Cette circonstance ne fait pas disparaitre son pouvoir de garde (Toulouse, juin 1912, D. 1914, 2, 174. Rappr. trib. Tours, 9 d6c. 1920, Gaz. Trib. 1921, 2, 454). La compagnie a mime la garde de cette force sp6ciale, I'6lectricit6 qui circule dans ses cables, comme dans le cas ci-dessus, ou dans le cas oil un courant trop fort va tuer l'abonn6 dans sa maison (Grenoble, 6 nov. 1906, D. 1909, 2, 20,

Paris, mars 1919, Gaz. Trib. 1919, 2, 122.

Rev. dr. civil, 1919, p. 504. Rappr. Trib. com. Marseilles, mai 1920. Gaz. Pal. 1920, 2, 436).

Dijh, dans un article publi6 dans la Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil (ann6e 1919, p. 499, h la page 504), le mme auteur avait 6crit:

Pour les compagnies 6lectriques, on admet qu'elles ont la garde des appareils et du courant, et cela non seulement chez elle ou sur la voie [1928J publique passent les fils (Toulouse, 9 fivr. 1910, 8. 1910, 2, 275 et juin 1914, D. 1914, 2, 174), mais mime ches les abonn6s. Cette dernibre solution a 6t6 donn6e soit si celui-ci est tu6 chez lui par l'arriv6e d'un courant trop fort (Grenoble, 6 nov. 1906, D. 1909, 2, 30, Revue. 1907, p. 100), soit s'il est 61ectrocut6 en s'approchant h, Ia suite d'un arrit d'61ectricit6 d'un transformateur 6lectrique que la compagnie devait fournir, poser et entretenir (Paris, 15 mars 1919, Gas. Trib. 1919, 2, 123). La notion de garde est done tris large.

Rinfret J. Cette id6e que la compagnie d'6clairage est responsable de l'6lectricit6 qui s'6chappe est conforme A la jurisprudence. Il y a analogie sur ce point avec la situation du gardien d'un barrage d'eau qui se brise et cause un dommage mat6riel A autrui (Voir la cause de The National Telephone Company v. Baker (1), et aussi ce que dit notre collgue, Monsieur le Juge Duff, dans la cause de Vandry v. The Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Company (2). II est int6ressant, A ce sujet, de lire le jugement du Conseil Priv6 (compos6 de Lord Macnaghten, Lord Shand, Lord Davey, Lord Robertson et Lord Lindley) dans la cause de Eastern & ,South African Telephone Company v. Cape Town Tramways Limited (3).

Notre intention, en y r6f4rant, n'est pas d'en faire l'une des bases de notre jugement, car il est toujours dangereux de chercher un appui dans des arrits prononc6s sous 1'empire de lois diff6rentes; mais l'intirit pour nous r6side dans la fagon dont Lord Robertson, parlant au nom de la cour, traite cette question "of the escaped current" et y r6fbre constamment comme " this electricity having escaped and being at large " * * * " the mode of escape of the electricity."

* * * " Electricity (in the quantity which we are now dealing with) is capable when uncontrolled of producing injury to life and to property; and in the present instance it was artificially generated in such quantity, and it escaped from the respondents' premises and control.

Une partie du jug6 en cette cause fut:

The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher (4) is not inconsistent with the Roman law. It applies to a proprietor who stores electricity on his land if it escapes therefrom and injures a person or (interferes with) the ordinary use of property.

11 convient d'insister cependant sur deux arrits qui ont fait I'application de la loi telle qu'elle est contenue dans l'article 1054 du Code civil de Qu6bec. L'un est de la cour d'appel de Grenoble, France, et l'autre est le jugement du (1) [1893] 2 Ch. 186.

(3) [19021 A.C. 38.

(2) 53 Can. S.C.R., 72, at p. 100.

(4) [18681 L.R. 3 H.L. 330. Conseil Priv6 dans la cause de Quebec R. L. H. and P. Co. v. Vandry (1).

&

La cause de Grenoble est celle de la Socidtd des forces Co.

motrices du Haut Gr6sivaudan v. Veuve Richard (2). Le sieur Richard avait 6t6 foudroy6 par un choc 6lectrique au Rinfret J. moment oii il appr6hendait, dans sa cuisine, pour en cons- tater l'4tat, une lampe 6lectrique mobile qui ne donnait qu'une faible clart6.

Sa veuve, agissant tant en son nom personnel que comme tutrice 16gale de ses quatre enfants, avait poursuivi la Soci6t6 qui fournissait et distribuait 1'6clairage 61ectrique dans la maison de la victime. Lh, comme dans la pr6sente cause, les constatations faites h la suite du d6cks par les mbdecins qui avaient examin6 le cadavre de Richard et par les experts entendus h 'enquote 6tablissaient irrifutablement que la victime avait 6t6 foudroyde (nous citons le jugement)

par un courant d'une tension excessive, sup6rieur de plusieurs milliers de volts h celui que le transformateur, qui regoit le courant primaire, doit distribuer aux abonnis, et qu'ainsi cet accident est le r~sultat direct de 1'installation 6lectrique- de la Soci6t6 et du fonctionnement de son transformateur.

La cour, en rendant jugement, rappelle d'abord le principle de l'article 1384 C.N., d'aprbs lequel on est responsalble non-seulement du dommage que 1'on cause par sa propre faute, mais encore de celui qui est caus6 par le fait des choses que l'on a sous sa garde. Elle procde ensuite h dire:

La Socit6 des forces motrices a la garde de l'installation qui est son auvre, h 1'aide de laquelle elle distribue de Ia lumibre 41ectrique, et il est constant que l'accident mortel survenu h Richard, dans son habitation, au moment oii il saisissait de Ia main gauche une lampe mobile a 6t caus6 par Ia chose m8me de Ia Socit6, puisque Richard a 6t6 foudroy6 par le courant qui circulait sur Ia ligne ext6rieure et qui a t transmis presque int6gralement au fil qui desservait son installation int6rieure.

Apris avoir insist6 de cette fagon sur le fait que la "chose" qui a cause le dommage fut le courant qui circulait sur Ia ligne ext~rieure et qui a 6t, transmis presque intigralement au fil qui desservait son installation int6rieure, la cour rend bien claire son id6e que ce courant doit 6tre envisag6 comme une "chose" distincte de l'installation 6lectrique, des fils conducteurs et de la. lampe mobile, car elle ajoute:

Il est ainsi sans int&rit de rechercher si Richard avait la charge de l'entretien et de Ia r6paration de son installation int6rieure qu'il avait (1) A.C.

pay6e, au dire de la Soci6t6. II suffit de consid6rer, pour la solution du litige, que sa mort a & d6terminde par I'afflux sur le fil qui transporte la force 61eotrique d'un courant extr~mement fort qui est arriv4 presque force6leotique& int6gralement sur le fil de Richard alors qu'il ne devait normalement lul 6tre transmis par le transformateur que trbs diminu6 et A l'6tat de courant secondaire.

Ind6pendamment de la question de faute personnelle de la Socift6 des forces motrices ou de la faute des pr6pos6s au Rinfret J. fonctionnement du transformateur ou h la distribution du courant, la conclusion de la cour de Grenoble fut que la Soci6t6 6tait responsable envers la veuve Richard, h raison du fait que le courant 6lectrique 6tait sous sa garde. Pour employer les termes du jugement, la cour a tenu ladite Socidt6 responsable envers la veuve Richard Es qualit6, du fait dommageable de la chose dont elle a la garde, et de la mort du sieur Richard, etc.

Mais la cause de Qu6bec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Company v. Vandry (1) m6rite ici une attention sp6ciale. Il s'agissait 1A aussi "of the escape of the electric current". Nous empruntons des Law Reports ce court r6sum6 des faits:

The appellant company, acting under statutory powers, had erected along a road in Quebec two overhead cables for the distribution of electric current at tensions of 2,200 volts and 108 volts respectively, and they supplied current at 108 volts to the respendents' premises.

A violent wind (not amounting to force majeure) tore a branch from a tree growing about 28 feet away from the cables, and drove it against them. In consequence the cables were broken down, and the high tension current found its way along the low tension cable into the respondents' premises, and caused a fire. The respondents brought an action for damages against the appellants:- Comme on s'en souvient, la compagnie Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power fut d6clar6e responsable par le Conseil Priv6. Et l'on voit la similitude des faits entre cette cause et le cas qui nous occupe. LA, le fil primaire avait 6t6 rompu par une branche d'arbre transport6e par un vent violent.

Ici, le fil primaire a t6 rompu par un 6clair. Dans les deux cas, comme cons6quence de cet accident, le courant de 2200 volts s'est communiqu6 du fil primaire au fil secondaire. A la maison Vandry, le courant 6lectrique 6tait fourni h 108 volts; A 1'usine de la compagnie Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway, il 6tait fourni A 110 volts. Chose digne de remarque, dans la cause de Vandry comme dans la pr6sente, on avait trouv6

(1) [1920] A.C. 662.

(ici de 110 volts). Et ce n'est pas parce qu'elle fut trouv6e coupable de faute ou de quasi-d6lit que la compagnie Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power fut condamn6e. La base du jugement du Conseil Priv6 fut le principe de la Rinfret J. garde de la chose. Le point sur lequel nous devons insister dans cette d6cision et dans celle de la cour d'appel de Grenoble est le suivant: Ces tribunaux ont considbr6 que le courant 61ectrique excessif, sup6rieur h elui que le transformateur devait distribuer aux abonn6s, 6tait la chose qui avait cause le dommage; et 'bien qu'il fit, dans le premier cas, dans la lampe mobile qui appartenait h Richard, et, dans le second cas, dans 1'installation intirieure de la maison de Vandry, nonobstant cela, ce courant 6lectrique continuait aux yeux de la loi, d'6tre sous la garde de la compagnie d'&clairage.

Il suffit d'ajouter que si, dans chacun de ces deux cas, le tribunal de Grenoble et le Conseil Priv6 avaient envisag6 le courant 6lectrique comme' faisant partie de l'installation int6rieure ou de la lampe mobile, le r6sultat esit 6t6 diff6rent. Comme la lampe mobile 6tait sous la garde de Richard, et comme l'installation int6rieure 6tait sous la garde de Vandry, par application du principe de la garde de la chose, le r6sultat in6luctable efit t6 que la veuve Richard ou Vandry eussent t6 ddbout6s de leur action. Nous devons done ici appliquer de la mime fagon la rbgle de l'article 1054 C.C. en concluant que la chose qui a caus6 la mort de Claveau (h savoir le courant 6lectrique de 2,200 volts) 6tait sous la garde de la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas Saint-Laurent, et non pas sous la garde de la d6fenderesse.

Comme cons6quence, suivant nous, 'Faction qui a t6 intent6e contre cette dernibre devait tre rejet6e. L'appel doit done 6tre maintenu et le jugement de premibre instance r6tabli, avec d6pens tant devant cette cour que devant la Cour du Bane du Roi, si la compagnie appelante juge h propos de les r6clamer des intims.

J. (dissenting).-I concur with Mr. Justice Duff. Appeal allowed with costs.