Majority
*Feb. 25. *June LA CORPORATION DE LACAILLE
R
(DEFENDANT)
.....................
RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE
Judgment of the Court
J.-The facts in this case are not in dispute. The appellant sued the respondent corporation in the Superior Court on four promissory notes made by the corporation in favour of the appellant and amounting in all to $6,073.47.
The defence set up was that the action was premature. At the time the action was brought, September 3, 1929, the maturity date of the notes sued on was passed, but the corporation relies on the fact that, on August 28, 1929, the appellant wrote to the secretary of the corporation a letter in the following terms:- This letter, it was contended on behalf of the corporation, had the effect of extending the time for payment of the notes until the expiration of fifteen days from the date of the letter and, as action was brought within fifteen days, it was-prematurely brought.
The first question to be considered is:
Did the appellant, by this letter, intend to signify to the corporation that he was extending the time within which the notes would become due for another fifteen days, or simply to intimate that he would not exercise his right to sue on the overdue notes for that length of time? In my opinion the latter is the true construction.
I cannot see in the letter anything that would justify the conclusion that the appellant was assenting to any modification of the terms of the obligations expressed in the promissory notes. Putting it at the very highest, the letter neither declares nor conveys by implication anything more than an assent to postpone the exercise of his undoubted right to sue. The letter is not to be construed as depriving the appellant of his rights to any greater extent than the language used calls for. Even conceding that it implies a promise to refrain from suing for fifteen days, and assuming that, in the circumstances, the respondent assented to this promise, such a