Majority
Agreement was assented to on the 25th November, 1932. At that date, the Tariff Board Act was already on the statute book. By art. 12 of the Agreement, His Majesty's JURISDICTION Government in Canada undertook to constitute forthwith the Tariff Board, for which provision had already been made in the Tariff Board Act (1931).
Our attention was Rinf ret J. not drawn to any subsequent legislation modifying the - Board Act after approval was given to the Trade Agreement. It follows that nothing contained in the Agreement may be helpful in construing the provisions of the Board Act.
For the reasons above stated, the questions referred to the Court will be answered as follows:
To Question No. 1:
No;
To Question No. 2: No;
To Question No. 3: Yes.
ANGUS WILLIAM ROBERTSON (DE- I-- APPELLANT; *Feb. 6,7.
FENDANT)
.....................
..
*Mar. 6.
AND
*June 6.
ETHEL QUINLAN AND OTHERS (PLAIN- RESPONDENTS; TIFFS) ...........
...................
AND
CAPITAL TRUST CORPORATION LTD.
(DEFENDANT)
AND
DAME CATHERINE RYAN AND OTHERS
(MIS-EN-CAUSE)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BEIoCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Judgment of the Court
J.-Les seules parties en pr6sence devant nous sont l'appelant Robertson et l'intim6e Ethel Quinlan et la Capital Trust Corporation comme fiduciaire ex6cutrice testamentaire de la succession de feu Hugh Quinlan, d6c6d6 le 26 juin 1927; le procureur de 1'intim6e Margaret Quinlan nous demande acte d'une transaction intervenue entre elle et l'appelant avec le concours de l'ex6cutrice et h laquelle sa sceur Ethel a refus6 d'adh6rer.
Pour d6terminer l'appel entre ces deux parties, sur cette partie du jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure port6e en appel devant la Cour du Banc du Roi et devant nous, la question capitale, comme 'a fort bien dit le juge de premibre instance, est de savoir s'il y a eu une vente des actions en litige avant le dic&s du testateur.
Si cette vente a eu lieu avant son d6chs, elle est valide, quelle que soit la vilit6 du prix; car, dit le juge de premibre instance, le 20 juin, M. Quinlan 6tait en 6tat de consentir h la vente; si, par contre, elle a eu lieu apris, elle est invalide, vu la prohibition de l'article 1484 C.C. alors mime que le prix repr6senterait la pleine valeur des actions. Le juge de premibre instance ne donne pas en d6tail les raisons pour lesquelles, apres avoir permis la preuve que la lettre de Robertson, du 20 juin 1927, h Quinlan avait 6t6 lue h ce dernier en pr6sence de M. Leamy, le tribunal a refus6 de laisser faire la preuve par t6moins de la nature de la r6ponse de Quinlan, alors que Robertson avait plaid6 que ce dernier avait accept6 sa proposition. I me parait essentiel, avant de discuter les autres points soulev6s, d'6tudier d'abord le bien ou mal fond6 de cette d6cision a 1'enquite qui, d'apris les notes de 1'honorable juge Martineau, a entrain6 comme cons6quence cette partie du jugement final dont l'appelant se plaint. La situation des parties avant l'enquite me semble bien r6sum6e comme suit par l'honorable juge Surveyer, dans son interlocutoire du 7 janvier 1929:
16) that said transfer was made when said Hugh Quinlan was not compos mentis;
18, that it was clandestine and made for less than the real value of the said shares;
,
(20, 22, 23) that in order to conceal said transfer, said defendant Cannon J. Robertson has assigned some of these shares to pr~te noms of his, unable to pay for same;
(24) that the said transfer was not mentioned in the inventory sent by defendants to plaintiff Ethel Quinlan on August 8, 1928;
Considering that the allegations of defendant Robertson's plea are in the following terms:
(37) In or about the month of June, 1927, and some time before his death, the said late H. Quinlan transferred and delivered all his holdings of stock in the said companies to his partner and associate, defendant Robertson, under an agreement with said Robertson, the terms of which were as stated in a letter addressed by said Robertson, to said Quinlan, dated June 20th, 1927:
(38) Said letter reads as follows:
June 20th, 1927. 357 Kensington Ave.,
Westmount, Que.
HUGH,-This will acknowledge your transfer of the following stocks to me:- 1,151 shares Quinlan, Robertson & Janin, Ltd.
50 shares Amiesite Asphalt Limited.
200 shares Ontario Amiesite Asphalt Limited.
200 shares Amiesite Asphalt Ltd., in the name of H. Dunlop. Which stock represented all your holdings in the above companies. I have agreed to obtain for you the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)
for the above mentioned securities, payable one-half cash on the day of the sale, and one-half within one year from this date, which latter half will bear interest at 6 per cent. Should your health permit you to attend to business within one year from this date, I agree to return all of the above mentioned stocks to you on the return to me of the moneys I have paid you thereon including interest at 6%.
Yours truly,
(Signed) A. W. (39) At the time the contract and agreement evidenced by the above letter was entered into, the said H. Quinlan was in full and complete possession of his faculties and thoroughly capable, in all respects, of passing upon the propriety and sufficiency of said transaction; and the defendant Robertson agreed to send the above letter only after he had been repeatedly and urgently requested to do so by and on behalf of the said late H. Quinlan;
(40) After the death of the late H. Quinlan, the defendant Robertson endeavoured strenuously to find some buyers, for said shares, at the price mentioned in the above letter, but was unable to do so, and finally he paid himself to the estate of the said late H. Quinlan, in fulfilment of his obligations, $250,000, as agreed upon between himself and the said late H. Quinlan;
(43) The shares mentioned in the above letter of June 20th, 1927, were not assets of the estate of the said late Hugh Quinlan, at the time of his death; but they were, in effeot, sold and transferred by the said late Hugh Quinlan himself either to defendant Robertson, or to some other buyer, whom the latter agreed to obtain and, failing the obtaining of whom, said defendant Robertson was obliged and entitled to retain said shares at the price of $250,000, agreed to be paid therefor;
(44) It was an error on the part of a subordinate employee of defendant "Capital Trust Corporation Ltd." who helped prepare the statement of assets and liabilities constituting the estate of the said late H. Quinlan and filed as plaintiffs' exhibit P-2, that the said 1,151 shares of Quinlan, Robertson & Janin Ltd. (erroneously called " Hugh Quinlan & Janin Co.") were entered as an asset of said estate, the said shares being at the time of the death of the said Hugh Quinlan transferred and delivered to defendant Robertson with said other shares on terms of the agreement aforesaid, and all that should have been entered as an asset of the estate of the said late H. Quinlan was .the claim against the said Robertson and of others to obtain payment of the price of said shares as and when it became payable in terms of said agreement;
Le d6fendeur Robertson fournit ensuite les d6tails suivants quant au paragraphe 37:
A. The said transfer of said shares from the said Hugh Quinlan to defendant A. W. Robertson, took place on or about the 20th of June, 1927;
B. The agreement was in writing;
C. The said agreement was dated the 20th of June, 1927;
D. The said agreement was signed by A. W. Robertson, the defendant, and by him delivered to Hugh Quinlan, who, in turn, delivered to the said defendant Robertson his certificate for said shares, endorsed in blank; E. The document was a private writing under the form of a letter addressed to the late Hugh Quinlan, and signed by the defendant A. W. Robertson;
De sorte que 1'on peut dire que l'action a t prise par deux l6gataires pour mettre de c~t6 1'acquisition qu'elles allguent avoir t6 faite le 20 juin, avant la mort du testateur, pour le motif que le transport des actions aurait 6 consenti alors que ce dernier, ne jouissant pas de la capacit6 mentale requise, aurait 6t6 victime des manceuvres dolosives de Robertson, son associ6, qui aurait abuse de sa confiance en lui payant un prix insuffisant.
I semble done que le litige entre les parties ne mettaient pas en doute 1'existence d'une vente h cette date; mais il s'agissait simplement de prouver en quelles circonstances elle avait eu lieu et quelle 6tait la capacit6 mentale de Quinlan lors de la transaction all6gude de part et d'autre dans les proc& dures.
Il nous faut done d6cider aux lieu et place de la Cour Sup6rieure si la preuve d6ji faite et les alligu6s 6taient suffisants pour constituer le commencement de preuve par 6crit exig6 par le paragraphe 7 de larticle 1233 du code civil pour permettre la preuve testimoniale.
Les faits et 6crits V' devant la cour 6taient les suivants:
J.
1. L'entente de 1925, par laquelle Quinlan et ses deux associ6s, Robertson et Janin, avaient pourvu h l'acquisition par les survivants de la part de l'associ6 dicid6; cet 6crit porte la signature de Quinlan et celle de ses associs; 2. L'6tat de sant6 pr6caire depuis plusieurs mois de Quinlan, qui faisait privoir sa fin prochaine;
3. Les pourparlers au sujet de cette acquisition entre Janin, Robertson et l'honorable M. Perron, avocat de Quinlan, qui lui a continu6 sa confiance mime apres sa mort en l'instituant par testament 1'aviseur de sa succession; 4. L'entrevue de M. Perron avec Quinlan, au commencement de mai 1927;
5. La fixation du prix de $250,000 par M. Perron comme 6tant la juste valeur des int6r~ts de Quinlan dans les diff6rentes compagnies contr6l6es par les trois associs; 6. La visite de l'appelant h Quinlan, le 21 mai 1927, au cours de laquelle Quinlan endossa en blanc, en pr6sence de l'appelant et de la garde-malade Kerr, la formule de transport au dos de quatre certificats d'actions, dont deux repr6sentant 1151 actions de Quinlan, Robertson & Janin, et deux certificats de 50 actions de Amiesite Asphalt Co. Ltd.; 7. La t6moignage de Mile Kerr h l'effet qu'h cette occasion l'appelant lui avait expliqu6 le but de sa visite, qu'il s'agissait de la vente de certaines actions;
8. Le mime jour, le testateur dicta A son fils le m6moire qui est devant la cour, 6num6rant tous les certificats qu'il d6tenait dans ces deux compagnies, avec la note suivante: "Dep. in A. W. Robertson's box," avec la date des endossements, savoir le 21 mai 1927, ce qui, h mon avis, d6montrerait clairement que, dans 1'esprit du testateur, ces valeurs devaient 6tre consid6r6es sous le contr6le et en possession de l'appelant h partir de cette date; cet 6crit provient certainement du d6funt;
Apris cette livraison et cet endossement, Robertson soumit h M. Janin que le prix de $250,000 serait raisonnable; et ce prix, conformiment h 1'avis de l'honorable J.-L. Perron, fut fix6 comme repr6sentant la valeur r6elle de ces actions;
10. Le fait qu'un double de la lettre dat6e du 20 juin
1927 fut trouv6 dans la votte de 1'honorable J.-L. Perron h l'endroit que ce dernier avait indiqu6 it son secr6taire;
11. La preuve que cette lettre a 6t6 lue h Quinlan, qui, d'apris le juge de premibre instance, 6tait parfaitement en
J. 6tat de comprendre son contenu et de donner ou refuser son assentiment au prix propos6.
A part la nature de la contestation li6e entre les parties, tel qu'indiqu6 plus haut, le transport des actions portant la signature de Quinlan et leur possession par Robertson et le m6moire prdpar6 sous la dict~e de Quinlan, joints A l'entente qui existait entre les associ6s, constituent-ils, oui ou non, un commencement de preuve par 6crit?
Le seul fait qu'il restait i prouver 6tait qu'h cette date du 21 juin
Quinlan a bien et dfiment, pour le montant de $250,000 mentionn6 dans la lettre de Robertson, consenti h rendre d6finitive, suivant les conditions de la lettre de Robertson,
1'ali6nation des actions dont les certificats endoss6s par lui
6taient d6ji physiquement en la possession de Robertson depuis le 20 mai. Ces 6crits ne constatent pas le consentement de Quinlan h accepter $250,000; mais constatent-ils des faits qui rendent vraisemblable le fait all6gu6? Il n'est pas n6cessaire que l'6crit 6tablisse un des 616ments du fait h prouver; il peut 6tre simplement le point de d6part d'un raisonnement pour le juge.
25 Revue Trimestrielle de
Droit Civil (1926) p. 410.
En appliquant ce critbre, il nous semble que le juge de premiere instance a restreint la port6e qu'il fallait donner aux 6crits et aux all6gu6s des parties en refusant, comme il
'a fait, de prouver par t6moins I'attitude et la conduite de
Quinlan en cette circonstance. Il se contente de dire qu'il est possible que le prix de $250,000 ait 6t6 fix4 en vue des conditions 6nonc6es en 1'acte d'accord du 11 juin 1925.
Nous croyons qu'il aurait aller jusqu'h accepter la vraisemblance et la probabilit6 que ce prix de $250,000, ayant 6t6 fix6 dans les circonstances plus haut relat6es
(1) (1874) 18 L.C.J. 317.
(2) (1870) L.CJ. 268.
(5) (1902)
(3) (1889) M.L.R.5S.C.11,at15.. (4) [1900] A.C. 467, at 474, 475. 32 Can. S.C.R. 547, at 550.
apris les entrevues de Quinlan avec son homme de confiance et avocat, 'honorable M. Perron, a 6t6 accept6 par Quinlan comme d6finitif, lorsqu'il lui fut offert par 6crit par son associ6 Robertson. Or la vraisemblance du fait all~gu6 est le criterium du commencement de preuve par 6crit. Voir Cox v. Patton (1).
Il a 6t6 d6cid6 en revision dans Lefebvre v. Bruneau (2), que la possession en fait de meubles 6q.uivaut & un commencement de preuve par 6crit, suffisant pour permettre au possesseur d'expliquer sa pos-session par une preuve testimoniale.
Le juge Tellier a jug6 de m6me dans Boucher v. Bousquet (3), que la possession seule d'effets mobiliers fournit en faveur du d~fendeur une prisomption de droit de propri6t assez forte pour lui donner droit de prouver son titre par t6moins. Or, dans l'esp~ce, Robertson 6tait en possession des actions depuis mai 1927, et aussi de celles endoss6es. par Dunlop. Voir aussi Forget v. Baxter (4).
En pr6sence de la plaidoirie 6crite risum6e plus haut, ne pouvons-nous pas dire, comme feu le juge-en-chef Taschereau, parlant au nom de cette cour dans Campbell v. Young (5):
It is not a commencement of proof of a contract that is in question. * * * The appellant had not to prove it, since it is admitted, pleaded by the respondents themselves. * * * Once a contract is admitted, no commencement of proof in writing is required for the admissibility of oral: evidence of the amount of the consideration thereof.
Mais, mime si l'article 1243 C.C. et la rigle de l'indivisibilit6 de l'aveu s'appliquent, nous dirions, comme dans cettecause:
The contract must be proved by the opposite party, aliunde of the admission. But the admission is sufficient as a commencement of proof in. writing to legalize oral evidence of it and of its conditions.
L'honorable juge Howard nous dit:
The appellant answers: " Well, if the evidence does not amount to, complete proof, it constitutes a commencement of proof sufficient to open the door to testimony on the point."
Again I cannot agree. If the evidence were all one way, it would, in my opinion, be sufficient, but it is rebutted by the significant fact that the appellant and his co-executor treated these shares as belonging to the succession of the late Mr. Quinlan, whereas if the proposal had been accepted by Mr. Quinlan and therefore the agreement, whatever it should be called, completed before his death, these shares would have been removed from his succession and their value, that is, the consideration re-ceived for them, would have taken their place among its assets. This con-- Avec respect, I'honorable juge nous semble avoir 6t6 trop s6vre. Le fait que ces actions avaient 6t6, par erreur suivant la pr6tention du d6fendeur, mentionn6es par sa Cannon . co-ex~cutrice testamentaire, exclusivement charg6e de la comptabilit6, comme faisant partie de l'actif de la succession, aurait parfaitement pu servir h la transquestion de Robertson, mais n'est pas suffisant par lui-mime pour d6truire la vraisemblance du fait all6gu6, savoir l'acceptation du prix de $250,000 par Hugh Quinlan.
Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs l'acte personnel de Robertson.
Il est fort possible que dans l'esprit de ce dernier et de sa co-ex6cutrice, 6tant donn6es les conditions de cette acquisition, aussi longtemps que le montant convenu n'avait pas 6t6 pay6 par un acheteur ou par lui-m~me, la valeur des actions, sinon les actions elles-mimes, faisaient n6cessairement partie de l'actif de la succession. Il s'agit de mots, plut6t que de la substance de la chose: de toutes fagons, ces actions ou leur valeur devaient figurer au bilan de la succession Quinlan. Cette erreur, qui a 6t6 expliqu6e, ne devrait pas, h notre avis, suffire pour mettre de c8t6 tous les 616ments de preuve 6num6ris plus haut et qui, d'aprbs le juge Howard, seraient suffisants pour constituer un commencement de preuve par 6crit. La nature du contrat intervenu peut expliquer cette attitude de Robertson, que lui reproche M. le juge Howard. Il s'obligeait h payer h Quinlan ou h ses h6ritiers la somme de $250,000 pour obtenir la propri6t6 des actions 6num6r6es dans la lettre. Il y a donc eu d'aprbs lui, contrat d'ali6nation d'une chose certaine et d6terminde pour un prix en argent, ou, en d'autres termes, une vente.
Le prix devait Atre pay6 moiti6 comptant et l'autre moiti6 dans l'ann6e. Il s'agit dans l'espice d'une vente avec "reserve d'6lection d'amis" ou de declaration de "command".
Colin et Capitant (Droit Civil, vol. 2, page 429) nous disent h ce sujet: La conduite des intiress6s, d6s le 22 juin 1927, en enregistrant le transport dans les livres des compagnies, semble confirmer cette interpr6tation de l'entente alliguee.
Nous sommes donc d'avis de mettre de c6t6 les juge- J. ments de la 'Cour Superieure refusant cette preuve testimoniale. Vu cependant les frais 6normes dbji encourus, nous d6sirons, avant d'aller plus loin, entendre les parties durant le terme actuel pour d6cider ce qu'il serait juste et convenable de faire dans les circonstances.
As it appears by the last words of the above judgment, a final judgment was not rendered by this Court, which was desirous, owing to the enormous costs already incurred, to hear later on the parties in order to decide what should be reasonably done under these circumstances. The parties were so heard, and, on the 6th of June, 1934, the following final judgment by the Court was delivered by
J.--Since the court ruled, on March 6, 1934, that the trial judge misdirected himself when he refused to hear oral evidence of the testator's answer to Robertson's letter of June 20, 1927, the parties were heard and requested to file in writing their views of the proposed settlement and as to what evidence should be allowed, if the case be sent back to the Superior Court. The respondent Margaret Quinlan reiterated her decision not to be any longer involved as plaintiff in this case and prayed that, under the agreement of settlement executed between herself and all parties interested in the estate of the late Hugh Quinlan, excepting only the appellant Dame Ethel Quinlan (Mrs. Kelly) and the tutor, if any, of her minor children, passed before R. Papineau Couture, N.P., on the 31st of January, 1934, whereof a certified copy was left with the Registrar, this court should either declare that it sees no objection to the intervenants carrying it into effect or grant acte thereof.
The intervenants also explained that the reason why the stipulation of paragraph 6 was inserted in the agreement was because the intervenants, having filed before this court a declaration that they submit to justice, there was at least doubt of their right to enter into a settlement without the acquiescence of the court.
We see no reason why we should not declare that the settlement forms part of the record of the appeal and that -360 we grant acte thereof without passing upon the validity or the binding character of the agreement in question, nor deciding whether or not the intervenants acted within their powers and the officers of the intervenants within their authority. As far as Robertson and Margaret Quinlan are concerned, we cannot refuse to find as a fact that they have settled their differences and wish to stop this litigation.
The filing of the agreement in the record so that it will form part thereof for the future is all that is required and granted by giving " acte " of the production of the settlement.
Therefore, there remains before us only the appellant
Robertson, the respondent Ethel Quinlan (Mrs. Kelly)
and the two trust companies, who intervened here at the request of the court to watch the proceedings, although they, at first, only appeared to submit to justice, s'en rapporter & justice, they having accepted the judgment of the
Superior Court.
The appellant's counsel submits that the only additional evidence which should be allowed, if the enquite is reopened before the Superior Court, is the evidence which has been offered, and refused by the trial judge. This should include oral evidence to show:
(a) the answer given by the late Hugh Quinlan when the letter of June 20, 1927, was read to him, including, of course, the conduct, statements, communications and declarations of the persons present when the letter was so read and of the late Hugh Quinlan himself and generally, all relevant circumstances relating thereto;
(b) All the facts, circumstances, statements and communications relating to the drafting of the said letter of
June 20, 1927, including the conduct of all those who shared in the drafting of the said letter; and the whereabouts and safekeeping of said letter;
(c) All the facts, circumstances, statements and communications relating to the visits of the Honourable J. L.
Perron and of the present appellant to the late Hugh Quinlan, during the month of May, 1927, or thereabout, and to the endorsement of the four certificates of shares filed as exhibits P-9, P-10, P-26 and P-27; also to the memorandum of the 21st of May, 1927, P-66; including the conduct of all the participants in these various events;
(d) Generally, all facts, conditions and circumstances tending to show that the late Hugh Quinlan agreed, or disagreed, as the case may be, to the contents of the letter of June the 20th, 1927.
The respondent would also bring new evidence of all facts, declarations and statements which might tend to rebut the evidence to be afforded as aforesaid by the appellant. The respondent in her memorandum does not object to the above suggestions of the appellant's attorney. We must take it that she would be content to reopen the enqu6te within the above mentioned limits, although she has refrained from offering any suggestions in respect thereto.
We believe, however, that we should not send the case back to the Superior Court before deciding the question of the status of the plaintiff Ethel Quinlan, which was strongly attacked and defended before us. It must be borne in mind that the litigation has taken a different aspect since the judgment of the Superior Court, which dismissed a very substantial part of the conclusions, to wit
1. The prayer that the appellant A. W. Robertson and the Capital Trust Company be removed from office; 2. The prayer that they be condemned to render an account;
3. The prayer that the inventory be annulled;
4. The various allegations of fraud against the appellant, as well as the allegation that the late Hugh Quinlan was not of sound mind when the letter of the 20th of June, 1927, was read to him.
Now, the plaintiff having acquiesced in the judgment of the trial judge, the issue before the Court of King's Bench and before us was limited to the following points:
(a) The existence or nullity of the transfer to the appellant of the shares enumerated in the letter;
(b) The validity of the transfer to the appellant of four hundred shares of the Fuller Gravel Company Limited; (c) The value of the shares whose transfer has been set aside; and as to the time at which the valuation should retroactively be made;
(d) The legality of the finding that the appellant should pay all the profits made and dividends paid since the death of the late Hugh Quinlan.
In this connection, we must take cognizance of the last will and testament of the late Hugh Quinlan, dated April 14, 1926.
The testator empowered his executors and trustees, in part, as follows:
I extend the duration of their authority and seizin as such executors and trustees beyond the year and day limited by law, and I constitute them administrators of my succession and declare that they and their successors in office shall be and remain from the date of my decease seized and vested with the whole of my said property and estate for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this, my present will, with the following powers in addition to all the powers conferred upon them by law:
(a) Power to collect all property assets and rights belonging to my Estate: power to sell and convert into money all such portions of my property and Estate, movable and immovable, as are not herein specially bequeathed, and that they may deem inadvisable to retain as investments as and when they think best, for such prices and on such terms and conditions as they may see fit: to receive the consideration prices and give acquittances therefore; to invest the proceeds and, all sums belonging to my succession in such securities as they may deem best but in accordance with Article 981o of the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, and to alter and vary such investments from time to time.
(b) To compromise, settle and adjust or waive any and every claim and demand belonging to or against my succession.
(c) To sell, exchange, convey, assign, borrow money, mortgage, hypothecate, pledge, or otherwise alienate or deal with the whole or any part of the property or assets at any time forming part of my succession, either movable or immovable, bank or other stocks or bonds and to execute all necessary deeds of sale, mortgage, hypothec and pledge, acquaintances and discharges and other documents, in connection herewith, and thus "de gr6 & gr6," without judicial formalities and with the express understanding that any third party dealing with my Executors and Trustees shall never be compelled to attend or to control the investment or re-investment (emploi ou rem-ploi) of the moneys.
(d) After the death of my said wife, to distribute and divide all the net income or revenue of my Estate equally between my children issued of my marriage with the said Dame Catherine Ryan "par tate" or the legitimate issue "par souche" and thus until the death of the last survivor of my said children at the first degree, it being my wish and desire that should any of my said children die without issue, his share in the revenues of my Estate shall be added to the share of his survivor brothers and sisters per capita "par tate" and nephews and nieces "par souches." (e) After the death of all my said children at the first degree to divide the capital and property of my whole Estate, with all accrued interests and revenues equally per capita "par tate" between my grandchildren and great grandchildren issued of legitimate marriages and then living. Article Twelfth
In order that all the stipulations of this, my -present will, may be respected by all and each of my legatees and beneficiaries, I hereby formerly (sic) declare that should any of them contest any stipulation of this, my present will and testament, they shall ipso facto lose their rights and titles of legatees or beneficiaries in this, my present will.
QUv.
Article Thirteenth
I expressly declare that no other parties or persons may have the right to endeavour, control, manage and divide the property of my estate, but my said testamentary executors and trustees and their successors in office and thus, without any intervention of any third party, tutors, curators and so on and so on and that the powers and authority hereinbefore given to my testamentary executors and trustees shall be interpreted as covering all deeds, documents and proceedings without any special judicial formalities being required and thus notwithstanding any provisions of the law to the contrary.
The nature of the rights vested in the female respondent under the will of the late Hugh Quinlan is not doubtful. He bequeathed his entire estate, save and except certain legacies in particular title, " in trust " to his trustees who are "seized and vested with the whole of my said property and estate."
As to the children of the first degree, their rights are strictly limited, until the death of their mother, to an annual sum not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not over two thousand dollars ($2,000) payable by monthly instalments in advance as will seem fit to my executors and trustees, and thus until such child or children will not remain with his or their mother.
And after the death of their mother, the rights of the children of the first degree are restricted to " all the net income or revenue of my estate," with the stipulation that, in the event of the death of one of them his shares in the revenues of my estate shall be added to the shares of his surviving brothers and sisters, per capita (par tate), and nephews and nieces "par souche."
The appellant has submitted to us that the children of Hugh Quinlan have no other right in their father's estate than the personal claim to the revenue payable out of the said estate; that mere creditors of revenues are as such unable to dispose of the estate or any portion thereof and that therefore they have no status to take an action concerning the ownership of any property appertaining to the estate.
The only remaining plaintiff now prays, as above stated, that the various sales and transfers of shares be declared null and void and that it be declared that these shares belong and have never ceased to belong in full ownership to the estate of Hugh Quinlan.
As creditors of the revenues of the estate, the plaintiffs certainly had an interest sufficient to sue for the removal of the executors, if they were acting fraudulently. But now that these conclusions have been refused, and that this issue has been finally determined between the parties, can we say that the sole remaining plaintiff has the right to compel the executors and Robertson to undo what she alleges has been J. done illegally and return to the "corpus" the shares in question?
We believe that Ethel Quinlan Kelly, to the extent that she is entitled to a variable share in the net revenue of the estate of her father, has sufficient interest and "status" to preserve intact the "corpus" of the estate if she can satisfy the court, that the shares mentioned in the letter of June 20, 1927, or that the 400 shares of the Fuller Gravel Company Limited were illegally transferred after the death of her father to the present appellant and should be returned to the estate.
We do not and cannot disturb that part of the judgment of the Superior Court which is now "res judicata" between the parties, since the respondent acquiesced in the dismissal of that part of her conclusion above enumerated, nor can we disturb that part of the judgment accepted by the executors and trustees.
We therefore allow the appeal with costs; quash in part the judgment of the Superior Court and also the rulings during the trial refusing oral evidence of the facts and circumstances hereinabove mentioned under paragraphs A, B, C and D; we declare such oral evidence to be admissible, and we send back the parties to the Superior Court to so complete the evidence already taken by a further enquite and then secure a new adjudication on the merits of the issues hereinabove shown as remaining to be decided as between the respondent Dame Ethel Quinlan (Mrs. Kelly) and the appellant Robertson personally. The Court gives "acte"
and considers as part of the record of this case the deed or agreement of settlement passed before R. Papineau Couture, N.P., on the 31st day of January, 1934, within the limits above stated. Appeal allowed with costs.
Cases cited
- A.C. 467 A.C. 467 474