language used so as to impose by inference a liability not expressly imposed by the language of the agreement. There
CIY was nothing in the conditions existing at the time or in the surrounding circumstances calling for extending the language of the agreement beyond its express and literal meaning.
On the contrary, those conditions and circumstances indicated that the parties never contemplated, at the time, that the Crown was to be made liable for the repairs in question. The term in the agreement giving the
City the right to cancel the licence to use the street and compel the removal of the railway tracks at any time on
60 days' notice, strengthened this view; also the specific provision, in another agreement between the same parties made two years later (by which the City granted to the
Government Railway the right to lay a spur along the same street on Ballast Wharf), as to repairs of the wharf structure in addition to the provision for repairs of the street, was another circumstance indicating that the parties did not regard repairs to the street as including repairs to the wharf.
A. N. Carter for the appellant.
I. C. Rand K.C. for the respondent.
QUEBEC SKATING CLUB v. THE KING
APPEAL by the defendant appellant and cross-appeal by the plaintiff respondent from the judgment of the
Exchequer Court of Canada (1).
The appellant was the owner of a property in the city of Quebec, upon which -there had been a skating rink building which was destroyed by fire. The building was not rebuilt because it was known that the property was to be expropriated by the National Battlefields Commission for the purposes of the National Battlefields park.
S.C.R.]