Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King

The learned Chief Justice overruled the objection and expressed the opinion that in view of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the assessment was not excessive. In the Appeal Court, Gillanders and McTague, JJ.A., were of the opinion that in the circumstances the jury's assessment of damages should not be disturbed. I am of the same opinion.

For these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs here and in the Court of Appeal and direct that the judgment be entered against both defendants alike for the amount assessed by the jury, in favour of the infant plaintiff, viz.: $10,000; this amount to be paid into court to the latter's credit and to be paid out to him on attaining the age of twenty-one years and subject to further order meanwhile, as directed in the formal judgment of the trial court against Stinson, with a further order that both defendants pay to the plaintiff in his capacity as next friend of the infant plaintiff, his costs of action in that behalf.

THE CHIEF JUSTIcE-A brief sketch of the facts leading up to this litigation is necessary.

The respondent Dumont is a retail dealer in Vancouver, using in connection with his business a delivery truck, for which he had a British Columbia license. He also held a driver's license. In November, 1937, a motor vehicle driven by Dumont was in collision with a motor vehicle driven by one Bollons. Dumont instituted, subsequently, as plaintiff, an action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia against Bollons as defendant, claiming damages for personal injuries and for injury to his motor vehicle.

Bollons defended the action and entered a counterclaim against Dumont for the sum of $59.35 for damages to his automobile.

At the trial Dumont's claim was dismissed with costs, which were subsequently taxed at $675.45, and Bollons' counterclaim was dismissed with costs, subsequently taxed at $209.40, Dumont's costs of the counterclaim being set off against Bollons' costs of the action, in the result Dumont became liable under the judgment to pay to Bollons the balance of costs.

No damages were recovered by either party. On the first of April, 1940, the judgment for costs not being paid, the Commissioner of Provincial Police, purporting to act under section 84 (1) of the Motor-Vehicle Act, suspended the truck license mentioned above and Dumont's driver's license, and on the 2nd of April, 1940, the licenses were delivered by Dumont to the Commissioner in response to his demand.

On or about the 6th day of April, 1940, Dumont consulted his solicitor, who wrote a letter to the Commissioner setting out the facts and requesting the Commissioner to rescind the purported suspension of Dumont's licenses.

By letter dated April 9th, 1940, and addressed to Mr. P. S. Marsden, Dumont's solicitor, the Commissioner refused this request. Thereupon, on the 16th day of April, 1940, Dumont, through his solicitor, commenced proceedings by notice of motion for a writ of mandamus, directed to the Commissioner of Provincial Police requiring him to return to Dumont the licenses and number plates.

The learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the application for mandamus S.C.R.]

and on appeal this judgment was reversed and mandamus was granted. The learned judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the Commissioner had no author- OF ity under subsection (1) of section 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, R.S.B.C., 1936, chap. 135, under which he had purported to act, to suspend the respondent's licenses. I agree with this view. The suspension of a driver's license and the owner's licenses in respect of motor vehicles may be a very serious matter and, while the legislation under consideration was enacted no doubt for cogent reasons as affecting the public interest, it must be assumed that the language which the legislature employed to express its meaning does express it; and a public official, named in such a statute as the official to exercise the authority thereby conferred, is, in exercising that authority, within the "iron framework" of the enactment to which he is professing to give effect.

As I have said, I have no doubt that the facts of the present case do not bring the Commissioner's action within the authority of the Commissioner under the statute. It is quite plain that the judgment against Dumont for costs in an action brought by himself in which no amount was recovered for damages, either in respect of personal injury or in respect of damage to property and in which no claim was made against Dumont for damages in excess of one hundred dollars, does not bring the power of the Commissioner under section 84 (1) into operation.

This is so clear that, in my opinion, there is no room for argument upon it.

After the judgment of the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal, the Commissioner of Police very properly complied with the order and delivered up the licenses and number plates. The argument on behalf of the appellant in support of the Commissioner's authority being, as I have said, quite without substance, I think a reasonable interpretation of what occurred is that the Commissioner acquiesced in the judgment of the Court that the suspension was invalid and that he was not entitled to retain the licenses and number plates. From that point of view the appeal had no practical object. Even if the appellant's technical objection to the proceeding by way of mandamus had been well founded, the licenses and number plates would still remain in the hands of the respondent; the purported suspension would still remain a void act and the