Town of Montreal West v. Hough

THE TOWN OF MONTREAL WEST

DAME SARAH HOUGH

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King's Bench, Appeal Side, province of Quebec (1), affirming, except as to the quantum of damages, the judgment of the trial court, Weir J. (2), and maintaining the respondent's action for damages occasioned to her by the death of her natural son. The material facts of the case and the quegbions at issue are stated in the judgments now reported.

respondent.

C.J.C.-The defendant appeals from the judgment of the majority of the Court of King's Bench modifying, but only as to the amount allowed, the judgment of Weir J. upholding the plaintiff's claim.

The action was brought by the natural mdther of David Hough, who was killed, as the plaintiff alleged, by the negligence of the defendant. In the view we take of the matter, the existence or non-existence of negligence is of little consequence. Upon that point, however, as at present advised, we should not be prepared to disturb the judgment of the Superior Court, affirmed, as it has been, by the majority (4-1) of the Court of King's Bench. The principal grounds of appeal to this court are: (1) that the respondent had no legal claim for alimentary support upon the late David Hough as her natural son; and

(2) that the death of David Hough was not due to any negligence on the part of the appellant, but was due to his own fault.

Upon the second ground, as already stated, we will not interfere. The true question upon this branch of the case is not as to the weight of evidence in support of the judgment maintaining liability, but rather as to whfether there is any evidence to justify the finding of negligence against the defendant and the inferences on which that finding rests. The appellant undertakes an almost impossible task when he seeks to convinee us, in the face of opinions to the contrary already expressed by the learned trial judge and four judges of the Court of King's Bench, that there is no such evidence. In our opinion, there is evidence which, if believed, was sufficient to justify the inferences drawn by the trial judge on which he based his finding of negligence; and there is also enough to warraint his having acquitted the victim of the accident of any contributory negligence. Nor is the balance of the testimony so clearly and overwhelmingly against the plaintiff that we would be justified on that ground in, setting aside the concurrent judgments below. These questions really depend on the appreciation of the evidence, both as to its veracity and as to the inferences of fact to which it gives rise. They were eminently matters for the consideration of the trial judge in the firdt instance; and, his views upon them having been affirmed on appeal, error therein must be demonstrated to our satisfaction in order to justify interference. This is the settled jurisprudence of this court. Such error has not been demonstrated; interference, therefore, on this aspect of the case is out of the question. In regard to the quantum of damages allowed-$4,500 at the trial, reduced to $2,500 in the Court of King's Bench, there was in the latter court considerable divergence of views. Guerin J. would affirm the judgment as it was; Allard J. would reduce the damages to the amount allowed by the Court of King's Bench, $2,500; Lafontaine C.J. did not discuss the matter, but probably agreed with one or the other of these two; Ldtourneau J., on the other hand, would reduce the recovery to $500; and Hall J. would dismiss the action, or, if compelled to allow damages, would make a Al reduction to $750. The practice of this court is not to interfere in the quantum of damages fixed by a provincial court of appeal, unless error in regard to the principle on which they have been assessed is shewn, or there is really no evidence to warrant the allowance. Here no error in principle is established; and the matter is merely one of appreciation of the sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., whether its weight was adequate to sustain the amount of the award. Following our usual practice in . such matters, although, were the matter res integra, we would probably have given a smaller sum, we should, we think, decline to interfere with the amount allowed for damages.

As was stated to counsel for the respondent in the course of the argument, it seems abundantly clear that the only right of action which the respondent can have must be based on that article, and that, under art. 1053 C.C., she can have no claim for " damages occasioned by the death " of her son. It may well be that, were there no art. 1056 C.C., the terms of art. 1053 C.C. would be deemed in se sufficiently wide to cover a claim for damages caused by the death of one killed through fault of the defendant, as has been held in France (where they have no provision corresponding to art. 1056 C.C.) in regard to the scope of arts. 1382-3 C.N., which cover substantially the same field as art. 1053 C.C. But the presence in the Civil Code of Quebec of art. 1056, providing expressly for the case of " damages occasioned by death " and directing that there shall be but one action, which is to embrace all the damages caused by such death, makes it clear that the intention MoE the legislature was to restrict claims for " damages occasioned by death " to cases within the purview of that article and to preclude actions under art. 1053 C.C. for such claims. (Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1) ). So far, at all events, the matter may be regarded as settled in this court by the views to that effect unanimously expressed in Regent Taxi & Transport Co., Ltd. v. Congregation des Petits Frbres de Marie (2).

Moreover, the plaintiff's claim being under art. 1056 C.C., of which Lord Campbell's Act was the prototype (Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (3) ), prima facie at least, the basis for estimating the damages recoverable in this action (common fault having been excluded) should be the same as under the English statute (City Bank v. Barrow (4) ). Of course, as was pointed out in Miller v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (5), Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Parent (6) and elsewhere, there are, in other respects, noteworthy differences between the provisions of art. 1056 C.C. and those of Lord Campbell's Act (Regent Taxi & Transport Co., Ltd. v. Congregation des Petits Frbres de Marie (7); but we do not find anything in art. 1056 C.C. to justify our treating it as affording, to a plaintiff in Quebec, only some basis on which his damages must be estimated less liberal than that afforded by Lord Campbell's Act. Under that statute in England, and as adopted in Ontario, it is well settled that, while there can be no recovery for anything except actual loss susceptible of pecuniary appraisal sustained by the plaintiff and those whom he represents (Jennings v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.) (8), " a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit " from the continued life of the deceased is all that a plaintiff need show in order to found a claim for damages, a legal right on his part against the deceased to alimentary support or otherwise, being unnecessary. (Mayne on Damages (10th ed.), p. 516, note (b)).

The jurisprudence under art. 1056 C.C. is to the same effect.

Thus, it was early settled that damages recover- OF able under that article do not include anything by way of compensation for solatiun doloris as distinct from pecuniary loss (Montreal v. Labelle (1); Jeannotte v. Couillard IoUan. (2); Bouchard v. Gauthier (3); and it is equally well established that a reasonable expectation, on the part of the plaintiff, of advantage from the deceased, the worth of which is estimable in money, suffices in an action against a wrongdoer responsible for the death of the victim of his fault (Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lachance (4); Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson (5); Bernard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (6); Hunter v. Gingras (7); Dumphy v. Montreal L.H. & P. Co. (8).

We find Mr. Justice Duff, with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Girouard, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lachance (9), at p. 208, after alluding to the question of the right to solatium, saying,

The jury may unquestionably take into consideration every other loss and every other disadvantage which are in the natural and ordinary course attributable to the death out of which the action arises and can fairly be appraised in money.

And I added, with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Idington, (p. 209),

If the only element for consideration in estimating the damages in this case were the actual wages or earnings of the deceased, the task of the appellants in impeaching the verdict would be less difficult. But for loss of his services at home-of his care and protection of his wife and family-of his assistance in husbanding the family resources-for the loss of these and other kindred and substantial benefits and advantages, of which the death of the husband and father has deprived them, the plaintiffs were justified in asking compensation from the jury under art. 1056 C.C., which declares them entitled to recover "all damages occasioned by such death."

We are accordingly of the opinion that upon the first ground of appeal, as stated, the appeal cannot succeed. It may be that, under the common law of Quebec, compensation in the case of death might have included an al- (1) (1888) 14 Can. S.C.R. 741.

(5) (1887) Can. S.C.R. 105. (2) (1894) Q.R. 3 K.B. 461, at

(6) (1896) Q.R. S.C. 69. 495-8.

(7) (1921) Q.R. 33 K.B. 403, at (3) (1911)

17 RL., N.S. 244.

409, 412.

(4) (1909) 42 Can. S.C.R. 205.

(8) (1905) Q.R. 28 S.C. at 27. (9) (1909) 42 Can. 8 S.C.R. 205.

lowance for solatium doloris (Ravary v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1); Hunter v. Gingras (2). It is also possible that a legal right to alimentary support, or something of the kind, from the deceased victim of the defendant's fault was essential to enable the plaintiff to sue.

But, under the common law of Scotland, which, we are ci.c.

assured by Mr. Justice Aylwin in the Ravary case (3), was, in these matters, " identical with " that of Quebec, the right to solatium was not recognized (or, in other words, the law did not recognize the supposed feeling of affection on the assumed injury to which that right to solatium was founded), except in the case of husband and wife, or ascendants and descendants. It did not recognize the right of collaterals to pursue an action for reparation of wrong done them on the ground of solatium, even though they were, as sisters, dependent upon their deceased brother for patrimonial support, since that dependence and that interest are quite irrespective of relationship and may exist where there is no relationship at all (Eisten v. North British Ry. Co. (4).

As the Lord President (Inglis) observed in that case, This passage was cited with approval by Lord Young in Weir v. Coltness Iron Co., Ltd. (5).

Quebec, however, is, in this matter, no longer under the regime of the common law, but is under a statutory provision, viz., art. 1056 C.C.; and it is on the construction of that article that the right of the plaintiff to maintain the present action must depend.

We have dwelt at considerable length upon the two grounds of appeal taken and discussed at bar to make it clear that neither of them affords a reason for setting aside. the judgment appealed against and that it is, accordingly, necessary (Art. 10 C.C.), in order to dispose of this appeal, to consider the broader question suggested from the Bench (the negative of which counsel for the appellant tacitly declined to argue), viz., whether a natural mother is a ci.c. " mere," or, an " ascendant relation," within the meaning of those terms as used in art. 1056 C.C., and its converse, whether an illegitimate son is an " enfant," or a " descendant relation," within the purview of the same article. This attitude of counsel probably accounts for the status of the plaintiff having apparently been taken for granted in the provincial courts (Mignault, Droit Civil, vol. 1, p. 108; but see Japiot, Proc. Civ. et Com., (1929 ed.) no. 160; McFarran v. The Montreal Park and Island Railway Co. (1). The learned judges in the Court of King's Bench appear to have devoted their attention largely to a consideration of the question whether or not the plaintiff had a legal claim for alimentary support upon the deceased, her natural son, the majority concluding that she had such a claim; and, on that ground, they maintained her status to sue. Mr. Justice Hall, who dissented, took the opposite view of this point and based his conclusion that the plaintiff had no status chiefly, if not solely, upon that ground, But it seems immaterial whether the plaintiff had, or had not, a legal claim for alimentary support, since she had, in fact, a reasonable expectation of receiving support in future from her deceased natural son.

The amendment of 1930 (20 Geo. V, c. 98, s. 1) not being retroactive, it is still advisable, in cases such as this arising before that date, to consider both the English and the French versions of art. 1056 C.C. in dealing with this question.

In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that the statute, as originally enacted (Can. 10-11 Vic., c. 6; C.S.C. 1859, c. 78), which was applicable to both Upper Canada and Lower Canada and was the predecessor of art. 1056 C.C., contained a definition (s. 6), which gave the word " parent " there used a meaning that included " father and mother, grandfather and grandmother, stepfather and step-mother," and to the word " child " a meaning that included " son and daughter, grandson and granddaughter, step-son and step-daughter." This corresponded to s. 5 of the original Lord Campbell's Act (9-10 Vic. Imp., c. 63).

Indeed, the Canadian Act of 1847 is practically a verbatim copy of the Imperial Act of 1846, except that the latter did not contain anything equivalent to s. 3 of the Canadian Act, which had to do with duels, etc. But the interpretation clause has now disappeared and we are left to deal with the words of art. 1056 C.C. without its aid. In England it was early decided, in Dickenson v. North Eastern Ry. Co. (1), that an illegitimate child is not within the statute (9-10 Vic., c. 93), Pollock C.B., saying,

Bramwell B., Channel B., and Pigott B., concurred. This decision was in accordance with the well established rule of English law that, where the word " child " is used, either in a private document or in an Act of Parliament, it connotes, as a rule, a legitimate child only; and, conversely, where the words " father " and " mother " are used they signify lawful parents only. (R. v. Totley (2); R. v. Birmingham (3); R. v. Maude (4); Hill v. Crook (5); Dorin v. Dorin (6).

In Helton v. Lidlynch (7), Lee C.J. said, and Chapple J. concurring, said, and Wright J. added that

The same idea prevailed in France (Ferribre, Dict. de Dr., vbo. " Enfants ") S. 52, 2, 35; P. 51, 1,660.

We can conceive of no reason why a different intention should be imputed to the legislature of Quebec. It would be a libel on that province to suggest that (except, perhaps, in the particular covered by art. 237, discussed below,) illegitimacy is there less disfavoured by law than it is in England, or in any province of Canada whose legal system is based on the English common law. Moreover, as Lord TowN OF Sumner observed in Quebec Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Vandry (1), speaking of arts. 1053 and 1054 C.C., the statutory character 'of the Civil Code of Lower Canada must always be borne in mind * * *, (It) is and always must be remembered to be the language of a legislature established within the British Empire. And, to adapt and apply language used of Art. 1056 C.C. by Viscount Haldane, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Parent (2),

*The presumption to be made is that in enacting art. 1056 the Quebec Legislature meant, as an act of the Imperial Parliament would be construed as meaning, to confine the special remedy conferred to cases of (claims by legitimate parents and children).

There is, in their Lordships' opinion, nothing in the context of the chapter of the Code in which the article occurs which displaces this presumption of its construction. The rule of interpretation is a natural one where law, as in the case of both Quebec and England (is based upon fundamental Christian morality). No doubt the Quebec legislature could impose many obligations in respect of (illegitimate children and natural parents); but, in the case of art. 1056 there does not appear to exist any sufficient reason for holding that it has intended to do so, and by so doing to place claims for torts committed (against illegitimates) in Quebec on a footing differing from that on which the general rule of (fundamental morality observed in the Imperial Parliament) would place them.

When, therefore, the legislature of Quebec speaks of father, mother and children (" phre, mere et enfants ") it must be taken to mean thereby, in the absence of clear indication to the contrary, lawful father, lawful mother and legitimate children, i.e., father and mother joined in lawful wedlock and the children of such a union. Indeed, the code itself suggests that this view prevailed with the legislature in enacting it. Thus, amongst the obligations arising from marriage, we find, by art. 166 C.C., that

Children are bound to maintain their father, mother and other ascendants, who are in want.

And, by art. 168 C.C., it is declared that

The obligations which result from these provisions are reciprocal. Nevertheless, in order to extend their application, even partially, to illegitimate children, it was thought necessary to provide, as was done by art. 240 C.C., that

The forced or voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother of their illegitimate child, gives the latter the right to demand maintenance from each of them according to circumstances.

(1) [1920] A.C. 662, at 671-2.

(2) [19171 A.C. 195, at 205-6. *(Passages in brackets indicate adaptations).

So, it is seen that when the Code deals with illegitimate TowN children it does so specifically and does not include them MOE under the general description of children.

There is no counterpart of art. 168 C.C. applicable to art. 240 C.C. Moreover, it will be noted that, whereas art. 166 C.C. declares the obligations of lawful children towards their parents, art. 240, conversely, declares the obligations of parents to their illegitimate children. If it were material, we would have to consider whether the dissenting opinion of Hall J., that no legal obligation for alimentary support of natural parents is imposed on their illegitimate children, should not prevail.

That the common law of Scotland also excluded from its description of " father " and " mother " persons not joined in matrimony who had children, and from the term "children" their bastard progeny, is also abundantly clear. It was so decided in Weir v. Coltness Iron Co. (1), above cited, it being there held that the mother of a bastard child has no title to sue an action of reparation in respect of his death.

This view was confirmed by the House of Lords in Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co. (2), where it was held that a parent of an illegitimate child has, by the law of Scotland, no right of action against a person whose negligence has caused its death. I quote this significant passage from the judgment of Lord Watson (p. 418),

As matter of fact, it cannot be disputed that, although for a century past actions for solatium and damages have been sustained at the instance of husband, wife, or legitimate child, in respect of the death of a spouse, a child, or a parent, a similar action at the instance of a natural parent or child had never (with one exception, which appears to me to be of no moment) been heard of in the law of Scotland. In my opinion, the rule which admits the former class of suits does not rest upon any definite principle, capable of extension to other cases which may seem to be analagous; but constitutes an arbitrary exception from the general law which excludes all such actions founded in inveterate custom, and having no other ratio to support it. I venture to think that the Lord President in Eisten v. North British Rly. Co. did not mean to suggest that the rule (or rather the exception) was capable of being extended to cases other than those in which it had already been received.

To my mind, it is evident that by "nearness of relationship" his lordship meant legal relationship; because he treats as an essential element of the pursuer's claim the right to demand solatium, which is a right to reparation for disruption of the family tie, and therefore impossible in the case of natural parent (1) (1889) 16 Ct. Sess. 614.

(2) [1891] A.C.

and child; and also because his lordship subsequently describes the connection between a bastard and his putative father as "one which the law TWO cannot recognize."

In Wood v. Gray & Son (1), Lord Watson, speaking of WEST Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co. (2), said

HoGn. The practical effect of your Lordships' decision was to limit the class to persons standing in the legitimate relation of husband, father, wife, mother or child, to the deceased. In Eisten v. North British Ry. Co. (3), which is the leading authority upon this branch of the law, the Lord President (Inglis) observed:

"As the existence of such claims in our oommon law is a peculiarity of our system, it is not desirable to extend this class of actions, unless they can be justified on some principle which has already been established."

In that observation, which has been repeatedly made, in different terms, by other judges of the Court of Session, I entirely concur.

It is, therefore, abundantly clear that, by the common law of Scotland (and by the common law of Quebec, if they be identical, as Mr. Justice Aylwin in Ravary's case (4), assures us that, in these matters, they are), the mother of an illegitimate child was not within the class of persons who were entitled to maintain actions for " damages occasioned by death."

That art. 1056 C.C. was intended to restrict, rather than to enlarge, the class of persons entitled to maintain such actions has been the basis of more than one judgment in Quebec. Thus in Hunter v. Gingras (5), we find that the head-note reads, in part, as follows:

L'article 1056 C. civ., tir6 du chapitre 78 S. ref. du Canada, reproduisant la loi 10-11 Victoria, ch. 6, n'a pas cree un recours 16gal qui n'existait pas auparavant; il a simplement modifi6 ce recours qui existait en France depuis des sidcles, en le restreignant aux plus proches parents, en donnant h ceux-ci une seule action, en 6tablissant la prescription d'un an, et en refusant le recours lorsque le difunt lui-mAme a obtenu compensation.

Again, in St. Laurent v. La Cie de Telephone de Kamouraska (6), it was held that the action under art. 1056 C.C. belongs exclusively to the persons mentioned in the article qui est restrictif et doit 6tre interprt6th l a lettre.

The court there decided that the stepfather had no cause of action under art. 1056 C.C. in his own right; but, being in community with his wife, he could, as head of the community, maintain an action on behalf of the community in (1) [18921 A.C. 576, at 581.

(4) (1860) 6 L.CJ. 49, at 50. (2) [1891] A.C. 412.

(5) (1921) Q.R. 33 K.B. 403.

(6) (1905) 7 Q.P.R. 293. 980, at 984.

her right. See too Bonin v. The King (1). And, in Dionne v. La Compagnie des Chars Urbains (2), we find it held that an adopted child, not being recognized by the Civil Code, the adopting father could not claim damages for his HouGn.

death under art. 1056 C.C.

AngJn

Again, in Gohier v. Allan (3), it was held that

By the terms of art. 1056 C.C. the only persons who have a right of action for the death of a person resulting from a quasi-delict, are his consort, and ascendant or descendant relatives; the brothers and sisters have no such right of action.

The plaintiffs failed in that case because they were not included within the enumeration of the persons entitled to maintain an action. (See, too, Ruest v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (4), and Tessier v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (5).

In Ruest v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., we find Mr. Justice McCord saying,

But no such action lies except under the terms of article 1056, the express inclusiveness of which excludes the right of any other persons than those therein mentioned. According to the terms of this article the " consort and ascendant and descendant relations " can alone have the right to claim damages for death occasioned by quasi-offence.

This passage is explicitly approved by that great civilian, Strong J., in Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (6). While there is a marked dearth of direct authority in the Quebec courts on the question at issue, there is, at least, one case in the Court of Queen's Bench (Provost v. Jackson (7) ), decided three years after the code was enacted, but upon the law as it stood before the code (as contained in C.S.C., c. 78), in which it was held, affirming the Superior Court in banco, which had agreed with the learned trial judge, that legal proof of the marriage of parents suing to recover damages for the death of their son was a sine qua non of the right to recover in the action. The point is put in these words by Johnson J. ad hoc (p. 170), with the concurrance of Duval C.J., Mackay A.J. and Torrance J. ad hoc,

The ground on which the Court goes is this: The statute gives a right of action to surviving parents in certain cases. Now, in the present case, the parents have not proved their relationship; therefore there is no right of action.

(1) (1918) 18 Can. Ex. C.R. 150,

(4) (1878) 4 QL.R. 181. at 158.

(5) (1898) 5 R. de J. 1. (2) (1895) Q.R. 7 S.C. 449.

(6) (1887) Can. S.C.R. 105, at (3) (1906) 8 QP.R. 129.

119-120.

(7) (1869) 13 L.CJ. 170.

and, as explained by Mackay A.J.,

This means that a valid marriage was essential to the plaintiff's right of action.

Caron J., who alone dissented, appears to rest his opinion chiefly on the grounds that the general denial in the defendant's plea of the allegations of the plaintiffs (which included the facts of their own lawful marriage and of the filiation of the deceased victim) did not suffice to put those facts in issue (See Royal Institution v. Picard (1); and that they were, in any event, sufficiently established in the case.

Nor is there any difference in substance between the enacting language of the statute (C.S.C., c. 78, s. 2) (excluding from consideration s. 6), which required that and the terms of art. 1056 C.C., which enacts that

There can be no reason whatever for holding that, while the father and mother bringing the action as "parents," under s. 2 of C.S.C., c. 78, must have established that they were the lawful parents of the deceased victim by legal proof of their marriage, the like proof may be dispensed with where the right of action is given to the father and mother (" pare et mare "), as it is in the terms of art. 1056 C.C. (French version).

Provost v. Jackson (2), must therefore, be regarded as a distinct authority supporting a negative answer to the question under consideration. It is cited without any adverse comment by Strong J., at p. 109, and by Taschereau J., at p. 126, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson (3). The following observation of Lord Watson, in Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co. (4), already quoted, seems to me to apply to the local situation, if the last word thereof be TowN changed from " Scotland " to " Quebec."

As matter of fact, it cannot be disputed that, although for a century past actions for solatium and damages have been sustained at the instance HoUoH.

of husband, wife, or legitimate child, in respect of the death of a spouse, a child, or a parent, a similar action at the instance of a natural parent or child had never (with one exception, which appears to me to be of no moment) been heard of in the law of Scotland.

Indeed, the recorded jurisprudence of the province of Quebec, as well under art. 1056 C.C. as under the statute which prevailed before it, and under the common law, which preceded the statute, presents no parallel to Renton v. North British Railway Company (1), the solitary case (of first instance) in the Scottish reports so slightingly alluded to by Lord Watson.

Nor is the plight of the plaintiff better if regard be had to the terms of the English version of art. 1056 C.C., which gives the right of action to " ascendant and descendant relations." The words " relations " and " relatives " are, for the present purpose, synonymous and interchangeable (Murray's Oxford Dictionary, pp. 398-9); both prima facie, import the idea of legal or lawful relationship.

When people speak of man or woman as brother or sister, son or daughter, unless they say something to the contrary, I think the meaning is legitimate son or daughter, brother or sister. (Smith v. Tebbitt (2), per Sir J. P. Wilde.)

Either word, " relations " or " relatives," may, if the circumstances or context necessarily imply that intention, include connections by blood only, i.e., illegitimate relations or relatives. Thus, we find Lord Herschell saying in Seale- Hayne v. Jodrell (3), where, with the other members of the court, he found that there was enough clearly to indicate such intention,

It is of course not open to dispute that the word " relatives " according to its natural interpretation, if there were nothing to show that another meaning was to be attributed to it, would not include those who were what may be termed natural blood relations, but whose parents or grandparents were not born in wedlock, and who therefore were not in the eye of the law related to the testator.

(1) (1869) 6 Sc. L.R. 255.

(2) (1867) L.R. 1 P. & D. 354, at (3) [1891] A.C. 304.

A like view was taken In re Wood where the difficulty of importing such an intention is dealt with by Vaughan Williams L.J.; and In re Corsellis (2).

As illustrative of the strictness with which American courts construe the term " relations " when found in statutes dealing with their rights, reference may be had to C.c. Kimball v. Story (3), and Horton v. Earl (4).

In the former a step-son was held not to be a child or relation, within the meaning of Gen. Stats., c. 92, s. 28, which saved from lapsing, by predecease of the devisee or legatee, any devise or bequest made " to a child or other relation " of a testator; in the latter, a brother-in-law was held not to be a " relation " within a like provision of the Pub. Sts., c. 127, s. 23; and in both instances the bequests were held to have lapsed.

(See also In re Renton's Estate (5); and Smith v. Knights of Maccabees (6).

It would seem, therefore, equally clear, whether we take the French or the English version of art. 1056 C.C., that neither natural parents nor illegitimate children are within its purview.

A somewhat ingenious suggestion was made in the course of consideration of this case, viz., that the plaintiff might invoke arts. 237 and 239 C.C. in aid of her status. These articles read as follows:

But there is here no evidence whatever to indicate that John Barnes, whom the plaintiff married some nine years after the birth of her natural son David Hough (to wit, on the 15th October, 1883), was his father. Had that been the case, the plaintiff would certainly have said so when obliged, in the course of her examination on commission, to admit that David Hough was her natural son. Moreover, in addition to the most significant fact that the deceased David Hough never took the name of Barnes but always adhered to his mother's maiden name, Hough, we have the testimony of George Barnes, a son born of the marriage of John Barnes with the plaintiff, and a witness for her, that David Hough was his half-brother, thus indicating that, although born of the same mother, they had been begotten by different fathers. There can be no presumption in favour of the paternity of John Barnes; and the burden of proving it rested on the plaintiff. (Provost v. Jackson (1); see, too, art. 241 C.C.).

The essential basis, therefore, for the application of art. 237 (Lahay v. Lahay (2) ), viz., that David Hough was the son of John Barnes and Sarah Hough, is entirely lacking. In fact, the only fair inference from the evidence in the record is that John Barnes was not his father.

It was strongly urged at bar that a construction of art. 1056 C.C. excluding natural parents and illegitimate children savours of barbarism and would shock the sensibilities of persons holding enlightened views, and that, accordingly, the courts should give to it a construction more consistent with humane and liberal ideas. The short answer to this contention is that the courts must await the action of the legislature, whose exclusive province it is to determine what should be the law. Whatever may occur elsewhere (1929, Canadian Bar Review, vol. VII, p. 617) it would seem to be the plan of this " Court of Law and Equity " (R.S.C. (1927), c. 35, s. 3), to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, not to make the law as they think it should be. Judicis est jur dicere, non dare.

The appeal will, therefore, be allowed, but without costs throughout.

J.-I have had the privilege of reading the judgment of the Chief Justice, as well as those of Mr. Justice Rinfret and Mr. Justice Cannon. I have no doubt that the rule of interpretation which the law of Quebec requires us to apply to art. 1056 limits " mother " to women who stand towards a victim in a maternal relation recognized by the law. To put it more pointedly, the article does not admit the claim of a mother in respect of the death of an illegitimate child.

One additional observation I feel obliged to make. We have before us a dry question of law, and I do not think it incumbent upon me to express either approval or condemnation of the well known traditional attitude of the common law, of England as well as of France, towards Iouan. illegitimacy.

D J We are, in consequence, constrained to allow the appeal, but I agree with my brother Rinfret that the plaintiff should not be required to pay costs here or below.

J.-L'intim6e, qui 6tait la demanderesse en Cour Sup6rieure, a poursuivi l'appelante, la ville de Montr6al-Ouest, pour lui r6clamer les dommages-int6rats r6sultant du d6chs de David Hough. Dans sa d6claration, elle a alligu6 que David Hough 6tait son fils et que la mort de ce dernier 6tait attribuable A la faute et A la n6gligence de la ville et de ses employ6s.

La Cour Sup6rieure a jug6 que le d6cks de Hough 6tait A la n6gligence des employ6s de la ville et a accord6 A I'intimbe une somme de $4,500. de dommages.

La majorit6 de la Cour du Bane du Roi a confirm6 ce jugement sur la question de responsabilit6; mais elle a r6duit le montant de la condamnation A $2,500.

Deux juges furent dissidents. Tous deux, d'apris leur appriciation de la preuve, eussent fix6 les dommagesint6r~ts A un montant moindre que celui qui fut accord6 par la majorit6 de la cour.

En outre, l'un d'eux 6tait d'avis qu'il y avait eu faute contributoire de la victime; et, de ce chef, il efit fait une r6duction additionnelle. L'autre efit rejet6 Faction in toto pour la raison suivante: La preuve a d~montr6 que la victime 6tait le fils naturel de l'intimbe, or, disait-il, 1'enfant naturel ne doit pas d'aliments A ses phre et mbre, parce que l'obligation alimentaire, qui est r6ciproque lorsqu'elle r6sulte des liens de parent6 l6gitime, ne 'est pas dans les cas de filiation naturelle.

mais la loi n'accorde pas ce droit au pare ou A la mire contre leur enfant naturel.

Les dommages-intr6ts que peut obtenir un phre ou une m~re, comme r6sultat du d6chs de son enfant, consistent uniquement dans la perte mat6rielle, c'est-h-dire dans la privation du secours alimentaire. Il s'ensuit que, le droit h ce secours n'existant pas dans l'esp~ce, la r6clamation de l'intim6e manque de base 16gale. Devant cette cour, 1'appelante nous a soumis de nouveau qu'elle n'6tait pas responsable de l'accident qui a caus6 la J. mort du fils de 1'intimbe; et, subsidiairement, que le montant des dommages accord6s avait 6t6 calcul6 sur une base erron6e. A l'appui de cette dernibre pr6tention, elle invoquait cette thiorie que, dans les cas de filiation naturelle, la r6ciprocit6 de 1'obligation alimentaire n'existe pas en faveur du pare ou de la mire.

Mais, au cours de 1'argument, il a surgi une question qui n'avait 6t6 soulev6e ni devant la Cour Sup6rieure, ni devant la Cour du Banc du Roi. Cette question est de nature telle que, si elle est tranch6e h l'encontre de l'intim6e, elle met fin h son action et il devient inutile de juger les autres points. C'est done lh que nous devons porter d'abord notre attention.

L'action est bas6e sur l'article 1056 du code civil. Dans la cause de Regent Taxi & Transport Company v. La Congrigation des Petits Frbres de Marie (1), les juges de cette cour ont exprim6 l'opinion que le recours auquel cet article pourvoit appartient exclusivement aux personnes qui y sont mentionnies. Cette opinion 6tait conforme h un certain nombre d'arr~ts de la jurisprudence de la province de Qu6bec: St-Laurent v. Compagnie. de T616phone de Kamouraska (2), Gohier v. Allan (3), Ruest v. Grand Trunk Co. (4), Dionne v. Compagnie des Chars Urbains (5), Tessier v. Grand Trunk Co.

C'est aussi ce qui ressort du jugement de monsieur le juge-en-chef Lamothe dans la cause de Hunter v. Gingras (7).

La question qui se pose dis 1'abord est done celle-ci: La mire d'un enfant naturel est-elle une des personnes 6num6r6es dans 1'article 1056 du code civil?

Si la r6ponse est dans la negative, l'appel doit 6tre maintenu et 1'intim6e doit 6tre d6bout6e des fins de son action. Ce moyen de d6fense, comme nous 1'avons dit, n'a pas t6 invoqu6 par l'appelante, et il ne parait pas avoir 6t6 discut6 avant 1'audition h la Cour Supreme. Je crois que nous devons quand m~me en tenir compte parce qu'il affecte le droit mime de l'intimbe de recouvrer une indemnit6. Avant de passer A 1'6tude de la d6fense, la cour doit n6cessairement se demander si le droit d'action a 6t6 6tabli. J. Or, le point de droit qui nous occupe, s'il est fond6, entraine le rejet de faction; et ce r6sultat s'imposerait m~me s'il n'y avait pas de d6fense au dossier.

En plus, par sa nature mime, la question rev~t un caracthre d'ordre public qui empicherait de l'6carter pour la simple raison qu'elle n'aurait pas 6t all6gude dans la d6fense, ni d6battue au cours du procks. Nous croyons de notre devoir d'entrer dans l'examen de cette question.

Dans cette cause-ci, il faut accepter le fait que l'intim6e est la mare de la victime. Les deux cours qui ont pr6c6d6 l'ont d6cid6; et 1'appelante ne nous a pas demand6 de reviser les jugements sur ce point. Mais il est 6galement admis de part et d'autre qu'elle est la mare d'un enfant naturel. Peut-elle, dans ce cas, r6clamer le b6n6fice de larticle 1056 du code civil?

Il ne suffit pas, pour r6pondre, de se borner au texte de 1'article; il faut l'envisager dans son sens et dans son esprit; et, suivant l'expression de Baudry-Lacantinerie, Des personnes, vol. 1, 3 6d., no 258, il faut " reconstituer la pens6e du 16gislateur ".

Nous sommes contraints d'admettre cependant que, en ce qui concerne 1article 1056 du code civil, nous manquons de plusieurs des proc6d6s habituels d'investigation auxiliaire. Il n'y a pas dans le code Napol6on d'article correspondant h 1'article 1056, et nous n'avons pas l'avantage de pouvoir r6f6rer la jurisprudence des tribunaux frangais -except6 peut-6tre dans son application h un syst~me de droit qui est semblable dans son ensemble. On ne nous a cit6 aucun jugement de la province de Qu6bec oii la question soit discut6e. La cause de Provost v. Jackson (1), qu'on nous signale, ne me semble pas, en tout respect, constituer un pr6c6dent. D'abord, c'est une cause antrieure au code. Ensuite, il n'apparait nulle part, dans le rapport de cette cause, que la 16gitimit6 de la filiation ait 6t6 mise en question. La d6claration all6guait

A l'enquite, les demandeurs n6gligbrent de prouver leur mariage et la filiation du d6funt, soit par la production d'actes de '6tat civil, soit autrement. L'un des moyens des d6fendeurs en appel 6tait que

Dans les circonstances, mon humble opinion est que lorsque M. le juge MacKay dit:

lorsque M. le juge Johnson dit:

ni l'un ni l'autre n'ont pr6sente A 1'esprit la question de filiation 16gitime; mais ces passages de leurs jugements 6quivalent tout simplement A constater que les demandeurs n'ont pas prouv6 l'all6gation de leur d6claration telle que faite.

De mime qu'il parait y avoir dans la province de Qu6bec absence totale de jurisprudence sur le point que nous discutons, nous sommes 6galement priv6s, pour p6n6trer la pens6e du 16gislateur dans l'article 1056, d'un autre moyen d'investigation, qui est de r6f6rer au rapport des codificateurs. Ainsi que le faisait remarquer monsieur le juge Mignault, dans la cause de Regent Taxi (1), h la page 683:

II n'est pas douteux que cet article tire son origine des statuts refondus du Canada de 1859, c. 78, qui reproduisent le statut 10-11 Vict., c. 6 (1847).

Et Lord Watson, dans la cause de Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (2), signalait que ces statuts,

Cela peut justifier de donner aux expressions qui se trouvent h la fois dans Particle 1056 du code civil et dans le Lord Campbell's Act le sens qui leur a 6t6 attribu6 dans la jurisprudence anglaise.

II parait 6vident que, en vertu de op cette jurisprudence, la mare d'un enfant naturel n'aurait pas de recours en l'espice.

Mais, dans Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1), au passage que nous venons de citer, Lord Watson ajoutait (p. 487) que, sous certains rapports,

Les observations de Lord Davey, dans la cause de

Miller v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (2) vont encore plus loin et considbrent qu'on ne serait pas en droit

Je pr6f~re donc appuyer mon jugement sur l'interpr6tation interne de la loi.

(Voir Geny, Mgthode d'interpritation, 2e 6d., vol. 1, p. 25.)

En ins6rant dans le code un principe inspir6 d'un systime de droit diff6rent, il est raisonnable de croire que les termes dont le l6gislateur s'est servi doivent Stre entendus suivant la signification qu'ils ont g6n6ralement dans la tradition doctrinale et dans le langage juridique du pays.

Les mots " pare ", " mere " et " enfants " dans larticle 1056 ne peuvent pas avoir pris dans la pens6e du l6gislateur du

Qu6bec un sens diff6rent de celui qu'ils ont dans les autres articles du code.

Or, nous pouvons affirmer, croyons-nous, que chaque fois que ces mots sont employ6s seuls dans le code, except6 lorsque le texte impose une interpr6tation diff6rente, ils r6f~rent exclusivement A la paternit6, A la maternit6 et h La filiation 16gitimes. Si le mot " enfant ", par exemple, dans larticle 54 du code civil, doit sans doute comprendre A la fois les enfants l6gitimes et les enfants naturels, A cause de la nature mime de la prescription qu'il contient, il nous parait certain que dans tous les autres cas il se trouve seul dans le code, et, en particulier, dans le chapitre des successions, il signifie exclusivement les enfants l6gitimes.

Comme consequence, les mots " phre " et " mere " signifient exclusivement le phre ou la mbre d'un enfant time.

Cette intention du 16gislateur est spicialement marqu6e dans le contraste entre le chapitre du code qui traite des obligations qui naissent du mariage et celui qui traite des enfants naturels. L'article 166 dit que

Si les mots " enfants "phre " et " mre " employ6s dans cet article visaient A la fois la parent6 1gitime et la parent6 naturelle, Particle 240 n'aurait plus sa raison d'6tre. Il est A remarquer, au contraire, que le 16gislateur, dans le but d'6tendre A l'enfant naturel le droit de r6clamer des aliments, a cru devoir 6dicter cet article special et, de plus, qu'il y a d6sign6 l'enfant ill6gitime par les mots " enfant naturel ", indiquant bien par li que ce dernier n'est pas compris par l'emploi du mot " enfant " seul. L'article 239 vient compl6ter cet argument en 6dictant que seuls les enfants 16gitim6s par le mariage subsequent ont les mimes droits que les enfants n6s du mariage.

Toute 1'6conomie du code civil est 6difi6e sur le principe de la 16gitimit6 de la filiation; et les droits r6sultant de la filiation naturelle, ou des relations entre les phre, mre et enfants naturels sont traitis A part dans des articles distincts.

Cette observation, d'ailleurs, ne s'applique pas seulement au code civil.

est trbs important de noter que dans la loi des Accidents du travail (S.R.Q. 1925, c. 274) qui traite d'un sujet connexe aux articles 1053 et 1056 du code civil, lorsque le 16gislateur parle de 1'indemniti, il s'exprime comme suit (art. 4):

L'indemnit6 est payable de la manibre suivante:

A On voit done que lorsque l'intention est d'inclure les enfants naturels dans une disposition de la loi dans la province de Quebec, cette intention est manifest6e d'une fagon expresse.

La consdquence qu'il faut d6duire g6n6ralement de cette constatation est qu'il en est de mgme lorsque le 16gislateur emploie les mots " phre " ou " mere " seuls.

Par surcroit, cette interpr6tation est conforme A la tradition historique et doctrinale. C'est ainsi que l'envisagent Ferrire et Merlin.

Pothier (6dition Bugnet, vol. 8, Substitutions, no 67) Laurent, dans ses Principes de droit civil, au volume 4, conclut dans le mime sens que Pothier. Il se demande s'il y a une analogie entre la filiation naturelle et la filiation l6gitime.

r6pond que lh les principes sont contraires il ne peut pas y avoir d'analogie.

Les textes diffirent, et I'esprit de la loi encore bien plus (p. 7).

L'enfant naturel a une filiation aussi bien que l'enfant 16gitime; mais cette filiation n'est reconnue par la loi que dans la limite fix~e par elle (p. 11).

" L'esprit qui anime le code ", ajoute-il, " est un esprit moral ", et le code traite les enfants naturels diff6remment afin d'honorer le mariage.

Plus loin (p. 43), il parle de la d6faveur dont la loi frappe la filiation ill6gitime et la restreint dans les limites les plus 6troites "parce qu'il en rbsulte une espbce de tache ".

Cette constatation elle-mime conduit au principe d'interpr6tation trbs ancien que toute l6gislation a pour base principale " l'honnitet6 et 'utile " et qu'on s'6carte de la volont6 du l6gislateur chaque fois qu'entre diverses significations possibles on admet celle qui n'est pas conforme A ce principe (Delisle, Principes de l'interpr6tation des lois, vol. 1, p. 10).

Pour les raisons que je viens d'exposer, j'en arrive A la conclusion que la mare d'un enfant naturel n'est pas comprise dans l'6num6ration des personnes qui peuvent recouvrer en vertu de 1'article 1056 du code civil.

Il s'ensuit que, dans l'espice, I'appel doit 6tre maintenu et Faction de la demanderesse-intimbe doit 6tre rejetie.

Mais l'appelante r6ussit par suite d'un moyen qu'elle n'a pas invoqu6 et qui efit mis fin h la cause dbs le d6but des proc6dures, s'il efit 6t6 soulev6 en temps utile. Dans les circonstances, je serais -d'avis de n'accorder de frais A l'appelante dans aucune des cours.

J.-Sans qu'il soit n6cessaire de d6cider si la mire qui, hors mariage, a port6 et mis au monde un enfant qu'elle a reconnu peut r~clamer des aliments de ce fils naturel, le jugement en cette cause d6pend du sens que comportent les mots " mre " et " enfants " dans la version frangaise de l'article 1056 du code civil, tel qu'il se lisait avant la modification apport~e par 20 Geo. V., c. 98. Cet article 1056 n'avait pas 6t6 incorpor6 dans le rapport des codificateurs charg6s de codifier les lois du Bas-Canada. Le pr6ambule du chapitre II des Statuts Refondus du Bas-Canada (concernant la codification des lois du Bas- Canada qui se rapportent aux matibre civiles et h proc6dure) constate, en 1865, que les lois du Bas-Canada, en matibre civile, 6taient celles qui, h l'6poque de la cession du pays A la Couronne d'Angleterre, 6taient suivies dans cette partie de la France regie par la Coutume de Paris; que ces lois et coutumes avaient 6t6 modifibes en France et r6duites h un code g6n6ral, de manibre que les anciennes lois encore suivies dans le Bas-Canada n'6taient plus ni r6imprim6es ni commenties en France, et qu'il devenait de plus en plus difficile d'en obtenir des exemplaires et des commentaires. Ce pr6ambule constate de plus que nos lois civiles avaient aussi 6t6 modifibes par l'introduction de certaines parties des lois d'Angleterre dans des cas speciaux. Le paragraphe 6 ordonnait aux commissaires, en ridigeant le code civil, de n'y incorporer que les dispositions qu'ils tiendront pour 6tre alors r6ellement en force et de citer les autorit6s sur lesquelles ils s'appuieraient pour juger qu'elles I'6taient.

Comme je l'ai dit plus haut, le rapport des commissaires ne contenant pas cet article 1056, nous devons nous contenter de constater qu'il fait partie de l'acte 29 Vict., c. 41, " concernant le code civil du Bas-Canada ", dont le pr6ambule d6clare que les commissaires se sont en tout point conform6s aux exigences de la loi pr6citbe, et que le projet, tel qu'amend6 par la l6gislature ayant finalement adopt6 par les deux chambres, le code tel que contenu dans le r6le d6pos6 au bureau du greffier du conseil 16gislatif aura force de loi au Canada du jour plus tard fix6 par proclamation, savoir, le ler aofit 1866.

Le savant juge-en-chef de cette cour a d6montr6 de quelle fagon les tribunaux de 1'Angleterre, dbs avant et depuis cette date, avaient appliqu6 le Lord Campbell's Act, qui est certainement un statut anglais introduit substantiellement dans la l6gislation civile du Bas-Canada par le parlement des provinces unies.

J'ai cru bon cependant de constater quelle interpr6tation on donnait aux mots " mire " et " enfant " dans l'ancien OF droit frangais, avant les changements introduits par la Rdvolution et le Code Napol6on.

Ferribre, Dictionnaire de Droit, vbo. " enfants ", dit: On n'entend ordinairement par le nom d'enfants que ceux qui sont CIannOn J 16gitimes, car ce qui caract6rise un enfant, c'est d'&tre n6 d'un pare et d'une mire unis par un mariage public: Filius est qui ex viro & uxore nascitur simul commorantibus, scientibus vicinis, aut qui legitimatus est subsequenti matrimonio.

A I'6gard des bAtards, on ne leur donne le nom d'enfants qu'en ajoutant quelque qualification, comme celle d'enfants naturels ou autre qui distingue leur condition de celle des enfants 16gitimes, surtout quand il s'agit de succession ab intestat: comme ils n'y ont aucune part, ils ne sont pas compris sous le nom d'enfants, non plus que quand il s'agit d'autres droits inhdrents h la famille.

Il suffit de lire les articles de notre code civil pour cons- I-ater que, lorsqu'on veut y parler des bitards, on a ajout6, comme le dit Ferribre, la qualification d'enfants naturels, ou autre expression distinctive:

121. L'enfant naturel qui n'a pas atteint I'Age de vingt et un ans r~volus, doit, pour marier, y 6tre autoris6 par un tuteur ad hoc qui lui est nomm6 h cet effet.

218. L'enfant congu pendant le mariage est l6gitime et a pour pbre le 237. Les enfants nds hors mariage, autres que ceux n6s d'un commerce incestueux ou adult6rin, sont 16gitim6s par le mariage subs6quent de leurs phre et mre.

240. La reconnaissance volontaire ou forc6e par le phre ou la mrne de leur enfant naturel, donne & ce dernier le droit de rclamer des aliments contre chacun d'eux, suivant les circonstances.

768. Les donations entrevifs faites par le donataire h celui ou h celle avec qui il a v6cu en concubinage, et h ses enfants incestueux ou adult6rins, sont limit6es A des aliments.

(Cette probibition ne s'applique pas aux donations faites par contrat de mariage intervenu entre les concubinaires.

Les autres enfants ill6gitimes peuvent recevoir des donations entrevifs comme toutes autres personnes).

Ferribre, dito, vbo. " L6gitime

Se dit de celui qui est n6 en l6gitime mariage.

Dito, vbo. " Illigitime ":

On appelle celui qui est n6 d'une conjonction r6prouv6e, ou non autoris6e par les lois, un enfant illigitime.

D'apris moi, cet article 1056 a eu pour effet de limiter A certains membres de la parent6 de la victime le recours qui, d'apris 1053, aurait pu 6tre exerc6 par tous ceux souffrant des dommages A la suite d'un d6lit ou quasid6lit causant la mort. Aussi longtemps que notre l6gislation conervera le christianisme et sa morale comme base et rdprouvera l'union libre, je suis d'avis qu'il faudra limi- TowN oF ter aux phres et mares d'enfants 16gitimes le recours de WEST

V*

Je cite Merlin, Rgpertoire de jurisprudence, vbo. bhtard:

Cannon J

Dans l'ordre de la nature, la condition des bitards et des enfants 16gitimes est la m~me, puisqu'ils sont tous enfants du mame sang; mais elle est in6gale dans le droit civil qui prononce contre les bAtards, non seulement l'incapacit6 de succ6der h leur phre, mais m~me de recevoir de lui des dons et legs consid6rables: on regarde ces sortes de personnes comme n'tant d'aucune famille et n'ayant point de parents: c'est la loi civile qui 6tablit cette diff6rence entre les bAtards et les 16gitimes: c'est elle seule qui leur impose une peine h, cause de la faute de leur pare. N'oublions pas, en cette matibre, ce que disent Planiol et Ripert, II Droit civil, 1926, p. 6:

Enfin il n'y a pas de partie du droit qui touche d'aussi pris h la morale: 'organisation de la famille n'est solide que si elle est fond6e sur une morale rigoureuse.

Les rkgles qui gouvernent la famille constituent autant, et quelquefois plus, des pr6ceptes de morale que des rkgles de droit.

Par li le droit de famille touche de tris pris aux priceptes religieux eux-mimes.

De fait, il fut r6gi en France pendant de longs sidcles par le droit canonique; si la R~volution l'a s6cularis6, elle n'a pu en changer le caractbre, et, dans la mesure oii les lois r6volutionnaires et les lois modernes se sont 6cart6es des principes sur lesquels la famille avait 6t6 ktablie, elles ont affaibli la solidit6 de l'institution.

Partout dans le code, le mot " enfants ", lorsqu'il est employ6 seul, n'a et ne peut avoir d'autre signification que celle d'enfants 16gitimes, sauf aux articles 54, 55 et 56, concernant les actes de naissance, ohi l'on privoit le cas oh un enfant, dont le pare, ou la mbre, ou tous deux, sont inconnus, est prbsent6 au fonctionnaire public. D'ailleurs, notre 16gislature a entendu maintenir le droit 6tabli par la Coutume de Paris et par S.R.C. c. 78 (1859) codifiant les dispositions du statut 10-11 Vict., c. 6, dont le but, dit Mignault (5 C.C. 339) 6tait de reproduire le statut imp6rial mieux connu sous le norn de " Lord Campbell's Act ". L'article 1056 doit recevoir l'interpritation et l'application qui lui 6taient donn6es sous 1'empire de la loi qu'il a remplac6e; chez nous, contrairement h ce qui a lieu en France, la position des enfants naturels ne diff6re pas substantiellement aujourd'hui de celle qui leur 6tait faite par le droit existant au temps de la cession du pays. Je suis done dispos6 h dire, adaptant le langage de la Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux, dans son arrat du 4 d6cembre