Pollack v. Comité Paritaire du Commerce de Détail à Québec

A decree relating to the retail trade in the city of Quebec, made under the authority of the Collective Agreement Act, provides that "Any regular employee shall be paid for the days when stores are closed: New Year's Day, the day after New Year's Day, Epiphany, Good Friday till 12.00 (noon), Ascension Day, St. John the Baptist's Day, Labour Day, All Saints Day, Immaculate Conception Day, Christmas Day and any other day the employer keeps his establishment closed to respect his religion" (section 3, par. 2(e)); and that "no employer shall compel his employees to work on Sundays and on the days mentioned in subsection "e" of the present section and all work performed on these days shall be paid double time with respect to the regular wages of the said employee."

(section 3, par. 2 (m)). The appellant corporation, carrying on business as a retail merchant, closed its doors to the public on three days by way of observance of the Jewish New Year and Day of Atonement. Notice was also given that any employee desiring to work voluntarily would be at liberty to do so. All employees, whether working or not, were paid the regular daily rates.

On behalf of those who did work, the respondent Comit6 Paritaire claimed payment of double wages in addition to the regular wages already paid, together with certain percentages provided by the Act.

The trial judge allowed one-half the amount claimed for wages, as the regular wages had already been paid; and that judgment was affirmed by a majority of the appellate court.

Held, reversing the judgment appealed from, that the obligation of the appellant company to pay double time must be confined to work performed on Sundays and on the days specifically set out in clause (e).

Employees will receive their regular wages on days "that employer keeps his establishment closed to respect his religion,' but clause (m) does not then apply.

*PRESENT:-Rinfret CJ and Kerwin, Hudson, Taschereau and Rand JJ. Per The Chief Justice and Taschereau J.:-The appellant corporation was at full liberty to open or close its premises on these three days. They were working days which were converted into holidays by the sole decision of the appellant, and that makes them distinct from the days mentioned in (e), which are holidays binding upon all employers without question of race or religion.-Quere whether a commercial corporation can have a religion.

Per Hudson and Rand JJ.:-Clause (e) is limited in its application to A QuiBEC a shop that is closed generally as to employees on the days specified. The decree does not purport to require a closure either towards the Rinfret C.J.

public or the employees; buit, once the shop is closed, the right to wages arises.

The day of optional closing, which becomes a day mentioned in (e) only if it becomes generally a closed day, is by its nature excluded from except in respect of special employees. In this case, the shop was admittedly open generally to the employees. As an open shop, it was not mentioned or enumerated in (e) which, in the optional case, means, to come under its operative effect. Clause (m) has, therefore, no application to it and the ordinary terms of employment must apply.

APPEAL by leave of appeal granted by this Court, from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, Sivigny

C.J. and maintaining the respondent's action.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: En vertu du d6cret relatif au commerce en d6tail dans la cit6 de Qudbec, (no 3265) 6dict6 par Arr~t6-en-Conseil le 5 septembre 1940 et approuv6 par le Lieutenant-Gouverneur le 6 septembre 1940, il a 6t6 stipul6 (article III) que la dur6e de la semaine de travail, dans les 6tablissements r6gis par le d6cret, est - de quarante-neuf heures et quinze minutes, r6parties sur les lundi, mardi, mercredi, jeudi et vendredi, de huit heures a.m. h six heures p.m., et les samedis et veilles de fetes, de huit heures a.m. A dix heures p.m., sauf le droit pour tout employ6 h une heure et quinze minutes pour prendre son repas.

Suivant le sous-paragraphe "e" du paragraphe 2 de cet article (III), jours Puis, en vertu du sous-paragraphe "m" de ce mime paragraphe 2:

jours Il y a certaines exceptions A cette prescription, mais elles ne concernent pas la cause et il n'est pas n6cessaire de les mentionner ici.

Le Comit6 Paritaire du Commerce de Ditail h Qu6bec, 1'intim6, invoquant ce d6cret no 3265 et ses amendements, ainsi que son devoir de surveiller 1'application de ce dicret, a poursuivi l'appelante et a conclu h ce qu'elle soit condamnde h lui payer la somme de $842.73, en all6guant que 1'appelante exploitait dans la cit6 de Qu6bec un commerce assujetti h ce d6cret, et que les 30 septembre, ler et 9 octobre 1943, elle avait ferm6 son 6tablissement au public pour respecter la religion h6braique A 1'occasion des fetes de la nouvelle anne hibraique.

A raison de cette fermeture, suivant les pr6tentions de l'intim6, l'appelante 6tait tenue de payer a ses employ6s leur salaire r6gulier pour les trois jours son 6tablissement a t6 ainsi ferm6, aux termes du paragraple "e" cihaut reproduit et elle ne pouvait obliger ses employds h travailler ces jours-l1 h son 6tablissement sans leur payer, en plus de leur salaire r6gulier, une r6mun6ration additionnelle, conform6ment aux prescriptions du paragraphe "m". L'appelante aurait requis certains de ses employ6s de travailler ces jours-l et elle ne leur aurait pas pay6 la r6mun~ration additionnelle en question; c'est pourquoi, d'apris l'intim6, elle devrait les montants mentionn6s* h une liste annexe A la d6claration, et qui forment un total de $669.36. Cette somme, ajout6e h celle que l'intim6 a le droit d'exiger aux termes du d6cret 2296 publi6 dans la Gazette Officielle du 28 aoiit 1943, soit $139.87, titre de dommages S.C.R.]

liquid6s, conformiment au paragraphe "c" de Particle 20 de la Loi de la Convention Collective, forme un total de $842.73, maintenant r6clam6 de 1'appelante.

La Cour Sup6rieure a maintenu les pr6tentions de lintime, sauf qu'elle a fait remarquer que sa r6clamation cornportait une r6mun6ration double pour les employds qui ont travail6 ces jours-1, en plus de leur salaire r6gulier qui leur avait d6jh t6 pay6. La Cour a done accord6 seuler ment la moiti6 du montant r6clam6. Cette moiti6, plus les dommages liquid6s par le d6cret, ne s'61ve qu'A un total de $421.37, et jugement est intervenu pour cette somme contre 1'appelante.

La Cour du Banc du Roi, en appel, a confirm6 ce jugement par une majorit6 de trois contre deux, les honorables juges Saint-Germain et Privost se d6clarant dissidents. La cause est maintenant devant nous par suite d'une permission sp6ciale d'appeler, qui 6tait n6cessaire, vu que le montant en jeu n'atteignait pas la somme requise pour 1'exercice de la juridiction de la Cour Supreme du Canada. Comme elle 1'avait fait devant les tribunaux dont l'appel est port6 devant cette Cour 1'appelante a propos6, entre autres, trois moyens qui, d'apr6s elle, devaient justifier cette Cour d'infirmer les jugements qui ont 6t6 rendus par la Cour Sup6rieure et la Cour du Banc du Roi.

ler moyen: Le jour en question, 1'appelante n'6tait pas tenue de fermer son 6tablissement et, par cons6quent, rien ne 1'empichait de fermer au public seulement et non A ses employds.

2ibme moyen: Le texte du d6cret ne concerne qu'un employeur tenant son 6tablissement ferm6 pour respecter sa religion. L'appelante, 6tant une corporation, n'a pas de religion.

3ibme moyen: L'obligation de payer temps double ne s'applique qu'aux jours enum6r6s au sous-paragraphe "e", c'est-h-dire h ceux-lh seuls qui sont nomn6s un h un. Le premier moyen de l'appelante me parait justifib. Elle n'6tait pas tenue de " respecter sa religion ", si toutefois 'on peut dire qu'une corporation peut en avoir une. La fermeture de son 6tablissement, pour ce motif, 6tait indiscutablement facultative.

Or, il est admis que les 30 septembre, ler et 9 octobre 1943 6taient des jours ouvrables.

Comme l'a fait remarquer M. le juge Provost:

L'appelante avait done pleine libert6 de laisser son 6tablissement ouvert ce jour-11 ou de le fermer. Pour M. le Rinfret juge Privost, ce motif seul suffisait au maintien de 1'appel. Le m~me juge 6tait 6galement d'avis que, par suite du deuxibme moyen, l'action aurait da 6tre rejet6e parce que la condition fondamentale et essentielle A 1'application de ce texte, c'est que l'employeur tienne son 6tablissement ferm6 " pour respecter sa religion

L'appelante 6tant une corporation commerciale, ne peut professer une religion ni lui appartenir.

fut d6cid6 dans ce sens, dans un jugement de l'honorable juge Robidoux dans la cause des Syndics de la Paroisse St-Paul de Montreal v. La Compagnie des Terrains de la Banlieue de Montreal (1), qui fut unanimement confirm6 par la Cour du Banc du Roi le 14 juin, 1905. Voir aussi l'arrit de la Cour du Banc du Roi re: Riverside Mfg. Co. Ltd., v. La Fabrique de St-Frangois d'Assise (2).

Mais ce qui est d6cisif, c'est que, en vertu du sous-paragraphe "e", l'obligation de payer temps double ne s'applique qu'aux dimanches et aux jours disign6s que nous avons d6jh mentionnis plus haut.

C'est l1 le troisibme moyen de l'appelante et celui sur lequel les deux juges dissidents en Cour du Banc du Roi se sont accord6s.

A mon humble avis, c'est lh la seule interpr6tation dont le sous-paragraphe "e" soit susceptible. Il y a dans ce sousparagraphe, d'abord, l'6num6ration de certains jours de l'ann6e.

Ces jours-l1 " les magasins seront ferm6s ". Les jours oii l'employeur tient son 6tablissement ferm6 pour respecter sa religion ne sont pas 6num6r6s.

Ces jours-1h, les patrons ne sont pas tenus de fermer leurs magasins et, en plus, ce sont des jours inconnus du d~cret, parce qu'il S.C.R.]

6tait impossible de privoir h l'avance quels jours 1'employeur jugerait h propos de fermer son 6tablissement " pour respecter sa religion

Ces jours-1h, les ouvriers de la mime profession sont tous au travail dans les 6tablissements des concurrents de 1'employeur.

Ce n'est pas le d~cret qui dicte h l'employeur DA de fermer ces jours-1h. C'est sa religion et cela ne relive Rinf-c.j que de sa conscience.

Ses employ6s ne peuvent compter sur un ch6mage ces jours-1h, parce qu'il est facultatif h l'employeur de decider de fermer son 6tablissement ou de le laisser ouvert. Tels jours ne pouvaient done 6tre 6numirds dans le sous-paragraphe "e" et ils ne le sont pas. N'tant pas " inum6r6s " dans le sous-paragraphe "e", ils ne tombent pas sous le coup des prescriptions du sousparagraphe "In", qui seul stipule que

Pour ces raisons, qui sont celles des juges dissidents dans la Cour du Bane du Roi, en appel, l'action de l'intim6 aurait dft 6tre rejet6e, et je suis done d'avis que l'appel doit 6tre maintenu avec d6pens dans toutes les Cours.

KERWIN J.: The appellant, Maurice Pollack Limit~e, is a corporation carrying on business as a retail merchant in the city of Quebec and as an employer is subject to the provisions of the decree relating to the retail trade in that city made by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of the province pursuant to the provisions of the Collective Agreement Act, now chapter 163 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, By section 3, paragraph (e) of the decree:- By paragraph (m):- So far as relevant, the French version of this paragraph states:et

On September 30th, October 1st and October 9th, 1943, the appellant published notices in various newspapers to the effect that its store would be closed to the public because those days were, as to the first two, the Hebrew New Year, and as to the latter, the Hebrew Day of Atonement. Notices to its employees were also posted in its establishment stating that the store would be closed to the public, that all employees would be paid as usual but that a specified entrance would be open to such employees who might have work to do and who would be willing to perform it voluntarily. All employees were paid their regular wages for those days whether they worked or not. On behalf of those who did work, the respondent Comit6 claimed payment of double wages in addition to the regular wages already paid, together with certain percentages provided for by the Collective Agreement Act.

The Superior Court allowed one-half the amount claimed on the basis of the appellant's employees who worked on September 30th,

October 1st and October 9th being entitled to double wages,

-but not in addition to the ordinary wages already paid.

This judgment was affirmed by the Court of King's Bench

(Appeal Side).

I find it unnecessary to canvass all the grounds of appeal urged by the appellant because I am satisfied that on one which is relied upon by the two dissenting judges in the

'Court of King's Bench the appeal should be allowed.

In paragraph (e) certain days are enumerated " when stores are closed " and it is provided that for them " and any other day the employer keeps his establishment closed to respect his religion " any regular employee shall be paid.

The English version of paragraph (m) provides that no employer shall compel his employees to work on Sundays

.and on the days " mentioned " in (e) and that " all work performed on those days shall be paid double time." Whatever one might think of the use of the word " mentioned ", the English version must, of course, be read in conjunction

.with the French version where the corresponding word is

"6num6r6s ". So read the obligation to pay double time must be confined to work performed on Sundays and on the days specifically set out in paragraph (e).

I would allow the appeal and dismiss the action with costs throughout.

J.: I am of the opinion that this appeal should be allowed and the action dismissed with costs throughout, for the reasons given by my brothers Kerwin and Rand. J.: By a decree relating to the retail trade in the city of Quebec, made under the authority of the Collective Agreement Act, R.S.Q. (1941) chap. 163, it is provided:- The appellant is a corporation, and on three days, September 30, October 1 and October 9, 1943 its store was closed to the public by way of observance of the Jewish New Year and Day of Atonement. A notice was given that any employee desiring to work voluntarily on those days would be at liberty to do so. All of the employees, whether working or not, were paid the regular daily rates, but certain of them who did work have been awarded double wages, and the question is whether that is required by the clauses quoted.

Clause (e) is limited in its application to a shop that is closed on the days specified.

Closed in what respect? Having regard to the object of the decree, which is to prescribe regulations to govern the relations between employers and employees, I should say it means closed generally as to employees. The decree does not purport to require a closure either towards the public or the employees: and its provision for double wages is the only pressure laid upon an employer to induce him to close. Once, however, that condition is present the right to wages arises. The day in that event becomes a holiday with pay.

On the other hand, clause (m) assumes a shop that is open generally or specially to employees.

If generally, then the case cannot be within (e) because a shop cannot be generally closed and open at the same time. If specially, then the case remains in (e) and comes under the requirement of (m).

In the latter case, there can be no compulsion to work, but double wages is the reward to the willing employee. In the former no compulsion is available to the employer in relation to the days mentioned in (e), but it is free to all employees to insist on working and at double rates.

But the day of optional closing, which becomes a day mentioned in (e) only if it becomes generally a closed day, is by its nature excluded from (m) except in respect of special employees.

Here, the shop was admittedly open generally to the employees. As an open shop, it was not mentioned or enumerated in (e) which, in the optional case, means, to come under its operative effect.

Clause (m) has, therefore, no application to it and the ordinary terms of employment must apply.

I would, therefore, allow the appeal and dismiss the action with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed and action dismissed, with costs throughout.

Lazarovitz & Chaloult.

Bh6rer, Beaudet & Fortier.