The King v. Dubeau / The King v. Laperrière

A

ENT) ................................

*Feb. 25,26. AND

*May 3. ALFRED LAPERRItRE, is-QUAL. (SuP- RESPONDENT. PLIANT)

............................

HIS MAJESTY THE KING (RESPOND-i

APPELLANT; ENTL)NT

ENT)

. . .. . . .

...........

AND

OMER DUBEAU, ES-QUAL. (SUPPLIANT)..

RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA During the evening of October 10, 1942, a detachment of soldiers belonging to a Canadian regiment carried on military exercises on the course of the old Kent Golf Club, near the city of Quebec.

During these manoeuvres some seventy five thunderflashes were used. On October 31st one unexploded thunderflash was found on the adjoining farm of one Giroux by two boys who had been looking for golf balls, one of them being Marcel, minor son of the respondent Dubeau.

The boys opened the thunderflash and extracted bits of powder from it, which they ignited with matches and caused small explosions. Marcel took home with him the thunderflash containing the remaining of the powder.

On the same evening, these two boys, with several others including Gaston, minor son of the other respondent Laperribre, gathered on the street. After burning a small bit of the powder on the sidewalk, Gaston and the other boy who had found the explosive decided to ignite the remainder of the powder in the thunderflash at once.

After two attempts had been made with no result, Gaston and Marcel, respectively and 12 years of age, thinking that the explosive had not been properly lighted, were about to pick it up, when it exploded causing severe injuries to the two boys. respondents, in their qualities of tutors to their minor sons, by petitions of right, claimed damages from the Crown, alleging its liability for the negligence of its officers or servants in the exercise of their duties or employment.

The Crown contended that there was nothing in the case which was of a nature to involve its liability, that the military exercises had taken place on private properties, that young Dubeau was illegally on such lands when he found *PRESENT:-Rinfret C.J. and Kerwin, Hudson, Rand and Estey JJ. the explosive and that there had been no neghgcnce on the part of any of its officers or servants while acting within the scope of their THE KING duties or employment. The Exchequer Court of Canada maintained the respondents' petitions of right, fixed the amount of the damages to a sum of about $15,371.00 in each case and then reduced such amount by one third on the ground that the two boys were at fault D . n to that extent.

The Crown appealed to this Court, and the suppliants cross-appealed, claiming that the Crown should be held liable for the full amount of the damages.

Held, affirming the judgments of the Exchequer Court of Canada ([1945] Ex. C.R. 53), The Chief Justice dissenting, that the appeals by the Crown should be dismissed and that the petitions of right of the respondents be maintained for the amount of damages awarded by that Court.

Held also that the cross-appeals by the respondents should be dismissed.- Rand J., dissenting, was of the opinion that the full amount of the damages should be granted.

Per The Chief Justice (dissenting)-A child, who is of sufficient age (at least over 7 years) and who also possesses requisite intellectual capacity and rational judgment, is legally liable to account for his acts: such doctrine is adopted by noted French authors and by a jurisprudence derived from many decisions rendered by the Quebec courts.

Thus, when a child is found to be guilty of contributory negligence, he is evidently guilty of negligence and answerable for the full liability attached to his illegal act, unless there is evidence that another person has contributed with him to cause the damages: he is solely responsible, being the causa causans. In the present case, the military men cannot be charged with gross negligence for having willingly and knowingly left on the ground a dangerous explosive, as, upon the evidence, they were ignorant of the fact that a thunderflash had remained unexploded. Assuming that, because the military men did not ascertain before leaving that no thunderflash was left unexploded, it would constitute negligence on their part, there is no evidence that they were aware, or should have been aware, that children would enter the ground after the manamuvres had taken place; on the contrary, the evidence shows that there could not be such possibility Moreover, in view of the opinion expressed by the trial judge that the two boys possessed sufficient intelligence to have foreseen the possible consequences of their acts, they should be treated the same as if they had been adults; and the Crown would not have been held liable if adults had committed these acts. On the whole, the minor sons of the respondents have conducted themselves with the full knowledge of the possible consequences of their acts and they have suffered injury through their own want of prudence. In any event, there has been, from the time the explosive has been found to the time when the accident occurred, a sequence of intervening events which makes of the alleged negligence of the military men a most remote cause (causa sine qua non) of the accident and of the damages resulting from it, but not a causa causans.

Per Kerwin J.:-On the facts of the case, there was negligence on the part of the officers in charge of the military exercises, their acting within the scope of their duties or employment, in leaving, without THE G making a search, the unexploded thunderflash, a dangerous article, on Giroux's farm, where the two boys on the day in question went with at least the implied permission of the owner.

Under al KING circumstances, steps should have been taken to see that all the thunderflashes used had been exploded; and, in the absence of such . steps, it should have been anticipated that an unexploded one would be found by children on Giroux's farm and that such children might so play with it as to cause injuries to themselves.

While the two boys were normal and intelligent enough to understand to a certain extent the imprudence of their acts, they were, nevertheless, of such an age as not fully to comprehend the dangerousness of their actions: such was the finding of the trial judge and it should not be disturbed. Per Hudson and Estey JJ.:-The Crown appellant has failed to prove that after the manoeuvres all the thunderflashes were accounted for and had, in fact, exploded. Notwithstanding that no permission had been obtained to use Giroux's land in any way, and in spite of the fact that these thunderflashes were thrown from a point adjoining it and in its direction, no effort was made to see that these thunderflashes did not reach it, nor to warn Giroux of the possibility that some of them might have reached his farm, upon which the boys who found the explosive were not trespassers. Under the circumstances, these facts constituted negligence.

The conduct of the two boys, having regard to their capacity, knowledge and experience, constituted also negligence, but that the boys were negligent, however, does not necessarily relieve the first party negligent of liability. Nevertheless, in spite of their partial knowledge of the possibility of injury with which they were confronted, they cannot be entirely excused because in part their negligent conduct has contributed to their own injuries. Per Rand J. (dissenting on the cross-appeal):-A highly dangerous explosive has been unlawfully placed and left on land where two boys who shortly thereafter found it had permission to be. The high degree of care required of those who control such articles means the anticipation of a greater range of probable mischief and, in this case, reaching to the children injured. The natural consequences of that initial culpa extend then to the injuries suffered unless it can be said that at some point a new and independent actor has intervened. The intervening act in this case, if an adult had been concerned rather than a boy of 12, would be held to be new and independent; it was not a situation in which contributory negligence could operate; it would have been an intermeddling by a responsible person with what he would know could be dangerous. There are degrees of liability for consequences between two or more participants in a negligent cause, but there is no binding authority which attributes fractional liability or deprivation of right to an infant in proportion to his appreciation of a particular situation; in relation to a specific act, he must be either responsible or not responsible, there is no halfway culpability and these boys of and cannot be held to conduct that in the 67580-2 circumstances would have avoided the results which happened. The act of both boys, moving to pick up the explosive after the fuse had been lighted, not only negatives intelligence and general capacity which would have placed them in an older age or adult category, but demonstrates their inadequate appreciation of the danger they were courting. Their conduct then was normal, likely and, just as prudent Dunu behaviour in an adult, innocent:

that excludes any qualification or limitation of the right to recover full damages from the Crown. The Crown contended that its liability under section 19 (c) of the Exchequer Court Act is confined to cases where the injuries to person or property are exclusively "resulting from the negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown", i.e. that there is no right of action against the Crown in a case of contributory negligence on the part of the Crown and the subject.

Held, per Kerwin, Hudson and Estey JJ. that the Crown's contention is not well founded when the cause of action arose in the province of Quebec. The Chief Justice and Rand J. expressing no opinion. Per The Chief Justice:-There is no necessity to decide such question in view of the conclusion arrived at, that the Crown was in no way liable for the accident.

Per Kerwin J.:-In cases between subject and subject in Quebec, damages must be mitigated in the case of common fault. This being the general law in that province, it is the law to be applied to the Crown under section 19 (c) : it has been so settled by decisions in this Court. Per Hudson and Estey JJ.:-In many decisions of this Court as well as of the Exchequer Court of Canada, where action was brought under section 19 (c) and the cause of action arose in Quebec, damages were apportioned between the Crown and the subject, when the negligence on the part of servants of the Crown contributed to the loss, thus indicating a long accepted construction of that section. Per Rand J.:-It is unnecessary to consider this ground of appeal, in view of the opinion above reported.-Semble that there is nothing whatever anomalous in the view that what Parliament intended in creating liability of the Crown was to adopt the law then existing 'n each province, except as it might thereafter be amended or changed by Parliament, but that in any event the interpretation placed on section (19 (c) since its enactment has established a jurisprudence which would now be too late to modify.

APPEALS by the Crown and CROSS-APPEALS by the suppliants from the judgments of the Exchequer Court of Canada, Angers J. (1), maintaining the suppliants' claims made by way of petitions of right, for damages amounting to about $15,371.00 in each case and then reducing such amount by one third owing to the suppliants' minor sons being at fault to that extent.-The Crown appealed to this (1) [19451 Ex. C.R. 53.

court, praying for the dismissal of the petitions of right, and the suppliants cross-appealed, claiming that the Crown should be held liable for the total amount of damages found by the trial judge.

Friddric Dorion K.C. and Camil Noel for the respondents. The (dissenting): Ces deux causes nous viennent par voie d'appel de la Cour d'Echiquier du Canada qui a accord6 A I'intim6 Dubeau une somme de $10,247.23 pour dommages, 6tant les deux tiers d'une r6clamation de $15,370.84, (la diff6rence repr6sentant la somme que cette Cour a cru devoir retrancher parce qu'elle est arriv6e & la conclusion que Dubeau s'6tait rendu lui-mame coupable de n6gligence contributoire), et accordant A Laperridre $10,- 248.39, 6tant les deux tiers de sa reclamation de $15,372.59, la diff4rence ayant 6t6 retranch6e pour la meme raison que celle qui a 6t6 adopt6e dans le cas de Dubeau.

Les deux causes ont 6t6 entendues ensemble, sur la mgme preuve, et nous pouvons en disposer pour des raisons & peu pris identiques.

La nature des faits est tris importante pour la d~cision que nous avons A rendre.

Le ou vers le 10 octobre 1942, un d6tachement de militaires de Ia cit6 de Qu6bec, sous les ordres du Ministre de la D6fense Nationale, s'est rendu sur un terrain appartenant h la compagnie Quebec Power, situ6 dans la ville de Courville, et de lh sur un autre terrain appartenant h Frangois- Xavier Giroux, cultivateur du mime endroit.

Les militaires y firent des exercices dans le but de se pr6parer A un raid simul6 qui devait avoir lieu h Quebec quelques jours plus tard et qui, de fait, eut lieu apris ces exercices.

Au cours de ces manoeuvres, le d6tachement s'6tait servi d'explosifs et il aurait apparemment lanc6 sur le terrain de Giroux un explosif commun6ment appel6 "thunderflash". Le samedi, 31 octobre, le fils du pititionnaire, ag6 de 12 ans et accompagn6 d'un autre gargon du mime trouva ce "thunderflash" en jouant sur le terrain de Giroux, et il s'amusa en retirer de la poudre en petites quantit6s et h y mettre le feu. Cela produisit une explosion minime au cours de laquelle son compagnon se brfila le pouce. Tous deux eurent alors 1'id6e d'apporter le "thunderflash" V. woau village de Courville et, le soir du m~me jour, accompagn6s d'autres gargons du mime age, parmi lesquels se RinfretcJ. trouvait cette fois le fils du pititionnaire Laperribre, ils commenchrent h s'adonner au mame jeu apris avoir de nouveau retir6 du "thunderflash" une petite quantit6 de poudre; puis ils d6cidbrent de mettre le feu au "thunderflash" lui-nmme afin de produire ce qu'ils ont appel6 un feu d'artifice.

Le "thunderflash" ne s'alluma pas imm6diatement; ils crurent que le feu s'6tait 6teint et alors le -jeune Dubeau et le jeune Laperribre voulurent prendre le "thunderflash" dans leurs mains dans le but d'en rallumer le feu lorsqu'une explosion violente se produisit, enlevant au jeune Dubeau et au jeune Laperribre une partie de leur main droite, ce qui nicessita plus tard, pour chacun d'eux, 1'amputation complte de la main droite.

Les deux p6titionnaires sont respectivement les phres de ces deux jeunes gens et, par voie de p6tition de. droit, ils r6clamrent de la Couronne les sommes ci-haut mentionn6es, en all6guant que 1'accident 6tait A la ndgligence, 4 l'incurie et h la faute des militaires qui, dans les circonstances, agissaient sous les ordres de Sa Majest6 le Roi par l'interrnidiaire de son Ministre de la D6fense Nationale. Le Procureur-G~ndral du Canada, au nom de Sa Majest6, plaida que les exercices des militaires avaient eu lieu sur des terrains privds, que le jeune Dubeau, au moment oi il trouva 1'explosif, 6tait ill6galement sur ce terrain, que d'ailleurs il n'y avait eu aucune n6gligence de la part ou des officiers en charge des exercices ou des militaires euxmirnes, et que rien de ce qui s'6tait pass6 n'engageait la responsabilit6 de la Couronne.

L'honorable juge de premibre instance a apprici6 la preuve de la fagon suivante:

II a 6t6 d'avis que le "thunderflash" trouv6 sur le terrain de Giroux avait 6t6 laiss6 non explosi, par les militaires; que tout s'6tait bien pass6 ainsi qu'il est rapport6 plus haut quant h la manibre dont l'accident s'6tait produit; que le jeune Dubeau, lorsqu'il trouva l'explosif, traversait la propri6t6 de Giroux qui est voisine d'un terrain de golf, pour chercher des balles de golf; que cependant le terrain de golf 6tait hors d'usage depuis trois ou quatre ans; et, de 1'aveu du jeune Dubeau, en passant sur le terrain de Giroux, il se trouvait sur la propridt6 d'un 6tranger, oi personne ne lui avait donn6 la permission de passer bien que c'6tait son habitude de passer sur cette propri6t6 pour se rendre au golf.

Quant Laperribre, il n'a vu 1'explosif pour la premibre fois qu'apr&s le souper lorsque les jeunes gargons se r6unirent et qu'ils d6cid~rent, au lieu de se contenter de faire brfiler un peu du contenu de 1'explosif, de le brfiler tout ensemble pour produire ce qu'ils appelbrent un feu d'artifice.

Le jeune Laperribre, au cours de l'appel au procks, a admis qu'il savait que, quand on met le feu h la poudre, cela explose et "c'est dangereux".

Tous deux avaient d6ji joud avec des p6tards ordinaires, mais ils ont avou6 que 1'explosif en question n'6tait pas un p6tard comme ils avaient l'habitude d'en voir.

Le jeune Dubeau, au cours de son t6moignage, d~clara d'abord qu'au souper il avait inform6 son pare de sa d6couverte et que. ce dernier lui avait dit de ne pas jouer avec

1'explosif qu'il avait trouv6 parce que c'6tait dangereux.

Son pare et sa mire lui auraient alors "d6fendu de jouer avec ga;" ils lui ont dit que c'6tait dangereux et "malgr6 cela il a jou6 avec".

II avoua que pour produire un feu d'artiflee il lui fallait faire quelque chose que son pare lui avait recommand6 de ne pas faire, en lui disant que c'6tait dangereux.

Mais plus tard, dans sa d6position, ii se contredit d'une fagon flagrante et affirma qu'il n'en avait parl6 ni k son phre ni A sa mre.

Comme cette dernibre affirmation du jeune Dubeau est corrobor6e par son pere et par sa mbre, I'honorable juge de premibre instance a cru devoir l'accepter.

Giroux, le propri~taire du terrain, fut entendu comme t6moin et d6clara que le jeune Dubeau avait pass6 une partie de 1'6t6 chez-lui h l'6poque des foins; 6galement que

Dubeau et d'autres petits compagnons venaient jouer au golf, surtout h 1'automne, tant sur le terrain de golf que sur son propre terrain, et il ajouta qu'il ne les empichait pas parce qu'ul ny avait pas grand tort h faire".

D'autre part, les officiers et les militaires qui ont rendu vtimoignage ont affirm6 que

On aurait employ6 au cours de ces manceuvres 75 "thunderflashes" contenus dans une boite, et les instructions 6taient d'6tre prudents dans la distribution de ces explosifs et la fagon de les allumer, vu qu'il 6tait admis qu'ils 6taient dangereux; mais, d'apris les affirmations des militaires, ces instructions avaient 6t suivies.

Personne n'a eu connaissance qu'un explosif aurait it6 laiss6 sans qu'il efit subs6quemment explos6.

Le constable en chef de la compagnie Quebec Power, en septembre et octobre 1942, s'occupait des terrains du club de golf Kent et du "power house", et il a timoign6 que durant I'4t6 et l'automne de 1942 les terrains 6taient fermis et que seules les personnes ayant un permis avaient le droit d'y aller.

a d~clar6 qu'il a lui-mame renvoy6 des gens qui 6taient venus sur le terrain sans permis et qu'il avait donn6 ordre h ses hommes d'en faire autant.

L'honorable juge de premibre instance a 6t6 d'avis qu'il etait possible que le "thunderflash" en question ait 6t lanc6 du terrain de golf sur la propri6t6 de Giroux. Il a cru qu'il n'y avait pas d'autre conclusion A tirer du fait que 1'explosif avait 6t trouv6 sur cette propri~t6.

De l il a conclu que le fait d'avoir laiss6 dans un champ utilis6 pour des manceuvres militaires un explosif constitue une n6gligence de la part des officiers qui avaient la direction de ces manceuvres; que des officiers prudents auraient dft faire ou faire faire des recherches sur le terrain des manceuvres pour v6rifier s'il y restait des explosifs non explos6s; or, comme rien de tout cela n'a 6t6 fait, d'apris le juge, ces omissions de la part des officiers et du quartiermaitre, tous serviteurs de la Couronne aux termes de l'article 50A de la Loi de la Cour d'Echiquier du Canada, entrainent, h son avis, la responsabilit6 de la Couronne.

Mais, par ailleurs, le juge de premidre instance fut d'avis que le jeune Dubeau et le jeune Laperribre avaient 6t6 cha- THE KWa cun d'eux partiellement responsables de l'accident.

II dit de Dubeau:

THE KING C'est un enfant intelligent qui savait que la poudre est une matibre inflammable, explosive et dangereuse, qui 6tait au courant du fait que

Guy Bouchard s'4tait un doigt en en faisant braler une petite Rifret CJ. quantit6 provenant du "thunderflash" et qui, d6sireux de faire un feu d'artifice, a, avec son ami Gaston Laperribre, d6cid6 de mettre le feu h ce qui restait du "thunderflash" et de le faire 6clater.

II cite Savatier dans son Trait6 de la Responsabilit6

Civile, et H. et L. Mazeau dans leur Trait6 Thdorique et

Pratique de la Responsabilit6 Civile, D61ictuelle et Contractuelle.

C'est d'ailleurs 1'essence de la doctrine que les tribunaux ont A rechercher si l'enfant avait 1'intplligence asses d6veloppe pour comprendre, sinon la malice, au moins i'imprudence de son acte. (Savatier, tome ler, no 199); (Mazeaud, tome 2, no 1468 et la note sous ce paragraphe.)

II cite 6galement Sourdat, Trait6 G6n6ral de la Responsabilit6, (tome 1, no 17); Demolombe, Cours de Droit Civil,

(tome 31, nos 494 et 495); Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde,

Trait6 de Droit Civil, (tome 15, no 2864); Planiol et Ripert,

Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil, (tome 6, no 497).

Tous ces auleurs sont d'avis que le mineur, nonobstant son est p6cuniairement responsable s'il a pu se rendre compte de la port6e de son acte.

En ce sens, ces auteurs adoptent la doctrine de Pothier qui, dans son Trait6 des Obligations, no 118, al. 3, 6dit.

Dupin, 1, p. 63, 6crivait:

On ne peut pr~cis6ment d~finir l'Age auquel les hommes ont I'usage de la raison, et sont, par cons6quent, capables de malignit6, les uns

Payant plus t6t que les autres; cela doit s'estimer par les circonstances.

L'honorable juge passa ensuite A la jurisprudence de la province de Qu6bec et il r6f6ra A la cause de Rowland v. La

Corporation de la paroisse de Rawdon et autres (1).

En toute dif6rence, cette cause fait bien voir la distinction qui existe avec celle qui nous est soumise.

Dans la cause de Rowland (1), la corporation d6fenderesse avait entrepris la rifection d'un chemin et, dans ce but, employait de la dynamite. Le contracteur procidait

(1) (1939) Q.R. 77 S.C. 477.

de cette fagon h trois ou quatre endroits simultandment. Pendant cette op6ration personne n'avertissait le public ni ne l'empichait de circuler, personne n'6tait charg6 de sur- -E veiller les d6tonateurs et le public circulait librement. Le jeune Rowland trouva le bout d'une m~che, la prit, la mit dans sa poche, l'en sortit h plusieurs reprises mime devant son phre, I'apporta chez lui, tenta de 1'allumer avec une allumette mais sans succes, alla alors ensuite derriere la maison, 1'alluma avec un feu de papier croyant que cela ferait 1'effet d'une piice pyrotechnique. L'explosion se produisit et lui causa des blessures aux mains et A l'oeil. La d6cision de la Cour fut que le contracteur, prdpos6 de la corporation d6fenderesse, aurait dfi savoir qu'il 6tait dangereux de laisser sans surveillance des explosifs h un endroit oi le public et surtout des enfants circulaient librement. La negligence attribude au contracteur, et, par son interm6diaire, A la corporation d6fenderesse, fut d6clar6e une faute r6sultant d'avoir permis au public de circuler sans l'avertir du danger.

Une autre cause cit6e par l'honorable juge de premiere instance, Cutnan v. Liveillg (1), est susceptible de la mime distinction car la faute sur laquelle s'appuie cet arrit est que le d6fendeur qui avait la garde d'explosifs, ndgligea "de les tenir hors d'atteinte de personnes 6trangbres et irresponsables".

L'honorable juge Archambault y r6fire 6galement A la cause de Plante v. La Citg de Montr6al, (portant le num~ro 75, 238 des dossiers de la Cour Sup6rieure de Montr6al, lequel n'a pas 6t6 rapport6) qui est le cas d'op6rations de minage faites par la cit6 de Montreal, oi l'enfant avait ramass6 un d6tonateur A l'endroit des travaux et

Encore, Makins v. Piggott & Inglis (2) couvre le cas d'un baton de dynamite trouv6 par un enfant de quinze ans qui 1'avait ramass6 et fait 6clater en le frottant.

Le propri6taire du bAton de dynamite fut trouve responsable; mais il s'agissait d'un prochs par jury oii, par cons6quent, les jurbs 6taient maitres des faits, et la Cour Supreme du Canada, en accordant jugement aux demandeurs, jugea THE que, en ce qui concernait 1'enfant, if his negligence contributed to the accident, the jury should have so T found; and that whether or not he was a trespasser, was also a question T K for the jury, who did not pass upon it.

Dans la cause de Lambert v. Canadian Pacific Railway Rinfret C.J. Co. (1), un enfant de huit ans fut trouv6 coupable de n6gligence contributoire. Dans la cause de Morin v. Lacasse (2), le pare d'un enfant de sept ans fut trouv6 coupable de faute commune pour "n'avoir pas exerc6 une surveillance convenable sur cet enfant".

Dans Burke v. Provencher (3), un enfant de huit ans fut trouv6 en faute lorsqu'il traversa une rue en faisant irruption derribre un tramway sans s'assurer qu'il pouvait le faire sans danger.

Dans la cause de Desroches v. St-Jean (4), la Cour du Bane du Roi (en appel) a jug6 que quoiqu'on ne puisse attendre d'un enfant de neuf ans le discernement et la prudence d'un adulte, au cas de faute de sa part, il sera responsable de l'accident dont il est victime mais dans une proportion moindre que celle d'un adulte.

Dans Normand v. The Hull Electric Company (5), oft il s'agissait d'un accident survenu au fils du demandeur, ^g6 de dix ans et demi, rsultant du fait qu'il avait voulu monter sur un tramway en mouvement, la Cour de R6vision modifia le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure et diminua le montant des dommages accord6 par cette dernibre Cour "vu son opinion qu'il y avait eu negligence de la part de 1'enfant du demandeur".

Dans Figiel v. Hoolahan et al (6), un enfant de dix ans avait 6t6 bless6 par une automobile en traversant une ruelle h 1'arribre de la r6sidence de ses parents. Il fut jug6:

There was fault on the part the victim the accident in that he stepped from the vacant lot into a paved lane practically in front of the automobile, without looking to his left to see whether any traffic was coming, and as he was ten years old, he had obtained a sufficient degree of intelligence so that he could have some appreciation of the danger to which he was exposing himself.

(1) (1932) 38 R. de J. 196.

(4) (1928) Q.R. 44 K.B. 562. (2) (1931) Q.R. 69 S.C. 280.

(5) (1909) Q.R. 35 S.C. 329. QR. S.C.

Q.R. S.C. De m~me encore dans la cause de Marquis v. Pr6vost (1) THE Kwao ohi un enfant de neuf ans s'6tait engag6 a la course dans L,,

1'intersection de deux ruelles, sans se soucier de la circulation; et aussi dans la cause de Ligard v. Quebec Power Com- THE Io pany (2), oih un enfant de treize ans bless6 par un courant DuEn,

6lectrique provenant de fils appartenant h la d6fenderesse, Rinfret CJ. rompus et tomb6s sur la voie publique et que 'enfant a touch6s, bien qu'il efit 6t6 conseill6 de ne pas le faire, il fut d6cid6 qu'il y avait faute commune et 75o de la responsabilit6 fut imput6 h 1'enfant.

Dans la cause de Lauzon v. Lehouiller (3), il fut d6cid6 que il y a lieu de tenir compte de l'age de 1'enfant et de faire supporter A un enfant de huit ans une part de responsabilit& moindre que celle qui devrait 6tre imput6e A un enfant plus Ag6.

Tout r6cemment, dans la cause de The Oliver Blais Company Ltd. v. Yachuk (4), qui pr6sentait de grandes similitudes avec celle-ci, cette Cour a confirm6 le jugement de la High Court d'Ontario qui avait imput6 75o de la responsabilit6 d'un accident h deux jeunes enfants, Ag6s respectivement de neuf et de sept ans.

Dans cette cause, 'honorable juge Urquhart, qui prisidait alors la Cour, d6clara entre autres choses:

I have little hesitation in finding that he (the infant plaintiff) was so negligent. The first point that should be considered is whether a boy of 9 years and one month, as this boy was at the time, could be guilty at all of contributory negligence. I have examined a great many cases on this subject and my conclusion is that where the boy is an ordinary bright, alert lad as this boy appears to be, and was shown to be at the time, there has been a short dividing line fixed at seven years. Under seven years, unless there is extraordinary brightness, in scarcely any case has a child been held guilty of contributory negligence.

Et l'honorable juge Urquhart passe en revue un certain nombre de causes pour appuyer son jugement.

Le r6sultat de 1'examen tris 61abord que fait dans le jugement a quo l'honorable juge de premibre instance est que: un enfant qui a atteint I'Age de discernement, g6n6ralement fix6 h 7 ans, doit 6tre tenu responsable de son acte de n6gligence et appel6 A en supporter seul, ou conjointement avec d'autres, selon le cas, les cons6quences. Comme le dit Savatier, (Responsabilit6 Civile, tome 1, no 199)

la minorit6 n'est pas, en soi, une impossibilit6 de pr~voir et d'6viter l'acte ilicite, donc une cause d'irresponsabilit6.

(1) (1939) 45 R. de J. 494.

(3) [19441 R.L. 449.

(2) (1939) Q.R. 77 S.C. 552.

(4) [19461 S.C.R. 1.

En somme, cette doctrine et cette jurisprudence impliquent que l'enfant qui a l'age, l'intelligence et le discernement voulus, est 16galement responsable de ses actes. En effet, ii suffit d'y rdfl~chir: Etre tenu coupable de n~gli- E m gence contributoire 6quivaut h dire: 6tre tenu coupable de n4gligence et entraine la pleine responsabilit6 de 1'acte.

L'att6nuation ne provient que du fait qu'une autre personne a elle aussi &t6 responsable. Et si 1'on arrive h la conclusion que les deux responsabilitis ont contribu6 aux donmages, alors on en fait supporter une partie par chacun de ceux qui y ont contribu6.

Mais la negligence de l'un n'est appel6e nigligence contributoire, cela est 4vident, que si une autre personne a, pour sa part, contribu6 aux dommages.

Si les circonstances ne permettent pas de relier h ces dommages la contribution de cette autre personne, il s'en suit nicessairement que la premibre est uniquement responsable et est seule la causa causans. D'oii il r6sulte que dire d'un enfant qui remplit les conditions voulues qu'il a 6t6 coupable de n6gligence contributoire, cela 6quivaut h dire qu'il a 6t6 coupable de n6gligence, qu'il en supportera seul les cons6quences, si nulle autre personne n'y a contribu6 avec lui.

Et voici maintenant I'appr6ciation que fait le juge des deux jeunes victimes de 1'accident qui a donne lieu h la pr6sente cause:

L'honorable juge a 6t6 d'avis que

4tait

Mais, dans les circonstances, il a cru qu'il y avait lieu de tenir chaque enfant, respectivement, partiellement responsable de 1'accident, conjointement avec la Couronne.

a attribu6 la responsabilit6 dans les proportions de 33)o A chacun des jeunes gens, et 662% A la Couronne.

A l'argumentation devant cette Cour, la Couronne a soulev4 la question de savoir si la doctrine de la faute commune pouvait s'appliquer A elle, et c'est lh un point d'une grande importance qui est susceptible de se poser de plus en plus l'avenir.

La pr6tention du savant procureur de la Couronne, en 'espice, est que Particle 19 (c) de la Loi de la Cour d'Echiquier du Canada, suivant sa v6ritable interpretation, stipule que la Couronne ne peut 6tre responsable en dommages vis-a-vis d'une personne ou A l'Fgard d'une propri6t6 que si les dommages r6sultent exclusivement de la n6gligence d'un officier ou d'un serviteur de 1'Etat dans 1'exercice de ses devoirs ou de ses fonctions;

II a ajout6 que l'accident qui r6sulte de la faute commune est un accident qui est la suite de la combinaison des n6gligences de chaque participant, et non pas un accident qui r6sulte uniquement de la n6gligence de l'officier ou du serviteur de l'Etat.

Je n'ignore pas 'arrit de cette Cour dans Canadian National Railway Company v. Saint John Motor Line Limited (1), o' l'honorable juge Newcombe avait exprimb l'opinion unanime des juges qui avaient alors si6g6 dans cette affaire; mais je n'ai pas me prononcer sur la question soulevie ici par l'appelante (et il aurait fallu examiner minutieusement le jugement dont je viens de parler), car je suis d'avis que, en l'occurrence, 1'appelante ne peut pas 6tre tenue l6galement responsable de 1'accident dont les fils des deux intimbs ont 6t6 les victimes.

Si je pouvais 6tre d'accord avec le juge qui a d6cid6 procks en qualifiant de n6gligence grossibre des militaires qui auraient volontairement et sciemment laiss6 sur le terrain un explosif du genre du "thunderflash" dont il s'agit, je ne puis le suivre lorsqu'il se prononce ainsi dans un cas ob, de toute 6vidence, il n'y a eu de la part des militaires, aucun'acte volontaire et conscient.

Il est manifeste que les militaires ne savaient pas que "thunderflash" 6tait rest6 sur le terrain sans avoir explos6. Le fait est que le juge de premidre instance a 6t0 amen6 A faire consister la n6gligence dans le fait que les officiers n'auraient pas, avant de quitter le terrain des manceuvres, fait un examen minutieux des terrains de golf et de celui de Giroux pour v6rifier si, par hasard, un "thunderflash" 6tait rest6 sur les terrains sans exploser. Mais, A supposer que ce d6faut de v6rification efit pu 6tre consid6r6 comme une n6gligence-ce qui ne me parait pas certain-je crois que ce Rinfret C.J. qui manque h l'appriciation des faits dans le jugement dont est appel, c'est qu'il n'y a aucune preuve que les officiers ou les militaires savaient ou auraient dfi savoir que des enfants se rendraient sur le terrain oil les manceuvres ont eu lieu.

Je ne pense pas me tromper en disant que tous les jugements oh des adultes ont 6t6 trouvbs responsables d'accidents survenus A des enfants et caus6s par l'abandon d'objets dangereux dans un certain endroit, ou le d6faut de surveillance d'appareils dangereux, ont toujours 6t6 rendus dans ce sens, parce que le juge saisi de la cause avait d'abord consid6r6 comme prouv6 le fait que ces adultes savaient ou auraient dfi savoir que le public ou des enfants avaient accis h l'endroit oft se trouvait I'objet dangereux; comme par exemple: des objets laiss6s sur une rue ou une voie publique, ou des objets abandonn6s ou non surveillis dans quelque r6gion oft le public ou des enfants avaient I'habitude de se rendre ou de jouer. Telle fut la base du jugement de la Cour du Banc du Roi dans la cause de Canadian

Pacific Railway v. Coley (1).

Mais ici il n'y a aucune preuve que les militaires savaient ou auraient dfi savoir que des enfants pourraient venir sur le terrain des manceuvres. Au contraire, tout indiquait qu'il n'y avait aucune possibilit6 de ce genre. Le terrain de golf

6tait ferm6 depuis trois ou quatre ans; le terrain de Giroux

6tait un terrain priv6, et le constable de la compagnie

Quebec Power a d6clar6 que lui et ses subordonn6s s'employaient h empicher tout le monde de se rendre sur 'un ou 1'autre de ces terrains; les enfants, au moment oii ils ont trouv6 1'explosif, n'6taient mime pas sur le sentier oii Giroux tol6rait le passage, mais ils se trouvaient h un tout autre endroit. Rien ne pouvait faire pr6voir aux militaires que des enfants se rendraient A cet endroit, et il ne fut certainement pas 6tabli, au cours de 1'enquite, que les militaires ou leurs officiers savaient ou avaient vu, ou auraient dfi voir ou savoir que des enfants circuleraient autour de cet en- droit. Dans les circonstances, il manque done un 616ment essentiel pour que 'on puisse attribuer de la n6gligence aux militaires qui avaient employ6 des explosifs de ce genre dans Rinfret CJ. 1exercice l6gitime et m~me obligatoire de leurs manceuvres. II me faut done 6carter toute attribution de faute aux militaires et, par le fait m~me, h la Couronne.

Mais. en plus. vu la decision du juge de premibre instance sur 1'intelligence des jeunes Dubeau et Laperribre, je ne vois pas bien comment 'on pourrait les traiter, pour le cas qui nous occupe, autrement que comme des adultes. Des adultes qui auraient fait ce que le jeune Dubeau et le jeune Laperribre ont fait auraient pu difficilement convaincre une cour de justice que la Couronne pourrait 6tre tenue responsable de ce qui 6tait arrive.

Il ne m'est pas possible de voir en quoi, dans les circonstances, le cas des deux jeunes gens peut 6tre distingu6 de celui d'un adulte.

11s avaient, dit le juge de premibre instance, toute l'intelligence n6cessaire pour comprendre ce qu'ils faisaient. avaient d6jh eu un avertissement lorsque le jeune compagnon de Dubeau s'6tait brfil6 le pouce sur le terrain de Giroux, apris avoir mis le feu h une petite quantit6 de poudre retir6e du "thunderflash".

Et d'ailleurs, ce n'est pas au moment ot ils out trouv4 l'explosif que les dommages ont t6 caus6s.

aurait pu y avoir une nuance si le "thunderflash" avait fait explosion au moment oh ils le trouvirent et s'en emparbrent. Mais le jeune Dubeau 1'a emport6 avec lui, et ce ne fut que plus tard, plusieurs heures apris, dans la rue, alors qu'ils jouaient avec d'autres petits compagnons que 1'accident s'est produit. D'apris leur propre t6moignage, ils savaient bien alors et appr6ciaient toute la port6e de leur acte. Ils ont encore commenc6 par extraire de la poudre et ' y mettre le feu. Puis lorsqu'ils d6cidbrent de mettre le feu au "thunderflash" lui-mime, ils ont euxmimes d6clar6 qu'ils voulaient faire un feu d'artifice. C'est bien h cela qu'ils s'employbrent et c'est bien cela qu'ils esp6raient.

Et m~me l encore, 1'accident ne s'est pas produit. Le moment fatal est venu lorsqu'ils ont cru que le feu s'6tait 6teint; ils ont mame mis le pied sur le "thunderflash" pour s'en assurer davantage; puis tous deux, le jeune Laperribre et le jeune Dubeau, ont pris 1'explosif dans leurs a mains et c'est alors qu'ils ont subi des domwnages dont ils se plaignent maintenant.

Il ne m'est pas possible de dire qu'ils n'ont pas agi en

"""" toute connaissance Oe cause et qu'ils n'ont pas 4t6 les vic- CJ. times de leur propre imprudence.

A tout 6vinement, il y a eu entre le moment Dubeau a trouv6 1'explosif sur le terrain de Giroux et le moment oii

1'accident s'est produit, toute une s6rie d'6v6nements interm6diaires qui rendent la pr6tendue n6gligence des militaires une cause certainement trbs 6loign6e (causa sine qua non)

de 1'accident et des dommages en r6sultant, mais non pas une causa causans.

Tout particulibrement pour le jeune Laperribre, il s'agit simplement d'un novus actus interveniens; ce qui, apris tout, n'est qu'une fagon de dire que la pr6tendue n6gligence des militaires n'a pas contribu6 h 1'accident qui s'est produit. (Potvin v. Gatineau Electric Light Co., (1) C.P.).

Comme le dit le juge de premibre instance lui-m~me:

I ne pouvait 6tre vraisemblablement pr6vu par les militaires ou leurs officiers que ce qui est arriv6 se produirait.

A mon avis, les deux jeunes gens, avec l'intelligence les caract6risant, les connaissances qui leur ont 6t6 trouv6es par le juge de premibre instance, sont uniquement responsables du malheureux accident dont ils ont 6td les victimes; et, toute participation des militaires-si l'on peut dire qu'il y en a eu-a certainement 6t6 trop loign~e pour que 'on puisse en tirer des cons6quences de responsabilit6

14gale contre eux.

Je suis d'avis de maintenir 1'appel dans chacun des jugements a quo, et de rejeter chacune des actions avec d6pens dans les deux cours.

KERWiN J:-These appeals from two judgments of the

Exchequer Court of Canada were argued together.

In one case the petition of right was presented by Omer

Dubeau as tutor of his son Marcel Dubeau and in the

[ other by Alfred Laperribre as tutor of his son Gaston Laperribre.

Each boy was injured under circumstances which, in the opinion of the trial judge, Mr. Justice Angers, made the Crown liable as for the negligence -of its officers KIa.

or servants in the exercise of their duties or employment under the provisions of section 19 (c) of the Exchequer Court Act as enacted by chapter 28 of the 1938 statutes, taken in conjunction with section 50 (a) of the Exchequer Court Act as enacted by chapter 25 of the statutes of 1943- 1944. The trial judge found the boys at fault to the extent of one-third and, therefore, reduced the sums which he otherwise would have allowed the suppliants. No question arises as to the amounts involved but the appellant argues that the suppliants are not entitled to succeed to any extent. On October 10, 1942, a detachment of soldiers belonging to the 57th Quebec Field Battery engaged in a scheme on the old Kent Golf Club course at Courville, Quebec, and, in the course of this operation, seventy-five explosives known as thunderflashes were employed.

The evidence accounts for their distribution and, on the whole, that every one who received a thunderflash was under the bona fide impression that each one used had actually exploded. The golf course had been closed to the public for some time but, whether the fact be that the men engaged ini the scheme did not go outside the limits of the course, an unexploded thunderflash was found on or about October 31, 1942, on the adjoining Giroux farm.

The evidence shows that at or about the spot where the thunderflash was found, the ground was disturbed in such a fashion that it might be proper to draw the inference that some of the men had actually used part of the Giroux farm but, whether that be so or not, it is undoubted that this particular thunderflash had been used during the course of the scheme.

It was found by Marcel Dubeau and another boy, Guy Bouchard.

These two boys were playing on the farm without the knowledge of the owner but they had on various occasions worked there and had also looked for golf balls. It seems clear that on the day in question they were there with at least the implied permission of the owner. They extracted bits of powder from the thunderflash, which they ignited with matches and caused small explosions. Marcel Dubeau took home with him the thunderflash -containing the remainder of the powder.

At the trial, Marcel, at one stage, testified that he told his father about what he had found and that he was warned to be careful but, on re-examination he denied this, and in this he was confirmed by his father. The trial judge chose to believe the boy's latter story thus confirmed, and I can see no .reason to interfere with that finding. That same evening Marcel was playing with a number of friends, including Gaston Laperribre, and had burned a small bit of the powder on the sidewalk when Gaston and Guy Bouchard .decided to ignite the remainder of the powder in the thunderflash all at once.

After two attempts had been made to ignite it and it did not seem to be burning, Marcel and Gaston were about to pick it up when it exploded ,causing severe injuries to the two boys.

On these facts the appellant contends that there was no negligence on the part of any officer or servant of the -Crown while acting within the scope of his duties or employment. The trial judge found that there was negligence -on the part of the officers in charge of the scheme in leaving the unexploded thunderflash on Giroux's farm -without making a search, and with that I agree. It is ,evident that whether any of the men actually traversed part of Giroux's farm or not, the latter was in fact used as part of the area for the scheme and although in time of war considerable latitude must be allowed the armed -services in their training operations in Canada, under all the circumstances in the present case, steps should have been taken to see that all the thunderflashes used had been exploded. Thunderflashes are dangerous articles and 'in the absence of any such steps it should have been anticipated that an unexploded one would be found by children -on Giroux's farm and that such children might so play with it as to cause injuries to themselves. The fact that this particular one, while found on the farm, caused the injuries complained of at another spot, including those one who is not the finder, can make no difference. The appellant argues that the injuries did not result dfrom such negligence but that it was caused by a novus actus interveniens, namely, the action of the two boys. Subject to the question discussed later, this, however, was the thing that the officers or servants should have antici- pated, and the doctrine contended for has no application. The suppliants cross-appeal and claim that the Crown should be held liable for the total amount of damages J. found by the trial judge. At the time of the accident, the boys were respectively eleven and twelve years of age. The trial judge saw them and came to the conclusion that while they were normal and intelligent enough to understand to a certain extent the imprudence of their acts, they were, nevertheless, of such an age as not fully to comprehend the dangerousness of their actions. This finding should not be disturbed. Bouvier v. Fee (1). It is clear, I think, that in the words of Lord Sumner in Glasgow Corporation v. Taylor (2), infancy as such is not a status conferring right and that a measure of care appropriate to the inability or disability of those who are immature or feeble in mind or body is due from others, who know of or ought to anticipate the presence of such persons within the scope and hazard of their own operations. Lord Denman's statement in Lynch v. Nurdin (3) that "ordinary care must mean that degree of care which may reasonably be expected from a person in the plaintiff's situation" has always been accepted as an authoritative statement of the law relating to the contributory negligence of children; see, for instance, the statement of Duff J., as he then was, in Winnipeg Electric Railway Co. v. Wald (4) where he stated that the trial judge in that case might perhaps have told the jury that

This is as applicable in Quebec as in the common law provinces: Bouvier v. Fee (1).

To revert to the negligence found against the Crown,it should be held to extend to the foreseeability that the thunderflash might be found by children but the extent of the liability must depend upon the age of the children playing with it. It was definitely settled in this Court in Price v. Roy (1), that in cases between subject and subject in Quebec, damages must be mitigated in the case of com- mon fault; and see the decision of the Privy Council in

The Montreal Tramways Company v. McAllister (2).

This being the general law in Quebec, it is settled by decisions in this Court that it is the law to be applied to the Crown under section 19 (c) of the Exchequer Court

Act. In view of this, I am unable to agree with Mr.

Geoffrion's argument that the Crown's liability under that section is confined to cases where the negligent act of the

Crown's officer or servant is the sole cause of the injury.

I would dismiss the appeals with costs and the crossappeals without costs.

J.:-These appeals are from judgments rendered in the Exchequer Court of Canada apportioning damages suffered by the boys in the loss of their right hands when on the evening of October 31, 1942, a thunderflash exploded.

The boys reside at Courville, Quebec, and at that time were respectively 12 years and 8 months and 11 ydars and

7 months of age.

The military authorities, having obtained permission to so use the premises, on the evening of October 10, 1942, conducted military manoeuvres at the Kent Golf Club.

About 30 men were so engaged and in the course of these manoeuvres 75 thunderflashes were used.

These were dangerous missiles about 10" long and 1" in diameter, manufactured for the purpose of representing "gunfire and shellfire in training". That they were dangerous is not disputed.

The instructions for using them required that the cap be removed, the fuse ignited, and then, lest

"somebody could get hurt", thrown some distance as they exploded in a few seconds.

These thunderflashes were thrown at distances varying from 25 to 100 feet. The learned trial judge finds that manoeuvres were not conducted on the farm of Mr. F. X.

Giroux adjoining that of the Kent Golf Club, but it is clear that one group of the men was during the manoeuvres stationed near Giroux's farm and that this and other thunderflashes were thrown upon the farm of Giroux. The learned trial judge states:

is apparent that the officers in charge cautioned the men as to the dangerous character of these thunderflashes and at the trial the appellant sought to prove that after the manoeuvres all the thunderflashes were accounted for and had, in fact, exploded. The evidence indicates they were not able to do so. Notwithstanding that no permission had been obtained to use Giroux's land in any way, and in spite of the fact that these thunderflashes were thrown from a point near the Giroux farm and in the direction thereof, no effort was made to see that these thunderflashes did not reach the farm, nor to warn Mr. Giroux of the possibility that some of these thunderflashes might have reached his farm.

Erle C. J., Potter v. Faulkner (1); Beven 4th Ed. p. 201. Again:

Swinfen Eady M. R. in Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co. (Leicestershire) (Limited), (2).

Pollock, 14th Ed., p. 402.

Under the circumstances, the throwing of these thunderflashes upon the farm of Giroux, the failure to ascertain if any so thrown had not exploded, or to notify Giroux of their possible presence and dangerous character, constituted negligence.

Later in the same month, on Saturday afternoon, October 31, Marcel Dubeau and Guy Bouchard (about 11 years of age) went out to play upon the premises of the Kent Golf Club where they had at times acted as caddies. It was their habit to look for golf balls, apparently both on the premises of the golf club and upon the farm of Giroux. .E At the time in question they were looking for golf balls on the farm of Giroux and there came upon the unexploded thunderflash (sometimes referred to in the evidence as "bAton").

It looked to them like a large firecracker and they proceeded to examine it.

Marcel Dubeau deposed as follows:

Q. Quand vous avez vu ce bAton, qu'est-ce qui est arriv6?

R. On I'a ouvert.

Q. Qui I'a ouvert?

R. Guy, on voyait qu'il y avait de quoi dedans.

On a mis ga A. terre, on en a vid6 un peu sur ce carton-lA, (No. 5), et 1&, on a mis une. allumette dedans, ga fait toute une boucane; il s'est brdl6 un peu le pouce; on a laiss tout ga on est descendu avee ce qui restait dedans. Q. Vous avez laiss6 tous ces papiers (nos. 4 et 5).

R. Oui, monsieur.

On a descendu le baton, on a vu un tas de planches chez monsieur Giroux; c'6tait I'heure du souper; je l'avais dans mes poches; on 1'a fait prendre un peu; je l'ai mis dans ma poche, et j'ai dit: on va aller souper, on se rencontrera a soir dans la rue St-Joseph. Q. Et

R. On s'est rencontr6, on 6tait plusieurs, il y en avait une gang, 1A on en a fait brler IA aussi; on mettait ga sur le trottoir; ca faisait une fum6e; il en restait pas beaucoup dans la boite; on a dit: on va faire tout br~ler, ga va 6tre beau.

LA, Gaston Laperrinre, il a pris une allumette et il I'a mis sur le bout, il voyait que ga allumait pas, et il l'a 4teint avec son pied; et il est une deuxibme fois pour l'allumer; il voyait pas de feu, il a kt6 pour voir, il a t6 pour le prendre avec sa main, et il s'est fait une explosion.

Both Marcel Dubeau and Gaston Laperribre gave evidence at the trial and the learned trial judge had an opportunity to hear and to observe with respect to their knowledge and capacity. He finds with respect to Marcel Dubeau: Je suis d'opinion par ailleurs que Marcel Dubeau, le. fils du pititionnaire, a lui-mame &t partiellement responsable de I'accident.

C'est un enfant intelligent qui savait que la poudre est une matibre inflammable, explosive et dangereuse, qui 6tait au courant du fait que Guy Bouchard s'6tait bri16 un doigt en en faisant brfler une petite quantit6 provenant du "thunderflash" et qui, d6sireux de faire un feu d'artifice, a, avec son ami Gaston Laperribre, d~cid6 de mettre le feu A ce qui restait du "thunderflash" et de le faire 6clater.

Le pauvre enfant ne savait pas 6videmment qu'il y avait dans le "thunderflash" une quantit6 de poudre aussi consid6rable que celle qui s'y trouvait encore et il ne privoyait pas qu'une explosion si violente se produirait.

His finding with respect to Gaston Laperribre is to the same effect.

Marcel Dubeau and Guy Bouchard thought they had found a firecracker.

They had neither seen nor heard of a thunderflash, and having regard to its size, the fact that the cap would have been removed before it was thrown, and its general appearance, one can understand how boys might well think they had found a firecracker. As Marcel Dubeau stated:

The boys knew that firecrackers contained powder and "ga faisait seulement qu'un petit paff".

In the evening on St. Joseph street one of them lighted the thunderflash and Gaston Laperribre, not satisfied with the way it was burning, put it out with his foot and lighted it again, and when this time it did not appear to burn, the two boys, Marcel Dubeau and Gaston Laperribre, picked it up with their right hands when it exploded. They admitted they appreciated danger. Marcel Dubeau admitted: "Je pensais que c'6tait pas dangereux".

Gaston Laperribre: "Q. Quand ga explose, c'est dangereux? R. Oui, monsieur."

but then explains:

These boys were not trespassers upon the Giroux farm. They and other boys were in the habit of going there and for the purpose they were pursuing when they found this thunderflash. Giroux knew of their doing so over a period of time and never made objection thereto. Indeed, Marcel Dubeau often worked on the Giroux farm, had in fact worked there that day and finished about 2.30 in the afternoon.

Mr. Geoffrion pressed that even if the military authorities were negligent, the conduct of the boys plainly indicated they were aware of the danger and therefore their conduct in these circumstances constituted an intervening act of a third person of such a character as to relieve the appellant of responsibility.

He points out that the first time the powder was lighted Guy Bouchard's fingers were burned and that Marcel Dubeau, one of the injured boys, was present and witnessed that incident, and thereafter stood further back from the danger. That after supper when a KN group of about 25 boys gathered on St. Joseph street they lighted the powder on the sidewalk and it burned with a puff. They wanted a bigger puff and decided to burn all of the remaining powder at once.

That when it was lighted and it did not burn as they anticipated from their experience with firecrackers, Gaston Laperrire put it out with his foot. Then when he re-lighted it and it did not appear to burn, he and Marcel Dubeau both took it in their hands when it exploded. He submits this constituted conduct so absurd and foolish in the light of their capacity, knowledge and experience and of what had taken place as to be quite beyond the field of reasonable foreseeability and the appellant ought not to be held liable therefor.

The conduct of these boys was in relation to what they believed to be a large firecracker. Upon their own admissions they knew it contained powder and was dangerous.

23 Halsbury, p. 688, para. 972.

In view of their admissions and the finding of the learned trial judge, it is impossible to say, at least with respect to a firecracker, that these boys were "naturally ignorant of danger", or that it was "a matter beyond his (their)

appreciation".

In my opinion, having regard to their capacity, knowledge and experience, their conduct constituted negligence. That the boys were negligent, however, does not necessarily relieve the first party negligent of liability.

That a thunderflash left unexploded in a field adjoining a golf course would be picked up and meddled with in a manner that might cause injury or damage is a consequence that in my opinion would be anticipated by a reasonably careful person.

If within the field of that reasonable anticipation injury results, the fact that the party finding the dangerous missile is negligent does not relieve the first party from liability.

A boy 17 years old found a gun and without realizing it was loaded he pointed it at and shot another boy. In an action against the party who had so left the gun, Holmes L. J., stated:

There is no evidence of how the path was used, but the jury were at liberty to infer that it was used to some extent; and their knowledge of the world would tell them that a gun casually laid aside has a great fascination for some people, who seem to have a natural impulse to handle and examine it, and who often do so in so careless and unskilful a way as that it is discharged without intention on their part. I do not attach much importance to the age of the defendant's son. He was old enough to know that it was dangerous to handle the gun on full cock, which had evidently been placed where he found it for some temporary purpose by a person who had been using it; and in my own reading and experience negligence in connection with firearms is as common in the case of men as of boys. Quite irrespective of the age of the persons who might use the path, I think that there was evidence from which the jury were at liberty to find that the defendant, when placing the gun against the fence, ought to have contemplated that it might fall into negligent hands. Sullivan v. Creed, (1).

Then again, in Pollock on Torts:

A wrongful or negligent voluntary act of Peter may create a state of things giving an opportunity for another wrongful or negligent act of John, as well as for pure accidents. If harm is then caused by John's act, which act is of a kind that Peter might have reasonably foreseen, Peter and John may both be liable; and this whether John's act be wilful or not, for many kinds of negligent and wilfully wrongful acts are unhappily common, and a prudent man cannot shut his eyes to the probability that somebody will commit them if temptation is put in the way. One is not entitled to make obvious occasions for negligence. Pollock on Torts, 14th ed. at p. 376.

Lord Dunedin in another case:

It has, however, again and again been held that in the case of articles dangerous in themselves, such as loaded firearms, poisons, explosives and other things ejusdem generis, there is a peculiar duty to take precaution imposed upon those who send forth or instal such articles when it is necessarily the case that other parties will come within their proximity; the duty being to take precaution; it is no excuse to say the accident would not have happened unless some other agency than that of the defendant had intermeddled with the matter.

Dominion Natural Gas Co. v. Collins, (2).

Gloster v. Toronto Electric Light Co., (3); Makins v. Piggott & Inglis, (4); Whitby v. Brock, (5).

(1) [19041 2 I. R. 317, at 355.

(2) [19091 A.C. 640, at 646.

(4) (1898) 29 Can. S.C.R. 188. (3) (1906) 39 Can. S.C.R. 27.

(5) (1888) 4 T. L. R. 241. Conduct that will relieve the first party negligent of liability is described by Lord Wright:

The Oropesa, (1).

'The negligent conduct of the boys, Dubeau and Laperriere, cannot be so described. It falls far short of that of the 14 year old boy who, while employed at his work, decided to quit. To do so he crawled over or under a barricade in front of an open door, jumped onto a sinoke flue and when it gave way fell and lost his life. His death was due to his "own rash act": Dominion Glass Co. v. Despins (2).

Another illustration, a boy of 12 years walked on a trestle across a ravine 17 to 19 feet deep and 300 feet wide in the face of conspicuous danger signs. Recovery could not be had. It was just as if some person was saying to the boy: "It is dangerous to go there". As Anglin J. states: Shilson v. Northern Ontario Light and Power Co. (3). That the boys believed they were playing with powder which they knew to be dangerous, that they were playing with a firecracker larger than they were familiar with, distinguishes this case and its facts from the case of Makins v. Piggott & Inglis, (4) where a boy scratched a detonator of which he was "unaware of its character" and did so "in ignorance of its dangerous character" and thereby caused an explosion that

The conduct of Marcel Dubeau and Gaston Laperribre indicated that they appreciated the possibility of injury, not the possibility of an injury so great as that which they suffered, but an injury similar in character. The difference is one of degree rather than of kind. Therefore, in spite of their partial knowledge of that with which they were confronted, they cannot be entirely excused because in part their negligent conduct has contributed to their own injuries. In the language of Makins v. Piggott & Inglis (1) their conduct was voluntary with respect to a dangerous substance.

In Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-Operative Society, (2), the defendants when they sold the tin of chlorinated lime appreciated the possibility of danger. No negligence was found on the part of the purchaser who recovered damages. Collins, M. R., stated at p. 161: It would appear that when due consideration is given to the capacity, knowledge and experience and age of the boys in relation to all the facts and circumstances in this case, the law applicable is that set forth in the well-known case of Lynch v. Nurdin (3) and quoted with approval by Anglin J. (later Chief Justice) in Geall v. Dominion Creosoting Co., (4).

The appellant contends that if this be a case in which both parties contribute, and therefore a case of contributory negligence, the action on behalf of the boys must fail because section 19 (c), under which this action is brought, gives a right of action against the Crown only where the injuries are those "resulting exclusively from the negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown". Section 19 (c) of the Exchequer Court Act, being 1927 R.S.C., c. 34:

The phrase "resulting from the negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown" has been in this section since it was enacted in 1887, and though twice amended, this phrase has remained unchanged. Referring to this enact- THETiING ment Mr. Justice Gwynne stated:

. The object, intent and effect of the above enactment was, as it appears to me, to confer upon the Exchequer Court, in all cases of claim TiS against the government, either for the death of any person, or for injury to the person or property of any person committed to their charge upon any railway or other public work of the Dominion under the management and control of the government, arising from the negligence of the servants of the government, acting within the scope of their duties or employment upon such public work, the like jurisdiction as in like cases is exercised by the ordinary courts over public companies and individuals.

The City of Quebec v. The Queen, (1).

Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C. J., referring to the same section stated:

Since the judgment in The King v. Armstrong (2), it must be considered as settled law that the Exchequer Court Act not only creates a remedy, but imposes a liability upon the Crown in such a case as the present and that such liability is to be determined by the laws of the province where the cause of action arose.

The King v. Desrosiers, (3).

The law varies in the respective provinces and the Crown has in the past quite properly availed itself of any defence provided by the law of the province in which the cause of action arose. This is illustrated by decisions in which the fellow servant rule was pleaded. When the cause of action arose in the province of Manitoba where the fellow servant rule obtained the suppliant's action failed: Ryder v. The King, (4).

When the cause of action arose in the province of Quebec, where the fellow servant rule did not obtain, the suppliant recovered: The Queen v. Fillion, (5). See also The King v. Armstrong, (2).

In this Court the damages were apportioned where the negligence on the part of servants of the 'Crown contributed to the loss. The cause of action arose in the province of Quebec and action was brought under the present section 19 (c) (then sec. 20 (c)). Anglin C.J.:

It seems to follow that we have here a case of "common offence or quasi-offence" of the respondent company and of the appellant resulting in a joint and several obligation on their part to persons who have sustained consequential injury (art. 1106 C. C.), with the result that there must be an apportionment of responsibility between these co-debtors (1) (1894) 24 Can. S.C.R. 420, at 449.

(2) (1908) 40 Can. S.C.R. 229.

(4) (1905) 36 Can. S.C.R.. 462. (3) (1908) 41 Can. S.C.R. 71,

'(5) (1895) 24 Can. S.C.R. 482. at 78.

The King v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. (1).

In the Exchequer Court damages have been apportioned between the Crown and the subject where the cause of action arose in the province of Quebec: Lapointe v. The King, (2); Rochon v. The King, (3); Thiboutot v. The King, (4); also two as yet unreported cases, Martial St. Estey

Jacques v. The King, and Joseph Bouchard v. The King. The foregoing indicates the -long accepted construction of section 19 (c). The insertion of the word "exclusively" in this section as suggested would make a substantial difference and at variance with the construction already established.

It would therefore appear that the addition of any such word is a matter for the consideration of parliament rather than for the Court.

In my opinion the appeals should be dismissed with costs and the cross-appeals without costs.

J.:-The essential fact of these cases is that what is known as a "thunderflash", a tube between 10 and 12 inches long and 1i inches or so in diameter, loaded with powder, highly dangerous, and used in military field exercises, was unlawfully placed and left on land where two boys who shortly thereafter found it had permission to be. Apart from the continuing trespass, the high degree of care required of those who control such articles means the anticipation of a greater range of probable mischief and that it must reach to children in their position I do not doubt. The natural consequences of that initial culpa extend then to the injuries suffered unless it can be said that at some point a new and independent actor has intervened.

The conception of "cause" in article 1053 of the Civil Code does not differ, in a case of this nature, from that of the Common Law: and as put by Lord Sumner in S.S. "Singleton Aubry" v. S.S. "Paludina" (5) in language approved by Lord Wright in The Oropesa (6).

But where we are dealing with persons in their normal state of mind and body acting deliberately, in the absence of special circumstances, the innocence or culpability of the intervening act, certainly as we have it here, must, as to the actor himself, fix it either as a consequence of the initial cause or a new and originating cause.

The chain of events was such that if an adult had been concerned rather than a boy of 12, the intervening act would be held to be new and independent; it was not a situation in which contributory negligence could operate; it would have been an intermeddling by a responsible person with what he would know could be dangerous.

As I understand the judgment below, it holds there can be partial culpability, in the case of children, for a given act.

We do admit degrees of liability for consequences between two or more participants in a negligent cause, but I know of no binding authority which attributes fractional liability or deprivation of right to an infant in proportion to his appreciation of a particular situation. In relation to a specific act he must be either responsible or not responsible for its consequences; there is no halfway culpability; and the question is whether or not these boys of and 12 are to be held to conduct that in the circumstances would have avoided the results which happened.

What is the standard by reference to which that question is to be answered? It has.been declared by Baron Parke, in his customary terseness and clarity of language: Lygo v. Newbold (2) (in argument).

The same rule is laid down by Duff, J. (as he then was) in Winnipeg Electric Railways v. Wald, (3).

That sets up an objective criterion: the prudent child of given years. But age is not to be taken too literally: understanding and care appear in rough categories. It is not, however, the actual capacity of the child whose conduct is being examined; on this basis, the standard would be that of the tribunal itself; and the inconvenience and uncertainty of that, long ago pointed out by Chief Justice Tindal K in Vaughan v. Menlove (1) in relation to adults, increase as we take into account the instincts and impulses of the child, in certain circumstances so susceptible to excitement, But that mode of stating the standard does not affect the substantial identity of the conduct so defined with .that from which, in the particular situation, there would be only the exceptional departure by persons of the same age class. As with the adult, the standard would take into account any clearly shown special knowledge, and, probably, the fact that the child's intelligence and general capacity had indubitably placed him in an older age category. But there is nothing of the unusual here. The act of both boys moving to pick up the explosive after the fuse had been lighted not only negatives such a capacity but demonstrates their inadequate appreciation of -the danger they were courting.

If, then, the child in all the circumstances has used as much care as the ordinary child of his years would have used or if he has acted as all save the exceptional child of his age would have acted, his act is innocent; if not, as regards his own injury it is culpable: and whether his responsibility is exclusive or contributory depends on the nature of the events into which he has projected himself.

To determine if he has met the standard, I ask myself what is the general opinion of prudent persons-"the common sense of the community" as Holmes has put it-as to the likely and expectable conduct of an ordinary boy of 11 or 12 who gets hold of such an explosive; and the answer is, I think, that it would be just what happened here. It follows that he should not be allowed to handle by himself and alone such a menace as a thunderflash; and the universal care and apprehension attending holiday celebrations in fireworks attests this. In the common understanding, the natural and probable consequence of the conjunction of a normal boy of that age and such a compact danger will be that he will pry and meddle to his own injury. There is the virtually inevitable external behaviour which adults must foresee in relation to acts which may, without justification or excuse, bring about that conjunction. conduct of the boys here, then, was normal, likely, and, jusi as prudent behaviour in an adult, innocent. That excludes any qualification or limitation of the right to recover front the appellants.

This makes it unnecessary for me to consider Mr. Rand J. Geoffrion's argument that the liability of the Crown under section 19 (c) of the Exchequer Court Act is limited to cases in which the act of the Crown's servant is the sole cause of the injury. I should perhaps say that I see nothing whatever anomalous in the view that what Parliament intended in creating liability of the Crown was to adopt the law then existing in each province except as it might thereafter be amended or changed by Parliament, such as for instance in the field of navigation and shipping; but in any event the interpretation placed on this section since its enactment has established a jurisprudence which I think it is now too late to modify.

As no question of quantum of damages has been raised, in each case I would dismiss the appeal with costs and allow the cross-appeal with costs both here and in the Court below.

Appeals dismissed with costs. Cross-appeals dismissed without costs.