Judgment of the Court
J.-The respondents apply for a re-hearing this appeal on the following grounds:
(a) that the reasons for judgment and the formal judgment failed to provide the usual terms for such orders as settled in the case of Baird v. Moule's Patent Earth Closet Co. (1) as set out in the report of Edison Telephone Co. v. India Rubber Co. (2), and followed in subsequent cases;
(b) that the reasons overlooked the statement counsel for the appellants made at the trial before the Exchequer Court that they did not intend to put in any further evidence with regard to the amendment they sought to add to the particulars, and consequently the costs of the appeal should not have been paid by the respondents.
In our view, this is not matter for re-hearing.
In effect, it is a motion praying the Court to amend its judgment. Treating it as such, we find the situation to be as follows: Judgment was delivered by this Court on the 16th June, 1933, setting aside the judgment of the Exchequer Court and directing that the appellants have leave to supplement the record by adding to the particulars of objections S.C.R.]
further particulars set forth in the notice of motion dated 26th June, 1931, before the Exchequer Court; also giving leave to add further evidence in regard thereto. Subsequently the judgment was drawn up and duly entered. In fact, the respondents in this Court petitioned His Majesty the King in Council for special leave to appeal from the judgment; and, on 27th November, 1933, the petition for leave was dismissed with costs.
The question really is therefore whether there is power in the Court to amend a judgment which has been drawn up and entered. In such a case, the rule followed in England is, we think,-and we see no reason why it should not also be the rule followed by this Court-that there is no power to amend a judgment which has been drawn up and entered, except in two cases: (1) Where there has been a slip in drawing it up, or (2) Where there has been error in expressing the manifest intention of the court (In re Swire (1); Preston Banking Company v. Allsup & Sons (2); Ainsworth v. Wilding (3)).
In a very recent case (Mac- Carthy v. Agard (4)), the authorities were all reviewed and the principle was re-asserted. In that case, although, indeed, all the judges expressed the view that the circumstances were particularly favourable to the applicant, but because neither of the conditions mentioned were present, the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that it had no power to interfere.
(The rule as stated was approved by the Privy Council in Firm of R.M.K. R.M. v. Firm of M.R.M. V.L. (5)).
The respondents' application does not come under the so-called slip rule. Nor is it apparent that some matter which should have been dealt with in the reasons has been overlooked; and, in our view, the minutes as settled accord with the judgment pronounced by the Court. Any doubt which might have subsisted on those points must have been made clear by the discussion before their Lordships of the Privy Council and the order made upon the petition for special leave to appeal.
The case involves the validity of a patent. A question of that nature concerns not only the immediate parties; it