Stephens v. Falchi

In 1904, dame Marguerite C. Stephens married Colonel Hamilton Gault at Montreal where they were both domiciled. They lived together in matrimony until 1914, when Colonel Gault went to France in command of a Canadian regiment and remained a member of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and in England until the end of the war. In the years 1916 and 1917 difficulties arose between Gault and his wife.

In 1917 cross actions for separation from bed and board were commenced and subsequently abandoned; and petition and cross-petition for divorce were lodged and also subsequently withdrawn. About November, 1917, dame Stephens went to London, then to Paris, where she carried on works of charity in aid of victims of the war. In the fall of 1918, Colonel Gault and his wife, being both in France, engaged in their respective duties, because of the war, the latter instituted an action for divorce against her husband before the Civil Tribunal of First Instance of the Department of the Seine, Paris, which action was maintained by a judgment of that Tribunal, on the 20th of December, 1918.

On the 14th of October, 1919, the respondent went through a form of marriage in Paris with dame Stephens, in compliance with all the formalities required by French law, the marriage having been preceded by an execution of a marriage contract, whereby inter alia the parties to it purported to submit their matrimonial affairs to the laws of Italy. They lived together as man and wife until the end of July, 1925, when they executed a separation agreement in Rome by which inter alia the respondent acknowledged payment of $5,000 in consideration of which he waived all present or future claim for aliment. At that time dame Stephens ceased to cohabit with the respondent and shortly afterwards returned to the province of Quebec where she continued to live until her death in 1930.

An action was brought in May, 1931, by the respondent against the appellant as executor of the last will and testatment of the late dame Stephens; and the respondent's claim was that, as the husband or the putative husband of the late dame Stephens, he was entitled, in virtue of Italian law, to the usufruct of one-third of the estate of the latter. The trial judge and the appellate court held the respondent was entitled to succeed; and accordingly an accounting was directed.

Held, that the Court in France had no jurisdiction to pronounce a decree of divorce and to dissolve the marriage tie, such judgment not being recognizable in the courts of Quebec where the domicile of both *PRESENT:-Duff C.J. and Cannon, Crocket, Davis and Hudson JJ. spouses was situated at the date of the judgment; and that therefore the marriage between the respondent and dame Stephens was null ab initio; but

, that, the good faith of the respondent not being disputed, the marriage was a putative marriage in the sense of the Italian law as well as of the law of Quebec and that the status of dame Stephens and the respondent was during her lifetime that of putative spouses within the intendment of articles 163 and 164 of the Civil Code. Thus the marriage settlement and the putative marriage itself produced their "civil effects" quoad property as if the putative marriage had been a real one; and, both by the law of Quebec and that of Italy, among these "civil effects" would be included any share of the husband or wife in good faith in the succession of his or her consort.

Therefore, the respondent, his nationality having remained unchanged, has the right, among the rights flowing from the putative marriage, to demand the share in the succession of his putative wife to which he would have been entitled by Italian law, had the marriage been valid (1).

.-The courts of the province of Quebec should merely declare, in deciding the issues raised by the respondent's action, that the marrisge invoked by the latter and the marriage settlement preceding it should receive no effect before these courts, and no declaration should be made as to their validity, as such a decision would not be within the scope of their jurisdiction. Even assuming such jurisdiction, the first husband not having been made a party to the respondent's action, no judgment concerning the validity of the divorce granted in Paris would be binding on him-Moreover, the respondent cannot claim the advantages resulting from the provisions of article 163 C.C. Even assuming good faith, the respondent cannot include among the "civil effects" of the putative marriage a change of nationality for dame Stephens from British to Italian; and the respondent has not established otherwise that dame Stephens had acquired Italian nationality through a -marriage recognized as valid by the courts of Quebec and that she had retained such nationality at the time of her death. Therefore the respondent's action should be dismissed.

Berthiaume v. Dastous ([19301 A.C. 79) disc.

Judgment of the Court of King's Bench ([19371 3 D.L.R. 605) affirmed. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (2), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, Demers P.J., which maintained the respondent's action, and ordered the appellant to render to the respondent an accounting of the estate and succession of the late dame Marguerite C. Stephens. The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

(1) Reporter's note.-Petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dismissed with costs, July 25th, (2) [1937] 3 D.L.R. 605.

JUSTICE.-The action out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent Falchi against the appellant as executor of the last will and testament of the late Marguerite Claire Stephens. The respondent's claim in brief was that, as the husband or the putative husband 'of the deceased Marguerite Claire Stephens, he was entitled, in virtue of Italian law, by which he alleged the determination of the issue is governed, to the usufruct of one-third of the estate of the appellant's de cujus. The trial judge, Mr. Justice Philippe Demers, and the judges of the Court of King's Bench unanimously held the respondent entitled to succeed and, accordingly, an accounting was directed, further adjudications being reserved. A brief statement of the facts is unavoidable. The late Marguerite Claire Stephens and Colonel Hamilton Gault were married in Montreal on the 16th of March, 1904, both being British subjects and domiciled in the province of Quebec. They lived together in matrimony until 1914 when Colonel Gault vkent to France in command of a Canadian regiment; he remained a member of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and in England until the end of the war, returned to Canada for demobilization and was struck off the strength of the Expeditionary Force on the 21st of December, 1919.

Difficulties arose between Colonel Gault and his wife in the years 1916 and 1917, cross actions for separation were commenced, and on the 30th of March, 1917, a judgment of separation was given in the wife's action against her husband. There was an appeal but the judgment was desisted from and proceedings on both sides were abandoned.

A little earlier, petition and cross-petition for divorce had been lodged with the Senate of Canada and, subsequently, withdrawn.

On the 20th of December, 1918, a judgment of divorce was pronounced between them at the instance of the wife by the Civil Tribunal of First Instance of the Department of the Seine, Paris.

It is not seriously open to dispute that at the date of this judgment the domicile of both spouses was in Quebec. The French tribunal had, therefore, no authority recogniz- Duf-CJ. able by the courts of Quebec to pronounce a decree dissolving the marriage tie. By the law of Quebec, marriage is dissoluble only by Act of Parliament or by the death of one of the spouses. By article 6 of the Civil Code, status is determined by the law of the domicile.

The facts resemble those under examination in the case of Stevens v. Fisk (1).

The husband was domiciled in Quebec and there also, since they were not judicially separated, by the law of Quebec, was the domicile of the wife. The wife having complied with the conditions of residence necessary to enable her under the law of New York to sue for divorce -in that state and, under those laws, to endow the courts of the State with jurisdiction to grant her such relief, obtained there a judgment for divorce a vinculo; the husband having appeared in the proceedings and taken no exception to the jurisdiction. It is not quite clear that the wife, had she been free to acquire a separate domicile, would not have been held to have done so; here there is no room for dispute that Mrs. Gault never acquired a French domicile in fact.

In both cases, therefore, the domicile of both consorts was in Quebec; in the one, in fact; in the other, in case of the wife, 'by force of law. It may at this point be recalled that, by the law of Quebec (Art. 207 C.C.) the wife acquires, as one of the consequences of separation from bed and board, the capacity to choose for herself a domicile other than that of her husband. The critical issue in Stevens v. Fisk (1) was whether in these circumstances the Quebec courts should recognize the New York divorce. The Court of Queen's Bench by a majority (of whom Dorion C.J. was one) held the divorce invalid in Quebec. This judgment was reversed in this Court (2) but Mr. Justice Strong dissented, explicitly agreeing with the conclusion as well as the reasoning of the majority of the Queen's Bench.

The considgrants I 'am about to quote express the grounds of the judgment in the Queen's Bench and, as we shall see, are entirely in accord with the prinsemNs ciples now established by judgments of the Privy Council. FAm.H

At the time, it had the weighty support of the two great judges whose names I have specified.

Considering that shortly after, to wit, about the year 1872, they removed to the city of Montreal, in the province of Quebec, with the intention of fixing their residence permanently in the said province; And considering that the said appellant has been engaged in business and has constantly resided at the said city of Montreal since his arrival in 1872, and that he has acquired a domicile in the province of Quebec; And considering that the female respondent has only left the domicile of her husband at the city of Montreal in 1876, and obtained her divorce from the appellant in the state of New York, in the year 1880, while they both had their legal domicile in the province of Quebec;

And considering that under article 6 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, parties who have their domicile in the province of Quebec are governed even when absent from the province by its laws respecting the status and capacity of such parties;

And considering that according to the laws of the province of Quebec marriage is indissoluble, and that divorce is not recognized by said laws, nor are the courts of justice of the said province authorized to pronounce for any cause whatsoever a divorce between parties duly married;

And considering that the decree of divorce obtained by the female respondent in the state of New York has no binding effect in the province of Quebec, and that notwithstanding such decree, according to the laws of the said province the female respondent is still the lawful wife of the appellant, and could not sue the said appellant for the restitution of her property without being duly authorized thereto.

These considgrants rest upon the principles of law applicable to the question now before us. The governing principle is explained in Lord Watson, speaking for the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1) as follows:- Their Lordships have in these circumstances, and upon these considerations, come to the conclusion that, according to international law, the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage. They concur, without reservation, in the views expressed by Lord Penzance in Wilson v. Wilson (2) which were obviously meant to refer, not to questions arising in regard to the mutual rights of married persons, but to jurisdiction in the matter of divorce;

It is the strong inclination of my own opinion that the only fair and satisfactory rule to adopt on this matter of jurisdiction is to insist upon the parties in all cases referring their matrimonial differences to the Courts (1) [1895] A.C. 517, at 540.

-(2) (1872) L.R. 2 P. & D. 435, at 442.

This principle has since been applied in Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey (1) and Attorney-General for Alberta v. Cook (2). The principle of this judgment is, in my opinion, applicable to the circumstances of this case. The rule laid down by article 185 of the Civil Code is in itself unequivocal. "Marriage," it says,

So long as both the spouses have their domicile in Quebec, dissolution of marriage can, as already observed, only be affected by an enactment of a competent legislature. The wife, it is true, has capacity to acquire a domicile separate from her husband where a judicial separation has been pronounced and is in force; and, by article 6, the laws of Lower Canada

Difficult questions may arise in the application of these rules and principles of the Code in respect of jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings where a decree of judicial separation having been pronounced the husband remains domiciled in Quebec while the wife has acquired for herself a domicile elsewhere. It is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of this subject. One conceivable view is that in such a case no court has jurisdiction to pronounce a decree of divorce between the parties recognizable by the law of Quebec.

As regards the divorce proceedings to which reference has just been made, I can see no reason for refusing to apply the principle of the judgments of the Privy Council in view of the fact that both parties were at the time domiciled in Quebec.

On the 14th of October, 1919, the respondent went through a form of marriage in Paris with Mrs. Gault (the late Marguerite Claire Stephens), the marriage having been preceded by the execution of a marriage contract on the 3rd of October, 1919, whereby inter alia the parties to it purported to submit their matrimonial affairs to the laws of Italy. They lived together as man and wife in. Italy, France and the province of Quebec until the 2nd of July, 1925, when they executed a separation agreement in Rome by which inter alia the respondent acknowledged payment of the sum of $5,000 in consideration of which he waived all present or future claim for aliment and declared:- Of this agreement the respondent undertook to obtain confirmation by the proper tribunal but failed to do so; there is unanimity of opinion in the courts below that this document could not operate as a valid renunciation of rights in an unopened succession. At this time the late Marguerite Claire Stephens ceased to cohabit with the respondent, and shortly afterwards returned to the province of Quebec where she continued to live until her death.

The learned trial judge and three of the judges of the Court of King's Bench came to the conclusion that this marriage was null ab initio,-and with this I agree. It is not, I think, without relevancy that Marguerite Claire Stephens was a British subject and, as regards her, therefore, this marriage was under the ban of the Statute of James, (Earl Russell's case

Before proceeding further, I ought to notice an argument to the effect that Colonel Gault, having appeared in the divorce proceedings in Paris instituted by the late Marguerite Claire Stephens, the judgment in those proceedings must be taken as valid as against the appellant, on the ground that she in her lifetime was estopped from disputing the jurisdiction of the Paris court and that he is in no better position; and, again, that the Paris divorce stands as a valid judgment until it is competently set aside.

This view was accepted by the majority of the judges of this Court in Stevens v. Fisk (2). It will not be necessary to examine those judgments. It results from Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier and the decisions based upon it that, the court having no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage tie, the judgment cannot be recognized in the courts of Quebec.

It follows also from the principles laid down in those judgments that consent on the part of the spouses to the exercise of jurisdiction is of no significance.

I have come to the conclusion that the good faith of the respondent not being disputed, the marriage was a putative marriage in the relevant sense. It is, nevertheless, important, as Mr. Geoffrion contended, in considering the "civil effects" to be ascribed to that marriage for the benefit of the respondent, to bear in mind that it was in the strict sense a bigamous marriage, a marriage which could not deprive the putative wife of her British nationality because her nationality remained that of her lawful husband. It could not, moreover, as I humbly think, confer upon the respondent any rights incompatible with the recognition of the status of the lawful husband as bound to Marguerite Claire Stephens as such, or of the status of Marguerite Claire Stephens as bound to him as his lawful wife.

So long as the vinculum of the real marriage subsisted, no act, as I humbly think, of either of the spouses, no form of marriage in which either of them might participate could deprive her of the legal status of his wife or him of the legal status of her husband.

The status of Marguerite Claire Stephens and the respondent was during her lifetime that of putative spouses within the intendment of articles 163 and 164.

As I venture to think, the true position is stated by Pothier in the following passage.

(Pothier, Vol. 6, 197, nos. 437 and 438):quoique ce second mariage soit nul, la bonne foi des parties qui l'ont con- STPN tract6 lui donne, par rapport aux enfants qui en sont nls, les effets civils SEHs que produisent les mariages, en donnant aux enfants les droits de famille, et tous les autres droits qu'ont les enfants n6s d'un 16gitime mariage. En consequence les enfants n6s de ce second mariage viendront aux successions de leurs phre et mire, et mime concourrent A celle de leur mire avee les enfants qu'elle a eus de son premier mariage.

Comment, direz-vous, ce mariage qui est nul peut-il donner ces droits aux enfants qui en sont nds? car, quad nullum est, nullum producit effectum. La r6ponse est que si ce manage, en tant qu'iI est consid6r6 comme nul, ne peut pas les leur donner, la bonne foi des parties qui 'ont contract6 les leur donne, en suppliant A cet 6gard au vice du mariage. 438. La bonne foi des parties qui ont contract6 un mariage nul, donne-t-elle pareillement A ce mariage les effets civils, A I'effet de confirmer entre elles leurs conventions matrimoniales, et de donner A la femme un douaire? Il y a mime raison.

On opposera que les conventions matrimoniales dependent de Ia condition, si nuptias sequantur, laquelle n'a pas t accomplie, puisqu'on ne peut pas dire qu'elles ont t6 suivies d'un mariage entres les parties; celui qui a suivi n'6tant pas un vritable mariage, puisqu'il est nul. La r6ponse est, que Ia bonne foi des parties qui 'ont contract6, suppl6e A la nullit6 de ce mariage, et fait regarder la condition comme accomplie, de mime qu'elle fait regarder comme 16gitimes les enfants qui en sont nds. It will be observed that Pothier says not a word to sanction the view that the solemnization of the second marriage affects the status of the parties to the lawful marriage. He is very careful to make it clear that the rights which that solemnization engenders are rights springing from the good faith by which the parties were actuated; rights which would have been "civil effects" of the ceremony if the former husband, erroneously supposed to be dead, had been dead in truth.

I shall have to revert to this topic.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to consider the question of the domicile of Marguerite Claire Stephens at the time of her death.

Mr. Geoffrion earnestly pressed upon us the contention that, since the decree of separation pronounced in 1917 was desisted from with the consent of the husband, the cause was thereby by force of section 548 of the Code of Civil Procedure, put in the same position "as it was in before the judgment."

I should have been disposed to think, were it not for the views expressed in the Quebec courts, that since the law favours the removal of obstacles to the reunion of separated spouses, and since the disistement from the judgment in due form with the common consent of both parties would be one step on the way, effect ought to be given in the case of a judgment of separation to this article of the Code of Civil Procedure as in the case of other judgments. On this point, however, I defer to the views of the Quebec judges.

Mr. Justice Demers appears to entertain no doubt that the only way in which the separation decree could be abrogated would be by actual reunion of the husband and wife as contemplated by article 130; and the majority of the judges of the Court of King's Bench appear to agree with him. The question whether or not the putative wife did acquire a domicile separate from that of her lawful husband by reason of the putative marriage is a question to be settled by the law of Quebec. The courts of Quebec administer the law of Quebec and no other law. If they apply the rules of the law of another country, it is because the law of Quebec commands them to do so in the circumstances. Whether or not the conditions are such as to require the application of the rules of law of another country is a question they must decide under their own law as to what constitutes domicile and what are the conditions under which a change of domicile takes place. If, at the date of the putative marriage, the judicial separation was not still in force, the Quebec domicile of the putative wife was not, I think, lost in consequence of that marriage because she could not acquire another domicile consistently with due recognition of the existing lawful marriage; as such recognition imports identity of domicile of the spouses.

If the judicial separation was still in force (and I am accepting that view) there are great difficulties, as I see it, in holding that ipso jure her domicile became the domicile for the time being of the putative husband. These alternatives, however, do not exhaust the possible situations. Since, on the last mentioned hypothesis, by the law of Quebec, she was free to acquire another domicile in fact, it is, on that hypothesis, a question of fact whether or not a change of domicile did take place. In my view of the facts, the marriage contract, the putative marriage, the residence in Italy, constitute evidence from which the inference ought to be drawn that she acquired an Italian domicile in fact. I think, nevertheless, that in point of fact she reverted to her domicile of origin when she ascertained. the invalidity of the putative marriage and returned to reside in Quebec. Before she had ascertained the true legal position she was living separately from her putative husband by agreement, and, once she ascertained the truth, it was, as Pothier points out, her duty no longer to cohabit with him.

The evidence, it appears to me, points conclusively to an intention on her part to establish herself permanently in Quebec.

This brings us to the precise question raised by the appeal: Has the respondent the right, among the rights flowing from the putative marriage, to demand the share in the succession of the putative wife to which he would have been entitled by Italian law had the marriage been valid and the nationality of the husband remained (as it has remained) unchanged?

Since the litigation is in the courts of Quebec and the domicile of the de cujus was, at her death, in the province of Quebec, this question must be determined by the law of Quebec, regard being had, of course, to the Italian law to the extent to which, for this purpose, the law of Quebec recognizes and applies it in the circumstances.

As regards the "civil effects" of putative marriage, there appears to be no pertinent difference between the law of Italy and that of Quebec.

The claim of the respondent, accordingly, rests upon the principle of articles 163 and 164 of the Civil Code which are in these terms:- Now, the first thing to be observed is that these articles are not limited in their operation to marriages in Quebec. In Berthiaume v. Dastous (1) the marriage had been celebrated in France; although by French law in point of form radically null, "void," as the judgment of the Privy Council says, "ab initio," and consequently (as the cause of nullity concerned solemnization) null by the law of Quebec on the principle locus regit actum. The right which was there affirmed (right to alimony after a declaration of nullity) was recognized as one of the " civil effects " of this marriage solemnized in France.

Here, the personal STEPHENS law of each of the spouses at the critical moment, the death of Marguerite Claire Stephens, recognizes the "civil effects" produced by putative marriages; and in their application to the circumstances of this case according to the same principles.

My conclusion is that, both by the law of Quebec and that of Italy, among the "civil effects" would be included any share of the husband or wife in good faith, as the case might be, in the succession of his or her consort. I am now considering the scope of "civil effects" in the general sense, and I think the proper conclusion is that it includes any share in the inheritance to which the putative consort in good faith would be entitled in the events which have actually happened if the marriage had been a real one; subject, in the case of a bigamous marriage, to full recognition. of the lawful marriage and the rights arising out of it. In this case, there is no suggestion that the rights of the real husband come into competition. That, as I understand it, is in substance the view of Mr. Justice Demers.

Lord Dunedin points out, if I may say so, with great force, that the children are linked with husband and wife in these articles. Pothier, it will be noticed, in the passage quoted above, expressly includes hereditary rights among the "civil effects" of which the children take the benefit. Hereditary rights are included under Scotch law (Fraser, Husband and Wife, Vol. I, 152) and, as regards Italian law, there is no serious dispute.

Laurent (2 Br. Civ., nos. 510 and 511, pp. 646-648) says:- 510. Si les deux 6poux sont de bonne foi, dit Particle 201, le mariage annuld produit les effets civils & leur 6gard. Ils ont done tous les droits qui naissent d'un mariage l6gal, d'abord sur la personne et les biens de leurs enfants; ils exercent Ia puissance paternelle et Fusufruit qui y est attach6. Voilh un effet qui se prolonge au delA du jugernent qui prononce la nullit6, et par Ia force des choses. Il en est de mame des conventions matrimoniales des 6poux, des donations qu'ils se sont faites. Tous ces effets sont incontestables. Mais que faut-il dire des effets que le mariage produit entre les 6poux?

I est certain qu'il ne peut plus 6tre question du devoir de fidlit, ni de la -protection que le mari doit A sa femme, ni de 1'ob6issance que la femme doit A son mari.

Mais si Pun des 6poux 6tait sans fortune, ne pourrait-il pas demander une pension alimentaire de son conjoint? Le code donne ce droit au conjoint qui a obtenu le divorce (art. 301).

Il nous semble que cette disposition doit recevoir son application, par analogie, au mariage putatif.

y a, en effet, mgme raison de d6cider. L'6poux sans fortune doit compter sur la subsistance que le manage lui assure; combien d'unions sont contractkes dans cette vuel Ce serait done tromper 1'attente des contractants que de les priver de cet J avantage.

* * * La vraie difficult6 est done celle-ci: la fiction s'6tendelle au droit hr6ditaire? La loi maintient le droit d'h6ridit6 au profit des enfants, des pare et mbre, et m~me des parents; pourquoi ne maintiendrait-elle pas le droit de succession au profit du conjoint? N'est-ce pas li un des effets civils du mariage? Dis lors ne faut-il pas dire que cet effet est produit par le mariage putatif?

La seule objection s6rieuse que l'on puisse faire au conjoint, c'est que le mariage annul6 ne peut plus produire de nouveaux effets & partir du jugement qui a prononc6 la nullit6; or, le droit de succession est un nouvel effet. Mais cet argument ne peut pas 6tre oppos6 aux enfants; pourquoi done l'opposerait-on A 1'6poux?

In Berthiaume v. Dastous (1), the Privy Council had to consider a case in which they held the marriage to be null and it was so declared. The principal question was whether the right to alimony is one of the " civil effects " subsisting after nullity has been decreed.

An imposing array of French authorities was cited to the effect that since the duty of cohabitation was gone, the duty of maintenance had disappeared with it.

This view was rejected by the judgment of the Privy Council which applies the test stated thus: " Those rights subsist which are consistent with a real marriage not existing." And again, as already observed, the judgment emphasizes the circumstance that the spouses and the children are linked together in articles 163 and 164 C.C.

The authorities cited before the Privy Council put alimony and hereditary rights on the same footing and exclude them from the "civil effects" for the same reason. The view of Laurent as touching hereditary rights would appear to be more consistent with the judgment than the opposite view.

As against all this, Mr. Geoffrion takes his stand on two propositions.

First, as regards Italian law, the right of the husband is necessarily conditioned upon the Italian nationality of the putative wife because, admittedly, the Italian law of succession in terms regulates only the successions of Italian nationals; second, given domicile in Quebec, the Quebec courts must apply the Quebec law of succession, including the right of testamentary disposition. (1) [1930] A.C. 79.

After a good deal of reflection, I have been forced to the conclusion that the putative marriage in question here being a marriage in contemplation of articles 163 and 164 C.C., and a putative marriage within the meaning of Italian law, the marriage settlement and the putative marriage itself produced their "civil effects" quoad property as if -the putative marriage had been a real one in accord with the law as explained by Pothier and Laurent, subject, of course, to the rights of the lawful husband, and that, in the events that happened, the "civil effects" of the contract and the putative marriage quoad property include the right now in question here.

Since (as the judgment in Berthiaume v. Dastous (1) lays down) "all civil rights appendant to real marriage" which are consistent with' the non-existence of real marriage are "produced by a putative marriage," I cannot agree that the jus mariti in relation to succession is excluded because the domicile and nationality of the putative wife were not in the circumstances those of the putative husband. Disunity of nationality was the necessary correlative of the bigamous character of the marriage and the invalidity of the marriage was a necessary condition of the acquisition by Marguerite Claire Stephens of a Quebec domicile. These legal results or incidents of nullity cannot really affect the question of the admission of this particular jus mariti as one of the "civil effects" since, ex hypothesi, the inclusion of it within that category is not incompatible with the recognition of the non-existence of a real marriage between the respondent and the putative wife. The obligations of the marriage contract subsist, as Pothier says, although the contract was entered into in contemplation of marriage and if there had been no marriage in fact would fail of effect. The good faith of the parties in the putative marriage is recognized by the law as fulfilment of the condition. Effect ought to be given to the stipulation that the parties are to be governed by Italian law so far as that can be done consistently with recognition of the non-existence of a real marriage between the respondent and Marguerite Claire Stephens and of the continued existence of the actual, legal marriage between her and her real husband, Colonel Gault.

My view summarized in a word is that the marriage between the respondent and the putative wife, having been a marriage in good faith, a putative marriage in the CJ sense of the Italian law as well as of the law of Quebec, the civil effects of which the putative husband is entitled to the benefit do not necessarily rest upon the hypothesis that he acquired the status of husband of Marguerite Claire Stephens, or that she acquired his nationality or his domicile, but simply upon the fact that the marriage was entered into in good faith a fact which has certain juridical consequences. These consequences would appear (Berthiaume v. Dastous) (1), to include quoad property -such consequences of a real marriage as are consistent with the nonexistence of a real marriage and, in the case of a bigamous marriage, such as are consistent with the continued existence and recognition of the status and rights of the lawful husband arising out of the lawful marriage.

Such being the case, the Quebec courts are not competent to pronounce against him or in his favour a judgment in rem affecting his marital status or his status in any respect. The Quebec courts have, however, complete jurisdiction to deal with suits concerning questions of property and, incidentally, to decide inter partes questions touching the validity of divorces in so far as they are relevant to the determination of the issues directly involved.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

J. (dissenting).-L'intim6, sujet italien, poursuit en reddition de compte 1'appelant, ex6cuteur testamentaire et l6gataire universel en usufruit de sa sceur Marguerite Stephens, demandant l'application en sa faveur d'une disposition de la loi italienne qui lui assurerait l'usufruit du tiers des biens laiss6s par Dame Stephens comme 6poux survivant de sa femme morte h Montr6al le 27 mars 1930 sans laisser d'ascendant ni de descendant.

II alligue un mariage c616br6 a Paris le 14 octobre-1919, suivant la loi frangaise, et un contrat de mariage ant6rieur par lequel les futurs 6poux soumirent leur mariage aux lois italiennes, qui auraient, en cons6quence, r6gi leurs domicile et status matrimoniaux.

L'appelant, par sa d6fense, alligue un mariage ant6rieur de sa soeur, le 16 mars 1904, A Montr6al, A Andrew Hamilton Gault, comme elle, sujet britannique de naissance et tous deux domicil6s depuis leur naissance et lors du mariage dans la province de Quebec; que ce mariage, sujet aux lois de leur domicile, dans la province de Qu6bec, oa le divorce n'est pas reconnu, est indissoluble du vivant des 6poux et constitue un empichement absolu A la validit6 de l'union all6gu6e, vu que Gault 6tait encore vivant lors du pr&tendu mariage et vit encore; que le divorce entre Gault et Marguerite Stephens obtenu A Paris, alors que tous deux 6taient l6galement domicil6s au Canada et r6gis, suivant Particle 6 du Code civil, par les lois qui riglent dans la province de Qu6bec lP6tat, i.e. la condition juridique, de chaque personne, et sa capacit6 de jouir des droits que confire l'6tat civil, est nul et de nul effet; que l'union all6gu6e par le demandeur est entachie de bigami6 et doit 6tre consid6rde comme nulle et contre Fordre public par le tribunal de la province de Qu6bec auquel il est soumis comme base de la reclamation de l'intim6.

La plaidoyer mentionne aussi un paiement de $5,000 fait par feu Marguerite Stephens h l'intim6 en vertu d'une convention faite A Rome le 2 juillet 1925, pour obtenir sa renonciation A toute r6clamation contre elle ou sa succession. L'on alligue aussi que de 1925 h sa mort Marguerite Stephens a conserv6 sa residence et son domicile A Montrial et a v6cu s6parde de Fintim6; elle a mgme, en 1928, demand6 A la Cour Sup6rieure de Montr6al de constater la nullit6 de la c6r6monie et du contrat de mariage alligu6s par l'intim6, mais aurait discontinu6 son action le ou vers le 27 f6vrier La rdponse au plaidoyer mentionne des actions -pour s6paration de corps et des demandes de divorce intenties en Canada r6ciproquement sans rdsultat l'un contre lautre par les 6poux Gault, alligue la bonne foi de l'intim6 et r6clame, en cas de nullit6 de son union, en sa faveur les effets civils d'un mariage putatif, vu qu'il croyait de bonne foi les representations h lui faites que feu Dame Marguerite Claire Stephens 6tait "l6galement capable de contracter un mariage valide". Enfin, I'intim6 nie A l'appelant, l6gataire universel de sa soeur, le droit d'attaquer le divorce parisien, meme si les Gault I'avaient obtenu collusoirement en fraude de la loi de leur domicile.

Apres enqu~te et examens de t6moins A 1'6tranger, le premier juge considbre que le mariage du demandeur et de d6funte Marguerite Claire Stephens 6tait nul mais contract6 de bonne foi; qu'h la mort de cette dernibre, le mariage, n'ayant pas encore t6 d~clar6 nul, les lois d'Italie s'appliquaient; et que l'un des effets civils de ce mariage putatif est le droit du demandeur A un tiers de l'usufruit des biens de sa femme. Le savant juge Demers dit qu'il constate comme certain que ni la femme ni le mari n'6taient domicili6s h Paris lors du jugement de divorce du tribunal de la Seine; et il trouve que, d'apris les principes de droit international reproduits A 'article 6 C.C. ces deux 4poux 6tant domicili6s dans la province de Qu6bec lors du divorce, il faut decider que ce divorce est nul et, en cons6quence, le mariage du demandeur nul. Le premier juge ajoute que la loi italienne s'applique et qu'en cons6quence, comme en France, le mariage entach6 de bigamie doit 6tre attaqud et d6clar6 nul; autrement il produit ses effets civils jusqu'h l'annulation, si les 6poux sont de bonne foi.

Cette question de bonne foi est risolue en faveur de l'intim6 par le premier juge; et il conclut que, le mariage du demandeur n'ayant pas t6 d6clar6 nul, Dame Stephens est r6put~e sa femme et, en cons6quence, r6put6e italienne. Il conclut que cette question est discut~e en Italie et en France; mais cela lui semble la solution la plus logique. En appel, le juge-en-chef de la province ne croit pas n~cessaire ni opportun de d6cider de la validit6 du divorce des 6poux Gault; il se contente, vu la bonne foi du demandeur-intim6, de lui donner le b6n6fice dicoulant d'un mariage putatif. Le jugement de la cour d'appel modifie sur ce point de nullit6 le jugement de la Cour Supirieure et fait disparaitre des consid6rants la d6claration de nullit6 du second mariage bas6e sur l'existence du premier, mais, chose 6trange, applique A l'intim6 les dispositions de 'article 163 C.C.. comme si la cour avait d6clar6 nul le second mariage; ce que, pr6cishment, elle a refus6 de faire.

Pour 6tablir qu'au moment de sa mort Marguerite Stephens 6tait de nationalit6 italienne, 'intim6 alligue d'abord son mariage c6l6br6 A Paris et produit le certificat Cannon J suivant:

Le quatorze octobre mil neuf cent dix-neuf, dix heures quarante-cinq minutes, devant nous, C16ment Legoueix, adjoint au maire du seiziame arrondissement de Paris, ont comparu publiquement en la maison commune Luigino Gaspero Guiseppe Falchi, commandant dans 'aviation italienne, n6 h Montopoli (Italie) le onze d6cembre mil huit cent soixantedix-neuf, domicili6 A Montopoli, et r6sidant A Paris, avenue Henri Martin 67, fils de Isidore Falohi, et de C61ine Mainardi, 6poux d6cid6s; d'une part, /- Et Marguerite Claire Stephens, propridtaire, n6 A Montrial (Canada) le vingt six aofit mil huit cent quatre-vingt-trois, domicilide & Montrial, et risidant h Paris, rue Pierre Oharron 54, fille de George Washington Stephens, et de Frances Ramsay McIntosh, 6poux d6c6d6s; divorc6e de Andrew Hamilton Gault, d'autre part;-sans opposition, un contrat de mariage a 6t6 regu le trois octobre courant, par Maitre Durant des Aulnois, notaire h Paris. Luigino Gaspero Guiseppe Falchi et Marguerite Claire Stephens ont d6clar6 I'un apris l'autre vouloir se prendre pour 6poux et nous avons prononc6 au nom de la loi, qu'ils sont unis par le mariage. L'appelant a nid que cette union pfit avoir aucun effet dans la province de Qu6bec, vu que le premier 6poux de Marguerite Stephens 6tait encore vivant lors de cette comparution devant le maire, A Paris; le divorce all 6 gu6 par l'intim6 ne pouvait 8tre reconnu dans la province de Qu6bee, vu que les deux conjoints, Gault et Dame Stephens avaient, de propos d6lib6r6 et dans le but de se lib6rer des obligations de la loi de leur domicile, demand6 h un tribunal 6tranger de dissoudre leur lien conjugal, ce qu'ils n'avaient pu obtenir au Canada, ni devant les tribunaux de la province de Qu6bec, ni devant le parlement du Canada. Une 6tude attentive du dossier m'a convaincu qu'en effet les 6poux Gault, apris avoir renonc6 A obtenir un divorce au Canada, ont profit6 de leur s6jour en France pour recouvrer leur libert6 de tenter, chacun de son c8t6, une nouvelle aventure matrimoniale. La jurisprudence a toujours refus6 de donner effet A toute tentative de secouer le joug des obligations imposies pour des raisons d'ordre public, par le code civil A toutes personnes dont le domicile l6gal, lors de leur mariage, 6tait dans la province de Qu6bec. Je citerai, entre autres, la cause de Gregory v. Odell (1), oi' les juges Malouin, McCorkill et Letellier, si6geant en revision, confirmant Langelier A.C.J., jugent que

(1) (1911) Q.R. 39 S.C. 291.

A decree of divorce by a foreign court purporting to dissolve a marriage contracted in this province, and made while the consorts still had their domicile herein, is without effect and cannot be set up by one FA.cmi.

of them as a plea by the other to enforce obligations arising out of the marriage.

Cannon J

Dans Monette v. Larivibre (1), la Cour du Banc du Roi a d6cid6 que le d6cret de divorce prononc 6 aux Etats-Unis et d~clarant dissous le mariage de deux 6poux, mari6s dans la province de Qu6bec, oil tous deux 6taient domicilds au moment de leur mariage, et dont 1'un y est encore domicile, est sans effet A leur 6gard, parce que seules les lois de cette province leur sont applicables. Le juge en chef Tellier, a la page 354, disait que l'on ne peut contraindre la d6fenderesse en cette cause, dont le domicile lors du mariage et depuis 6tait A Montrial h se soumettre a la loi d'un pays 6tranger et faire d6pendre ses droits matrimoniaux d'une loi que ne la concerne pas. II ajoutait qu'aucune decision d'un tribunal tranger-dans 1'espee, celui des Etats- Unis-ne peut, dans ces circonstances, affecter soit son mariage, soit ses droits matrimoniaux.

Le juge Rivard dit: p. 352:- D'aprbs la loi de la province de Qubbec, le mariage est indissoluble; il ne se dissout que par la mort naturelle de l'un des conjoints (art. 185 C.C.).

De cette loi d'un ordre supbrieur on peut rapprocher ce principe g~ndralement accept6: le droit des gens n'oblige pas un Etat & reconnaltre une loi 6trangbre, lorsque cette loi 6trangbre n'a pas de droit naturel (sic), que son 616ment essentiel n'est pas la conservation des bonnes meaurs, et qu'elle est contraire A l'6conomie g6n6rale du systime juridique de cet Etat. * * * Il n'est done pas 6tonnant qu'on puisse soutenir que chez nous les divorces obtenus devant les tribunaux 4trangers ne devraient pas Stre reconnus.

Et A la page 360:

Il n'y a pas de doute que les lois du mariage et du divorce forment un statut personnel (5 Laurent, Nos 119 et 122). Le divorce est en effet relatif A l'6tat des 6poux, puisqu'il change cet 6tat, La loi personnelle dont les parties relbvent a done seule comptence en cette matibre (Weiss, Manuel de droit international priv4, 76. 6d. p. 505; Foelix, Dr. int. pr., pp. 53 et 112; Surville, Dr. Int. pr. 76. 6d. No 300).

Enfin, je citerai une d6cision d6cente, Stern v. Stern (2), oii D6saulniers J., a d6cid6:- Est sans effet dans la province de Qu6bec un divorce obtenu dans 'un des Etats-Unis d'Am~rique par des personnes qui ont contract6 mariage dans cette province.

Le juge pose d'abord en principle que la Cour Sup6rieure n'a pas juridiction pour annuler un divorce prononc6 par un tribunal am6ricain; et je suis aussi d'avis que la Cour Sup6rieure n'a pas juridiction pour annuler un divorce (1) (1926) Q.R. 40 K.3. 350.

(2) (1932) Q.R. 70 S.C. 549. obtenu 'a Paris par les 6poux Gault et que seuls les tribunaux frangais auraient juridiction en cette matiare.

Mais j'adopte le d6claration du juge D6saulniers que, d'aprbs les lois de notre province, un divorce obtenu aux J Etats-Unis, entre des citoyens de Qu6bec qui se sont mari6s dans ses limites, n'a aucun effet chez nous. L'article 185 du code civil nous dit que le mariage est indissoluble et qu'il ne peut 6tre dissous que par le mort de l'un des conjoints. Ce principle domine la matibre et est, chez nous, un 616ment essentiel du consentement au mariage; or le consentement et ses suites sont r6gis par la loi nationale. Il serait vraiment singulier que les tribunaux 6trangers eussent plus de pouvoir et d'autoriti que les n6tres. Ce que les citoyens de cette province ne peuvent obtenir ici, ils pourraient l'obtenir ailleurs. Ce serait un non-sens. La seule autorit6 comp~tente pour annuler un mariage validement c616br6 dans la province de Qu6bec par deux noncatholiques qui y sont domicil6s est la parlement du Canada.

Je suis done dispos6 A declarer que le divorce obtenu par les 6poux Gault A Paris n'a aucun effet dans cette province et ne saurait y l6gitimer le second mariage de Marguerite Stephens du vivant de Gault; nous pouvons done consid6rer, pour les fins du present litige, lors de sa mort, Marguerite Stephens, comme justiciable de la province de Qubbec, toujours l'6pouse de Hamilton Gault. Voir sur tous ces points les autorit6s cit6es par Johnson, Conflict of Laws, vol. 2, pp. 132 a 170.

Il est important de remarquer une divergence entre le droit et la jurisprudence de la province de Qu6bec et le droit anglais, comme Johnson, A son deuxibme volume, pp. 74 et 152, le souligne:

Et j'adopte cette conclusion:

Je suis d'avis que notre Cour, dont les pouvoirs sont aussi restreints que ceux des cours de la province de Qu6bec quand il s'agit de d6clarer la nullit6 d'un mariage ou d'un divorce, c6l6br6 ou obtenu A l'6tranger, doit se contenter, comme la Cour Sup~rieure aurait dfi le faire, de d6clarer, pour les fins de la prisente cause, que le mariage invoqu6 par l'intim6 et le contrat qui l'a pr6cid6 entre lui et Dame Stephens, 6pouse de Hamilton Gault, ne doivent recevoir aucun effet devant les tribunaux de la province de Qu6bec qui sont charg6s de faire respecter l'indissolubilit6 du mariage unissant des personnes domicili6es dans Quebec et y ayant conserv4 leur domicile. Mais nous devons aussi refuser de donner un effet extra-territorial au d6cret de divorce, quand le tribunal frangais a d6pass6 les limites de sa juridiction en statuant de manibre a affecter l'tat et la capacit6 de Marguerite Stephens, alors, ainsi que son mari, domicili6e non en France, mais h Montr6al.

Si, pour les raisons ci-contre, le mariage en question n'est pas annul6 ou d6clar6 nul, peut-on, comme l'ont fait les deux cours inf6rieures, accorder h l'intim6 le bindfice des articles 163 et 164 du code civil qui disent:

Le demandeur-intimb s'est adress6 aux tribunaux de la province de Qu6bec pour leur demander de donner effet a l'union qu'il pr6tend avoir exist6 entre lui et feu Marguerite Stephens, au moment du d6cs de cette dernidre et de l'ouverture de sa succession; et il rclame sa part des droits que la pr6tendue nationalit6 italienne de cette dame r6sultant du mariage invoqud lui assurait en vertu de la loi italienne sur les biens laiss6s dans la province de Qu6bec par Marguerite Stephens.

Pour les raisons que j'ai exposies plus haut, les tribunaux de la province de Qu6bec doivent refuser de donner effet A ce mariage, sans cependant le d6clarer nul, pour la raison que sa validit6 6chappe A leur juridiction.

Par ailleurs, M. Hamilton Gault n'a pas 6t6 mis en cause et aucun jugement affectant d6finitivement quant h lui la validit6 du divorce accord6 A Paris ne saurait 6tre rendu, mime si la Cour Sup6rieure de Qu6bec avait juridiction, sans qu'il ait 6t assign6 et ait eu 1'occasion de se faire entendre. Bien que, d'aprbs les termes expris de l'article 163 C.C., il n'y aurait pas lieu, dans l'espice, de faire jouer, comme 1'a fait la cour d'appel, en faveur de l'intim6 la fiction du mariage putatif, il est bon, je crois, vu que les jugements des cours inf6rieures sont bases sur cette fiction, d'en dire quelques mots. La condition essentielle pour que l'intim6 puisse jouir des avantages que lui conf6rerait notre article 163 C.C., c'est la bonne foi. Peut-on dire qu'il ignorait, lors du mariage dont il se privaut, le fait que les 6poux Gault s'6taient rencontris A Paris dans le but expris de se soustraire A l'indissolubilit6 de leur union, qui les empechait de divorcer et de contracter un nouveau mariage tant et aussi longtemps qu'ils conservaient leur domicile dans la province de Qu6bec?

Sur ce point de fait, il ne saurait faire de doute que le domicile conjugal n'avait pas 6t6 change et que Hamilton Gault avait, lors du divorce, son principal 6tablissement A Montreal, oit il est revenu pour etre d6mobilis6, avant son d6part pour 1'angleterre oii il a v~cu depuis 1919 environ.

L'intim6 admet que Marguerite Stephens lui aurait dit, avant leur mariage, qu'elle se proposait de divorcer pour pouvoir l'6pouser.

Quoi qu'il en soit, m~me s'il faut, comme les juges de premibre instance et ceux de la Cour du Banc du Roi conclure A la bonne foi de l'intim6, peut-on compter parmi les effets civils du mariage putatif invoqu6 comme dernibre ressource par l'intim6 pour maintenir son action, un changement de nationalit6 de Marguerite Stephens?

Peut-on aller A 1'encontre du droit public de la province de Qu6bec et du Canada et sanctionner, en vertu d'une fiction 16gale, un changement de nationalit6 fictif, quant A nos tribunaux, dans les circonstances de la cause, pour permettre A un aubain de jouir des droits que Marguerite Stephens a l6gu6s par testament A l'appelant?

Bien qu'une d6cision r6cente de la Cour de cassation, en France, re Edwards (1), semble affirmer que le changement de nationalit6 peut 6tre consid6r6 comme un effet civil d6coulant d'un mariage putatif, il y a lieu de se demander si cette jurisprudence peut s'appliquer dans la province de Qubbec. En effet, chez nous, le droit civil a 6t6 conserv6 par l'Acte de Qu6bec, 14 Geo. III (1774) ch. 83, toujours en vigueur sur ce point; et la section 8, en substance d6crite ce qui suit:

Et la section 10 introduit chez nous la libert6 de tester, nonobstant toute loi A ce contraire.

I semble donc que toute question d'all6geance au souverain et de nationalit6 ait 6t6 express6ment r6serv6e comme n'6tant pas matibre de droit civil, mais de droit public. Or, la loi anglaise, qui aurait 6t6 la loi du domicile conjugal des Gault, A la mort de l'6pouse de ce dernier alors 6tabli en Angleterre, et notre loi f6d6rale concernant la naturalisation et la nationalit6 canadienne ignorent ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler mariage putatif; et la question A r6soudre est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, dans la province de Qu6bec, on peut conclure, comme les juges des cours inf6rieures, que, parmi les effets civils d'un mariage putatif en faveur du conjoint 6tranger de bonne foi, il y aurait, comme on le pr6tend en cette cause, eu un changement de nationalit6 de sa femme canadienne, et ce mariage putatif, fiction de la loi, aurait-il eu pour effet de faire perdre h la d6funte son allgeance A la Couronne britannique, sa nationalit6 canadienne et son droit illimit6 de tester?

Tous s'accordent A dire que, pour r~ussir, Falchi doit prouver qu'au moment de sa mort, Marguerite Stephens 6tait de nationalit6 italienne, afin de la soumettre A l'opration des lois d'Italie qu'invoque le demandeur. En vertu de Particle 6 du Code civil italien, et, d'apris Particle 8,

Je trouve aux Rapports des Codificateurs (Vol. ler, p. . 186) ce qui suit :

FALci. A J A A Il est vrai que, d'aprbs la Loi de Naturalisation (R.S.C. 1927, c. 138, sec. 13), 1'6pouse d'un aubain est cens6e 6tre un aubain. Mais ceci n'est pas en vertu des dispositions de notre code civil mais bien en vertu des pouvoirs exclusifs confi6s par la constitution au parlement du Canada de 16gif~rer en tout ce qui concerne la naturalisation et 1'acquisition ou la perte de la qualit4 de citoyen canadien. Quelle que soit la doctrine adopt6e en France ou dans d'autres pays oii le pouvoir lgislatif est confi6 en entier a un organisme unique, nous ne pouvons ignorer chez nous que certaines matibres-et pour ce qui concerne cette cause, les effets civils du mariage putatif-sont, quant A la naturalisation et au changement d'all6geance au Souverain, de par les dispositions expresses de l'Acte de Qu6bec (1774) et de l'Acte de l'Am6rique Britannique du Nord, en dehors de la comptence de la lgislature de la province de Qu6bec. Comme les codificateurs l'ont fait remarquer, c'est la une question de droit public concernant les droits et les obligations politiques des sujets canadiens, comme citoyens, non d'une province, mais de la Conf6d6ration.

Sur ce point, nous avons uniformit6 de l6gislation, laquelle ne saurait varier d'une province A 1'autre, comme en matibre de droit purement civil ou prive.

Je suis donc d'avis que, meme si nous pouvions appliquer A cette cause, en faveur de l'intim6, la fiction du mariage putatif, nous ne pourrions aller jusqu'au point de conceder en sa faveur comme un de ses effets civils le pr6tendu changement de nationalit6 de Marguerite Stephens. Pour 6tayer sa thise et sa cause, 1'intim6 admet qu'il lui faut