Lights or windows, as described in article 534 C.C., can only be made in a wall "not common adjoining the land of another.-When a wall has been erected as to one half on an adjoining property and has all the characteristics of a wall designed to become common, even though it does not appear that the owner of the adjoining land has acquired title to, and paid for, the rights of mitoyennetd in it, th-e owner who has erected the wall has not the right to make such openings.
Judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Q.R. 64 K.B. 78) aff.
CJ. and Cannon, Crocket, Kerwin and Hudson JJ. Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), affirming the KER judgment of the Superior Court, Boyer J., and maintaining in part the respondent's action n6gatoire.
The material facts of the case and the questions at issue D are stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
M. M. Sperber K.C. for the appellant.
M. I. Sigler for the respondent.
THE JUSTIcE.-The issue between the parties to this appeal concerns a brick wall, fourteen feet in length and twelve inches thick at its base, diminishing to a thickness of eight inches at the third story. The wall rests, as to one half on the property of the appellants and as to the other on the property of the respondents.
The courts below have agreed that, the wall having been erected by the appellant's predecessor in title, the respondent never acquired title to rights of mitoyennetg in it. The appellant has created openings in this wall and inserted therein sheets of translucent but not transparent glass. The question in controversy concerns their right to maintain these openings in this state.
I agree with the Court of King's Bench that article 534 of the Civil Code of Quebec is plainly not applicable, the wall in question not being " un mur non-mitoyen joignant 1'h6ritage d'autrui."
Nor does article 533 strictly apply because, to quote the judgment of that Court, " ce mur n'est pas mitoyen au sens de 1'article 533 du Code Civil." I agree also with the Court of King's Bench that the last paragraph of article 515 appears to give the key to the principle for determining the controversy before us. Although that article deals with a different case, yet, reading it with articles 533 and 534, there can, I think, be little doubt as to the governing consideration.
Mr. Justice St. Jacques says:
A With this I agree.
Mr. Justice St. Germain has given convincing reasons for concluding that the openings in question here constitute jours " in the sense of article 534.
-- It follows that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.-The parties own two adjoining immoveables situate on Hutchison street, in the city of Montreal. Appellant's property was built in 1910; respondent's in The twelve inches northwest brick wall of appel- Jant's property is for a depth of 55 feet built half on appellant's land and half on the adjoining land acquired by the respondent in 1919.
When respondent's building was erected, in 1911, the appellant's wall was used, for a depth of forty-one feet; and on that part joists and beams were inserted to support the weight of respondent's building. The remaining fourteen feet of the wall for its whole height has never been used by respondent or her auteurs. It is a plain brick wall which faces the back yard of respondent's building.
In September, 1936, appellant made two openings in the said fourteen feet of the said wall. These openings, one on the second story and the other on the third story, had inside or interior window frames with blue coloured frosted glass. The windows were nailed to the sills at the bottom and at the sides, and in addition there were mouldings put up at the sides to prevent the windows being pushed up; these mouldings were also nailed. There were hinges for shutters or exterior windows which were never put on. The date of the construction of the windows, as originally or later used, is of little importance, except perhaps in respect to the costs of the injunction proceedings, with which we are not now concerned, as the Court intimated to the parties during the argument that, in view of the concurrent judgments of the Quebec courts on this question of procedure, it should not be raised again before us. It is enough to say that, after the demand for injunction, appellant caused the outside frame to disappear, filled the opening with bricks of translucent but not transparent glass, which bricks are sealed and do not project outside the wall.
The trial judge found that the structure or alterations made by the appellant were illegal and based his finding KEmT on article 534 C.C. which prohibits, not only windows, but lights, i.e., anything that will permit the light of day to penetrate, except in the manner indicated by the article. cannon J. Such lights or windows. must be provided with an iron trellis the bars of which are not more than four inches apart, and a window-sash fastened with plaster or otherwise in such a way that it must remain closed. The trial judge, therefore, ordered the appellant to close completely that part of the windows which is less than seven feet from the floor in such a manner that the light could not penetrate through this part, and in so far as the surplus height is concerned, the appellant was ordered to put in window sashes pursuant to the terms of article 534. The respondent accepted this judgment and precluded the Court of King's Bench from giving full effect to their finding which was that the appellant had no right whatsoever to construct opening windows or lights.
The appellant accepts the findings of fact of the Court of King's Bench, which are as follows:
Attendu qu'il est prouv6 que le mur dans lequel la d4fenderesse a pratiqu6 les fen~tres ou jours est construit en partie sur le terrain de la demanderesse et en partie sur celui de la d6fenderesse; qu'il a toutes les caract6ristiques d'un mur fait pour devenir mitoyen;
Attendu qu'il ne ressort pas de la preuve que la demanderesse et ses auteurs aient la mitoyennet6 du mur en en payant la valeur;
Consid6rant que si ce mur n'est pas mitoyen au sens de Particle 533 du Code Civil, il n'est pas non plus un mur non-mitoyen joignant l'h6ritage d'autrui, puisqu'il est assis en partie sur le terrain de la demanderesse;
The Court of King's Bench refused to the appellant the benefit of article 534 because the wall does not adjoin the land of the respondent but is built half on it. They applied, however, the principle established in par. 3 of article 515, which reads as follows:
515. Every proprietor may raise the common wall at will, but at his own cost, upon paying an indemnity for the additional weight imposed, and bearing for the future the expense of keeping it in repair above the height which is common.
The indemnity thus payable is the sixth of the value of the superstructure.
On these conditions such superstructure becomes the exclusive property of him who built it; but it remains, as to the right of view, subject to the rules applicable to common walls.
S.C.R.]
The ratio decidendi of the Court of King's Bench may be found in the following quotation from the reasons of w Mr. Justice St. Jacques:
La d6fenderesse peut-elle pr6tendre que ce mur lui est propre et Cannon J. qu'elle peut y faire des ouvertures permettant A la lumibre ou au jour de pin~trer A l'int6rieur de sa maison?
Dans cette partie du mur de six pouces d'6paisseur qui est assise sur le terrain de la demanderesse, il ne peut s'agir d'un mur propre A Ia d6fenderesse, au sens de l'article 534 du Code civil.
Ce mur n'en est pas un "joignant imm6diatement l'hdritage"
de la demanderesse; il y est assis en partie, et ce n'est pas parce que Ia demanderesse n'aurait pas pay6 la moiti6 du cofst ou de Ia valeur de ce mur que Ia d6fenderesse peut y faire des ouvertures, mime pour y obtenir le jour, suivant les dispositions des articles 534 et 535.
Les codificateurs nous disent que 1'article 533 et les deux suivants sont tir6s de la Coutume de Paris et sont conformes au Code Napolbon. Et ils ajoutent que " c'est A leur occasion que s'61ve la question d6jA mentionnie de savoir si le copropri~taire, qui exhausse A ses propres frais le mur mitoyen, a droit de faire dans l'exhaussement les ouvertures permises dans le mur qui lui serait propre; et I'on se rappellera que les Commissaires ont fait adopter de d6cider cette question dans Ia n6gative au moyen du paragraphe ajout6 A I'article 515, pour les raisons qui ont 6t exposdes en le commentant."
Or, sous larticle 515, ils ont dit:
" Les deux premiers paragraphes de cet article sont pris des articles 195 et 197 de la Coutume de Paris, et diffbrent peu de 'article 658 du Code Napol6on.
Quant au troisibme paragraphe qui ne se trouve ni dans I'un ni dans l'autre, il a td ajout6 afin de trancher la question controvers6e sous l'ancienne jurisprudence de savoir si dans cet exhaussement, il 6tait permis A celui qui I'avait fait d'y pratiquer des vues de coutume, de mgme que si tout le mur lui 6tait propre, suivant 'article 200 de Coutume. Les Commissaires ont pens6 que le mur mitoyen exhauss6 ne saurait 6tre assimil6 au mur propre joignant sans moyen a l'hiritage d'autrui, parce que, en r6alit6, cet exhaussement est fait pour moiti6 sur le terrain du voisin et peut A peine 6tre regard6 comme lui appartenant exclusivement; ils sont done d'avis que le droit en question ne doit pas exister, et Iont ainsi d6clar6, sans pr6tendre qu'en cela il y ait eu introduction de droit nouveau."
Le troisibme paragraphe de 'article 515 est A 'effet que bien que la partie du mur ainsi exhauss4e soit propre A celui qui I'a faite, elle reste, quant au droit de vue, sujette aux ragles applicables au mur mitoyen. Cette disposition a pour but, ainsi que le disent les codificateurs, d'dviter Ia controverse qui existait en France A ce sujet.
On voit done quelle a t la raison qui a inspir6 les codificateurs dans le r6daction de Particle 515; c'est que l'on a voulu 6viter ce conflit de jurisprudence et d~terminer, d'une favon nette, que la partie du mur exhauss6e, bien que propre A celui qui a fait cet exhaussement, reste soumise A la prohibition de l'article 533 quant au droit de vue, parce que le mur repose sur deux hiritages et qu'on ne peut pas dire que, tout en n'6tant pas mitoyen, il est propre exclusivement A 1'une des parties. Cette disposition du dernier paragraphe de Particle 515 nous fait voir le sens et la signification qu'iI faut donner aux mots employds dans Particle 534, pour d6signer le mur dans lequel il peut 6tre pratiqub des jours ou fen~tres A fer maill6 et verre dormant. Ce n'est que dans un mur non-mitoyen joignant immddiatement l'hdritage d'autrui que de telles fengtres ou jours peuvent 6tre pratiqus.
Le mur dans lequel la d6fenderesse a pratiqu6 des ouvertures qui, A l'origine, avaient I'apparence de v6ritables fenatres pouvant donner droit de vue, n'est pas ce mur que d6crit Particle 534. Il n'est pas mitoyen, Cannon J. en ce sens que rien ne fait voir dans la preuve que le droit de copropridt6 ait 6t6 acquis par le paiement d'une partie du cofst de construction du mur; mais i a t6 construit avec toutes les caract6ristiques d'un mur destin6 i devenir mitoyen, et, en plus, il est assis en partie, pour une moiti6, sur l'immeuble de la demanderesse. Celle-ci peut, en tout temps, acquirir la copropri6t6 du mur, si elle n'est pas d6jh en mesure d'6tablir que ses auteurs l'ont fait.
QuantA la coproprit6 du terrain sur lequel le mur est b5ti, elle est certaine et admise de part et d'autre. Les ouvertures que la d6fenderesse a pratiqu6es dans ce mur ne me paraissent pas autoris6es par Particle 534, mgme si elles avaient t6 faites strictement en conformith avec les exigences de Particle 535.
I accept the views of the Court of King's Bench and apply as they have done, by analogy, the principle of art. 515, par. 3, concerning the superstructure built by one of the owners of a common wall to the wall built, as in this case, by the owner half on his property and half on his neighbour's land. It may be true that under modern conditions these articles of our Code may create difficulties and unnecessary hardships to those who wish to improve their properties. There seems to be a tendency in France to alleviate the strictness of the rule. For instance, in the case of Lacrevaz C. Ecuvillon (1), they have decided what would seem favourable to the appellant's contention: Les art. 676 et 677, C. Civ., qui r6glementent les jours de souffrance, de fagon A empicher de voir dans le fonds voisin, d'y jeter des immondices et de e'y introduire, ne sont pas applicables au cas oii un propriftaire fait garnir une ouverture pratiqu6e dans son mur de "plots"
ou blocs de verre d'une certaine 6paisseur, formant par leur assemblage une cloison solide qui permet de recevoir la lumibre de I'ext~rieur h l'int~rieur, mais A travers laquelle il n'est pas possible de distinguer les objets places au dehors; la paroi de verre ainsi scell6e dans la mur, et qui ne permet ni la vue, ni le jet des immondices, ni 1'introduction des personnes, constitue une sorte de mur 6clairant, et il n'est pas n~cessaire qu'elle soit rev~tue d'un treillis de fer, ni qu'elle soit place & la hauteur d6termin~e par Fart. 677 (C. civ., 676 et 677).
Il en doit 6tre surtout ainsi, lorsque cette cloison translucide est 6tablie au-dessus et au-dessous d'autres ouvertures incontest6es, prenant jour et vue sur 1'h6ritage voisin, et ne saurait, partant, 6tre pour ce dernier la source d'aucune g~ne.
It must be said, however, that this decision of a court of first instance is not accepted as final by the official report, in a foot-note.
(1) S. 1901-2-147.
See Gazette du Palais, Table 1930-1935, Vo. Servitudes, Km nos 97 & Seq.
See also authorities in Juris Classeur Civil, Art. 675, - No. 19.
.Any change in the law, however, should come from the legislators and not from the courts.
We must say that the glass bricks placed in this wall by the appellant constitute " jours " because they are translucent and allow the light of day to penetrate the respondent's building. The reasons given by the codifiers would exclude from our consideration the controversies of the commentators of the Code Napol6on.
As to the right of the builder of the wall to use it as his own, although one half of it is built on the neighbour's land, the commissioners ruled that this superstructure, being for one half built on the neighbour's property, could not be considered as the exclusive property of the builder; and they have applied to it the restrictions as to the right of view applicable to superstructures built by one owner on common walls.
The other points raised in appellant's factum as to the failure of the respondent to prove that she was duly authorized to "ester en justice" was not pressed before us in the argument.
In any case, in view of the concurrent judgments, the finding of the Quebec courts should not be disturbed on this matter of procedure.
As to the costs of the injunction, I have already disposed of it.
Therefore, I cannot agree with the appellant that the judgment a quo is erroneous and should be reversed; and, therefore, I dismiss the appeal with costs.
J.-I agree this appeal should be dismissed with costs for the reasons mentioned by Mr. Justice St. Jacques and Mr. Justice St. Germain in the court below.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellant: Sperber, Godine & Hayes. Solicitors for the respondent: Myerson & Sigler.
APPEAL by the defendant appellant from the decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec
(1), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, Gibsone J. and maintaining the plaintiff respondent's action.
The appellant, during the period December, 1930, to July, 1931, entered into a number of transactions with Carroll & Wright, brokers, of the city of Toronto, and was indebted to them in the sum of $3,542.55 when they went into bankruptcy on or about the 10th September, The respondent, having been appointed trustee in bankruptcy, instituted against the appellant an action on the 17th November, 1932, which was, however, dismissed by the Hon. Mr. Justice Prevost on the 4th April, 1934, on the ground that it was drafted in the form of an action for goods sold and delivered, without alleging the actual relations between the parties, of broker and client, and the advances made by the former in execution of his orders. The action was, however, dismissed without costs " et sauf A se pourvoir."
The present action was instituted on the 19th February, 1935, and alleged in detail the purchase and sales of stock on orders received from the appellant, and the respondent claimed a sum of $3,566.28, the difference between the amounts claimed in the first and second actions being added interest on the sums due. The action was maintained by the Superior Court, Gibsone J. and on appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of King's Bench, appeal side (1).
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Paul Belcourt for the appellant.
J. A. Legris K.C. for the respondent.
S.C.R.]