ed with care in order to avoid such a result, and that a faulty bevel- or mitre-joint would be a potential and not improbable cause of their failure to withstand the great pressure to which they became subject when the level of the water in the lower lock was reduced.
It must be remembered that it was the duty of the lockmaster and his men to see that an accident did not happen through lack of reasonable and proper care in the working of the gates, and the fact that such an extraordinary occurrence took place from a cause which, upon the evidence, may probably have consisted in their neglect, affords the basis of a finding, especially when, as in this case, there is no proof of any competing cause. I think there is here a preponderance of probability which constitutes sufficient ground for the finding of the learned trial judge. In Cooper v. Slade (1), Willes J., refers to the proposition as elementary that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict, and he says that, so long since as the 14th of Elizabeth, Chief Justice Dyer and a majority of the other Justices of the Common Pleds laid it.down that, when the parties are at issue the Justices may, if the matter be doubtful, Newis v. Lark (2). I see no reason to doubt that the present case should be governed by that rule, and the appeal therefore fails.
Solicitor for the appellant: Aimg Geoffrion.
Solicitors for the respondent: Atwater, Bond & Beaure- GRENIER MOTOR CO. v. BERNIER
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (3), reversing the judgment of the trial judge, Wilson J., and maintaining the respondent's action for cancellation of the sale of an automobile.
The trial judge dismissed the action and the appellate court reversed the judgment.
The Supreme Court of Canada, at the conclusion of the argument of the appellant's counsel and without calling in the respondent's counsel, dismissed the appeal.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Chas. Laurendeau K.C. and Jules Desmarais K.C. for the appellant.
Eug. Lafleur K.C. and N. K. Laflamme K.C. for the respondent.
HALL v. KNOX
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (1), reversing the judgment of the trial judge, Macdonald J., and maintaining the respondents' action.
The respondents brought an action in damages against the appellants based on the alleged repudiation by the latter of a contract by correspondence in relation with the sale of timber limits in British Columbia.
The trial judge dismissed the action, holding that the appellants were in the circumstances of the case justified in repudiating the contract; but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was allowed with costs and the judgment of the trial judge was restored.
Appeal allowed with costs. I. F. Hellmuth K.C. and W. F. Johnson for the appellant.
D. L. McCarthy K.C. for the respondent.