City of Montreal v. Salaison Maisonneuve Ltée

THE CITY OF MONTREAL (Defen- APPELLANT; dant) .........................

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*Dec.10,11 *Apr. 1 SALAISON MAISONNEUVE LIMITIE

RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE OF QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF

Municipal Corporation-Sewer-Backing up of river waters in sewer- Flooding of premises-Liability-Negligence-Articles 1053, 1054 Civil Code.

Action for damages sustained by the respondent company when an ice jam in the St. Lawrence River, into which the appellant's sewers emptied, caused the contents of the sewers to back up into the respondent's premises. The action was maintained by the trial judge and by a majority in the Court Appeal.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

Per Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau J.:-It doubtful if Article C.C. has any application since the damage was caused by the waters of the St. Lawrence which are not tinder the City's care.

But in any event, the City must be held responsible under Article C.C. for a fault of omission, having neglected to take the necessary precautions to prevent damage, the probability of which it could not ignore. Per Kellock, Estey and Fauteux JJ.:-The damage having been caused by a thing under the care of the City, Article C.C. applies and the City must be held liable since it has failed to bring itself within its exculpatory provision. (City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott applied).

Per Curiam: There was no ground in contract or in law for allowing the expenses incurred by the respondent in having the damages valued by experts.

APPEAL fron the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), affirming, Bissonnette and Bertrand JJ.A. dissenting, the decision of the trial judge and holding the City liable to the respondent when the contents of the City sewers backed up into his prenises.

Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau, Kellock, Estey and Fanteux JJ.

(1) Q.R. [19521 Q.B. 159; [19521 R.L. 33.

:- J.: J'entretiens des doutes sdrieux sur la question de sayoir dans la cause qui nous est soumise, 1'article 1054 C.C. trouve son application et, si pour arriver a une juste solution, nous devons 6tre guid6s par les principes qui ont t6 affirmis par cette Cour et le comit6 judiciaire du Conseil Priv6, dans Ia cause de la Ville de Montrial v. Watt & Scott Limited (1).

Dans cette cause, il a 6t6 d6cid6 que la responsabilit6 de Ia Ville de Montr6al 6tait engag6e en vertu de Particle 1054 C.C., mais les faits se prbsentaient sous un aspect diffirent. Les eaux qui avaient d6bord6 et avaient inond6 le sous-sol de l'immeuble de 1'intim6e, 6taient des eaux que la Ville avait l'obligation de conduire au fleuve, et dont par cons6quent elle avait le contr8le, comme d'ailleurs, elle avait la garde de son systime d'4gout. Il lui appartenait de d6montrer pour satisfaire aux exigences de 1054 C.C. qu'elle n'avait pu par des moyens raisonnables emp&cher le fait qui avait caus6 dommage. En cela i1 a 6t6 jug6 qu'elle n'avait pas rdussi ' se .d6gager de 'la responsabilit6 que dans des cas semblables, la loi fait peser sur celui qui a la garde et le contr6le d'une chose.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, il semble que la situation p'est pas tout h fait la mime. II est vrai que la Ville est encore propri6taire du systime d'6gout, mais, ce n'est pas ce systime qui a caus6 le dommage.

Comme cette Cour I'a dit dans Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Co. v. Levesque (2), la chose par elle-mime (dans Poccurrence une lampe 6lectrique) n'a rien fait et n'aurait rien pu faire. Difectueuse ou non, sans 1'6lectricit6, laquelle elle a servi de v6hicule, cette lampe 6tait inoffensive.

Et le' Juge Rinfret ajoute:

et Dans la Ville de Montrial v. Watt & Scott, la Cit6 avait le contr6le de l'eau qui a caus6 le dommage, mais dans le cas qui est soumis h la Cour, i1 ne me parait pas que ce soit une chose dont la Ville avait la garde qui soit la causa causans du dommage. Ce sont les eaux du fleuve St-Laurent qui, refoul6es par un embicle vis-h-vis la Ville de Montrial, et dont le niveau s'est substantiellement 61ev6, se sont introduites dans les conduites d'6gout et caus6 l'inondation. Ii y a me semble-t-il une grande similitude entre la pr6sente cause et la cause du Canada & Gulf Terminal. Dans cette dernibre, oii on a refus6 de donner effet aux rigoureuses dispositions de 1'article 1054 C.C., la lampe et le fil qui 6taient la propri~t6 de la d~fenderesse, n'ont 6t6 jug6s que les agents par lesquels le dommage a 6t6 caus6, n'ayant servi qu'A transporter un courant non transform6 de 2,200 volts, propri6t6 d'une autre soci6t6. Ici 1'6gout n'est 6galement qu'un facteur indirect. Il n'a servi qu'h transporter de I'eau dont la Ville n'avait pas la garde, et qu'une force 6trangbre a refoulde.

: Mais ceci ne signifie pas que la Ville doive 6tre absoute de responsabilit6 pour le dommage caus6. Car si elle peut se soustraire h 1'application de 1054 C.C., je suis tout de m me d'opinion qu'elle a commis une faute et qu'elle a l'obligation de ia, reparer en vertu de 1053 C.C. En effet, il ne s'agit pas d'un cas de force majeure.

Des embicles comme celui qui s'est produit ne sont pas impr6visibles, et ce n'est pas le premier dont sont t6moins les citoyens de Montrial. La preuve r6vile qu'il y en a eu d'autres ant6rieurement qui ont causd -de substantiels dommages, et pour pr6venir la r6pitition de ces inondations, la Ville a install un. systeme de valves et de pompes, ineffectives cependant A 1'endroit du dernier embiele.

Ce n'est pas tine d6fense valable pour la Ville de soutenir que c'est la premibre fois qu'un embacle de ce genre se produit ; l'endroit pr6cis celui-ci a occasionn6 le refoulement des eaux. Bien des choses arrivent une premibre fois et n'acquibrent pas pour cela un caractbre d'impr6visibilit6. La Ville pouvait employer, pour 6viter ces inondations, des moyens raisonnables dont d'ailleurs elle a fait usage h d'autres endroits.

Sa fa bilit6 est une faute d'o les pr6cautions necessai elle ne pouvait ignorer tion d'agir a 6t6 fautive.

ute qui doit entrainer sa responsanission.

Elle a n6glig6 de prendre es pour pr6venir un dommage dont 1'6ventualit6 possible. Son absten- Par ses procureurs elle a soutenu que le cotit d'installation de valves et de pompes serait exorbitant et disproportionn6 A ses moyens financiers.

Mais aucune preuve ne le d6montre et aucun chiffre n'a 6t6 fourni pour 6tablir cette pr6tention.

En ce qui concerne le montant de 10 p. 100 du capital accord6 pour payer les honoraires des t6moins experts, dont les services ont 6t6 retenus par l'intimbe, je suis d'opinion de retrancher cet item, et je m'accorde sur ce point avec les raisons de mon colligue M. le Juge Kellock.

Rgalement, je disposerais de cet appel en capital et frais, tel qu'il le propose.

J.:-The judgment at trial in favour of the respondent was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (1) on the ground that the action, tried with a number of others of a similar character, was one to which Art. 1054 C.C. applied and that the appellant had failed to bring itself within its exculpatory provision. In Vandry's case (2), Lord Sumner said at p. 676:

The words "unable to prevent the damage complained of" in the Article mean "unable by reasonable means"; per Lord Dunedin, in Montreal v. Watt and Scott (3).

In that case, which was an action for damage sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the backing up of a city sewer with the consequent flooding of his premises through a private drain connecting with the sewer, it was held that if the rainstorm which had overloaded the sewer could have been described as a cas fortuit or force majeure, and if the appellants had been able to show that they had constructed the sewer of a size sufficient to meet "all reasonable expectations", they would have brought themselves within the terms of the relieving clause. * The standard of what was reasonably to be anticipated which the Board adopted was that laid down by Lord Chelmsford in Great Western Railway Company v. Braid (1), namely:

~MAlso- Their Lordships agreed with the view of Migneault and Anglin JJ. in this court, that the liability of the appellant depended upon Art. 1054 inasmuch as the -damage was caused by "a thing, to wit, the sewer, which was under the control of the appellants."

In my view, although the backing up of the sewer in the case at bar was not due to precipitation but to a rise in the level of the St. Lawrence River, into which the sewer emptied, caused by an ice jam, this fact constitutes no basis upon which the principle upon which the case of Watt and Scott was decided can be said to be inapplicable to the case at bar.

Liability -could, therefore, be discharged by the appellant only by establishing that the -occurrence which caused the backing up of the sewer, was not, on its part, reasonably avoidable.

Not only the majority in the Court of Appeal but the trial judge also, found against the appellant's contention that it had discharged the onus resting upon it. Pratte J., with whom Marchand and Casey JJ. agree, said:

The appellant did not call any evidence to establish, for example, that the physical features of the river in the relevant area were such as to indicate that ice jams were not reasonably to be expected there, but contented itself with relying upon the evidence of two of its employees that no ice jam had, in their experience, occurred in that area until that of 1945. Nor was it shown how much above normal high water mark it was necessary for the river to rise to cause flooding in the cellar of the respondent.

While a cursory glance at the map indicates that those portions of the river in the vicinity of St. Helen's Island and between Longue Pointe and Boucherville Island, where these witnesses stated the river had been blocked by ice on earlier occasions, are somewhat narrower than where the 1945 ice jam occurred, and this is particularly true in the case of the first mentioned location, the fact that the jam of 1945 also occurred in the neighborhood of islands (les Iles Vertes) is not without significance.

In my opinion the situation called upon the appellant to do more than merely say that no trouble had previously occurred in the area in question. That was evidently the view of the courts below. In these circumstances, I agree that the appellant has failed to avoid the liability placed upon it by the Article in question. The appellant also contended that the cost of installing proper means of preventing an occurrence of the kind here in question, such as the installation of valves for shutting off the sewer from the river during a flood and the diversion of the contents into a basin or basins from which they could be pumped directly into the river (a means to which the city had resorted at Delorimier Street after one or more similar experiences in that vicinity), was so excessive as to be outside what should reasonably be demanded of it, particularly as the same means might well have to be installed in connection with other sewers. This does not seem, however, to have been a very serious part -of the appellant's defense as no figure of cost was given in evidence. A figure which included the cost not only of a pump and basin but of a whole new system of sewers in the area affected was given but this evidence is quite valueless for the purpose of the question with which we are here concerned.

With respect to the appellant's contention that the private drain of the respondent should have been fitted by it with a valve which would have automatically operated to prevent the backing up of the contents of the sewer into his premises, it was necessary for the appellant to show that the respondent was guilty of faute in failing to foresee that flooding from such a cause was likely. I do not think this has been made -out on the evidence. It is one thing for the city, the sewers being "under its care", to be expected to have regard to the probability of their being rendered inoperative by a rise in the letel of the river, but quite another thing for a householder to expect that the instrumentality which carries away waste from his property will suddenly become the means of introducing thereto the M river, the nature of the connection of the sewers with which he may, and probably does not, know anything about. On this aspect of the case the facts are different from those in Watt and Scott's case in which, moreover, certain by-laws of the city were put in evidence. This was not done in the case at bar and we were told that the former by-laws had been substantially changed.

With respect, however, to the allowance made in the courts below for the expense incurred by the respondent in qualifying certain witnesses to give evidence as to the damage suffered, I think the appeal should succeed. This item was allowed below on the ground that although not normally recoverable as damages, nevertheless, because of an admission by the appellant and as stated by Pratte J. pas et As to the admission above referred to, however, it was to operate only

To both parties there resulted a saving in expense by reason of the shortening of the trial. However this may be, no ground in law has, in my opinion, been established upon which the respondent is entitled to recover this item of expense.

I would vary the judgment by reducing the amount recoverable to $6,876.

Otherwise the appeal should be dismissed.

The respondent should have four-fifths of its costs in this court and in the Court of Appeal.

In the Superior Court the respondent should have full costs of an action of the appropriate class.

J.:-I am in agreement with my brothers Kellock and Fauteux in the disposition of this appeal.

J.:-Il est av6r6 que V'inondation, end-ommageant la propri~t6 de l'intim6e, r6sulte d'un renversement du cours des eaux dans les 6gouts de la cit6, occasionn6 par une hausse subite du niveau du fleuve, consequence d'un embacle h un point affectant la sortie de 1'6gout de la rue Lasalle.

De tous les Juges ayant eu, jusqu'h ce stage, h consid6rer cette cause, tous, sauf un, en sont venus h la conclusion que les dispositions de 1'article 1054, telles qu'interpr6ties par le Comit6 Judiciaire du Conseil Priv6 dans City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott, Limited (1), s'appliquent h Fespice. Partant de ce principe, la majorit6 de la Cour d'Appel (2) confirma le jugement de premibre instance condamnant la cit6, alors que, d'autre part, les Juges de la minorit6, MM. les Juges Bissonnette et Bertrand, auraient infirm6; 6tant d'opinion, le premier, que la cit6 ne pouvait par l'emploi de moyens raisonnables, risister au fait causant le dommage, et, le second, que le Juge de premibre instance avait mal interpr6t6 les dispositions des articles 1053 et 1054. A l'audition 'devant cette Cour, l'appelante a plaid6 principalement (i) que 1'article 1054 n'a pas d'application en 1'espice et (ii) que si Particle s'applique, la cit6 a prouv6 1'impr6visibilit6 du fait causant le dommage, aussi bien que 1'impossibilit6 a 1'empicher par 1'emploi de moyens raisonnables.

Sur le premier point.

L'appelante soumet que cette cause se distingue de celle de City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott, Limited (supra) et se compare plut6t h celle de Canada and Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Lvesque (3). Pr6cis6e, la position prise par la cit6 est exprim6e comme suit en son factum:- In this case, it is evidently not the sewer system, a thing under the control of the city, which has caused the damage.

It is not either the water which the sewer should normally receive and evacuate. The sewer is built for the purpose of taking care of service waters accumulating in the streets and also in order to assure proper drainage of buildings which are connected to it.

Such water once normally introduced into the sewer may become a thing which the sewer has under its care, which it has accepted to take care of and of which it must keep proper control. If such water so nor- Fauteux J. mally coming into the sewer regurgitates from the sewer to cause damage, it might be well conceived that article should then receive its application ...

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We only emphasize for the moment that the waters of the St. Lawrence river are not a thing under the care of the city and that neither the sewer nor the waters which normally may 'be found in the sewer have been the cause of the damage. On this point, we submit that we may rely on a decision given by this honourable Court in 1928 in re Canada and Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Livesque (supra).

Comme la grande majorit6 des Juges des Cours inf6rieures, il m'est impossible de distinguer cette cause de celle de City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott, Limited. En cette affaire, et h la suite de pluies torrentielles et successives, les eaux capt6es aux entr6es de surface des 6gouts de la cit6 p6n6trbrent dans les caves et y endommagbrent la propri6t6. L'6gout fut trouv6 de dimension insuffisante. Sur la cause du dommage, Lord Dunedin d6clara, ainsi qu'il appert h la page 563:- Their Lordships agree with the majority of the Court in considering that the damage was done by the sewer which was obviously under the control of the appellants.

En i'espce, par suite d'un embicle sur le fleuve, les eaux du Saint-Laurent s'tant 6lev6es h un niveau superieur a celui de la sortie de 1'6gout, y ont p6n6tr6, en empichant ainsi le fonctionnement, i.e. 1'6vacuation des eaux qui normalement devaient s'y trouver, pour ref ouler avec elles dans 1'tablissement de 'intim6e.

Dans City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott, Limited, l'insuffisance du -diam~tre de l'6gout constituait le vice de la chose; dans la pr~sente cause, c'est l'absence de dispositifs susceptilbles d'empicher l'entr6e des eaux du fleuve h la sortie de l'6gout et le renversement du cours normal des eaux dans icelui.

Je ne puis, d'autre part, soit dit en toute d6f6rence, voir, au point de vue juridique, de similitude entre la pr6sente cause et celle de Canada and Gilf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Uvesque. Je crois que c'est dans la dernibre phrase de SUPREME COURT OF CANADA l'extrait des raisons de jugement qu'en cite mon colligue, M. le Juge Taschereau, qu'apparait la raison v6ritable de la d6cision. Ainsi, r6f6rant aux fils, conduites et tuyaux au moyen desquels l'61ectricit6, le gaz et 1'eau sont respectivement livrds, M. le Juge Rinfret, tel qu'il 6tait alors, d6clare:- J.

Et h la question pos6e h la d6termination de 1'affaire, savoir "qui avait ce courant sous sa garde au moment de l'accident", le savant Juge r6pond:

"Nous devons done ici appliquer de la mime fagon la rbgle de 1'article 1054 C.C. en concluant que la chose qui a caus6 la mort de Claveau (h savoir le courant 6lectrique de 2,200 volts) 6tait sous la garde de la Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas Saint-Laurent, et non pas sous la garde de la d6fenderesse".

C'est que la preuve r6v6la que la Canada and Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. n'avait assum6, en sa propre usine, que la garde juridique de son propre systhme de distribution et d'un courant 6lectrique mesur6 et limit6 h 110 volts et susceptible .d'y 6tre distribu6 sans danger, qu'elle n'eut pas h r6pondre de 1'accident caus6 par un courant de 2,200 volts qui, suivant son contrat avec la 'Compagnie de Pouvoir du Bas Saint- Laurent, n'6tait pas celui qui devait lui 6tre livr6 et n'6tait pas celui dont elle avait assume la garde. Mais en la pr6sente cause, et suivant la preuve faite, seule la cit6 a la propri6t6, le contr8le absolu et la garde -de cet 6gout dont elle impose, par ailleurs, aux contribuables, 1'utilisation; seule, elle a la garde des eaux qui normalement doivent s'y trouver; et, permettant elle-mime, par l'installation de cette conduite reliant les immeubles au fleuve, Yentr6e des eaux du fleuve en ce systhme d'6gout et, partant, le renversement fatal du cours normal des eaux dans icelui, elle demeure gardienne de l'6gout et des eaux qui s'y trouvent. Sur le deuxibme point. Je ne crois pas que la cit6 ait prouv6, comme elle y 6tait oblig6e, l'impr6visibilit6 du fait dommageable et l'impossibilit6 h 1'empicher par l'emploi de moyens raisonnables.

Sur ces moyens, comme d'ailleurs sur les autres invoqu6s par la cit6 aux fins d'6tre lib6r6e, en tout ou en partie, de sa responsabilit6, je concours dans 1'opinion qu'ils sont mal fondis.

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