← Cases

Marino v. The King

[1931] SCR 482 Court SCC Decision date 1931-04-28 English

Delivered by Judgment of the Court

Contents

Judgment of the Court

C.J.C.-To contend that, because two separate sales were proved in evidence, two offences are actually charged seems absurd. How could distribution be shown unless more than one sale was proved? A single sale probably does not amount to " distribution " within the meaning of that word, as used in the Criminal Code. There is nothing to restrict what may be proved as evidence of distribution to a single sale.
It is manifest that the defendants had the drugs in question for distribution and the proof shows they did in fact "distribute " them. That seems to be all that is necessary. As to the difficulty created by the words " to any person " found in the section in question, it is fully met by the interpretation clause in s. 31 (j) of c. 1 of R.S.C., 1927, and by the admission of counsel for the appellant that " any person " includes " any persons."
We are all of the opinion that the appeal fails and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed. Solicitor for the appellants: J. R. Nicholson.
Solicitor for the respondent: Oscar Bass.
GEORGE MILLER .......................
HIS MAJESTY THE KING..............RESPONDENT. * J.A. dissenting), the. appellant's conviction for unlawfully keeping a common betting house (s. 229 Cr. C.).
A. M. Sinclair K.C. for the appellant.
W. S. Grey K.C. for the respondent.
The judgment of the court was orally delivered by C.J.C.-This is an appeal from the decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta affirming the conviction of the defendant by a stipendiary magistrate for keeping " a common gaming house " (s. 229, Crim. Code).
The chief evidence consisted in the finding of certain cards suitable for the purpose of betting and which might constitute a " means " for betting under s. 986 (2) of the Criminal Code.
In the absence of any suggestion in the evidence as to the possibility of the duplicate cards found having been used by the appellant for any other purpose than that of betting, there appears to have been prima facie evidence of guilt.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.

Statutes and regulations cited