Majority
This is, however, not such a case. It appears to be common ground that at least the forward part of both vehicles were on the proper side of the road and passed at a safe distance from each other, but something -occurred which brought the rear part of the vehicles into contact. Co. That any part of both vehicles was in the center of the road Loke J. is not suggested by anyone. In my opinion, the evidence does not justify the inference that both parties were at fault and the respondent may not be found liable on the footing that one or other of the drivers was guilty of the negligence which caused the collision.
I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
Judgment of the Court
- J.:-This appeal is from an order of the Court of Appeal for Ontario (1) dismissing an appeal from an order of Aylen J. (1) which had, in turn dismissed an application on behalf of the appellants, husband and wife, for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and, in the alternative, by way of certiorari, for an order quashing an order of detention and deportation, dated the 5th of April, 1954, made against the appellants by a Special Inquiry Officer under the provisions of the Immigration Act on the ground that the said order was made without jurisdiction. Both the appellants were released, the male appellant entering into a bond requiring him to surrender when called upon so to do.
The order in question proceeded upon the ground that the appellants were "Asians" and, as such, excluded by the terms of s-s. (2) of Regulation 20, passed under the provisions of s. 61(g) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1952, 325. Without considering whether the appeal might have been rejected upon any other ground, it is sufficient to say that, in our view, the order was authorized by the regulation and that the regulation itself is within the statute.
The argument on behalf of the appellants was based upon the difference between the phraseology employed in s. 39(c) of the former Act, R.S.C., 1952, 145, and that of s. 61 (g) of the present statute, in that the earlier statute authorized the Governor in Council, inter alia, to prohibit the landing in Canada of immigrants belonging to any "nationality or race", whereas s. 61 of the present Act authorizes the making of regulations respecting
Under the provisions of the earlier statute, the relevant regulation prohibited the landing in Canada of any immi- or grant "of any Asiatic race", whereas s-s. (2)
of Regulation 20 of the existing regulations provides that none of which classes embraces the appellants.
It appears that both appellants were born in Trinidad, from whence they had come to Canada, and that in reply to the question "of what race are you?", the answer in each case was "East Indian".
Mr. Brewin contends that the use of the word "Asian" in the regulation is justified only by the words "geographical area of origin" in the statute and that his clients, having been born in Trinidad and alleging that their parents and grandparents were also born there, are not within the statute. It is not necessary to consider the true meaning of the words referred to nor the word "nationality" as, in our view, the words "ethnic group" justify the regulation. In Mr. Brewin's submission the words "ethnic group" cannot be interpreted as in any sense equivalent to "race" but are to be given a much narrower meaning.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the meaning of the word "ethnic" here appropriate, is "pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological".
An example given of the use of the word is "That ethnic stock which embraced all existing European races". Similarly, the word "ethnically" is equated to "racially". Further, one of the meanings given to the word "race" is
A second meaning given is "a group of several tribes or peoples forming a distinct ethnical stock."
S.C.R.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- s. (2)
- s. 61(g)
- s. 39(c)
- s. 61