ordinary use of the land. I find no evidence in the present cRowN matter upon which to base a conclusion that to bring water DAmocN for commercial use into business premises in a four-inch PAINT CO.
n o nueo pipe is a non-natural, and not merely an ordinary, use of them. In my opinion, the principle does not apply to a Co. case such as this.
Locke J.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Friel & Friel.
Solicitors for the respondent:
Stewart & Savage. LA COMPAGNIE FRANQAISE DU
APPELLANT; *Apr. 23, 24,
PHENIX (DEFENDANT)
...........
*Jun.
AND
THE TRAVELERS FIRE INSUR- R
ANCE CO. (PLAINTIFF) .....
R.E.O.... ON APPEAL FROM THE KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Insurance-Fire-Contents of building-Whether objects lost in fire were part of contents-Whether variation of statutory conditions-Subrogation-Quebec Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 299, ss. 240, 241- Articles 1156, 2573 C.C.
The insured entered into contracts of insurance with the appellant and several other companies for a total fire insurance of $250,000, apportioned $150,000 upon the building and $100,000 on the contents. These policies were "blanket policies", identical in terms and each one limiting the issuing company's share of the total risk. The insured was authorized to augment or diminish the total amount but had to maintain an insurance "de m~me forme, teneur et port6e" of a total of $250,000.
The word "contents" was defined:
"Tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur". Subsequently the insured acquired an insurance with the respondent in the sum of $10,000 on certain "objets d'art". These were part of the contents of the buildings and initially included under the appellant's policy.
A fire having occurred, the respondent paid the full amount of the loss on the "objets d'art", took a transfer from the ensured and, as the appellant denied any liability to pay a pro rata share, brought action against him. The appellant contended that the "objets d'art" did not Rinfret CJ. and Taschereau, Kellock, Estey and Fauteux JJ.
Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), reversing, St. Jacques and Hyde JJ.A. dissenting, the judgment of the trial judge which had dismissed the action.
A. J. Campbell Q.C. for the appellant. The property described in the policy issued by the respondent was otherwise insured within the meaning of that phrase -as used in the appellant's policy and consequently was not covered by the appellant's policy. Otherwise insured means differently insured i.e., a different kind of coverage. The appellant's coverage was a blanket coverage as opposed to the respondent's coverage which was a specific one. That is the meaning that has been assumed throughout by the parties tb that policy. Moreover, if it could be said that the provisions of that policy are not free from obscurity, the intention of the parties may be ascertained by taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and by examining the conduct of the parties themselves insofar as it throws light on the interpretation they may have placed upon their contractual rights.
When one takes into consideration all of the terms of the wording, it is clear that the consent to other insurance is to other blanket insurance of the same form, range and wording. Therefore, even if the property described in the respondent's policy was not "autrement assur6", there was no consent given by the appellant to such insurance and accordingly the appellant ceased to cover.
The so-called transfer and subrogation does not justify the institution of the action. Article 1156 C.C. does not apply, because if the appellant was in any way liable to its assured for the loss of the collection, it was liable in virtue of its obligation to its assured and not in virtue of an obligation owed by it to the assured jointly with others. In view of the fact that each company is only bound for its share, there cannot be any legal subrogation under 1156 C.C.
The assured can no longer attack the policy for illegality because he has accepted the validity of that policy by the inference to be drawn from the fact that he has claimed the whole amount from the respondent. Furthermore, no subrogation was ever given by the "Pcole" because the requirements of s. 4 of Statute 16 George V (1926), c. 49, which requires two signatures from the "icole", were not met.
The sentence "tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur6", used to define the contents in the appellant's policy is not a variation of the statutory conditions, because this sentence is not a condition of the policy but simply a description or limitation of the risk: Curtis's & Harvey v. North British and Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. (1); The London Assurance Corp. v. The Great Northern Transit Co. (2); Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gregory (3) and Ross v. Scottish Union & National Ins. (4).
John T. Hackett Q.C. and R. S. Willis for the respondent. The words "et qui n'est pas autrement assur&" come in conflict with certain conditions of the policy and in consequence are subject to the provisions of ss. 240 and 241 of the Quebec Insurance Act, and are, therefore, without binding effect on the insured.
This sentence is not only descriptive of the property insured but is also a stipulation contradicting the statutory conditions. The test is not whether the stipulation is a condition or a description, but whether the stipulation varies, contradicts, etc. The W. Malcolm MacKay Co. v. The British American Ass. Co. (5) which was approved by the Privy Council in Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gregory (supra).
Even if the words were purely descriptive, they would not have the effect of freeing the appellant from the obligation to pay by virtue of Article 2573 C.C.
The interpretation of the words when read in conjunction with the permission to increase or diminish the total amount of the insurance without notifying the insurers thereof, means that there had to be $250,000 of insurance at all times in like form, tenor and bearing, but once that requirement had been met with, the assured was free to increase the total amount of its insurance in any way it elected. If, however, the Court should come to the conclusion that the language is ambiguous, it should be interpreted against the appellant by the application of the rule contra proferentem.
The respondent is entitled to exercise any and all the rights of the insured. He is suing under a sale or transfer of rights. Any right may be transferred if law or policy does not forbid it. There is nothing in the Insurance Act to support the contention that the assured may not transfer his rights to impugn a variation. Considering the wording of the statute (16 George V., c. 49) and the Order in Council and that payment was payable to the Province, which got the money, then the subrogation was rightly signed and was good. The person to give the subrogation is the payee (the Province in this case) and not the assured. Article 1156 C.C. is applicable because the appellant had an interest in the payment of these indemnities.
The qu'elle fut -intentie, l'action de "The Travelers Fire Insurance Company" alliguait exclusivement l'6mission, en date du 7 f6vrier 1940, par la Compagnie Frangaise du Phinix (difenderesse) d'une police d'assurance contre le feu en faveur de la Corporation des Icoles techniques ou professionnelles, pour une p6riode de trois ans depuis sa date, pour la somme de $60,000, assurant certains effets contenus dans la bitisse de l'Ecole Technique de Montrial, y compris 1'cole du Meuble. Il y fut stipul6 que l'indemnit6 qui pourrait devenir due, au cas de sinistre, serait payable au Gouvernement de la province de Qu6bec.
La d6claration ajoutait que, le 2 juin 1940, alors que cette police d'assurance 6tait en vigueur, des pertes caus6es par le feu, au montant de $7,070.53, furent 6prouvies par l'assur6e aux objets suivants:
L'intim6e ajoutait que ces objets 6taient 6galement assures, en outre de la Compagnie Frangaise du Ph6nix, par la Compagnie d'Assurance du Canada contre 1'incendie, au montant de $10,000; La Nationale, Compagnie Anonyme d'Assurance contre 1'Incendie et les Explosions, pour le mime montant; "Commerce Mutual Fire Insurance Company", "The Stanstead & Sherbrooke Fire Insurance Company", "The Mercantile Fire Insurance Company" et "The Missisquoi & Rouville Mutual Fire Insurance Company", conjointement pour un montant de $20,000; et par l'intimbe elle-mime, "The Travelers Fire Insurance Company", pour un montant de $10,000.
Chacune de ces polices d'assurance, sauf celle de l'intim6e, stipulait que l'assurance porterait sur le contenu des immeubles de 1'appelante et que l'on devrait entendre par "contenu": "tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur6."
L'appelante pretendait que cette stipulation 6tait une variation des conditions statutaires n* 9 et que, comme elle n'6tait pas indiquie dans la police en la maniere exig~e par la loi, elle 6tait en cons6quence sans effet 16gal et n'engageait pas 1'assur6e.
Les pertes totales caus6es par l'incendie diji mentionn6 s'6lev6rent a $76,852.14 et chacun des assureurs paya en cons6quence sa part respective de ce montant de $76,852.14, moins $3,000 supportis par "The Phoenix Assurance Company, Limited, of London, England", en vertu d'une autre police d'assurance.
L'appelante, cependant, refusa de payer une somme de $1,939.85, reprisentant sa part dans le montant de $7,070.53 pour l'indemnit6 due sur les objets d'art et autres meubles 6num6r6s plus haut.
L'intimbe se fit done subroger par lIcole du Meuble et le Gouvernement de la province de Qu6bec dans leurs droits contre l'appelante, et, apris en avoir signifi6 le document de subrogation A l'appelante, 1'intimbe intenta contre cette dernibre Faction dont il s'agit dans la pr~sente cause. C'6tait tout ce qui 6tait all6gu6 dans la d6claration par laquelle 1'action a d6but6.
L'appelante produisit une plaidoirie 6crite niant que la police d'assurance, en vertu de laquelle elle pouvait 6tre tenue responsable, contint une variation aux conditions statutaires, et que les mots "tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assurV" fussent autre chose que la description de l'objet de 1'assurance; qu'elle avait acquitt6 tout ce qu'elle devait & la Corporation des tcoles techniques ou professionnelles, ainsi qu'au Gouvernement de la province de Qu6bec, comme reprisentant sa proportion dans le montant de $76,852.14; et que la somme de $7,070.53, A laquelle r~firait la declaration de l'intimbe, 6tait uniquement la responsabilit6 de cette dernibre qui, en la payant au Gouvernement de la province de Qubbec, n'avait fait rien autre chose que d'acquitter sa propre dette.
Jusque 1,, il ne s'agissait done que d'une action bien simple dans laquelle 1'intim6e all6guant le paiement et la subrogation faite en sa faveur en r6clamait la part de
1'appelante.
Il n'6tait done aucunement question d'une action ricursoire, oii l'intim6e aurait all6gu6 avoir pay6 pour le compte de l'appelante et lui en aurait demand6 le remboursement.
Ce n'est que dans la r6ponse que 'on trouve au paragraphe 5 de 1'alligation suivante:
Il apparait au dossier et cela est confirm6 par l'information que nous poss6dons, qu'une action semblable fut institude par 1'intimbe contre les autres compagnies d'assurance d6ji mentionn6es et il fut convenu que la preuve et
1'enquate seraient communes h chacune de ces actions.
Il ne fait pas de doute que cette nouvelle allegation contenue dans la r6ponse non seulement aurait se trouver dans la d6claration, mais que, comme elle n'y
6tait pas, mgme si l'intim6e avait demand6 la permission au tribunal de 1'introduire par voie d'amendement, il est improbable que cette permission efit pu 6tre accord6e, vu qu'elle changeait complitement la nature de Faction de Rinfret cj. l'intim6e et qu'elle avait pour effet de transformer une simple action directe contre 1'appelante en exercice des droits du Gouvernement de la province de Qu6bec et de l'assur6e en une action r~cursoire.
Cependant, 1'appelante a n~glig6 de se pr6valoir de la possibilit6 de faire rejeter cette all6gation de la r6ponse, qui est rest~e dans les plaidoiries 6crites, tant en Cour Sup6rieure qu'en Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel), et il semble bien que la Cour Supreme n'a pas d'autre alternative que de considbrer le litige A la fois comme comportant une action directe et une action r6cursoire, mime en d6pit du fait qu'il soit douteux que cela ne constitue pas un cumul de recours incompatibles ou contradictoires ne tendant pas a des condamnations de mame nature oi I'appelante, par voie d'exception dilatoire, efit pu contraindre l'intimbe A laire option, en vertu de Particle 177 du Code de Procedure Civile.
A notre humble avis, cette situation met l'appelante dans une position d6favorable.
Sur la d6claration, telle que r6dig6e d'abord, elle n'avait qu'& rencontrer la r~clamation de l'assur6e et A lui opposer, entre autres, le contrat d'assurance par lequel l'assur~e se trouvait li6e au moins par acquiescement. Au contraire, lorsque l'intimbe ajoute aux droits dans lesquels elle a 6t6 subrog6e la pritention qu'elle n'a fait que payer une somme due par l'appelante et qu'elle est autoris6e A se faire rembourser par cette dernibre, il s'agit alors d'un droit tout different les moyens de d6fense de 1'appelante ne sont plus les mimes.
L'appelante n'aurait qu'h se blimer elle-m~me si cela devait tourner A son disavantage. Mais je ne vois pas comment nous pouvons traiter la cause comme si le paragraphe 5 de la r6ponse ne se trouvait pas au dossier. Il importe tout d'abord de signaler que la police d'assurance 6mise par l'intim6e 6tait d'une nature diff6rente de celle des autres compagnies. Alors que les autres polices d'assurance couvraient "le contenu des bitiments decrits A 1'article pr6c6dent" et 6galement "les choses, d6crites ci-apris sous le titre "contenu" se trouvant dans un rayon de 50 pieds" des bAtiments, alors que le "contenu" 6tait d6crit comme "tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur&", la police de 1'intim6e, au contraire, Atait sp6cifique et ne couvrait que les "objets d'art et autres meubles faisant partie des collections du mus6e de l' icole du Meuble".
M~me en envisageant le paragraphe 5 de la r6ponse de 1'intim6e, il est done tout i fait inexact de dire que cette dernidre 4tait sur un pied d'6galit6 avec les autres compagnies d'assurance.
L'appelante et les six autres compagnies assuraient les mimes objets, bien que pour des montants diff6rents, A savoir: "tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur". Du moment que ce qui se trouvait dans les immeubles et qui n'itait pas autrement assur6 lors de l'incendie 6tait d6truit par le feu, chacune des six compagnies, ainsi que l'appelante, devenait responsable pour la perte dans la proportion du montant pour lequel chacune avait assur6.
Mais le d6tenteur de ces polices, propri6taire de ce qui 6tait contenu dans les immeubles, avait stipul6-comme il en avait le droit--que ces polices ne couvriraient pas ce qui 6tait autrement assur6. Il lui appartenait de decider pour lui-m~me la nature de la police d'assurance qu'il d~sirait obtenir et l'6tendue du risque dont chaque police rdpondrait.
L'assur~e consentit, entre autres, avec l'appelante, un contrat par lequel cette dernibre s'est oblig6e, moyennant une r~mun6ration, appel6e prime, ' certaines prestations, au cas oil se r6aliseraient certaines 6ventualit6s (A savoir: l'incendie), relative & des biens d6termin6s dans la police. fut convenu entre l'assureur et l'assur6e que les biens pour la perte desquels I'assur~e aurait le droit de r6clamer une -indemnit6 seraient ceux qui se trouveraient dans les immeubles de l'assurie, au moment de 1'incendie, mais ne comprendraient pas ceux qui 6taient "autrement assur6s". Je ne puis me convaincre qu'il ne s'agit pas de la description des objets assures et que ceux qui 6taient "autrement assures" se trouvaient par le fait mime de cette autre assurance soustraits A la description et cessaient d'6tre assures par la police de 1'appelante. C'est bien ainsi que toutes les autres compagnies d'assurance int6ress6es ont compris la convention.
Chacune d'elle a oppose a laction de l'intim6e la mgme contestation que celle de 'appelante. Elles 6taient toutes r6unies devant la Cour Sup6rieure et devant la Cour du Bane de la Reine (en appel). A la, suite du jugement de cette dernibre Cour, les autres compagnies d'assurance n'ont pas jug6 A propos de persister; elles se sont simplement soumises au jugement qui les condamnait.
Par l, elles ont 6t6 contraintes de payer, mais il n'y faut voir aucun acquiescement; et, d'ailleurs, l'acquiescement des. autres compagnies ne saurait 6tre invoqu6 contre 'appelante.
Si elle a raison, le fait que les compagnies qui etaient sur le meme pied qu'elle ont fini par c6der ne saurait pr6valoir contre son droit & elle. Mais il r6sulte in61uctablement que, lorsque 1'1cole du Meuble a d6cid6 d'assurer sp6cialement les objets d'art et les autres meubles sp6cifiquement d6crits dans la police d'assurance de l'intime, ces objets d'art et ces autres meubles se sont trouvis autrement assur6s par l'intim6e, et, par le fait mme, ont cess6 d'6tre assur6s par l'appelante et les autres compagnies. II s'ensuit que, lorsque l'intim6e a invoqu6 contre l'appelante les droits que pr6tendaient possider 1'Rcole du Meuble et le Gouvernement de la province de Qubbec, elle a voulu tenir l'appelante responsable de la perte d'objets qui n'6taient plus assures par l'appelante. Vainement l'intim6e aurait-elle pr6tendu que 1'icole du Meuble n'avait pas le droit de prendre une autre assurance ou une assurance suppl6mentaire, car, en outre que cette question ne pouvait 6tre soulev6e que par La Compagnie Frangaise du Phinix, ou par les six autres compagnies qui avaient assum6 le risque originairement, si cette assurance suppl6mentaire constituait une infraction h leur convention, c'eut t6 l une objection appartenant exclusivement A chacune de ces compagnies, ainsi qu'A 'appelante, et 'intim6e ne pouvait la soulever. En le faisant, l'intim6e eut excip6 du droit d'autrui.
D'ailleurs, le problkme ne se pose pas puisque les polices d'assurance elles-mimes 6mises par l'appelante et les six autres compagnies autorisaient 'assur6e A obtenir cette police d'assurance suppl6mentaire.
La Cour Sup6rieure a maintenu 1'action de 1'intimb'e en 6tant d'avis que les mots "qui n'est pas autrement assure ne faisaient pas partie de la description des objets qui se trouvaient assur6s par l'appelante au moment de l'incendie, mais en les consid6rant comme une variation des conditions statutaires. Et, comme ces mots n'6taient pas inscrits dans la police d'assurance conform6ment aux exigences de la Loi de Qubbec, elle a d6cid6 que l'Icole du Meuble n'itait INS. CO pas lice par eux et que l'appelante ne pouvait pas en avoir Rinfret CJ. le b6n6fice.
Elle cite la d6cision du Conseil Priv6 dans
Curtis's & Harvey v. North British and Mercantile Insurance Company Limited (1) et un passage du jugement de
Lord Dunedin qui, h mon humble point de vue, me parait contraire aux pr6tentions de 1'intim6e.
I se lit comme suit:
Their Lordships think that it is the policy of the statute to make a hard and fast rule that every fire policy shall have attached to it these statutory conditions, and that they cannot be varied so as to be binding on the insured, unless the variations are authenticated in the prescribed manner. The result will be that, "if not varied, they remain in full force, but any other stipulation and covenant which may define or limit the risk can also receive effect in so far as it does not contradict the statutory conditions which are paramount."
Il y est bien dit: "but any other stipulation and covenant which may define or limit the risk can also receive effect in so far as it does not contradict the statutory conditions which are 'paramount'."
La Cour Sup6rieure cite encore un jugement de notre
Cour dans The London Assurance Corporation v. The
Great Northern Transit Co. (2).
Voici le passage en question:
In this case the policy insured the SS. Baltic whilst running in the inland rivers and canals during the season of navigation. To be laid up in a case of safety during the winter months from any extra hazardous building.
Sedgewick J. at page 583:- One other point remains. It is contended that the stipulation contained in the words "whilst running" etc., is a condition without the meaning of the Ontario Insurance Act, and in as much as it varies from or is in addition to the conditions by that Act made statutory the policy should comply with section 115 of the Act which provides that such variations or additions should be printed in conspicuous type and in ink of different colour.
So far as this point is concerned, I entirely agree with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal and Mr. Justice Osler. The stipulation in question is in no sense a condition but rather a description of the subject matter insured.
It is descriptive of and has reference solely to the risk covered by the policy and, not to the happening of an event which by the statutory conditions would render the policy void. The statute, therefore, does not apply.
(1) 55 D.L.R. 95.
Can. S.C.R.
De nouveau, cette Cour a d6cid6 que les mots "whilst running in the inland rivers and canals during the season of navigation" n'6taient aucunement une condition mais plut6t une description de l'objet assur6.
A un moment de son jugement, la Cour Supbrieure semble s'6tre demandde si les mots "non autrement assur6" pouvaient Stre considiris comme une garantie, mais elle parait avoir 6cart6 cette pr6tention.
En effet, il paraitrait surprenant qu'un propriftaire qui assure garantirait qu'il maintiendrait sur les lieux, jusqu'd 1'6poque de l'incendie, les effets pour lesquels il a demand6 une assurance. Tout simplement la police d'assurance ne couvre pas autre chose que la perte des effets qui se trouvent sur les lieux au moment de 1'incendie et 1'assur6 ne peut r6clamer rien d'autre. Cet argument 6quivaudrait A pr6tendre qu'un propri6taire assur6 s'engage & ne jamais 6liminer de son immeuble les effets qui s'y trouvaient lorsque la police d'assurance a 6t6 6mise. Or, c'est lui-mame qui a stipuld que cette police ne couvrirait que les effets qui n'6taient pas autrement assures & 1'6poque de l'incendie et il aurait les mains li6es pour l'empicher d'assurer autrement ces mimes effets.
Autant dit pour la question de savoir quelle est la nature de cette stipulation ("et qui n'est pas autrement assur6") et si vraiment elle est autre chose que la d6signation ou la description des effets qui se trouveront assures au moment de 1'incendie.
Mais j'avoue comprendre encore moins la pr6tention que cette stipulation serait contraire aux conditions statutaires qui, en d6finitive, semble le motif de la decision de la Cour Sup6rieure et celui de la majorit6 de la Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel) (1).
J'insiste sur le fait qu'il faut y trouver un changement aux conditions de la police d'assurance aux termes de l'article 241 de la Loi des Assurances de Qu6bec, c'est-h-dire, une variation des conditions mentionnies dans cette Loi. Or, je cherche encore en quoi 1'addition des mots "et qui n'est pas autrement assure peut 6tre consid6r6e comme une variation des conditions statutaires, car il ne s'agit pas 6videmment de ce que 1'intim6e semble soumettre d'une pr6tendue contradiction entre les mots en question et les autres stipulations de la police d'assurance.
faut nicessairement pour que ces mots aient 6t6 ill6galement introduits dans la police d'assurance de l'appelante qu'ils constituent un changement aux conditions statutaires pro- CJ. prement dites et qu'ils n'y aient pas t6 imprimes en caractbres voyants et en encre d'une couleur diff~rente.
Ce n'est certainement pas 1'article 7 des conditions statutaires avec lequel 'on pourrait dire que les mots en discussion entrent en conflit. Je n'ai mime pas besoin de le reproduire, car cela est 6vident.
Ce n'est pas, non plus, a Particle 8 des conditions statutaires que les mots incriminds comportent une d6rogation.
Cet article est A l'effet que la compagnie d'assurance n'est pas responsable de la perte, s'il y a quelque autre assurance antirieure dans une autre compagnie "A moins que le consentement de la compagnie h cet effet n'apparaisse dans la police ou au dos de la police . . . ou A moins que la compagnie n'ait fait d6faut de s'y opposer par 6crit dans les deux semaines apres avoir regu un avis par erit de l'intention ou du d6sir d'effectuer l'assurance subs6quente, ou ne s'oppose par 6crit apris ce temps, mais avant que
1'assurance subsiquente ou additionnelle soit effectude."
Or, en l'espice, le consentement de la compagnie d'assurance h augmenter ou h diminuer le montant total des assurances est clairement pr6vu dans les clauses de la police de l'appelante. Mais, d'ailleurs, ce serait une objection ou une d6fense qui appartiendrait A la compagnie d'assurance appelante et ce ne serait sfirement pas l'assurbe qui pourrait invoquer une pareille contravention au contrat--si cette contravention existait-dont elle se serait elle-mame rendue coupable. De toute fagon, je ne vois pas en quoi les mots
"et qui n'est pas autrement assur" pourraient venir en conflit avec cet article 8.
Il reste Particle 9 qui pourvoit que dans le cas une autre assurance aurait eti prise sur la propri6t6 d6crite, au cas oil telle autre assurance serait encore en vigueur au moment de la perte, chaque compagnie d'assurance n'est responsable que pour sa part ou sa proportion de la perte ou du dommage, sans tenir compte des dates des diffirentes polices d'assurance.
Je continue de me demander en quoi 1'addition des mots "et qui n'est pas autrement assur" vient en conflit avec cet article des conditions statutaires.
L'on pretend que de l'insertion de ces mots enleve a chaque compagnie c. et, en particulier, h 1'intimbe, je suppose, le droit d'exiger le paiement de sa part par les autres compagnies. Que 1'on remarque bien qu'il s'agit d'une "autre assurance sur la propri6t6 d~crite dans la police", c'est-h-dire, sur la mime propri6t6.
Je ne me demande pas si les autres compagnies d'assurance qui avaient 6mis une police semblable h celle de l'appelante, auraient pu pritendre que c'6tait lh une dirogation h Particle
La question ne se pose pas, bien qu'il est juste de faire remarquer que chacune des six autres compagnies d'assurance a souleve, h l'encontre de la r6clamation de 1'intim6e, la mime objection que l'appelante fait dans le pr6sent appel et que, je le riphte, elles ne se sont soumises qu'A la suite du jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel) qu'elles n'ont pas jug6 A propos de porter devant la Cour Supreme du Canada, ainsi que le fait I'appelante pr6sentement. Mais en quoi 1'intimbe, avec une police d'assurance diff6rente, qui couvre des objets d'art et des meubles dont 1'assur6e elle-m~me a stipul6 que ces objets, 6tant autrement assures, cesseraient d'6tre assures par l'appelante, peut-elle pr6tendre que Particle 9 s'applique A elle? Au moment de la perte, l'intim6e assurait des objets d'art et des meubles pour lesquels elle avait sp6cifiquement assum6 le risque et ces m~mes objets d'art et ces meubles avaient cess6 d'6tre assures, ou avaient 6t6 soustraits h la police d'assurance de 1'appelante, par l'acte de 1'assur6e elle-m~me. C'est cette dernibre qui a jug6 h propos d'assurer sp6cialement les objets d'art et les meubles en question et qui avait stipuld que, d~s le moment oft elle les assurait autrement, l'appelante cesserait d'en 6tre responsable par le fait qu'ils 6taient autrement assures.
De toute fagon, je m'accorde avec les jugements dissidents de MM. les Juges St-Jacques et Hyde et, en r6alit6, je ne fais vraiment que r6affirmer les arguments et les motifs contenus dans ces jugements. Je suis mime impressionn6 par ce passage des raisons de M. le juge Casey, qui a sign6 le jugement formel de la Cour, et qui se lit comme suit: Bien respectueusement, du moment que l'on conchde que les mots "autrement assur"
limitent le risque, il m'est impossible de suivre le savant juge dans sa conclusion. Si les mots cit6s limitent le risque, dis lors ils font partie de la description du risque, et "tout ce qui, lors de l'incendie, se trouvait dans les immeubles et qui 6tait autrement assur6"-a savoir, assur6 par la compagnie intim6e-n'6tait pas assur6 par la compagnie appelante.
Et il est important de se rendre compte a quelle consquence nous conduirait la pr6tention de l'intimbe et le jugement dont est fait appel. Cela 6quivaudrait ni plus ni moins h dire que l'appelante pourrait 6tre appel6e h contribuer h la perte d'effets qu'elle n'assurait pas.
Pour toutes ces raisons, j'en viens done h la conclusion que I'appel doit 6tre maintenu et que 1'action de 1'intim6e doit 6tre rejet6e, avec d~pens, dans toutes les Cours. J.:-Plusieurs de mes colligues, dont j'ai 1'avantage de lire les notes, ont rapport6 les faits de cette cause. II serait en cons6quence superflu de les exposer au complet de nouveau.
Je d6sire cependant ajouter les considerations suivantes pour lesquelles, je crois que l'appel qui nous est sounis doit 6tre maintenu.
Les polices 6mises contre le feu, au b6n6fice de La Corporation des ecoles Techniques ou Professionnelles de Montr6al, qui comprend '11cole du Meuble, l'ont t6 par les compagnies suivantes:- Ces compagnies ont assum l'obligation d'indemniser PHENIX
P'assur~e contre 1'incendie, mais leur risque 6tait limith V. ' $150,000 sur les immeubles et ' $100,000 sur leur contenu, Fa INs. o. et la responsabilit6 de chacune 6tait proportionnelle au Taschereau J. montant de la police. I a t6 convenu entre l'assur6e et les compagnies d'assurance, dans des polices redigees de fagon identique, que la Corporation s'engageait h maintenir "en vigueur une assurance de mime forme, teneur et port6e au montant total de $250,000, divis6 A raison de $150,000 sur les bitiments et de $100,000 sur le contenu." En outre, I'assur~e a t autoris~e "A augmenter ou ' diminuer le montant total de ses assurances sans en avertir les assureurs; ceux-ci renongant au pr6avis pour toute assurance souscrite ant6rieurement ou postbrieurement au pr6sent contrat."
Toutes ces polices sont ce que l'on est convenu d'appeler des "blanket policies", ou si l'on aime mieux des polices susceptibles de fluctuations ou de changements et qui couvrent des biens en g6n6ral, plut8t que des biens sp6cifiques et d6termin6s. (Black, Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 226).
Les clauses 8 et 9 des conditions statutaires de ces polices se lisent ainsi:
8. La compagnie n'est pas responsable de la perte, s'il y a quelqu'autre assurance antrieure dans une autre compagnie, A moins que le consentement de la compagnie A cet effet n'apparaisse dans la police on au dos de la police, ou si quelqu'autre assurance subs6quente est effectu6e par une autre compagnie, A moins et avant que la compagnie n'y consente, ou A moins que la compagnie n'ait fait d6faut de s'y opposer par 6crit dans les deux semaines apres avoir revu un avis par 6crit de l'intention ou du disir d'effectuer l'assurance subsiquente, ou ne s'oppose par 6crit aprbs ce temps mais avant que l'assurance subs6quente on additionnelle soit effectude.
9. Dans le cas il y a eu consentement comme suadit A toute autre assurance sur la propri6t6 d~crite dans cette police, cette compagnie, si telle autre assurance reste en vigueur, advenant une perte ou un dommage, n'est responsable que du paiement d'une partie proportionnelle de cette perte ou de ce dommage sans 4gard aux dates des diff6rentes polices.
Il r6sulte de ceci que l'assur6e devait toujours maintenir ses polices a $250,000, "de mimes force, teneur et port6e", qu'elle avait le droit de les augmenter, mais de ne jamais les r6duire a un niveau plus bas que celui stipul6, qu'elle pouvait agir ainsi sans donner avis it ses assureurs par suite du consentement 6crit de ces derniers, et que dans le cas d'incendie, toutes les compagnies d'assurance, m~me celles qui avaient 6mis des polices subs6quentes, 6taient tenues proportionnellement au paiement des pertes, sans As 6gard A la date des polices.
Or, il est arriv4 que la Corporation des tcoles TechniquesTahereu J. ou Professionnelles de Montr6al, quelque temps apres s'tre assurde avec les compagnies pric6demment mentionn6es, a fait 6mettre par l'intim6e, La Travelers Fire Insurance Company, une nouvelle police couvrant jusqu'h concurrence de $10,000, les effets suivants:- A Apris un incendie, dont les dommages se sont 6lev6s A $76,852.14, survenu le 2 juin 1940, les comptes ont 6t payis et I'intim6e a d6bours6 la somme de $7,070.53 pour les effets qu'elle avait assur6s. Elle a r6clam6 de la Compagnie Frangaise du Ph6nix, en vertu de la clause 9 des conditions statutaires, sa proportion du risque, soit $1,939.85 plus les interts, ce qui forme un montant supdrieur A $2,000, n6cessaire pour donner juridiction A cette Cour. Cette r6clamation a 6t6 rejetge par la Cour Sup6rieure, mais maintenue par la Cour d'Appel (1), MM. les juges St-Jacques et Hyde 4tant dissidents.
L'intimbe, qui a pay6 en totalit6 la somme de $7,070.53, a t6 subrog6e dans les droits .de l'assur6e contre ses coassureurs, mais nous n'avons A consid6rer que sa r6clamation contre 1'appelante-d6fenderesse.
Celle-ci invoque 1'une des clauses de la police qu'elle a 6mise et qui par l'op6ration de la subrogation limiterait les droits de 1'appelante a ceux de 1'assur6e.
Cette clause est A l'effet que La Compagnie Frangaise du Ph6nix assure le contenu des immeubles de La Corporation des ecoles Techniques ou Professionnelles, mais est exclu du risque, "tout ce qui n'est pas autrement assur6."
L'appelante pretend que les "objets d'art de l'Icole du Meuble", 6tant assur6s par la police de la Travelers Fire Insurance, il en r6sulterait que l'appelante ne pourrait 6tre appel6e de mgme que ses co-assureurs A partager proportionnellement avec l'intim6e qui seule aurait assum6 ce risque.
Je m'accorde avec cette pritention, non pas parce qu'il existe une autre police d'assurance emise par la Travelers, TAvEB qu'en vertu des polices I'assurge avait incontestablement le droit de prendre, mais parce qu'il existe une police que celles d6jh 6mises, et qu'en consequence, 1'assur6e est "autrement assurde" aux termes memes de la police qui limite ainsi les obligations de l'appelante. "Autrement assurde" a n6cessairement le sens de "diff6remment assur6e."
Les compagnies d'assurance ont voulu, et c'est le risque qu'elles ont assume en consideration de la prime qui leur a 6t6 vers~e, que des polices de "mmes forme, teneur et port6e", que celles 6mises par elles, atteignent toujours la somme de $250,000 avec permission de d~passer ce montant. II 6tait done essentiel que chaque police additionnelle, pour qu'intervienne la responsabilit6 proportionnelle, soit une police g6ndrale (blanket policy).
Lorsque, comme c'6tait son droit, 1'assur6e a fait 6mettre une police additionnelle sur des biens "sp6cifiques", comme dans le cas qui nous occupe, les effets assur6s sont devenus "autrement" c'est-h-dire "diff6remment assures" et ont cess6 de faire partie du risque couvert par 1'appelante. Ils en ont t6 soustraits par la volont6 mime des parties contractantes. Il est rationnel qu'il en soit ainsi, et que les quatre .compagnies d'assurance qui ont 6mis les premibres polices, -consentent a partager le risque avec d'autres compagnies *qui 6mettent des polices identiques, mais refusent de le faire avec d'autres qui assurent hors leur connaissance, les biens d'une fagon dif6rente. C'est pr6cisdment pour cela qu'on y insbre cette clause qui exclut les objets "autrement assures."
Ignorer ces mots serait les effacer de la police. Il faut n6cessairement leur donner un sens. Le pouvoir qui est donn6 h l'assurie d'augmenter ses assurances g6n6rales, ne vient nullement en conflit avec la clause qui exempte de responsabilit6 les assureurs des biens "autrement assur6s."
Comme second moyen 'intimbe invoque Particle 241 de la Loi des assurances, c. 299, S.R.Q. 1941, qui se lit ainsi:- C'est la pr6tention de l'intim6e qu'il y a eu une variation des conditions statutaires, qui ne lie pas l'assurie, parce qu'on aurait omis d'indiquer en encre de couleur diff~rente que l'assureur, pour les biens "autrement assures" ne participera pas proportionnellement dans le cas d'incendie. Je suis d'opinion que ce moyen est non fond6, car il ne s'agit pas d'une condition, mais plut6t d'une limitation de responsabilit6.
C'est une description des biens assur6s qu'on a voulu faire et ga a 6t6 I'intention des parties de d6terminer la quantit6 et l'identit4 des objets que la police devait couvrir. L'appelante et l'intim6e n'ont pas assur6 les m~mes biens.
ne peut 6tre question de paiement proportionnel.
Enfin, il est inutile, h cause de ma conclusion, d'examiner la question de savoir si le transfert avec subrogation, obtenu par la demanderesse-intimbe 6tait suffisant pour la justifier d'instituer la pr6sente action.
L'appel doit done 6tre maintenu, et l'action rejet6e avec d6pens de toutes les cours.
The dissenting judgment of Kellock and Fauteux JJ. was delivered by
J.:-The policy here in question was issued February 7, 1940, by the appellant in a form common to a number of other policies issued concurrently therewith by companies underwriting a total sum of $250,000, of which $150,000 was on buildings and $100,000 on their PHENI contents, the share of this insurance taken by the appellant being $150,000.
The relevant provisions, which I have FIE INS. numbered for convenience of reference, are as follows: Kellock J.
S100,000. Sur le contenu des bAtiments d4crits A. Particle pr6cident et sur les choses d~crites ci-apris sous le titre "contenu" se trouvant dans un rayon de 50 pieds de ceux-ci.
1. L'on entendra par contenu: tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assur6 . .
. .
(This is followed by an enumeration including therein articles which would otherwise have been excluded from the coverage by statutory condition 7.)
2. L'assurance portera sur ce qui appartient , l'assurbe, sur les choses qui, vendues, n'auraient pas encore 6t6 livrdes et sur celles qui lui sont confides A titre de commissionnaire, de consignataire ou pour rdparation et enfin, sur tout ce dont elle peut 8tre tenue responsable.
3. L'assurance portera 6galement sur les choses que l'assurde achhte A temp6rament et sur lesquelles elle a un droit de d6tenteur pricaire, sous condition suspensive en vertu du contrat de vente portant que le titre de propridt6 reviendra A l'assur6e une fois le prix entibrement pay6. 4. L'assurde s'engage A6 maintenir en vigueur une assurance de mimes forme, teneur et port6e au montant total de $250,000, divis6 A raison de $150,000 sur les bAtiments et de $100,000 sur le contenu. Si elle ne se conforme pas A cette convention, I'assur6e deviendra co-assureur pour le dficit.
5. L'assur4e est autoris6e:
a) A6 augmenter ou h diminuer le montant total de ses assurances sans en avertir les assureurs; ceux-ci renongent au pr6-avis pour toute assurance souscrite ant6rieurement ou postirieurement au pr6sent contrat.
Cette pr6rogative ne libbre pas l'assurde, cependant, de la convention relative au montant minimum d'assurance mentionn6 pr6c6demment.
The position, of the appellant is that the words "qui n'est pas autrement assure in para. 1 form part of the description of the risk and that as, at the time of the loss, part of the contents were insured under the respondent's policy, such goods ceased to be covered by the policy of the appellant, with the result that the latter is under no obligation to contribute to the loss. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that its policy was issued within the permission provided for by para. 5 and that, by reason of statutory condition 9, the appellant is liable for a rateable proportion of the loss and that the language in para. 1 upon which the appellant relies, cannot be given effect as against the statutory condition.
It is undoubted that the words, the meaning of which is in dispute, viz. "qui n'est pas autrement assur", taken alone, might very well be considered to come within the principle of such a case as London Assurance Co. v. Great Northern Transit Co. (1), as forming part of the description of the risk, with the result for which the appellant contends.
In Republic Fire Ins. Co. v. Strong (2), a case in this court, not reported in the regular reports, the policy provided that
It was held that under such a policy there could be no contribution. The coverage according to its terms, applied only after all other insurance had been paid.
Coming back to the case in hand, if a policy were written so as to provide coverage only until or so long as the property insured should not be covered by any other insurance, a clause in such a policy giving the assured permission to effect other insurance could have no relevancy, to say nothing, for the moment, as to a clause permitting the assured to "increase" his insurance.
An insurer whose policy is to cease to cover upon any other insurance being effected on the insured property has no interest in giving permission to his assured to effect other insurance.
Such permission is only relevant to prevent the avoidance, by the operation of statutory condition 8, of the existing insurance if further insurance is effected.
But under a policy such as I am now considering, that result would be effected by the terms of the policy itself.
Accordingly, a provision that the policy will cease to attach if other insurance is effected, and a provision in the same policy that the assured may "increase" his insurance, assuming, as it does, that the policy which contains that permission will continue, are prima facie antagonistic. It is therefore necessary, in the case at bar, to scrutinize these provisions to see if the repugnancy may be resolved.
The words "autrement assur6" which, according to Larousse, are the equivalent of "d'une autre fagon assur6," considered apart from any context, are capable of more . than one meaning, namely, that the interest of the assured is not already insured; (2) will not be insured by any other insurer at the time of loss; (3) will not be covered by insurance taken out at the instance of any other person. The appellant contends for still another meaning, namely, that, as put in its factum,
This contention is explained to mean that if at the time of any loss there is in existence any other insurance effected by the assured on the goods which does not cover the entire contents and which is not of the same "forme, teneur et portie" as the appellant's policy, the goods, or any specific part of them so covered, will be "autrement assur6" within the meaning of the appellant's policy and not covered thereby.
This meaning for which the appellant contends is not, as already pointed out, a meaning which the words in question bear when taken by themselves without a context. Such a result is only to be reached by reading into para. 1 words which are not there, but which are to be found only in para. 4. To reach such a result it is necessary for the appellant, as it does, to contend further that the same words are also to be read into para. 5 so as to qualify the permission provided by that paragraph.
Unless the clear language of para. 5 is to be thus modified, this whole contention falls. There are, in my view, a number of reasons why the contention cannot be accepted.
In the first place, unlike the words in question in para. 1, which are capable of more than meaning, the language used in para. 5 is perfectly clear and proceeds on the basis that if the permission which it contains is acted upon, either in the continuance of insurance already existing upon the goods at the date of issue of appellant's policy or by the placing of additional insurance, the insurance provided by the appellant's policy and those of the other members of the group will remain in force.
No other effect can be given to the word "augmenter."
Further, the words which Mr. Campbell seeks to read into para. 5 are to be found only in para. 4, and it is to be observed that para. 5 expressly refers to para. 4, but for one purpose only, namely, to make it perfectly clear that the permission given by para. 5 to "diminuer" the total amount of insurance is not to free the assured from the obligation imposed upon him by para. 4, to keep in force insurance to the extent of $100,000 at least. The reference to the latter paragraph has nothing at all to do with
"augmenting" the insurance beyond $100,000.
Again, it is to be observed that the notice which is dispensed with by para. 5 is notice with respect to "any"
insurance, even though already in existence. As paras. 1 to 5 inclusive are not to be found in the standard printed portion of the policy but are specially typed-in clauses, it would be the merest chance that existing insurance at the time the appellant's policy was effected would be found to be of the same "forme, teneur et port6e."
This consideration alone is sufficient to show that the parties had no intention, when providing for renunciation of notice with respect to "toute" insurance, of using that word in any sense other than the word ordinarily bears, namely, that permission was granted to the assured to maintain
"any" existing insurance, whether blanket or covering specific goods only, no matter what the form of the contract.
It follows that the intention was the same with respect to subsequent insurance.
It may be observed also at this point that the same considerations render inapt the first two possible meanings of the language of para. 1 set out above.
Mr. Campbell argues, however, that the respondent, by its act in effecting the respondent's policy, adopted the construction of the appellant's policy for which he contends.
Mr. Campbell says that the respondent's policy was for the full value of the specific property to which it applied and that the assured thus recognized that the appellant's policy no longer applied to that property.
In considering this contention, it will be convenient to refer first to the other insurance effected by the assured on May 31, 1940, on specific property, namely, the policy for $3,000 in the Phoenix of London upon property loaned to the assured by a number of named firms for exhibition purposes. The actual loss with respect to this last-mentioned property due to the fire in question, which occurred on June 1940, was $5,248.19.
It would appear hardly likely that the assured, in effecting a policy for only $3,000 on this property, did so with the intention that he would thereby bring about a situation in which the policies of the appellant and the other members of the group would cease to attach to this property, thereby causing this property to be uninsured for over forty per cent of its value. I do not think, with respect, that it can be reasonably argued that the assured had any such intention, or that its intention was other than to provide, by the additional insurance, ample coverage in case the protection provided by the group policies should prove insufficient under any circumstances.
It is further to be observed that the Phoenix of London policy was for a term of sixteen days only, and it is hardly likely that it was contemplated there would be any change in the composition of the articles on exhibit during this period.
When one comes to the situation under the respondent's policy, which was issued on February 22, 1940, within approximately two weeks of the appellant's policy, it is to be observed that it was to run for a period of three years, and while the face amount of the policy may have been the value at the date of its issue of the particular goods of that description which were actually on the premises at that time. The itemized list formed no part of the policy delivered to the assured, and the description of the property insured was not limited to particular items then on the premises, but was a coverage generally of
These collections might run to much more or much less in value than $10,000 as the composition thereof might change from time to time within the three-year period. In these circumstances, I am unable, with respect, to see any ground upon which a court could be asked to find that the assured had "adopted" a construction of the appellant's policy which, for reasons already given, that policy cannot on its own language reasonably bear.
It is further suggested that the permission granted by para. 5 may be restricted to additional insurance on the buildings only, and thus bring about a result under which the paragraph does not come in any way in conflict with the language of para. 1 with respect to contents. In my opinion, it is sufficient to say that para. 5 does not purport to be limited to additional insurance on buildings and the appellant does not so contend.
As to the suggestion that the "montant total" would be increased if specific insurance were placed on some items, with the result that the appellant's insurance remained on the remainder, this may be true enough, but the idea behind the paragraph is that if the permission is acted upon the result will be, in all cases, more protection for the assured, not less.
The Phoenix of London policy affords a good example. When it was effected the total insurance on the contents became $103,000, but under the appellant's contention, the result was that $2,542 value became uninsured. Such a situation might well be aggravated if further insurance were placed on other specific goods. Moreover, had the Phoenix of London policy covered all the contents, instead of being limited to part only, the result, according to the argument of the appellant, would have been that the appellant and its group would have ceased to be on the risk, and the assured would have been left with $3,000 insurance only.
To be consistent, Mr. Campbell was obliged to go, and did go, this far. Thus, in seeking to "augment" his total insurance with the permission granted by para. 5 so to do, the assured would have actually reduced his protection almost to the vanishing point. The parties might, of course, have so contracted, but only, in my view, by clear words not to be found at all in para. 5 as it stands. Such a result can, in my opinion, be reached only by reading into the paragraph words which are not there, in violation of the fundamental canon of construction applicable to a contract of this nature, namely, that it is to be construed contra proferentem.
With respect to the third of the possible meanings of the words "autrement assur" set out above, paras. 2 and 3 of the appellant's policy are relevant. Under their provisions the insurance is to extend to everything belonging to the assured, as well as to goods which it has sold but not delivered and goods in its possession on consignment or for repair or on any basis involving responsibility on the part of the assured for them. The insurance is also to cover goods bought on "conditional sale" contracts. In any of these situations where the assured would not have an absolute title, it might very well be that, in many instances, insurance would have been placed on the goods by the other persons interested in them, such as, for instance, by an unpaid vendor. It is not unusual in such circumstances for an unpaid vendor in his insurance to cover also the interest of the purchaser in the goods. An example of such a situation is afforded by the circumstances in Keefer v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1).
It may very well have been in the contemplation of the parties in the case at bar that the appellant's policy should not apply in similar circumstances so as to oblige the appellant and the other members of the group to contribute in any way to indemnify the assured when its interest would be covered by such other insurance. This view of the language of para. 1 acquires additional strength from the fact that under para. 5 it is "I'assurie" who is authorized to augment or diminish the total amount of "ses assurances."
This is a reasonable construction of the language used, and when the policy is so construed all its provisions are brought into harmony. If for any reason, however, this is not the true view, the result, in my opinion, is that the ambiguous words to be found in para. 1 cannot stand with the clear language actually used in para. 5, and being repugnant thereto, they fall to the ground. It is impossible to write out of the policy the clear provisions of para. 5 or to amend it so as to give to the ambiguous words of para. 1 the meaning for which the appellant contends. The insurance provided by the respondent's policy, therefore, being authorized by the terms of para. 5, it came within the words "any other insurance on the property herein described" (that is, described in the appellant's policy) in statutory condition 9, and the appellant is bound to contribute rateably with respect to the loss. The appellant next contends that the respondent was in any event not entitled to sue, as the "subrogation" in writing. is signed only by the president of the assured, whereas the incorporating statute, 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 4, prescribes as follows:
Assuming that this contention is well taken, the Government of the Province of Quebec, to whom the loss is payable under the policy, is also a party, and the document as executed was authorized by Order in Council. In Guerin v. Manchester (1), it was held that a party to whom, as in the case at bar, loss under a fire insurance policy is payable, is entitled to sue and that this right of action may be assigned. In the case at bar, the provisions of Articles 1570 and 1571 of the Civil Code were met, so that the appellant is in a position to maintain its action claiming through the Government of the Province, regardless of any defect in his title as claiming through the assured; Bank of Toronto v. St. Lawrence Fire Ins. Co. (2). I think, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.:-La Corporation des Pcoles Techniques ou Professionnelles, the insured, entered into contracts of insurance, identical in terms, with the appellant and several other companies on February 7, 1940, for a total insurance of $250,000, apportioned $150,000 upon the buildings and $100,000 on the contents. The appellant's share was $150,000.
On February 22, 1940, the insured entered into a contract of insurance with the respondent in the sum of $10,000 on the "Objets d'Art et des meubles faisant partie des collections du mus6e de l'Icole du Meuble, . . . ." (hereinafter referred to as "objets d'art").
These were a part of the contents of the building and initially included under the appellant's policy.
On June 2, 1940, a fire occurred by which the insured suffered a total loss of $83,922.67 in respect of both buildings and contents. The loss of the "objets d'art," etc., as insured by the respondent, totalled $7,070.53. The respondent paid the full amount and, as the appellant denied any liability to pay a pro rata share, this action is brought to PERNIX recover that share in the sum of $1,939.85.
If liability be Tnsviin found, the amount of $1,939.85 is not contested.
FIRE 1NS.
The learned trial judge dismissed the action. The EsteyJ. majority of the Appellate Court (1), Mr. Justice St-Jacques and Mr. Justice Hyde dissenting, allowed the appeal. The appellant's policy provided:
L'on entendra
1' par bitiments: les immeubles mgmes, leurs annexes et allonges communicantes, les couloirs reliant les bitiments, les chemin6es et le tunnel, et tout aminagement fixe 6 l'int6rieur et h l'ext6rieur.
. 2* par contenu: tout ce qui se trouve dans les immeubles et qui n'est pas autrement assurA.
A titre indicatif seulement: l'ameublement, les livres, les cauvres d'art, les objets ex6cutis ou en voie d'ex6cution, . . . . les objets exclus par Particle 7 des conditions statutaires reproduites dans Ia police et, enfin, les effets et les choses appartenant aux et aux professeurs.
The appellant contends that, by virtue of the words "qui n'est pas autrement assur6," when the respondent placed its insurance on "objets d'art" these "objets" were no longer covered by its policy.
The respondent contends that appellant consented to this further insurance within the meaning of Statutory Conditions Nos. 8 and 9 and, therefore, the appellant and its co-insurers must pay a pro rata share of the loss; that, in so far as the words "qui n'est pas autrement assur" be relied upon to prevent that result, they constitute a variation of Condition No. 9 which, not being endorsed on the policy in conspicuous type and in ink of different colour, as required by s. 241 of the Insurance Act (R.S.Q. 1941, c. 299), is not binding upon the insured.
The appellant's policy also provided:
L'assuree s'engage & maintenir en vigueur une assurance de mgmes forme, teneur et port6e au montant total de $250,000, divis4 & raison de $150,000 sur les bitiments et de $100,000 sur le contenu. . Bi elle ne se conforme pas A cette convention, Fassur6e deviendra co-assureur pour le dificit.
This policy further provided:
L'assur~e est autoris6e:
a) & augmenter ou I diminuer le montant total de ses assurances sans en avertir les assureurs; ceux-ci renoncent au priavis pour toute assurance souscrite antrieurement ou postdrieurement au prisent contrat.
Cette prdrogative ne lib6rera pas 'aassur6e, cependant, de Ia convention relative au montant minimum d'assurance mentionn6 pr&c6demment.
(1) Q.R. [1951] K.B. 224.
The relevant paragraphs in the appellant's policy quoted above are, for convenience, hereinafter referred to as paras. 1, 2 and 3. The words "bAtiments" and "contenu," in the first paragraph, are described with such particularity as to leave no doubt but that they were prepared in a manner to justify the adoption of Lord Watson's view that they should be regarded as "the deliberate act of both parties."
Birrell v. Dryer (1).
The possibility of further insurance upon both buildings and contents, or either, was obviously present to the minds of the parties as they completed the contracts of insurance of which the appellant's is one. Only in relation to the contents did they adopt the words "qui n'est pas autrement assur"
and make them part of the sentence describing the subject matter and the peril insured. Though expressed in the past tense, the parties have construed these words as referring to insurance to be subsequently placed. As insurer, the appellant has so construed these words, at least from the moment this claim was made. That the insured so construed them from the outset is evidenced by the fact that within fifteen days after the appellant's policy became effective it insured the "objets d'art" up to their full insurable value. A few months later, May 31, 1940, the insured entered into a still further contract of insurance with the Phoenix Assurance Company, Limited of London, England, upon certain contents loaned to the institution. At the time the appellant's policy was taken out there was no other insurance upon the property.
It should also be noted that the respondent has brought this action on the basis that these words applied to subsequent insurance and has so contended throughout this litigation.
When the parties are in agreement as to the meaning of a provision, a court, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, should construe the document in accord therewith.
Adolph Lumber Company v. Meadow Creek Lumber Company (2), Forbes v. Watt (3); Pollock on
Contracts, 13th Ed., 373.
On the basis of this construction, and leaving aside, for PHENIX the moment, the respondent's contention, the position here TrAm.ERs is not unlike that where the steamer "Baltic" was insured PIu Co. against fire "whilst running on the inland lakes, rivers and Estey J.
canals during the season of navigation" and when "laid up in a place of safety during winter months from any extra hazardous building."
The ship had been laid up for a period of approximately three years prior to the fire and it was held that in that circumstance the ship was not covered.
Mr. Justice Sedgewick wrote the judgment of the Court and stated:
The stipulation in question is in no sense a condition but rather a description of the subject matter insured. It is descriptive of and has reference solely to the risk covered by the policy and not to the happening of an event which by the statutory conditions would render the policy void. The statute, therefore, does not apply.
The London Assurance Corporation v. The Great Northern Transit Company (1).
Where the policies insuring ten houses contained a provision "while occcupied by . . .
. as a dwelling-house," it was held that if, at the time of the loss, one of the houses was unoccupied or otherwise used, it was not covered. While vacant, as they were for many months prior to, and at the time of, the fire because of failure to rent them, the houses in respect of which it has been held that the plaintiffs cannot recover did not answer the description of the subject matter in the policy and were therefore not covered by the insurance.
Mr. Justice Anglin (later C.J.) in Ross v. Scottish Union and National Insurance Company (2).
In a fire insurance policy the words "only while the premises are occupied as a private dwelling" were held to be words of description. Riddell J.A. stated:
Unless there is something in the policy itself or in the legislation to take the present out of the authority of the cases cited, the company have a perfect defence, as the building at the time of the fire was not ,'occupied as a private dwelling," it was not occupied at all . . . . what suggested as such is not a stipulation at all, it is part of the description of the property insured as the cases cited above conclusively compel us to hold.
Cooper v. Toronto Casualty Ins. Co. (3).
(1) (1899) 29 Can. S.C.R. 577
(2) (1918) 58 Can. S.C.R. at 584.
169 at 179.
(3) [19281 2 D.L.R. 1007 at 1008.
See also Schmidt v. Home Insurance Co. (1).
The contract of insurance must describe the property and the risk or peril insured against. It was the "Baltic," not at all times, but as described in the policy, that constituted the subject matter and the peril insured against. Estey J. In the same manner it was the houses only while occupied. These are distinguishable from those cases where there is a description of the property and the peril and then, in the contract, a provision that the risk will be varied or altered by the failure on the part of the insured to maintain or observe an undertaking on its part. In W. Malcolm Mackay Company v. British America Assurance Company (2), the policy insuring lumber against loss or damage by fire contained the following clause:
Duff J. (later C.J.) stated at p. 344:
See also St. Paul Lumber Company, Limited v. British Crown Assurance Corporation, Limited (3); Fidelity- Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York v. McPherson (4); Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gregory .(5).
Parties are at liberty to select the subject matter and peril to be insured. In so far as the words chosen constitute a part of the description, they are not, under the foregoing authorities, a stipulation within the meaning of s. 240 of the Quebec Insurance Act. In appellant's policy, that portion of the description here in question reads: The last portion of this sentence is an essential part of the description and, as such, does not constitute a stipulation within the meaning of s. 240. In the Cooper case supra Mr. Justice Middleton expressed his disapproval of this distinction and suggested legislative action. Ontario thereafter amended its s. 106(1), corresponding to s. 240 of the Quebec Act, by adding thereto the words:
1929 S. of 0., c. 53, s. 12(1).
This amendment was considered in Renshaw v. Phoenix Insurance Company (1).
Section 240 of the Quebec Act does not contain a provision similar in effect to that contained in the Ontario amendment of 1929.
The foregoing constitutes an answer to the respondent's contention which may be summarized as follows:
When, on February 22, 1940, the respondent's policy became effective, the coverage under the appellant's policy upon the same contents was automatically removed. There never was a moment when the appellant's and respondent's policies covered the same contents. That was the position at the time of the loss and, therefore, the provisions of Conditions 8 and 9, which contemplate at the time of the loss an enforceable coverage of the same property, have no relevancy. Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Gavel (2). The parties hereto do not agree as to the effect of the consent to further insurance provided for in para. 3. The appellant sought to restrict its meaning to only those policies which are "de m~mes forme, teneur et port6e" as its own.
The respondent, however, contends that the provisions of para. 3 are sufficiently comprehensive to apply to its policy.
The respondent's view relative to the construction of para. 3 is more in accord with the language used. This para. 3 is phrased in rather general terms and the words "le montant total de ses assurances" do not suggest they are limited in their application to "(le) montant total de $250,000" in para. 2 and do not import into para. 3 the words "de mimes forme, teneur et portie" from para. 2. The language of para. 3 appears sufficiently comprehensive to cover the appellant's consent to respondent's policy. If, however, we assume, as the respondent contends, that the appellant, by virtue of para. 3, consented to the former's policy, that does not alter the position. The language of both policies, including the words "qui n'est pas autrement assur6,"
notwithstanding the consent, remains the same. In the result, the consent, in relation to respondent's policy, is of no effect and may be looked upon as surplus. This construction does not involve any repugnancy between paras. 1 and 3. Even if these paragraphs be construed in a manner that recognizes some repugnancy, that construction should be avoided, if reasonably possible.
Here the language of para. 1 is specific, while that of para. 3 is general. If the general terms of the latter be construed not to apply to the words "qui n'est pas autrement assur6," thereby avoiding the suggested repugnancy, that should be done, particularly if consistent with the intention of the parties as disclosed in relation to the contract as a whole. As stated in the oft-quoted maxim of Bacon, Rule 10:
Moreover, the parties to a contract must be presumed to have attributed a meaning and purpose to its several parts which, when read together, constitute a complete consistent contract and, therefore, repugnancy should be, if reasonably possible, avoided.
This construction, which so limits the general words of para. 3, appears to be most in accord with the intention of the parties, as it would appear they never intended, by this general provision, to contradict the specific words "qui n'est pas autrement assur6."
Moreover, this construction does not nullify nor indeed eliminate the necessity for para. The parties, as they completed appellant's contract, would contemplate other insurance in general which would include other policies on the buildings only, or upon the buildings and contents, in language identical to that of the appellant, or otherwise. It is clear that the consent in para. 3 would have meaning and effect as to some of these and it is unnecessary here to construe its precise effect in relation to all of them. It is sufficient to observe its effect in relation to the respondent's policy in question in this litigation.
It should be noted that under the appellant's policy the total coverage throughout remained the same. When the respondent's policy became effective it alone covered the contents therein specified, but, by virtue of the appellant's policy remaining in total the same, there was a larger coverage upon the contents.
The policy with the Phoenix Assurance
Company, Limited of London, England, placed by the insured on certain borrowed chattels was not equal to the full insurable value of this borrowed property. It was the right of the insured to place such amount thereon as it might decide and no conclusion can be drawn therefrom such as in the respondent's policy, which covered the specified contents up to their full insurable value. The appellant did make an ex gratia payment on account of the loss suffered by the insured, but neither this nor the foregoing circumstance is of assistance in determining the issues raised in this litigation.
The words "qui n'est pas autrement assure are a part of the sentence describing the subject matter and peril insured. They limit or qualify that subject matter or peril, but are nevertheless a part of the description.
They are not, in this policy, a stipulation contrary to any provision, or any variation, addition or omission to Statutory Conditions 8 and 9 within the meaning of s. 240 of the Quebec Insurance Act.
The appeal is allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- ss. 240
- 241
- s. 4
- 241 of the Quebec Insurance Act
- section 115
- s. 241 of the Insurance Act
- s. 240 of the Quebec Insurance Act
- s. 240
- s. 106(1)
- s. 240 of the Quebec Act
- s. 12(1)
- Section 240 of the Quebec Act