The King v. Cliche

Solicitor for infant respondents: McGregor Young (Official Guardian).

J.-A la suite de la collision d'un automobile avec un rouleau h vapeur, sur la route nationale Livis-Jackman, le 17 octobre 1931, 1'intim6, par p6tition de droit all6guant la negligence du d6partement de la voirie de la province de Quebec, a obtenu de la Cour Sup6rieure (Gibsone, J.) une indemnit6 de $3,515.55.

Sur appel de la Couronne, la Cour du Banc du Roi, par son jugement du 30 novembre 1934, a confirm6 le jugement, Hall J. dissident, tout en le r6duisant de $100 pour corriger une erreur d'addition. Comme il s'ag'it purement et simplement d'une question de faits que les deux cours ont dicid6e en faveur de l'intim6, I'appelant, devant nous, a born6 exclusivement son recours A des moyens de droit.

Nous rif~rant au t6moignage de Joseph Gilbert, la Couronne a pr6tendu que le rouleau de fer, dont la presence a amen6 la collision, appartenait aux d6nomms B6noni cannonJ. Poulin et Marcotte (les contracteurs), qui l'avaient d6pos6 depuis trois jours sur le chemin public alors en reparation. Quoique cette preuve ait 6t6 faite par l'intim6, je partage l'opinion de 1'honorable juge L6tourneau que, dans la contestation comme au cours de 1'enquite, l'on a sembl6 prendre pour acquis qu'il 6tait lh pour les r6parations qui s'y poursuivaient.

A tout 6v6nement, le rouleau avait 6t6 accept6, tol6r6, et, lors de l'accident, 6tait sur le chantier des travaux; de plus, il appert au plaidoyer que le d6partement en avait assum6 la garde et le contr8le, et cette particularit6 suffit pour que la responsabilit6 du maitre des travaux (dans l'espice, la Couronne) doive en r6sulter. Le second point soulev6 par la Couronne est bas6 sur 'article 106 du chapitre 91 des statuts refondus de la povince de Qu6bec de 1925, tel que remplac6 par 17 Geo. V (1927), c. 31, s. 22, qui se lit comme suit:

Encore sur ce point, je crois, avec 1'honorable juge L6tourneau, qu'il est possible que, d'une fagon g6n6rale, la garde d'une route, et l'obligation d'en faire disparaitre les obstacles, reviennent aux municipalitis; mais dans un cas comme dans l'espice actuelle, oi le d6partement s'en est empar6 pour les travaux de son ressort, il faut maintenir le principe que la responsabilit6 suit le contr8le. Cette disposition, d'ailleurs, semble, implicitement du moins, d6cr6ter la responsabilit6 en dommages du gouvernement. Or ce rouleau 6tail certainement sur le chantier organis6 par le d6partement de la voirie et, d'apris les plaidoiries, sous la garde de ses employds qui en auraient indiqu6 la presence un public voyageur par un pavillon rouge plac6 A quatre cents pieds de 1'endroit de l'accident et par un autre pavillon semblable plac6 sur le rouleau a vapeur, en mime temps Can-m J. qu'un fanal allum6, plac6 sur le mime rouleau, 6clairant c Jtrbs bien.

Ce sont 1 les pr6tentions de la d6fense qui, d'apris les jugements des cours inf6rieures, n'ont pas 6t6 prouv6es, pas plus que les actes de n6gligence reproch6s au conducteur de l'automobile.

Mais, nous dit en troisibme lieu l'avocat de l'appelant soulevant un point qui ne senble pas avoir 6t6 du tout plaid6 ou consid6rd devant les cours inf6rieures, la loi 46 Vict. (1883), c. 27, reproduite & l'article 1011 du Code de Proc6dure Civile, ne donne pas un recours illimit6 contre la Couronne pour d6lit ou quasi-d6lit.

Cette disposition se lit comme suit:

Dans cette cause, la Couronne ne semble pas avoir mis en doute, d'apris les plaidoiries, sa responsabilit6 pour les actes ou omissions des employ6s de la voirie. Ceci est d'ailleurs conforme h la pratique dans la province de Qu6bec depuis que cet acte de 1883 a 6t6 pass&. Ses dispositions sont plus g6ndreuses que celles de la Loi de la Cour d'Echiquier du Canada qu'il nous a t6 donn6 de discuter r6ceminent re: The King v. Dubois (1).

Il semble que la 16gislature de Qu6bec se soit inspirie de la Crown Suits Ordinance XV de 1876, section 18, sous-section 2, se lisant comme suit:

'Ce texte a 6t0 discut6 par le Conseil Priv6 re: Attorney- General of the Straits Settlements v. Wemyss (2), oii Lord Hobhouse s'exprime comme suit:

Their Lordships are of opinion that the expression "a claim against the Crown for damages or compensation " is an apt expression to include claims arising out of torts, and that as claims arising out of con- KINa tracts and other classes of claims are expressly mentioned, the words ought to receive their full meaning.

In the case of Farnell v. Bowman (1) attention was directed by this Cannon J. Committee to the fact that in many colonies the Crown was in the habit of undertaking works which, in England, are usually performed by private persons, and to the consequent expediency of providing remedies for injuries committed in the course of these works. The present case is an illustration of that remark. And there is no improbability, but the reverse, that when the legislature of a Colony in) such circumstances allows claims against the Crown in words applicable to claims upon torts, it should mean exactly what it expresses.

D'ailleurs, mime sans cette autorit6, nous croirions devoir suivre la coutume accept6e depuis un grand nombre d'ann6es dans la province de Qu6bec et interpr6ter cet article 1011 C.P.C. comme cr6ant un droit d'action contre la Couronne dans les cas de d6lits et de quasi-d6lits, en suivant les formalit6s de la petition de droit (Vo. Rapport des codificateurs, nov. 1896--C.C.P. (Surveyer) 93).

Pour ces raisons, je suis d'avis de renvoyer l'appel avec d6pens. Le demandeur cependant n'a droit aux int6rits que depuis la date du jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure qui devra 6tre modifi6 en cons6quence.

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ROYALTY

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*June l8, AND DOMINION ROYALTY COR- APPELLANTS; 19,20. * Oct. 1. PORATION

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(PLAINTIFFS)

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RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE APPEAL ONTARIO Contract-Rescission-Inability to make restitutio in integrum-Whether relief not based on rescission could be granted in the action--Form of action and conduct of case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, [1935] O.R. 169, held that, while the facts in connection- with the transaction in question C.J. and Lamont, Cannon and Crocket JJ. and Dysart J. ad hoc.

(1) App. Cas. at gave plaintiff a good cause of action for rescission, yet as, through what had since taken place, the circumstances had changed and become such that plaintiff couldi not make restitutio in integrum, its right of action for rescission had gone, and as it had not framed or Ino.

pursued the action for any relief except relief on the basis of rescission, its action must be dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. Held: The appeal must be dismissed. By reason of said change in circumstances, the objections to granting relief by way of rescission were insurmountable; and, a claim for relief by way of damages (as to damages no evidence had been given), or otherwise except on the basis of the setting aside of the impeached transaction, not having been presented either at the trial or in the Court of Appeal, could not properly be entertained by this Court; defendant should not be called upon in this Court to meet an entirely new case unless, at all events, it rested exclusively upon propositions of law, and unless, moreover, it appeared that he could not be prejudiced by its not having been advanced at an earlier stage.

APPEAL by the plaintiffs from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario (1), which (reversing the judgment of Hope J.) dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The action was brought to recover from the defendant certain moneys paid by the plaintiff Dominion Royalty Corporation Ltd. (incorporated 1930) (hereinafter called the plaintiff company) as the purchase price of a certain interest in a gas and oil lease covering lands in the State of Oklahoma, U.S.A.

The Court of Appeal, while holding that the defendant was the real vendor to the plaintiff company of said interest; that the defendant stood in such a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff company as required him to make full and complete disclosure of the material circumstances in connection with the transaction in question; that he failed to make that full and complete disclosure; and that on these facts, taken by themselves, the plaintiff company had had a good cause of action for rescission, yet held that, as, through what had since taken place, the circumstances had changed and had become such that the plaintiff company could not make restitutio in integrum, its right of action for rescission had gone, and that, as it had not framed or pursued the action for any relief except relief on the basis of rescission, the action must be dismissed. (1) [19353 O.R. 169; [1935] 1 DI.R. 780.

The material facts and circumstances of the case are dealt with at length in the reasons for the judgment appealed from (1).

By the judgment now reported the appeal to this Court was dismissed with costs.

C.J.-I agree with the unanimous view of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that, by reason of the change in circumstances, the objections to granting relief by way of rescission are insurmountable; no purpose would be served in merely repeating the reasons given in the judgments of Mr. Justice Masten and Mr. Justice Davis. On this account, the appeal should be dismissed.

No claim for relief by way of damages or equitable compensation, or to recover the moneys paid to Goffatt as moneys had and received to the use of the appellants, as distinguished from the claim for the restoration of those moneys (with interest), as consequential upon the setting aside of the impeached transaction, was presented either at the trial or in the Court of Appeal. No evidence as to damages was given. The sole title to relief advanced by the appellants was that the transaction with Goffatt was voidable and that Goffatt was bound at their demand to make restitutio in integrum.

In these circumstances, no claim for damages, or for equitable compensation, could properly be entertained by this Court. Similar considerations apply to the contention put forward that the appellants are entitled to recover the moneys paid to Goffatt as moneys had and received to their use; but, indeed, it seems too clear for argument that effect could only be given to such a claim if the impeached transaction were set aside. The appellants are bound by the way in which they conducted their case at the trial and in the Court of Appeal, and it would be contrary to wellsettled principles to call upon the respondent in this Court to meet an entirely new case unless, at all events, that case