Ouellette v. Cloutier

A final point remains: should the securities given by Poulin in 1931 be appropriated pro rata to the two debts? Whether the language stating the purpose of the note:- . has the effect of making the respondent a surety may be J. doubted; but I take it to preclude a surrender of any security in the hands of the appellants to another creditor of Poulin. It must, then, be attributed proportionately to the debt owing to the respondents and to that under the guarantee.

I would allow the appeal and reduce the amount of the judgment at trial to the sum of $11,158.18.

The appellants should have their costs in the Superior Court and in this Court. The respondents should have their costs in appeal before the Court of King's Bench.

J.: Le demandeur-intim6, en sa qualit6 de tuteur h son enfant mineur, a poursuivi Napoleon Ouellet et Joseph Ouellet, et leur a r6clam6 conjointement et solidairement la somme de $2,722. Il all&gue dans son action que son fils mineur, Marcel Cloutier, Ag6 de 10y ans, a 6t6, le 21 septembre 1944, serieusement bless6 alors qu'il aidait les d6fendeurs h la mise en sacs du grain dans un moulin h battre, op6r6 par Napoleon Ouellet et propri6t6 de 1'autre d6fendeur Joseph Ouellet.

La Cour Sup6rieure pr6sid6e par M. le juge Boulanger a rejet6 laction, mais la Cour du Banc du Roi, infirmant ce jugement, a fait droit A l'appel et a maintenu 1'action du demandeur &s-qualit6 pour la somme de $2,484.20. Devant cette Cour, seuls Napol6on Ouellet et l'intim6 sont en cause. L'accident qui fait la base de ce litige est arriv6 alors qu'un jour de cong6, Marcel Cloutier, fils mineur du demandeur, s'6tait rendu chez une dame Thomas Fournier pour aider un nomm6 Talbot h charroyer du bois. Avec tous les hommes de madame Fournier, I'enfant se rendit chez le d6fendeur pour lui aider h battre du grain, sans 6tre invit6 a le faire, mais sans qu'on lui d6fende de s'y rendre. Le d6fendeur Napoleon dirigeait les op6rations de battage, et c'est lui qui indiquait aux hommes le travail qu'ils devaient faire.

Le jeune Marcel n'a pas regu d'instructions particulibres, mais, au cours de la journ6e, a fait des travaux divers, et, quelque temps avant que le travail ne prit fin, Talbot qui recevait le grain dans les sacs a demand6 au jeune Marcel de faire ce travail qui, d'apris la preuve, n'est pas un travail dangereux.

La machinerie 6tait compos6e d'un tracteur qui fournissait la force motrice A la batteuse, et les deux 6taient reli6s l'une h 1'autre par une courroie de transmission. Une autre courroie reliait 6galement deux organes mobiles de la machine.

Lorsque le travail, vers la fin de la journie, fut termin6, Napol6on Ouellet ordonna la fin des travaux et enleva la grande courroie reliant le tracteur h la batteuse, ainsi que les deux courroies plus petites qui partent de poulies A chaque extr6mit6 de 1'axe du batteur et actionnent le secoueur et le cribe ventilateur. Sous 1'effet de la force acquise, le batteur continua cependant h tourner encore, et Marcel s'aventura de 1'arriter avec ses mains qu'il appuya sur la poulie de 1'axe; mais, voyant qu'il ne pouvait r6ussir, il prit la courroie qui gisait A terre, 1'appuya sur la poulie, mais malheureusement cette courroie s'enroula sur 1'arbre, happa le bras droit de 1'enfant qui fut fractur6 au poignet.

Le demandeur 6s-qualit6 pr6tend que cet accident est dfi A la faute, h la n6gligence, A 'imprudence du d6fendeur Ouellet, en tol6rant la presence du jeune enfant pris de la machine h battre, qui serait une machine dangereuse et en n'ayant pas pr6vu l'imprudence de 1'enfant qui accomplissait un acte dans l'ignorance totale du danger qu'il comportait.

II est certain que la prdsente action ne repose pas sur 'article 1054 du Code Civil, mais que la demande ne peut 6tre fond6e que sur les dispositions de Particle 1053 C.C. Pour r6ussir, le demandeur 6s-qualit6 doit n6cessairement prouver la faute de l'intim6.

Ce dernier a-t-il manqu6 ' un devoir quelconque? Je ne le crois pas. Il est incontestable que la pr6sence du jeune Cloutier 6tait tol6re dans la grange oii se faisaient les travaux de battage et que mame ce dernier a t autoris6 A y participer.

Mais, dans les circonstances, le fait de laisser ce jeune enfant, habitu6 h ce genre de travaux, aider les autres hommes ne pr6sentait aucun danger.

Je m'accorde avec M. le juge Pratte de la Cour du Banc du Roi qui a dit:

A

A m~me s'il n'a pas la dext6rit6 ou la stiret6 requises pour qu'on lui en confie la direction. Cela fait partie de son 4ducation.

Marcel Cloutier avait d~jh assist6 au battage du grain; et s'il n'est pas 6tabli qu'il connaissait en d6tail le fonctionnement de la batteuse, il savait, A n'en point douter, danger que pr6sente une roue ou un arbre de couche en mouve- Taschereau J. ment.

Or, le d6fendeur connaissait Marcel; non seulement i1 I'avait d6jh vu travailler avec les ouvriers de madame Fournier, mais l'enfant avait d6jh assist6 au battage chez lui.

Le d6fendeur avait raison de croire que 1'enfant en savait tout autant, sur les travaux de la ferme, qu'un fils de cultivateur. Peut-on dire alors qu'il a commis une faute en I'admettant dans la grange avec des ouvriers de madame Fournier qu'il accompagnait souvent et qu'il avait suivis ce jour-1? Non pas. Certes, s'il se fut agi d'un enfant inconnu, ou absolument 6tranger aux travaux de la ferme, le d6fendeur aurait t6 tenu d'exercer sur lui une surveillance 6troite; mais dans le cas qui nous occupe, une telle mesure ne s'imposait pas. La machine elle-mime n'6tait pas dangereuse, et le travail confi6 au jeune homme ne l'exposait h aucun p6ril. S'il a 6td bless6, ce n'est pas h cause de la nature de son travail, mais bien parce qu'il a volontairement commis une imprudence, qu'on ne peut pas reprocher A Ouellet de ne pas avoir privue. Cet enfant, normalement intelligent, a 6t par son imprudente activit6 l'auteur de sa propre m6saventure, en essayant, malgr6 que 1'on cut tent6 de 1'en dissuader, d'arriter par le moyen que l'on sait la poulie en mouvement.

II s'est expos4 lui-mime h un danger 6vident, qu'il avait pourtant I'Age voulu pour appr6cier. Il se peut qu'il 6tait possible qu'un accident semblable arrivit. Mais ce n'est pas 1A le critbre qui doive servir h determiner s'il y a eu oui ou non n6gligence. La loi n'exige pas qu'un homme pr6voie tout ce qui est possible. On doit se pr6munir contre un danger h condition que celui-ci soit assez probable, qu'il entre ainsi dans la catigorie des 6ventualit6s normalement pr6visibles. Exiger davantage et prdtendre que 1'homme prudent doive pr6voir toute possibilit6, quelque vague qu'elle puisse 6tre, rendrait impossible toute activit6 pratique.

(Bacon v. H6pital du St-Sacrement (1); Savatier, Responsabilit6 Civile, tome 1, no 163; Mazeaud, Responsabilit6 Civile, 2e 6d. tome 2, p. 465; Demogue, Des Obligations, tome 6, no 538, p. 576; Planiol et Ripert, Droit Civil, 1930, Des Obligations, tome 6, p. 531; Volkert v. Diamond Truck Co. (2); Donoghue v. .Stevenson (3).

(1) (1935) 41 R.L.N.S. 497.

(2) (1939) Q.R. 66 K.B. 385; affirmed [19401 S.C.R. 455.

(3) [19321 A.

Je suis en consequence d'opinion que 1'appelant n'a pas commis de faute en tol6rant dans la grange la pr6sence du fils de l'intim6, pas plus qu'en ne privoyant pas l'imprudence que ce dernier a commise. On ne peut reprocher a -- I'appelant de ne pas avoir fourni les soins ordinaires qu'un homme diligent devait fournir dans des conditions identiques. (L'(Euvre des Terrains de Jeux de Qu6bec v. Cannon (1), M. le juge Rivard A la page 114.)

L'appel doit 6tre maintenu, Faction rejet6e et le jugement de M. le juge Boulanger r6tabli avec d6pens devant toutes les cours.

see nothing in the evidence to support the case against the appellant. He is charged with fault in failing to exercise the- care which, in the circumstances, a prudent man would have exercised to protect the young boy aged ten years and five months against the danger presented by the revolving shaft of the threshing machine. The boy had gone along to the barn with a group of four men sent over by a neighbour to assist in the threshing. Like a child of that age, he wanted to be in the work, and he was allowed to hold the bags into which the grain was poured by hand out of the containers into which it came from the machine; but he was in and out of the barn at will all day, and when near the machine would be in the presence of the workmen.

Late in the afternoon, the appellant removed the main belt running from the tractor to the thresher on the left side and the small belt on the right side of the thresher connecting the main shaft with a smaller one, and set about to back the tractor out of the barn. At that moment, the shaft of the drum of about 2" in diameter and projecting a few inches beyond the closed side of the drum was revolving under its own momentum, and three of the men were watching the teeth or arms of the shaft with the boy within five or six feet of them. All of a sudden, he picked up the small belt, about 1i" in width and 5' in length, and pressed it to the end of the shaft to slow it down.

One of the men called out to leave it alone, but he answered:

"Non, je l'arrite". A moment later, the belt seems to have been seized by the shaft and whirled around, and the boy's arm caught up in it was badly broken above the wrist.

S.C.R.]

I will assume that the end of the revolving shaft did present some degree of danger, but having regard to the fact that the boy was almost within reach of three men with whom he had come to the barn, that the shaft was merely running down, and that the boy was acquainted with the operations of the machine, I think it impossible to say that a reasonably prudent father would have taken any further step to guard against such a sudden and unexpected sortie. The appellant must show that the boy was surrounded with the care and foresight of such a person, and this I think he has done.

Boys at farms, as part of their practical education as well as a satisfaction of their natural propensity to imitate their elders, assist at small jobs where they do not interfere with the work, and where the conditions are reasonably safe for them; and although the boy's father was not a farmer, he lived in a farming district and the boy spent a good deal of his spare time around the farms in the vicinity of his home, including the appellant's.

He had the ordinary boy's discipline and dependability in these practical situations. But here was an impulsive act of wantonness indulged in a few moments before the last motion of the machinery would have been ended. Normally, in such circumstances, particularly the presence of the men, a boy of that age would not touch a revolving shaft, but certainly he would be expected to drop the belt instantly upon a sharp command to do so; and the injury suffered by him is due to that momentary wilfulness in disobedience.

I would, therefore, allow the appeal and dismiss the action with costs throughout.

J.:-Mr. Pigeon agrees that there is no difference between the civil law and the common law as to the principles applicable to such a case as the present. I proceed on the assumption contended for by the respondent that the infant was an employee of the appellant. In Smith v. Baker Lord Herschell said at p. 362: It is part of the obligation of the master that he shall warn the servant where the employment involves the use of machinery which may prove dangerous to the servant O. unless he is instructed with regard thereto, and instruction which reaches the standard of reasonable care in the case of an adult may not be sufficient in the case of a young person; Young v. Hoffman Mfg. Co. Ld. (1).

I do not think there was any fault on the part of the appellant in permitting the boy to be engaged at all as he was that day. The evidence shows that he had beer. engaged in doing much the same sort of thing the year before without incident.

The other ground of liability which is urged is that the appellant ought to have anticipated that what happened was just the sort of thing a young boy would be likely to do and that the appellant failed in his duty to warn against it.

It is to be observed in the first place that in the case at bar the boy was not injured during the course of any work which he had been engaged in during the day or which he had been called upon to do. He had not been called upon to operate any part of the machinery or to come in contact with it. Moreover, the machine was not, when properly used, a dangerous machine, and even if the end of the shaft, which continued in motion after the belts were thrown off, came into contact with anyone it would not have caused any injury as is shown by the fact that the boy said he first placed his two hands on it to try to stop it.

Nor was the boy left alone. There were three adult workmen near him at all times. I do not think it can be said that the appellant ought to have anticipated the combination of circumstances that the boy would take from the floor one of the belts lying there and apply it to the shaft without being observed by one of the workmen in time to prevent him. I think the principle applicable is to be found in the following authorities:

Mazeaud:

Responsabilit6 Civile, 2e 6dition 1934, t. 2, no. 1597, p. 464;

Demogue:

Des Obligations, 7, 6, no. 538, page 576: OUSLE

Le fait doit 6tre assez probable pour qu'on doive se prdmunir contre lui car on ne peut se pr6munir contre tout ce qui est possible.

In Glasgow Corporation v. Taylor (1) Lord Sumner Kellock J. said at p. 67:

Where a question as to the care to be used arises between persons using as of right the place, where they respectively act, infancy as such on others to respect it, than infirmity or imbecility; but a measure of care is no more a status conferring right or a root of title imposing obligations on others to respect it, than infirmity or imbecillity; but a measure of care appropriate to the inability or disability of those who are immature or feeble in mind or body is due from others, who know of or ought to anticipate the presence of such persons within the scope and hazard of their own operation.

As to the boy himself the learned trial judge says: 1. Selon son certificat de naissance, Marcel Cloutier est n6 & Qubbec, le 6 avril 1934. II 4tait done exactement de 10 ans, 5 mois et 15 jours A la date de l'accident. Les timoins sont unanimes A dire que c'est un enfant intelligent et 6veill6. Le soussign6 1'a vu en Cour au cours du procks et il s'est tris bien tenu. LI n'a pas 6t6 entendu cependant, devant le tribunal, mais, en autant qu'on peut en juger A la lecture de sa ddposition au prbalable, il paralt, en effet, normalement intelligent, raisonnable et averti.

The present is not such a case as Murphy v. Smith, (2). There, while the plaintiff was injured in the course of doing an act which he had no right to do, he was observed and permitted to do the act by the employee in charge. This, had it been done by the defendant himself, would, in the opinion of the court in that case, have involved liability. In Lawson v. Packard Electric Company, Ltd., (3), the difference of opinion among the members of the court was as to whether operation of the machine causing the injury was within the scope of the instructions the plaintiff had received.

I do not think that the case Bouvier v. Fee (4), is of assistance here. In that case the machine was left unguarded and it was the breach of that duty upon which liability was founded.

I think the appeal must be allowed and the action dismissed with costs throughout.

(3) [1907] O.L.R. 1. '2) (1865) 19 C.B. NS. 361.

(4) [1932] S.C.R. 118.