Tenders were called by the respondent for the construction of a water and sewerage system, and appellant submitted an offer to do the work for a stated sum "conform6ment aux plans et devis" plus an undetermined amount for the excavation of rock at the rate of $3 a cubic yard. This offer was accepted at a meeting of respondent's Council. At a subsequent meeting of the Council, but before a formal contract before Notary had been signed by the parties, the acceptation of appellant's offer was rescinded. In his action, appellant asked that respondent be forced to sign a contract or pay him damages in the amount of $25,000.
When the case came for trial, another contractor had already executed the work, and the Superior Court awarded him $5,000 damages.
The Court of King's Bench maintained the appeal and dismissed the action in toto.
Hela: The agreement between the parties was, by the requirements of the Municipal Code, dependent on the signature of a contract, and as long as this contract was not signed, one of the parties could back out. More so in this case where the offer submitted and the resolution to accept it were at variance.
Rinfret CJ. and Kerwin, Rand, Estey and Locke JJ. Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, reversing the judg- AucLAI ment of the Superior Court, Rh6aume J., in which appel- VILGE OF lant had obtained damages in the amount of $5,000 for breach of an alleged contract for the construction of a water and sewerage system.
The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
C. A. Cannon K.C. for appellant.
John Aylen K.C. and L. L. Legault K.C. for respondent.
The CHIEF JUSTICE: Il s'agit d'un appel du jugement de la Cour du Banc du Roi (en Appel) de la province de
Quebec (1) qui a infirm6 le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure par lequel le demandeur-appelant avait obtenu une condamnation en dommages de $5,000.00 contre l'intimbe, dans les circonstances suivantes.
L'intimbe a demand6 des soumissions pour la construction d'un systbme d'aqueduc et d'un syst~me d'6gout pour le village de Brownsburg.
En r6ponse A cette demande de soumissions I'appelant s'est procur6 les plans et devis pr6par6s par les ing6nieurs de l'intim6e et il a adress6 A cette dernibre une soumission se lisant comme suit:
Je, (nous) soussign6, syant pris connaissance et examin6 les plans et devis dress6s par messieurs Gohier et Dorais, Ing6nieurs Conseils, pour la pose de conduite d'eau et d'6gout et de diff6rents travaux accessoires, pour le village de Brownsburg, offre d'ex6cuter tous les travaux, fournir tous les mat6riaux, tels que tuyaux en fonte, tuyau en b6ton, valves, bornes-fontaines et autres pikces sp6ciales en fonte, puisards, regards d'igout, etc., conform6ment aux dits plans et devis pour la somme de cent quatorze mille cent quarante-cinq piastres ($114,145.00).
Il est entendu de plus que sera pay6 extra pour le roe au prix de trois dollars (83.00) la verge cube.
Il est aussi entendu que la s6rie de prix ci-dessous servira de base pour 6tablir le cofit de ces travaux et les matiriaux additionnels qui pourraient atre requis.
(sign6)
J. A. AUCLAIR.
(1) Q.R. [19461 K.B. 466.
Le conseil municipal de l'intim6e prit connaissance des soumissions a sa seance du 11 septembre 1940, et adopta es rsolutions suivantes:
Moved by Counc. Hector Parizeau second by Counc. Lemuel Wilson Rinfret CJ to accept the tender of Mr. J.
Moved by Counc. W. J. Graham second by Counc. G. I. McFaul, and resolved to authorize the Mayor and Secretary to sign the contract for the water and sewerage system at the Notary G. E. Valois.
Remarquons en passant que dans ces r6solutions il n'est nullement question du prix extra de $3.00 la verge cube pour le creusage du roc.
Les plans et devis sur lesquels 6tait. bas6e la soumission de l'appelant comportaient entre autres les clauses suivantes:
14.-Les frais du notaire pour la pr6paration du contrat et de deux copies d'icelui seront b charge de l'entrepreneur.
15.-L'entrepreneur signera le present contrat sous quatre jours d'avis par l'ing6nieur que sa soumission a 6t6 accept6e et commencera les travaux aussit~t que 'ing6nieur le jugera A propos pour se terminer au plus tard le premier juillet 1941.
Pour chaque jour de retard l'entrepreneur sera passible d'une amende de $10.00 par jour.
II n'appert pas au dossier qu'un avis ait 6t6 envoy6 par l'ing6nieur h l'appelant que sa soumission avait 6t6 accept6e; mais, h tout 6vdnement, avant qu'aucun contrat ne fut sign6, A savoir le 14 septembre .1940, le conseil municipal de l'intim6e adopta une nouvelle r6solution rescindant celle qui avait accept6 la soumission de l'appelant et autorisa l'ing6nieur h demander de nouvelles soumissions pour un prix global pour la construction de l'aqueduc et de 1'6gout.
Dans ces conditions, 'appelant a intent6 une action h 1'intimde concluant h ce que cette dernibre soit condamn6e h signer un contrat en sa faveur ou alternativement h lui payer la somme de $25,000.00 de dommages.
Lorsque le litige vint devant la Cour Sup6rieure les travaux qui avaient 6t6 accord6s h un autre contracteur avaient dbjh 6t6 ex6cutis, et le seul intir~t qui subsistait dans la cause 6tait de savoir si, dans les circonstances, l'intim6e pouvait 6tre tenue de payer des dommages A l'appelant.
Une trds longue enquite a eu lieu devant la Cour Sup6rieure pour savoir si riellement 'appelant avait subi des dommages, et il est malheureux que la conclusion a laquelle nous en arrivons ait pour effet de rendre cette enqu~te inutile.
Nous croyons en effet que le point de droit soulev6 en Cour d'Appel (1) est d6cisif, et c'est A savoir que lorsque l'intim6e *a rescind6 la r6solution par laquelle elle avait accept6 la soumission de 1'appelant, le contrat entre ce dernier et I'intim6e n'itait pas encore complit6 et que
I'intim6e avait done le droit de ne pas donner suite h sa r6solution du 11 septembre.
Nous signalons de nouveau que, par suite de la divergence entre la soumission de 1'appelant et la r6solution de
1'intim6e, il n'y avait pas accord complet entre les deux.
Dans les circonstances, cela donne d'autant plus d'importance au point qui a 6t6 soulev6 par l'intim6e, tant en
Cour d'Appel (1) que au cours de 1'argumentation devant nous.
Ainsi que le fait remarquer M. le Juge Saint-Jacques dans ses notes en Cour d'Appel (1), la premitre question A envisager et A r6soudre 6tait de savoir quelle 6tait la situation juridique de la corporation municipale aprits l'adoption de la resolution du 11 septembre acceptant la soumission de l'appelant et autorisant la signature d'un contrat notari6.
Les plans et devis envisageaient, comme nous 1'avons vu, la signature d'un contrat notarid. Ce contrat 6tait n~cessaire pour complter l'acceptation de la soumission par le conseil municipal. La corporation n'6tait pas libe d'une fagon d6finitive tant et aussi longtemps que ce contrat notari6 n'aurait pas 6t6 sign6 par les deux parties pour d6terminer leurs obligations et leurs droits respectifs.
C'est d'ailleurs ce qui semble bien r6sulter des exigences du code municipal aux articles 624 et suivants.
D'aprs Particle 624, tous les travaux publics des corporations locales dont 1'ex6cution n'est pas sp6cialement r6gl6e par les dispositions du code, sont faits par contrat adjug6 et pass6 d'aprs les rkgles 6tablies dans les articles suivants.
Ils peuvent 6tre faits 6galement A la journ6e sous la direction de 1'inspecteur municipal mais ce cas ne se pr6sente pas ici.
L'article 625 de nouveau parle des travaux "faits a 'entreprise, par contrat, sur resolution A cet effet".
Cela indique la distinction qu'il faut faire entre la risolution et le contrat. Cette distinction .se poursuit dans les articles 626 et 627 d'apris lesquels l'entreprise est accord6e par r6solution, mais un contrat doit 6tre pass6 au nom de la corporation et accept6 par le chef du conseil ou par une personne sp6cialement autoris6e.
I s'en suit, suivant nous, que la convention entre les parties est, d'apris le code municipal, subordonn6e h la signature d'un contrat et, tant que ce contrat n'a pas 6t6 sign6, l'une des parties peut se d6dire avant la passation de l'acte, m~me dans le cas oii les conditions du contrat avaient 6t6 d6termindes par accord. (Compagnie d'Aqueduc du Village de St-Michel d'Yamaska vs Riendeau (1) ). A plus forte raison, dans le cas actuel faut-il decider que les parties ne seraient d~finitivement li6es que lorsque le contrat aurait 6t6 sign6 puisque jusque comme nous l'avons vu, la soumission et la r6solution du conseil de l'intimbe ne s'accordaient pas entre elles.
On peut dire que la convention entre les parties ne devait exister que du jour oii le contrat serait intervenu; jusque lh il n'6tait encore qu'un projet qui ne devait se r6aliser que lorsque I'acte serait pass6.
(Voir 24, Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil, no 129.)
Si la corporation ne devenait li6e d'une fagon absolue que par la signature du contrat, il est 6vident que le conseil pouvait, dis le 14 septembre, rescinder la r6solution qui avait accept6 la soumission de l'appelant.
Dans ces conditions, la rescision de la r6solution 6tait l6gale et ne pouvait donner lieu, A 1'encontre de la corporation intim6e, h aucune condamnation en dommages. Pour ces raisons qui sont plus amplement 61abor6es dans les notes de M. le Juge Saint-Jacques en Cour du Banc du Roi, j'en viens A la conclusion que l'appel doit 6tre rejet6 avec d6pens.
J.-This appeal arises out of what is alleged to have been a contract entered into between the appellant contractor and the respondent village for the construction of a water and sewerage system. Tenders were called for and the Contractor, on a form supplied by the engineer of the Village, under date of September 4th, 1940, submitted an offer to do the work "conform~ment aux dits plans et devis" for a stated sum plus an undetermined amount for the excavation of rock at the rate of $3.00 a cubic yard. A modification was made by which the fixed sum was increased by $4,095.00. At a meeting of the Council held on the 11th of September, a motion "to accept the tender of" the Contractor was carried, as well as a resolution "to authorize the Mayor and Secretary to sign the contract for the water and sewerage system at the Notary G. E. Valois". In the specifications were three pertinent clauses:jours On the 12th of September, the Contractor and the secretary, at whose instance does not appear, attended at the Notary's at Lachute when instructions were given for the preparation of the contract which was apparently to be signed that day. Shortly after noon, the secretary telephoned Mr. Auclair that there would be a delay of three or four days to confer with the solicitors of the Village. On that day also the secretary sent out a notice of a special meeting of the Council to be held on the 14th of September for the purpose, among other things, "reconsiderer les soumissions d'aqueduc et d'6gouts". At that meeting a resolution was passed "to rescind the motion granting a contract to J. A. Auclair for the water and sewerage system of the previous meeting". Later, new tenders were called for and a contract ultimately made with and carried out by another person.
Article 626 of the Municipal Code provides: "The contract for such works (public) must be awarded by resolution"; and 627: "The contract is made in the name of the corporation, and accepted by the head of the Council, or by a person specially authorized for that purpose".
It has been held by this Court that the law governing the acceptance of an offer under the Civil Law of Quebec is the same as that of the Common Law of England: Charlebois vs Baril (1); and that, subject to special circumstances, including. terms of the offer or under which the offer has been made, an acceptance becomes effective only when it is communicated to the person making the offer. A tender, such as we have here, is an offer and its acceptance in the present circumstances must have been communicated to the Contractor by the authority of the Council before, in any event, a contract could be said to have arisen. The passing of the resolution was no more than the decision of the Council that it would proceed to a contract on the terms of the tender: it was the formal making up of the mind of the corporation, the act which Article 626 envisages. No authority was given to the secretary to communicate the acceptance and nothing was done by the Council to affect the provision of the specification for notice by the engineer when the contract was ready for execution by the parties.
The construction of the Article by which an "award" without more effectuates a contract would conflict and, in the context, quite unnecessarily, with the rule so laid down.
In that background of circumstances and considerations and consistently with Article 627, it is clear, I think, that no binding obligation was contemplated otherwise than under a written contract to be prepared by the Notary. The requirement that the Contractor should sign within four days of notice by the engineer, the authorization to the Mayor and Secretary to sign for the Village, and the absence of any directed communication to the Contractor of the passing of the resolution, all look to that formal embodiment of the consensus reached for the only obligations to arise. The Council's action was the necessary preliminary to them, but no more than that: Edge Moor Bridge Works v. County of Bristol (2).
The theory of the plaintiff's original conclusions was that the Village had bound itself by a preliminary contract to enter into a written construction contract, but that was not vGEOF the proposal made by the Contractor; his tender was an offer to do the work, not a proposal of a contract for a contract; and the award, if it had created a lien de droit, must have constituted an acceptance of an offer by which the works contract was brought into full force. A contract so formed might contemplate its own absorption in a subsequent formal instrument, but that is to be distinguished from the conception being considered.
Mr. Cannon urged that the provision for forfeiture of the deposit required an obligation to support it, but I cannot agree that that is so. One of the terms on which the tender would be considered was the voluntary transfer of the equivalent of a certain sum of money by the Contractor to the Village to be returned in a certain contingency but to be retained in another. The condition that if, within the time mentioned, the Contractor refused to sign a written contract, he would lose all right to a return of the money, does not assume or require that there was, at that point, an obligation in law on the Contractor to do an act, the refusal of which was a breach; the power over the deposit was simply a coercive means exacted by the Village to compel the Contractor to take on an obligation. If he were already bound to carry out the work, the Village could, if he refused to proceed, insist on damages for the total loss suffered, unless the provision is one for agreed damages; but for that I can see not the slightest basis in fact.
On the ground, therefore, that the tender was submitted and the resolution to accept made as preliminaries only to the conclusion of a formal contract in writing and that up to that point, no legal obligation to perform or to accept that performance and to pay for it had arisen, the action did not lie and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with
Solicitors for the appellant: Taschereau, Cannon &
Fremont.
Solicitors for the respondent:
Legault & Legault.