Per Rinfret J.-A writ of mandamus could not be granted against the respondent Campbell, as treasurer of the District Bar, as the latter, in refusing to accept dues from the appellant, while he was no more a member of the Bar, was not refusing "to perform any duty belonging to such office or any act which by law he (was) bound to perform." Art. 992 (3) C.C.P.
Judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Q.R. 49 KB. 124) aff. APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, Patterson J. (2), and dismissing the appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus. The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
L. J. de la Durantaye and C. A. S6guin K.C. for the appellant.
Ls. St. Laurent K.C. and Camille Tessier for the respondents, Campbell and The Bar of the district of Montreal. C. A. Guertin K.C. and N. A. Millette K.C. for the respondent The General Bar of Quebec.
ANGLIN C.J.C.-Condemned originally by the Magistrate's Court for failure to account to the complainant for a sum of approximately $1,300, the receipt of which he acknowledges, and non-repayment by him whereof to the (1) (1930) Q.R. 49 K.B. 124.
Q.R. S.C. complainant pursuant to a demand therefor, duly made on him as a member of the Bar of the Province of Quebec, he admits, the appellant now seeks to escape one of the consequences of his established guilt on the ground that he did not receive the money as bailee, or that, if he did, the charn.c. acter of his tenure of it was later so changed that the magistrate's judgment convicting him should not be looked upon as having amounted to a conviction for an offence which would have been a felony under the old law. The appellant on this latter ground claims his discharge from disbarment to which the Bar Council has subjected him. In my opinion, the question of the legal nature and effect of the appellant's conviction has been conclusively determined against him by the Council of the District Bar, and its view has been equally conclusively affirmed by the Court of King's Bench. One of the consequences of this conviction is his liability to disbarment, the statute having, I think, made the district Council the final judges upon the sufficiency of the conviction, unappealed and duly reported to them, to warrant their action.
Under these circumstances, I cannot see my way clear to interfere with the action taken by the Council of the Bar of the District of Montreal, on a mere technical ground, such as, that conversion by a fiduciary to his own use of money belonging to his cestui que use did not amount to a felony before 1892. Of that, however, the legislature, in my opinion, has left the final and conclusive determination to the Council of the Bar of the district to which the barrister owed allegiance.
The early part of the judgment of Rinfret J. shews the details of the action taken by the Bar and its officers in connection with this matter and it is unnecessary, therefore, to repeat them here. A similar observation may be made as to the argument in favour of res judicata by reason of the unappealed judgment of Duclos J. on the former application for mandamus.
The appellant had the money of the applicant. He wrongfully kept that money. The learned trial judge found him guilty of having stolen it. He is, accordingly, a person unfit to be entrusted with the funds of others. The Council of the Bar has expressly so found. Its finding is for me conclusive on that point. I should not wittingly be party to an order of this court, which would enable such MAnon a man to resume practice before our Canadian courts--a practice in which he would necessarily be entrusted with the money of others.
cI.c.
I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
J.-The controversy in this appeal, once the facts are appreciated, is seen to lie in a very narrow compass and to present little difficulty.
I concur with my brother Smith as to the character of the offence of which the appellant was convicted; it would not, I agree, have been a felony prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code;-but I also share the view of the other members of the court that the earlier proceedings in the Superior Court constitute a conclusive answer to this appeal.
At this point it is convenient to state my opinion-it is a matter upon which I can discover no room for the slightest doubt-that the secretary-treasurer of the General Council has duties to perform which are committed to him by statute; and that his responsibility in respect of those duties is one which cannot be affected by any direction given by the General Council itself. He could not, for example, justify the deletion of the name of an advocate from the roll, on the ground merely of a decision by the General Council, that the.advocate had been guilty of an offence which, prior to the passing of the Criminal Code, would have been a felony, when, in truth, the offence was not of that character. The statutory disqualification under section 68 (1. b) occurs only when the conditions laid down by that enactment have come into operation. For the purpose of applying that provision, the courts, and the courts alone, have authority finally to determine the question whether or not the case comes within it. The procedure is laid down in section 69, and by that section the responsibility is put, not upon the General Council, but upon the General Secretary, to decide, in the first instance, whether the offence is one in which the enactment requires him to act. If it is, the direction of the statute is peremptory. If it is not, he is without authority.
It should be observed in passing, however, that courts administering the law of England have always possessed a judicial discretion in respect of the prerogative writ of mandamus; and, had it not been for the considerations I am about to mention, it might have been necessary to examine the circumstances of this case with a view to ascertaining whether they presented grounds upon which such a discretion might properly be exercised.
Briefly, the judgment of Duclos J. seems to have established, as between the Bar of Montreal and the appellant, that the appellant was disqualified from practising as a member of the Bar of the province, and that, for that reason, he was not entitled to call upon the Treasurer of the Bar of Montreal to accept his subscriptions for the years during which they had not been paid.
This seems to me to be conclusive of the issue before us. Section 82 does not contemplate payment by a former advocate who, in virtue of a decision of the Superior Court in litigation between himself and the " proper officer," has no right to call upon that officer to receive the subscriptions alleged to be in arrear. The appellant is precluded from requiring the Treasurer to accept his tendered subscriptions, and that is the end of the matter.
I am not, of course, saying that the judgment of Duclos J. constitutes a case of chose jugge, as between the appellant and the secretary-treasurer of the Bar of the province. It does not.
But the conditions upon which alone the appellant could call upon the secretary-treasurer to act are, in point of law, non-existent, because of the estoppel as between him and the Bar of Montreal and the Treasurer of that Bar.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.- L'appelant a demand6 1'6mission d'un bref p6remptoire de mandamus (en vertu de 1'article 996 du code de proc6dure civile), enjoignant au trisorier du barreau de Montrial de recevoir le montant de certaines " cotisations " et de lui en d6livrer un regu, afin que, au vu de ce regu et sur paiement de la somme necessaire, le secr& taire-tr6sorier du conseil g6n6ral du Barreau de la province de Qu6bee soit tenu de lui d6livrer un certificat, sous le sceau du Barreau de la province de Qubbec, lui tenant lieu d'inscription au tableau de l'Ordre.
Le Barreau de Montrial et le Barreau de la province de Qu6bec ont 6t6 mis en cause, mais aucune conclusion n'a 6t6 prise contre eux.
Le secr6taire-tr6sorier du conseil general est 6galement en cause, mais les conclusions contre Rinfret .lui ne sont que subsidiaires.
Les faits essentiels sont les suivants:
L'appelant a 6t6 trouvb coupable d'un acte criminel devant le magistrat de district h Hull, et ce jugement a t confirm6 par la Cour du Bane du Roi si6geant en appel. A une s6ance du conseil de section du barreau de Montreal, dont l'appelant relevait au moment oii il fut trouv6 coupable, le conseil prit connaissance du jugement; et voici comment le procks-verbal relate ce qui se passa: Aprbs discussion, le Conseil d6cide de dinoncer b, Mtre Victor Martineau, C.R., secr6taire du Conseil Gindral, le fait que Mtre N. J. Marion a trouv4 coupable d'un acte qualifi6 de filonie avant 'adoption du Code Criminel de 1892 et de prier Mtre Martineau d'agir suivant la loi. La proposition de Mtre H. N. Chauvin, C.R., d'envoyer un avis de cette d6cision aux protonotaires et aux greffiers des diff&rentes Cours de la province, est mise de c6t6; vu que cette proc6dure relive plutat du Conseil G~ndral.
Mtre N. J. Marion se prsente devant le conseil et, dkclarant qu'il a l'intention de porter de nouveau cette cause en appel, demande au Conseil de suspendre sa d4cision jusqu'au jugement final.
Mtre R. G. de Lorimier, C.R., informe alors Mtre Marion de la d~cision que vient de prendre le Conseil et lui fait savoir que cette dcision est finale.
Marion 6tait present h cette seance, h la suite d'un avis qui lui avait 6t0 envoy6 par 1'assistant-secritaire du conseil de section, comme suit:
Cher monsieur, Le mercredi, 25 courant, h 4 heures de l'aprbs-midi, le conseil du Barreau prendra connaissance du jugement rendu le 29 juin dernier par la cour d'appel, division de trois juges, dans la cause du Roi vs vous-mme.
Je suis charg4 de vous dire que si vous dksirez vous pr6senter devant le conseil a ce sujet, vous serez entendu.
Bien ! vous,
L'Assistant-Secrdtaire. Pour se conformer h la d6cision prise par le conseil de section, l'assistant-secrtaire fit parvenir une copie du jugement au secr6taire-tr6sorier du conseil gindral. Ce dernier raya du tableau le nom de l'appelant (art. 69 du c. 210, S.R.Q., 1925, qui 6tait larticle 4543 des Statuts Refondus de Qu6bec de 1909); puis il donna avis, sous le sceau du barreau de la province de Qubbec, A tous les secr~taires de sections, leur enjoignant de rayer le nom de 1'appelant. A la suite de quoi, sur transmission de cet avis par les secr6taires de sections, les protonotaires et greffiers des tribunaux de la province raybrent 6galement le nom de caVELL. 1'appelant du tableau des avocats en leur possession. R t J. Cette procedure est privue par Particle 85 de la loi du barreau (c. 210 S.R.Q., 1925); et, aprbs qu'elle a 6t6 accomplie, les protonotaires et greffiers de tous les tribunaux de (la) province doivent * * * refuser de reconnaitre comme avocat celui dont le nom n'apparait pas sur le tableau, ou en a 4t6 ray6. (Art. 87.)
Le 13 avril 1926, I'appelant demanda 1'6mission d'un premier bref de mandamus contre le Barreau de la province de Qubbec, intim6, et le Barreau de Montreal, misen-cause, concluant:
A ce qu'iI soit enjoint A l'intim6e de r~intbgrer le requirant dans l'exercice de sa profession d'avocat, aprbs qu'il aura acquitt6 les redevances dont il est endett6 tant envers l'intimbe qu'envers la mise-en-cause; a ce qu'il soil enjoint au secritaire de la mise-en-cause d'accepter le paiement des redevances qui pourraient Stre dues t cette derniare par le requdrant et de lui en donner regu; A ce qu'il soit enjoint tant A l'intimbe qu'h la mise-encause d'avoir A consid&rer votre requkrant, lorsqu'il se sera acquitt6 des redevances dont il peut 6tre endett6 envers elles, comme 4tant membre en rigle du Barreau de la province de Quebec, et habile A exercer sa profession d'avocat, jouissant de tous les priviliges attach6s A cette qualit6, le tout sous toutes peines que de droit et avec d~pens contre I'intimbe, mais sans frais contre la mise-en-cause, A moins de contestation de sa part, et, en ce cas, avec d6pens contre elle.
Cette requite pour mandamus fut contest6e par les deux corporations du Barreau qui, toutes deux, invoqubrent le fait que l'appelant avait 6t6 trouv6 coupable d'un acte criminel, et all6gu~rent sp6cialement ce qui suit:
(c) Le 25 juin 1924, aprbs avis donn6 au requ6rant, le conseil du Barreau de Montrial a pris connaissance de ces faits et documents et a rendu jugement assimilant I'acte du requdrant au cas punissable par la radiation de son nom du tableau des avocats et -a communiqud cette decision au secr4taire g~ndral du Barreau de la province de Qubbec pour qu'action soit prise en cons6quence, et c'est en exdcution de cette decision que la radiation a 6t6 faite;
(d) I n'y a pas eu d'appel de cette decision aupris de l'intimde qui 6tait un tribunal d'appel comptent dans les limites d4termines par la loi;
Le bref de mandamus dans cette premiere instance fut refus6 par jugement de M. le juge Duclos, rendu le 11 octobre 1926 (1).
(1) [1926] Q.R. 64 S.C. 502.
Il convient de bien noter la port6e de ce jugement. Le savant juge y d6cide deux questions principales:
L'offense commise par 'appelant 6tait qualifide de filonie avant 1'adoption du Code criminel de 1892;
2. Dans une s6ance convoquie suivant la proc6dure pr6vue A l'article 69 (3) de la Loi du Barreau, apris avis donn6 h l'appelant, et oii il " a eu l'occasion de se d6fendre ", le conseil du barreau de Montrial a rendu une d6cision sur le cas de l'appelant. " Il n'y a pas eu d'appel de cette d6cision au conseil du barreau de la province de Qu6bec, tel que pr6vu par la loi ", et la requate de 1'appelant n'est " qu'une tentative d'appel aux tribunaux de la d6cision du barreau de Montreal, appel que la loi ne permet Comme cons6quence, sur la premiere requite pour mandamus, il a donc it6 jug6 entre l'appelant, d'une part, et le Barreau de la province de Qu6bec et le Barreau de Montr6al, d'autre part, que l'acte criminel dont l'appelant a kt6 trouvi coupable constituait une f6lonie avant 1892; et que, en plus, le conseil du barreau de Montreal avait r~gulibrement d6cid6 que cet acte criminel tait une flonie, et avait pri6 le secr6taire-trdsorier du conseil g~ndral d'agir en cons6quence.
L'appelant avait d'abord inscrit en appel du jugement de 1'honorable juge Duclos; mais il a subs6quemment abandonn6 son appel. Ce jugement est par devenu final et a acquis le caract~re de chose jug~e entre les parties dans cette premibre cause.
C'est dans ces circonstances, prbs de trois ans apris ce premier jugement, que 'appelant a pr6senth sa seconde requite pour mandamus, qui est celle qui est maintenant devant cette cour.
II alligue qu'il est porteur d'un dipl~me d'admission au barreau; qu'il a prWti serment comme avocat; qu'il a pay6 ses contributions jusqu'au 26 avril 1924; qu'il a offert au tr6sorier du barreau de Montr6al tous les arrirages a date de ses cotisations et les honoraires du certificat qui peut lui tenir lieu d'inscription au tableau de l'Ordre, suivant la loi organique et les riglements du barreau de la province, mais que le tr6sorier a refus6 d'accepter ces sommes; qu'il est ainsi priv6 du regu du trisorier et qu'il ne peut obtenir du secr6taire-tr6sorier du conseil gin6ral le certificat sous le sceau de la corporation pour lui permettre de pratiquer comme avocat; et voici maintenant ses conclusions textuelles:
Par ces motifs, plaise h. la cour:
V* Enjoindre au d6fendeur As-qualit de recevoir ledit montant de 135 dollars plus toutes 6ch6ances A, survenir en cours d'instance et d'en d6livrer Rinfret J. un revu au demandeur; et au mis-en-cause, secr~taire-trisorier du Conseil g~n6ral, au vu de ce revu, de dilivrer au demandeur, sur paiement de 7 dollars, un certificat sous le sceau du Barreau de la province de Qubbec lui tenant lieu d'inscription au Tableau de l'Ordre; A quoi faire contraints mgme par corps, quoi faisant d6charg~s. Avec d6pens contre toute partie contestante.
Les intim6s ont de nouveau alligu6 la sentence de culpabilit6 prononc6e contre 1'appelant, la d6cision rendue le 25 juin 1924 par le conseil du barreau de Montr6al " assimilant 1'acte (de l'appelant)
*
*
* au cas pr6vu par la loi et entrainant la radiation du nom du demandeur du tableau des avocats dans la province de Qu6bec " * * *, I'avis donn6 " au Secrtaire-Tr6sorier du Barreau de la province de Qu6bec d'observer la loi en cons6quence," et ils ont ajout6:
c'est en execution de cette d6cision que le nom du demandeur a 6td ray6 de la liste des avocats de la province de Qubbec suivant la loi.
Ils ont invoqu6 la chose jug6e r6sultant du jugement de l'honorable juge Duclos; et ils ont plaid6 que, en cons6quence, le trisorier du barreau de Montrial n'avait pas le droit ni le pouvoir d'accepter les offres que l'appelant alligue lui avoir faites et que, en refusant ces offres, (il) n'a aucunement omis, niglig6, ou refus6 d'accomplir un devoir attach6 h sa charge ou un acte auquel la loi 1'oblige. Le juge de premibre instance a maintenu le mandamus; mais la Cour du Bane du Roi a unanimement infirm6 ce jugement, sur le principe que les conclusions de la premiere requite de mandamus comprenaient tout ce que l'appelant demandait dans sa seconde requite et que, dans ces conditions, 1'exception de chose jugde oppos6e en defense h la nouvelle demande de 1'appelant 6tait bien fondie.
C'est ce jugement qui est port6 devant cette cour. Il y a lieu au mandamus pour enjoindre l'accomplissement d'un devoir ou d'un acte dans certains cas 6num6r6s h Particle 992 C.P.C.
Le cas invoqu6 en l'espice par l'appelant est celui du paragraphe 3 de l'article 992, qui se lit comme suit:
3. Lorsqu'un fonctionnaire public, ou une personne occupant une charge dans une corporation, corps public ou tribunal de juridiction inf6rieure omet, n6glige ou refuse d'accomplir un devoir attach6 & sa charge, ou un acte auquel la loi 1'oblige.
Pour que l'appelant post rdussir, il lui fallait done 6tablir que le tr6sorier du barreau de Montr6al, en refusant de recevoir $135, plus toute 6ch6ance A survenir, que l'appelant lui a offerts pour ses cotisations au barreau, et d'en .nfrt
' d6livrer un regu A l'appelant, refusait " d'accomplir un devoir attach6 A sa charge, ou un acte auquel la loi l'oblige." Le nom de l'appelant n'est pas sur le tableau g6n6ral des avocats de la province, d'oA il a 6t6 ray6 par le secr6tairetr6sorier du conseil g6ndral, A la suite des 6v6nements qui viennent d'6tre rapportis. L'appelant s'adresse au tr6sorier du Barreau de Montr6al. Il lui offre ses arr6rages de contributions comme membre de la profession et lui demande de lui en d6livrer un regu. Pour d6montrer que ces deux actes: accepter la contribution et en dilivrer un regu, constituent " un devoir attach6 A (la) charge " du Trisorier et " un acte auquel la loi l'oblige ", I'appelant s'appuie sur l'article 82 de la loi du Barreau.
Il n'est pas n6cessaire de reproduire cet article; il suffit de remarquer qu'il se rapporte au cas de I'avocat:
i.e. par erreur.
C'est sur cet article que l'appelant se base pour offrir ses arr6rages au tr6sorier du barreau de Montr6al et prendre un mandamus contre lui pour le forcer A les accepter et A lui donner un regu dont il se servira auprbs du secrbtairetr6sorier g6n6ral pour obtenir le certificat lui donnant droit de pratiquer comme avocat.
Or, il est bien 6vident que l'appelant ne tombe dans aucune des trois cat6gories bien distinetes pr6vues par Particle 82.
L'appelant n'a pas 6t6 omis du tableau de l'Ordre pour 1'une des raisons contenues dans cet article; il ne figure pas sur le tableau parce qu'il en a 6t6 ray6. En pareil cas, le tr6sorier du barreau de Montrial, non seulement n'a pas le devoir de recevoir ses contributions et de lui donner un regu, mais il n'en a pas le pouvoir. Il n'est pas n6cessaire d'insister, en effet, sur la difference entre un avocat qui a 6t0 simplement suspendu de ses fonctions et un avocat qui est priv6 pour toujours du droit d'exercer sa profession. Cette distinction est soulign6e A chaque instant dans la loi du barreau. Seuls les " avocats qui ont droit de pratiquer dans la province " doivent figurer sur le tableau de l'Ordre (art. 81). Seuls les avocats dont le nom est sur le tableau peuvent pratiquer devant les tribunaux de la province (art. 68); et il ne peut 8tre rem6di6 h cela que dans trois cas bien RtJ. d6finis: lorsque le nom a 6t6 omis faute par l'avocat d'avoir pay6 ses contributions; ou lorsque le nom a 6t6 omis par suite d'une suspension, ou lorsque le nom a 6td omis par erreur.
Dans chacun de ces cas, I'avocat peut obtenir du secr6taire-trbsorier du -conseil g6n6ral " un certificat sous le sceau de la corporation constatant qu'il s'est conform6 ' la loi; et ce certificat lui tient lieu d'inscription au tableau pour le reste de l'ann6e courante ". Lorsque le nom a 6te omis par erreur, 1'avocat obtient le certificat gratuitement sur premibre demande.
Lorsqu'il a t6 omis par suite d'une suspension, il peut obtenir le certificat " h l'expiration du temps pour lequel il a t6 suspendu ", en payant les contributions et les honoraires.
Lorsqu'il a th omis, faute par lui d'avoir pay6 toutes les contributions, il n'a qu'A les payer h qui de droit; et, sur production du regu, il obtient le certificat du secr~tairetrisorier du conseil g6n6ral.
Mais tel n'est pas le cas de l'appelant. Lorsque le tr6sorier du barreau de Montr6al, en refusant d'accepter sa contribution et de lui en donner un regu, r6pond a l'appelant qu'il ne peut recevoir cette contribution au barreau parce qu'il a t6 ray6 du tableau et qu'il a cess6 d'6tre membre de la profession, cette raison constitue une r6ponse complte au mandamus de 1'appelant, ce dernier ne peut pr6tendre que le tr6sorier du barreau de Montreal, en agissant ainsi, " refuse d'accomplir un devoir " attachi h sa charge ou un acte auquel la loi l'oblige " (C.P.C. 992-3), et, par cons6quent, il n'y a pas lieu h l'6mission d'un bref de mandamus en pareil cas.
Naturellement, I'appelant pr6tend que son nom n'aurait pas dfi tre ray6. Mais c'est lh une toute autre question, qui ne concerne pas le tr6sorier du Barreau de Montr6al. Ce n'est pas lui qui a ray6 le nom. Ce n'est pas h lui qu'il appartient de le r6installer. C'est pricis6ment l le d6bat qui s'est engag6 dans la premibre instance entre l'appelant d'une part, le Barreau de Montr6al et le Barreau de la province de Qu6bee d'autre part; et il a 6t6 tranch6 contre l'appelant par le jugement de 'honorable juge Duclos. Sur ce point et sous ce rapport, il y a chose jugge contre l'appelant. Quand 1'appelant s'est adress6 au tr6sorier pour lui demander de recevoir ses contributions, il s'adressait A lui non pas comme h un officier de la loi qui a des devoirs statutaires, mais comme h un mandataire et un repr6sentant du Barreau de Montreal. Le tr6sorier pergoit les contributions pour le compte du Barreau de Montr6al. La question de savoir si le nom de l'appelant a 6t6 r6gulibrement et validement ray4 du tableau est chose jugee pour le repr6sentant du Barreau de Montr6al tout autant qu'elle 1'est pour le Barreau de Montrial lui-mime. (Pothier- Bugnet, 3e 6d. vol. 2, 900; Baudry-Lacantinerie, Traiti de droit civil, 3e 6d. Des Obligations, tome 46me, 2687 et suivants; Lacoste, De la chose jug6e, 3e 6d. 475 et suivants; Ellard v. Millar (1).
Pour ces raisons, je rejetterais l'appel avec d6pens. J.-The appellant (plaintiff) was an advocate of the province of Quebec duly enrolled and was in practice in the district of Hull.
On the 23rd January, 1922, one Mrs. Daniel laid complaint against him before the district magistrate in Hull, as follows:
The indictment was proferred in the same terms on 15th February, 1922, and on 7th March following he was found guilty, but sentence was deferred, pending the hearing of a. reserved case.
The appeal court ordered the magistrate to return a new stated case, which he did in the following terms:
1. Elle a consid6r6 que Marion 6tait agent de la demanderesse &s-qualit6, il 6tait son avocat.
2. Qu'en sa qualit& d'agent, il a regu valeur chique de $1,300, remis par T. P. Foran.
3. Cette valeur, la demanderesse n'en a jamais connu portie, ni eu libre possession, elle ne 'a pas eue un instant entre ses mains. Marion a collect6 le produit; il a regu $1,300.
D6position du g~rant de la Banque Provinciale.
4. Ces produits, il les a convertis A son usage A la banque N.-E. II a tird sur ce dip8t, jusqu'h 6puisement. D~position du g6rant de la Banque Nouvelle-Ecosse.
5. Marion pritend avoir agi sur la force d'un certain endossement non prouv6 et certains documents.
Ces documents sont absolument nuls et ill6gaux, et A 1'encontre des articles 297, 298 et 307 du code civil, comme aussi du code de proc6dure civile, aux articles 1347 et 1348, et n'ont pu 6tre pris en consid~ration par la cour, et ne peuvent 8tre consid6rds ici que comme du surplusage aggravant l'offense plut3t que de I'att6nuer. 6. Il n'a jamais rendu compte, tout au contraire, il s'est retranch4 derribre toutes sortes d'excuses pour faire croire h la demanderesse qu'il n'avait pas encore 6t6 pay6.
D~position de la tutrice et de dame Anna Asselin.
7. Qu'il n'a jamais fait remise et n'a jamais prouv4 sa bonne foi, vis-A-vis de la demanderesse, ni devant la cour.
Pour la cour, la quintessence du crime 6tait prouv6e, elle a cru de son devoir de rendre jugement en consiquence.
On the 20th June, 1924, the Court of King's Bench confirmed the judgment of the magistrate, the notes of one of the judges containing the following:- Upon a re-statement of the case, the learned magistrate states in detail what was proved before him. He states that the conviction is based upon the fact that it was proved that appellant, in his quality of agent of Daniel, received a cheque for $1,300 which he cashed and converted to his own use.
Upon these facts I can only say that the question should be answered in the affirmative and an offence known to the law is disclosed and proven. I should maintain the conviction.
On the 24th July following, the magistrate sentenced Marion to two years in the penitentiary.
On the 23rd June, prior to the date of the sentence, the assistant secretary of the Bar of Montreal sent Marion a letter, as follows:
Le Barreau de Montr6al,
Palais de Justice, Montreal, 24 juin 1924. M. N. J. Marion,
71A rue St-Jacques, Montrial.
Cher monsieur,
Le mercredi, 25 courant, b 4 heures de l'apris-midi, le conseil du Barreau prendra connaissance du jugement rendu le 29 juin dernier par la cour d'appel, division de trois juges, dans la cause du Roi vs vousmeme.
Je suis charg4 de vous dire que si vous d~sirez vous pr6senter devant le conseil 4 ce sujet, vous serez entendu.
Bien A vous,
L'assistant secrtaire, (Sign6)
J. M. Nantel. There was no complaint lodged by the syndic or other officer of the section council, but at the date fixed by the notice there was a meeting of the council, at which Marion was present, and the following appears in the minutes: Apres discussion, le Conseil d&cide de d6noncer h Mtre Victor Martineau, C.R., secr6taire du Conseil G6ndral, le fait que Mtre N. J. Marion a 6t trouv6 coupable d'un crime qualifi6 de f6lonie avant 1'adoption du Code Criminel de 1892 et de prier Mtre Martineau d'agir suivant la loi. La proposition de Mtre H. N. Chauvin, C.R., d'envoyer un avis de cette d6cision aux protonotaires et aux greffiers des diff6rentes Cours de la province, est mise de c6t6; vu que cette proc6dure relive plut6t du Conseil G~ndral.
Mtre N. J. Marion se pr6sente devant le conseil et, d6clarant qu'il a l'intention de porter de nouveau cette cause en appel, demande au Conseil de suspendre sa d6cision jusqu'au jugement final.
Mtre R. G. de Lorimier, C.R., informe alors Mtre Marion de la dcision que vient de prendre le Conseil et lui fait savoir que cette d6cision est finale.
On the 26th August, 1924, the assistant secretary of the Bar of Montreal sent a copy of the conviction to the secretary-treasurer of the Council of the Bar of the province of Quebec, who, on the 28th August, 1924, struck Marion's name out of the list of advocates for the province of Quebec, and sent the legal notice of same.
In the present action, Marion contends that the secretary-treasurer of the Bar of the province of Quebec had no jurisdiction to strike his name off the roll as he did, because he was under no disqualification; and that, having tendered the arrears of his contributions to the treasurer of the Bar of Montreal, it was the duty of that officer to accept same and give a receipt, pursuant to sec. 82 of the Bar Act, chap. 210, R.S.Q., 1925, on presentation of which it would have become the duty of the secretary-treasurer of the Bar of the province of Quebec to give him a certificate in lieu of his inscription on the roll.
The validity of these contentions must be tested by the provisions of the Bar Act. The Act provides that the advocates of the province shall form a corporation called " The General Corporation of the Bar," which shall be divided into sections, each of which shall form a separate corporation, one of which is named " The Bar of Montreal." The general corporation may make by-laws for maintaining the honour and dignity of the Bar and discipline among its members, and for preparation and publication of the general roll of advocates in the province, and for other purposes.
The general corporation and the corporation of sections may make by-laws for defining the duties and functions of their officers, and for certain other purposes.
The powers of the general corporation are to be exercised by a council called the " General Council of the Bar of the province of Quebec " which shall select a secretarytreasurer who shall be a member of the council.
The Council of each section is to be composed of a batonnier, a syndic, a treasurer, a secretary, and, for Mont-, real, nine elected members.
The syndic is specially charged with the supervision of the discipline of the Bar. He is bound immediately to inform the council of the section of any conduct of a member derogatory to the honour of the Bar, and to submit to it any accusation handed to him, saving the right of the council to receive the same directly or to take the initiative in the exercise of its disciplinary powers.
Every complaint against a member shall be made under oath before the syndic, batonnier or secretary of the Bar of the district where it is laid. Each council of a section may pronounce a censure or reprimand against a member guilty of a breach of discipline or any act derogatory to the honour and dignity of the Bar, and may also suspend him forever from the right of practising his profession.
In the exercise of these powers, the council is to proceed deliberately and allow the accused to defend himself. The decision is subject to appeal to the General Council to be instituted by letter to the secretary-treasurer of such council, but such appeal shall lie only when it appears V* on the face of the complaint, decision or sentence that the council had no jurisdiction; and no appeal shall lie to the courts from decisions rendered by the council of any section.
Every member shall pay to the treasurer of his section certain prescribed subscriptions and dues, and the treasurer shall forward annually, before the 5th of May, to the secretary-treasurer of the General Council a list of all the advocates in his section who have paid their subscriptions and dues for the previous year, and the current year.
Section 68 provides that no advocate shall practise in any of the courts of the province in the following cases: (b) If he has been found guilty of any criminal offence ranked as a felony before the passing of the Criminal Code, 1892, of perjury, or subornation of perjury, of conspiracy to defraud, or of one of the criminal offences set forth in sections 405, 406, 407, 412 and 442 of the Criminal Code.
(c) If his name is not inscribed on the General Roll of the advocates of the Province;
(d) If he has been suspended from his functions by a court or by a council of his section or by the General Council.
The secretary-treasurer of the General Council is required every year during the month of May, as far as practicable, to prepare a general roll of all the advocates having a right to practise in the province, taking as a basis the information supplied him by the treasurers of sections, the secretary-treasurers of library associations and the registers in his possession, but only those who have paid their subscriptions and are not disqualified or suspended.
Section 82 provides that:
Any advocate, whose name has been omitted from the roll for neglecting to pay all his subscriptions, may, at any time, pay the same to the proper officer; and on producing the receipts or certificates of the said officer, the secretary-treasurer of the General Council shall give to such advocate a certificate, under the seal of the corporation, showing that he has complied with the law, and such certificate shall take the place of the entry on the roll for the rest of the current year; and provided such advocate be not under the effect of a sentence of disqualification or suspension from his functions, he may, on producing such certificate before the prothonotary or clerk of the court, practise as if his name were on the roll. It will be observed that the only action taken at the meeting of the Council of the Bar of Montreal was the resolution to notify the secretary of the General Council of the fact that Marion had been found guilty of a crime ranked as a felony before the passing of the Criminal Code, Acting on this resolution the assistant secretary wrote to the secretary of the General Council, enclosing what he calls a copy of the judgment in the affair of The King v. Marion, in virtue of which Marion is condemned to two years in the penitentiary. The original of this letter was not produced, and the only proof of its loss was the statement of Mr. Nantel, the writer of the letter, that Mr. Martineau, to whom it was addressed, had died and Mr. Jodoin, Mr. Martineau's successor, told him he had not found the original. At all events, the only ground that this notification furnished to Mr. Martineau, the secretary of the General Council, for striking Marion's name off the list was the conviction, and he and the Council of the Bar of Montreal purported to act under sec. 68 of the Act on the view that the conviction was for an offence ranked as a felony before the passing of the Criminal Code, 1892.
The offence for which Marion was convicted was not a felony prior to 1892 unless it comes within see. 4 of the Larceny Act, R.S.C., 1886, c. 164, which is as follows:
It has been held that the bailment intended by this section is a deposit of something to be specifically returned, and, therefore, one who receives money with no obligation to return the identical coins received is not a bailee within the section; R. v. Hassall (1); R. v. Garrett (2); R. v. Hoare (3); R. v. de Banks (4).
I think it is impossible to hold here that there was an obligation to return the identical coins, and that, therefore, the offence was not a felony prior to the passing of the Criminal Code in 1892. There was, therefore, no power to strike Marion off the roll under the provisions of s. 62.
The Council of the section of Montreal could have struck him off for life by proceedings under sect. 27 and 28 of the Act, but can it be said that any such proceedings were taken, or that any pronouncement was made by that body, depriving him forever of the right of practising his St profession?
No complaint was laid under oath, pursuant to s. 22, and the Council did not purport to hear any complaint or to render any decision on a complaint and award of punishment under s. 27. The view was that s. 68 applied, and that Marion at once ceased to have the right to practise, and that his name must be struck off by the General Secrctary upon receipt of the certified copy of the sentence as provided by see. 69.
In my opinion, therefore, Marion did not in fact become disqualified automatically by virtue of section 68 and was not disqualified by any decision of the council of the Montreal section on complaint under section 27.
We must, however, consider the effect of the judgment in the former litigation instituted by Marion against the Bar of the province of Quebec and the Bar of Montreal. I have examined carefully the reasoning of my brother Rinfret on this point and agree with his conclusion with regard to it.
In those proceedings there was put directly in issue the question of whether or not Marion had ceased to be a member of the Bar of Quebec, and the decision of the court was that, by virtue of section 68 and also by virtue of a decision of the council of the Montreal section, he had ceased to be such member.
While this decision is contrary to the view I have expressed above, it is, nevertheless, a final judgment on the issue of fact and is, therefore, binding as between the parties quite regardless of whether, as a matter of law, it was correct or not.
The statutory duty of the respondent treasurer of the Bar of Montreal is to receive subscriptions and dues from those who are members of the Bar and Marion having, by the judgment referred to, which binds him, been declared not to be a member of the Bar, there was no obligation on the treasurer to receive the dues tendered and to give a receipt for same.