judgment it was decided that the defendant's objection in point of law to the action, on the ground that the action when instituted was prescribed, was incompetent because, under article 2233 C.C., husband and wife cannot prescribe DAWS. against one another.
The right in controversy under the inscription in law (the right, that is to say, of the plaintiff to institute the action notwithstanding the lapse of time) is a "substantive right * * * in controversy" in a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the Supreme Court Act.
Unless reversed -on appeal, the decision of the Court of King's Bench (1) will be binding on the parties throughout all stages of the litigation and thus finally determines the issue in respect of that right. The judgment is, therefore, a final judgment within the definition of our statute. The motion to quash consequently fails and should be dismissed with costs.
J.-This is a motion by the respondent to quash an appeal to this Court for want of jurisdiction.
Catherine Sophie Edwards, wife separated from her husband, Linton H. Ballantyne, brought an action against him, claiming damages in the sum of $22,799.28, made up of $2,799.28, said to be costs incurred by her to fight a petition for divorce before the Senate of Canada and $20,000 for libel and slander committed by her husband and his agents concerning the life and habits of the respondent. The defendant inscribed in law against the whole of the action.
Mr. Justice Surveyer, on the 10th June, 1937, dismissed the action on the ground that the right of action was prescribed at the time of the action, under 2267 C.C. On appeal to the Court of King's Bench (1), the appeal was allowed and the defendant's inscription in law dismissed, Mr. Justice Galipeault and Mr. Justice Saint- Germain dissenting. The Court of King's Bench (1) held that, under art. 2233 of the Civil Code, husband and wife cannot prescribe against each other.
Is this judgment appealable as final under section 2 (b) Of our Act, or, in other words, is it a judgment, rule, order EDWADS, or decision which determines in whole or in part any cannon J substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in o Jany judicial proceeding?
I am of opinion that, as far as the provincial courts are concerned, the question raised by the inscription in law is finally determined. When the case comes back before the Superior Court, if the facts were proven as alleged, the trial judge would be bound in law by the decision of the Court of King's Bench that, under 2233 C.C., prescription could not run against the plaintiff in favour of the defendant.
In Shaw v. St. Louis (1), Taschereau, J., said:- The judgment of the Superior Court * * * was undoubtedly right. As it holds in one of its considirants, its hands were tied by the previous judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench.
Though the Roman law says that:- "it often happens that the appeal court's judgment is the wrong one, and that he who judges the last does not always judge the best." still it must be conceded that the relative functions of courts of first instance and of appeal cannot be so inverted as to have authorized the Superior Court, in this instance, to Teverse the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench.
It had to, unreservedly, submit to it, as it It had no alternative.
The maxim " l'interlocutoire ne lie pas le juge " cannot have any application to an interlocutory judgment given by an appeal court and transmitted to 'the Superior Court for execution. This maxim applies to the very tribunal that rendered the interlocutory judgment, that is to say, if the Superior Court, for instance, renders a purely interlocutory judgment, it may, in certain cases, at the final judgment, not be bound by this interlocutory.
But to extend this doctrine to the judgment of a court of appeal, and make it say "'interlocutoire de la cour d'appel ne lie pas le tribunal de premire instance" seems to me untenable.
At p. 405 of the report, I find the following quotations:- Cette maxime, que " l'interlocutoire ne lie pas le juge ", qu'il peut toujours s'en 6carter, judex ab interlocutoris discedere potest, n'est vraie qu'i l'6gard des simples jugements interlocutoires qui se bornent A ordonner une mesure d'instruction pr~jugeant le fond, et qui ne contiennent aucune d6cision d6finitive sur tous ou quelques-uns des chefs du d6bat. Ce sont les seuls qui ne soient pas susceptibles de passer en force de chose jug~e.
Il convient done de distinguer entre les divers jugements interlocutoires, et mgme dans chaque jugement interlocutoire proprement dit, les d6cisions qui n'ont pour objet qu'une simple mesure d'instruction, et celles au contraire par lesquelles il est statu6 A certains 6gards d'une manibre definitive. Les d6cisions de cette dernibre esp&ce (1) (1883) 8 Can. S.C.R. 385, at 399.
passant, h raison de leur caracthre dMfinitif, en force de chose jug6e, aussi bien que les jugements ordinaires, qui n'ont aucun caraotkre interlocutoire. (Larombibre, 5 vol., page
Tout jugement n'a pas I'autorit6 de chose jug&e. La pr6somption de vWrit6, qui est attach6e aux jug6ments, implique qu'ils d6cident une con- Cannon J testation. * * * De la consiquence que Ia chose jug6e ne resulte que des jugements qui statuent d6finitivement sur la contestation. Il ne faut pas entendre le principe en ce sens que l'autorit6 de chose jug6e ne soit attribu6e qu'au jugement qui met fin au procks.
II peut, dans une m8me affaire, intervenir plusieurs jugements difinitifs, en ce sens, qu'ils ddcident d~finitivement certains points ddbattus entre les parties. Tous ces jugements ont 1'autorit6 de chose jug6e. * * *
Quand un jugement, interlocutoire en apparence, d6cide r6ellement un point contest6 entre les parties, i1 est d6finitif, et il a, par cons6quent,
1'autorit6 de chose jug6e.
(20 Laurent, Nos. 22, 25 et seq.)
Pigeau says (vol. 1, p. 390):- Quelquefois le jugement eat interlocutoire et d6finitif en mime temps, c'est lorsque les juges se trouvent en 6tat de statuer d6finitivement sur un chef et oat besoin d'6claircissement sur un autre.
I, therefore, reach the conclusion that we have before us a " jugement d6finitif " determining the merits in law of the plea of prescription raised by the defendant. It may also be mentioned that a similar judgment of the Court of King's Bench was appealed to this Court in Rattray v.
Larue (1), under exactly the same circumstances.
The judgment of the Court of King's Bench dismissing the
" d6fense en droit " was treated as a final judgment, and this Court took and exercised jurisdiction. It must be said, however, that, there, the question of jurisdiction was not raised by a motion to quash; but this Court could not acquire jurisdiction by the consent of the parties.
I also refer to the authorities quoted in Ville de St. Jean v. Molleur (2) by Fitzpatrick C.J.
I would, therefore, dismiss the motion with costs.
Motion dismissed with costs.
(1) (1887) Can. S.C.R. 102,
(2) (1908) 40 Can. S.C.R. 139, at at 106.
153 to 157.
S.C.R.]
Statutes and regulations cited
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Unresolved citations
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