appeal, from the judgment of Jenks J. (1), given on the findings of the jury at the trial, dismissing the plaintiff's action as to the first two policies of life insurance in question, but directing cancellation of the third one. The plaintiff's action was for a declaration that three contracts of life insurance were null and void, on grounds hereinafter mentioned.
The formal judgment of the Court en bane ordered " that the motion for a new trial asserted by the plaintiff herein be and the same is hereby allowed "; that " the crossmotion asserted by the defendant herein be and the same is hereby dismissed "; and that "upon the plaintiff paying or tendering to the defendant the amount of all premiums paid to the plaintiff in respect of [the three policies in question in the action], less any balance of costs that may be taxed in favour of the plaintiff
* *
* the said [three policies in question] be and the same are hereby cancelled and rescinded and shall forthwith be delivered to the plaintiff for cancellation."
The following statement of the case and of the proceedings below is taken from the judgment of Lamont J., who delivered the reasons for the judgment of this Court.
" The question to be decided in this appeal is: Was there evidence before the jury on which it could reasonably find that Hyman Brody believed he was in good health when he made certain applications for insurance on his own life with the respondent company?
" The applications were made on the following dates, namely, December 9th, 1925; February 15th, 1926, and
March 10th, 1926. In each application Brody made the following representation:- " Pursuant to each of these applications a policy was issued to Brody. After issuing the last of these policies, the company received information which led it to believe that
Brody had not been in good health when he applied for insurance, and, on December 17th, 1926, it brought this action and asked for a declaration that the three contracts of insurance entered into with Brody were null and void
S.C.R.