The King v. Décary

Judgment of the Court

THE KINo THE CHIEF JUSTICE--As is well known, appeals to this Court in criminal cases are regulated by the Criminal Code. By section 1023 of the Code it is enacted:- Duff C.J. Any person convicted of any indictable offence whose conviction has been affirmed on an appeal taken under section ten hundred and thirteen may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada against the affirmance of such conviction on any question of law on which there has been dissent in the Court of Appeal.

"The Attorney-General of the province may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the judgment of any court of appeal setting aside a conviction or dismissing an appeal against a judgment or verdict of acquittal in respect of an indictable offence on an appeal taken under section ten hundred and thinteen on any question of law on which there has been dissent in the Court of Appeal.

Turning to section 1013, that section provides:- A person convicted on indictment may appeal to the court of appeal against his conviction,

(a) on any ground of appeal which involves a question of law alone, (b) with leave of the court of appeal, or upon the certificate of the trial court that it is a fit case for appeal, on any ground of appeal which involves a question of fact alone or a question of mixed law and fact; and (c) with leave of the court of appeal, on any other ground which appears to the court of appeal to be a sufficient ground of appeal. The respondent, Pierre D6cary, was tried upon a charge preferred by the Attorney-General of the province of Quebec before the Hon. Mr. Justice Lazure and a jury on the 10th of June, 1941.

The charge contained three counts, of which it is only necessary to quote the first and third:- (1) A Montr6al, district de Montrial, du ler du mois d'octobre 1940 au 23 du mois d'avril 1941, Pierre Dcary, r6gistraire de division, nommi en vertu des R&glements de 1940 sur les Services Nationaux de Guerre, Jean Tarte et Mike Maloley et autres personnes inconnues out complot6 ensemble et les uns avec autres pour frauduleusement, en demandant, exigeant, obtenant, recevant et acceptant, directement ou indirectement, des argents de personnes soumises aux Rglements de 1940 sur les Services Nationaux de Guerre ou d'autres pour elles, nuire A l'application et h ]a mise en vigueur des dits rbglemenits.

(3) A Montr6al, district de Montr6al, du ler du mois d'octobre 1940, au 23 du mois d'avril, Pierre Dcary, r6gistraire de division, nomm6 en vertu des Rbglements de 1940 sur les Services Nationaux de Guerre, a provoqu6 et excit6 Jean Tarte et Mike Maloley A commettre et leur a conseill6 et leur a fait commettre

'offence suivante, savoir: de faire des offres, propositions, dons, pr~ts, promesses, d'offrir et de donner des compensations, r6mun6rations, directement et indirectement, A lui-m~me, fonctionnaire et personne chargde de I'application des R~glements de 1940 S.C.R.]

sur les Services Nationaux de Guerre, et syant A remplir des fonctions Tnaw qui s'y rapportent, dans le but d'obtenir frauduleusement pour des tiers, un ordre d'ajourner iappel pour le service militaire.

DCAny

Contre la forme du Statut en tel cas fait et pourvu, et contre la - Paix de Notre Souverain Seigneur le Roi George Six, sa Couronne et DuffCJ.

Sa Dignit6.

The respondent was found guilty and convicted on both of these two counts. He appealed from this conviction and the court of appeal, by a majority of three to two, quashed the verdict and the conviction.

It is convenient, I think, to set forth the grounds upon which the judgment of the majority of the court of appeal rests, as they appear in the formal judgment:- Attendu que I'appelant invoque A iappui de son appel divers moyens bas6s uniquement sur des questions de fait, d'autres sur des questions de fait et de droit et aussi sur des questions de droit seulement; Attendu que I'appelant soutient, en particulier, que le verdict n'est pas raisonnable et n'est pas support6 par le poids de ]a preuve; qu a sa face mime, ce verdict, comportant une recommandation A la cl6mence de la Cour, est un verdict d6raisonnable rsultant d'un compromis ill6gal entre les jur6s qui avaient des doutes sur sa culpabilit6 et ne lui en ont pas donn6 le b6n6fice; que le seul t6moignage incriminant rendu contre lui ne pouvait, A raison de Pensemble de la preuve et plus particulibrement de son propre timoignage, servir de base h un verdict de culpabilit6, et qu'A raison des circonstances et de la favon dont ce seul t6moignage incriminant a 6t donn6, il y lieu de '6canter enti~rement et qu'il ne peut servir de base raisonnable A un verdict de culpabilit6;

Attendu que de toute la preuve rapport6e par la Couronne devant le jury, le seul t6moignage pouvant incriminer Pappelant eat ceiui du t6imoin Jean-Louis Tarte dont les affirmations sont nettement, catigoriquement et sp6cifiquement ai6es par Pappelant;

Attendu qu'il ressort du verdict, tel que libell6, que le doute que devait n6cessairement produire dans Fesprit des membres du jury ce conflit de t6moignages, n'a pu ktre complktement 6limin6 et qu'il y a lieu, en pareil cas, pour la Cour, saisie du pr&sent appel, d'6tudier, peser et apprbcier la preuve et de lui donner sa v6ritable interpr6tation et son plein effet;

Attendu que les circonstances qui out pr6cid4 et entour6 le t6moignage de Jean-Louis Tarte, telles qu'elles sont d6voilies par le dossier donnent A ce t6moignage un caractire particulier et qui en affecte la force probante A un point tel, qu'en face des dinigations claires, explicites et convaincantes de Pappelant, il serait d&raisonnable d'asseoir un verdict de culpabillit6 contre lui sur l'un ou 1'autre des deux chefs d'accusation qui lui sont reproch6s;

As appears from the enactments of section 1023, quoted above, the Attorney-General's right of appeal from a judgment of the court of appeal, setting aside the conviction of an accused, is limited to some ground which raises a question of law on which there has been a dissent in the court of appeal. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court that such ground must raise a question of law in the strict sense and that it is not a competent ground of appeal if it raises only a mixed question of fact and law. Counsel for the respondent moved to quash the appeal of the Attorney-General from the judgment of the court of appeal alleging that there was no dissent in the court of appeal upon any such question of law and, consequently, that there is no competent ground of appeal available to the Attorney-General.

After fully considering the able argument presented by Mr. Fauteux, on behalf of the Attorney-General, our conclusion is that for the reasons advanced by Mr. Geoffrion the Attorney-General has no right of appeal in this case. There were two judgments delivered by learned justices of the court of appeal which were in disagreement with the conclusion of the majority, and the point to be considered is whether or not either of these judgments discloses a dissent on a question of law within the meaning of section 1023 of the Criminal Code.

It is convenient, first of all, to notice that the judgment of the majority of the Court does not proceed upon the ground that there was no evidence in support of the accusations before the jury in the sense that it was within the power of the trial judge, and, therefore, of course, his duty, to direct a verdict of not guilty to be entered.

The judgment obviously proceeds under section 1013 (b), or (c), which gives a right of appeal upon leave to the court of appeal on any ground which involves a question of fact alone or a question of mixed law and fact, or on any other ground which appears to the court of appeal to be a sufficient ground of appeal. The judgment pronounces the verdict to be unreasonable for reasons resulting from inter alia an examination of the relative values of the testimony adduced by the Crown and the testimony given by the accused. It is quite plain that the judgment does not rest upon any view of the majority upon a question which is a question of law alone.

Turning now to the judgments of the minority, Mr. Justice Hall simply says:- Plainly there is here no dissent upon any question of law.

S.C.R.]