A.G. for Quebec v. Begin

:- THE JUSTICE:-The respondent was charged that, while driving an automobile, "par son incurie et sa n6gligence ill~galement caus6 la mort de trois pi6tons, savoir: Paul Emile Dorion, Zenon Longpr6 & John Hudak, commettant ainsi un acte criminel, savoir: un homicide involontaire 'manslaughter', le tout tel que d~crit aux articles 262 et 268 du Code Criminel". He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to twenty-three months in jail and an Order was made prohibiting him from driving a motor vehicle anywhere in Canada for seven years. The Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) (1) set aside the conviction and directed a new trial. By an Order of a Member of this Court, leave was granted to the Attorney General of Quebec to appeal from that decision on the following questions of law:- 1. Was the Court of Appeal right in deciding that subsections 4(d) and 4(e) of section 285 of the Criminal Code as enacted in 1951 had no application in the circumstances of this case in view of the fact that the accused was not charged under the said section 285 but was charged with manslaughter?

As appears from the second question, the accused had consented to a blood test, but he had not been warned that it might be used in evidence against him.

Before considering s-ss. 4(d) and 4(e) of s. 285 of the Criminal Code, as enacted in 1951, it might be noted that there has been a divergence of opinion in Canada on the point mentioned in question 2. In Rex v. Ford (1), Boyd McBride J., of the Alberta Supreme Court, while finding that the accused did consent and that an adequate warning had been given, considered that the rules governing the admissibility of statements, or confessions, of an accused person applied, or at least should be followed. In Ontario in Rex v. McNamara (2), Schroeder J. decided that there was no analogy between the taking of a blood sample without consent and the taking of a statement which was not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously affirmed that decision which was followed by Egbert J. in Rex v. McIntyre (3). In the meantime, Roy J. of the Court of Sessions of the Peace of Quebec, in Rex v. Frechette (4), had decided that the same rule did apply, stating:

An appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) (5) was -dismissed without reasons. In 1949 Marquis J. in Rex v. Gagnon (6), refused to admit evidence of the result of a blood test.

In the present case the accused consented, but I agree with the judgment in the McNamara case that even if he had not been asked and therefore had not consented the evidence would be admissible.

To the same effect is the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England in Rex v. Nowell (7).

It was not suggested in that case that force had been used to examine Nowell and there is no suggestion in the present case that any force had been exercised. As stated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ifuruma v. The Queen (8):

And at p. 204, it was pointed out that

A.G. onR when it is a question of the admission of evidence strictly it is not whether the method by which it was obtained is tortious but excusable but .

whether what has been obtained is relevant to the issue being tried. Kerwin C. It was stated in that case and, I repeat, we "are not now concerned with whether an action for assault would lie against the police officers and express no opinion on that point".

In my view a confusion has arisen between the rules as to the admissibility of statements, or admissions, and those relating to self-incrimination.

In taking a blood test the accused does not say anything because he is not asked any question.

Nothing in this judgment is to be taken as weakening the effect of the rules as to the admissibility of statements, or admissions, because the two matters are entirely distinct.

The amendments in 1951 to the Criminal Code have no application. S-s. (4) of s. 285 had already provided for the offence of driving, etc., while intoxicated or under the influence of any narcotic. In 1951 s-s. 4(a) created a new offence generally known as impaired ability to drive. S-s. 4 and s-s. 4(a), so far as relevant, are as follows:- (4) Every one who, while intoxicated or under the influence of any narcotic, drives any motor vehicle or automobile, or has the care or control of a motor vehicle or automobile, whether it is in motion or not, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable ...

(4a) Every one who, while his ability to drive a motor vehicle or Automobile is impaired by alcohol or any drug, drives any motor vehicle or automobile, or has the care or control of a motor vehicle or automobile, whether it is in motion or not, is guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction or upon conviction under indictment.

S-ss. 4(d) and 4(e) (also enacted in 1951) read:- 4(d) In any proceedings under subsection four or four a the result of a chemical analysis of a sample of the blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance of a person may be admitted in evidence on the issue whether that person was intoxicated or under the influence of a narcotic drug or whether his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol or a drug, notwithstanding that he was not, before he gave the sample, warned that he need not give the sample or that the results of the analysis of the sample might be used in evidence.

(4e) No person is required to give a sample of blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance for chemical analysis for the purposes of this section and evidence that a person refused to give such a sample or that such a sample was not taken is not admissible nor shall such a refusal or the fact that a sample was not taken be the subject of comment by any person in the proceedings.

In the present case the accused was charged with manslaughter under a different section of the Code. Counsel for the accused argued that the mere fact that Parliament had provided as it did by s-ss. 4(d) and 4(e) indicated that it was not prepared to enact the same provisions with KerwinCJ. reference to charges other than those dealt with by those subsections. In my opinion, this contention is not entitled to prevail. In 1951 Parliament was confining itself to the offences -described in s-ss. 4 and 4(a).

The appeal should be allowed and the Order of the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) set aside. At the argument counsel did not suggest that, if the Court came to this conclusion, the conviction should not be restored and it should be so ordered.

J.:-For the reasons given by my brother Fauteux, I agree with his conclusion that the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, erred in law in holding that the evidence of the result of the analysis of a sample of the respondent's blood was illegally admitted at the trial. It remains to consider what order should be made.

As is pointed out by my brother Fauteux, the appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench against the conviction was based on three grounds.

That Court rejected the first ground, gave effect to the second, and so found it unnecessary to consider the third. The judgment of the majority of this Court in The Queen v. McKay (1) indicates that, in deciding what order we should make, we have jurisdiction to consider this third ground; but in my view it is not desirable that we should do so in this case as, in regard to it, we have had neither the benefit of the expression of opinion by the learned Justices of the Court of Queen's Bench nor the assistance of the argument of counsel.

For these reasons I would direct that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench be set aside and that the matter be referred to that Court to dispose of the third ground of appeal against the conviction and such appeal as there may be as to sentence.

The judgment of Taschereau and Fauteux JJ. was A.G.Fon delivered by:- FAUTEUX J.:-Accus6 et trouv6 coupable d'avoir, dans la nuit du 24 au 25 avril, 1953, dans le district de Terrebonne, province de Qu6bec, illigalement caus6 la mort de trois pi6tons, en conduisant un v~hicule moteur, I'intim6 en appela du verdict sur des points libellis comme suit:- (i) La preuve telle que faite ne justifie pas la condamnation de l'accus6;

(ii) L'admission en preuve de la prise de sang faite sur I'accus6 n'a 6t0 pric6d6e d'aucun avis ni mise-en-garde et constitue une confession irr6gulibre et nulle;

(iii) L'Honorable Juge a err6 dans la directive de droit et de fait aux jurds;

La Cour d'Appel (1) a rejet6 le premier grief comme mal fond6.

Le troisibme, qui ne comporte d'ailleurs aucune pricision, n'a fait I'objet d'aucun prononc6; on n'a pas cherch6 A le justifier devant nous; et, A l'examen, les directives donnies par le savant Juge au prochs ne r6v6lent aucune ill6galit.

Sur le second moyen, cependant, la Cour d'Appel (1) en est venue h la conclusion que 1'admission de la preuve r6sultant de la prise de sang 6tait illgale. D'oii le maintien de 1'appel et I'ordonnance d'un nouveau procks. Le Procureur G6n6ral se pourvoit maintenant contre ce jugement, aprbs avoir obtenu permission -de ce faire, sur deux questions de droit ainsi formul6es:- (i) Was the Court of Appeal right in deciding that subsections 4(d) and 4(e) of section 285 of the Criminal Code as enacted in 1951 had no application in the circumstances of this case in view of the fact that the accused was not charged under the said section 285 but was charged with manslaughter?

(ii) Was the Court of Appeal right in deciding that on a charge of manslaughter, evidence as to a blood test to which the accused submitted, is only admissible, if the accused has been warned that it might be used in evidence against him?

Au jugement formel de la Cour d'Appel apparaissent les consid6rants suivants sur lesquels se fonde cette conclusion sur l'inadmissibilit6 de la preuve pr6citie:- CONSIDERING that the only provisions of the Criminal Code relating to the admission of blood tests in evidence are set out in subsections 4(d) and 4(e) of Section 285 thereof added in 1951 by the Statute George VI, Chapter 47, Section

(1) (1955)

C.R. 33.

CONSIDERING that the said statutory provisions are only concerned with driving offences under Section 285 of the Criminal Code; A.G. CONSIDERING that as the said sub-sections provide that no warning is required in connection with the said offences under Section 285, it must be assumed that a warning is required where the more serious charge of manslaughter is concerned;

Fauteux J. CONSIDERING that although Appellant's consent to the blood test was obtained in the present instance he was not warned that it might be used in evidence against him;

CONSIDERING, therefore, that such evidence was illegally admitted and that a new trial should accordingly be ordered;

Ces consid6rants r~sument fiddlement les raisons de jugement de M. le Juge Hyde, auxquelles les autres membres de Ia Cour ont souscrit, et manifestent clairement, sur la question de idroit A d6terminer, la ratio decidendi du jugement a quo. En somme, on se r6fire principalement au paragraphe 4(d) de Particle 285 prescrivant:- Dans des proc6dures privues par le paragraphe quatre ou quatre-a, le risultat d'une analyse chimique d'un 6chantillon du sang, de 'urine, de l'haleine ou autre substance corporelle d'une personne peut tre admis en preuve sur la question de savoir si cette personne 6tait en 6tat d'6brit6 ou sous 1'influence d'un narcotique, ou si sa capacit6 de conduire 6tait affiaiblie par I'alcool ou une drogue, bien qu'avant de donner I'6chantillon cette personne n'ait pas t avertie qu'elle n'6tait pas tenue de le donner ou que les r6sultats de I'analyse de l'chantillon pourraient servir en preuve. On interprite ensuite cette disposition tout comme si, en raison de ce qui y est dit relativement h la mise en garde, le L6gislateur entendait pourvoir, h titre de principe nouveau, h l'6tablissement d'une dispense de la donner et non pas comme s'il entendait simplement indiquer ex abundanti cautela que 1'absence de mise en garde n'affecte pas l'op6ration du paragraphe de Particle. Et du fait qu'on interprte la disposition comme n'a-yant d'application que dans le cas d'offenses concernant la conduite d'un v6hicule moteur, sous Particle 285, on conclut qu'il faut n6cessairement inf6rer que, dans l'6ventualit6 oii cette conduite en violation des dispositions du mime article 285, a comme cons6quence la mort d'une personne, et qu'une accusation d'homicide involontaire s'ensuit, la mise en garde est de rigueur. En d6finitive, on applique la maxime expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

A mon avis et an toute d6f6rence, Ia 16galit4 de 1'admissibilit6 en preuve des conclusions de 1'expertise, rdsultant d'une prise de sang, non pric6d6e de mise en garde, ne fait aucun doute sous la loi g6ndrale, telle qu'elle 6tait avant et telle qu'elle est demeur6e apres 1'addition du paragraphe 4(d) de Particle 285. Et si ces vues sont fond6es, ainsi que je tenterai de le d6montrer, il en r6sulte qu'il devient inutile pour les fins de cet appel, de d6cider la premibre question de droit sur laquelle permission d'appeler a 6t6 donn6e; car si les prescriptions du paragraphe 4(d) de 'article 285 ne s'appliquent pas dans le cas d'homicide involontaire, c'est la loi g6n6rale qui r6git et, dis lors, la preuve est admissible; et si, an contraire, ces mimes prescriptions s'appliquent dans le cas d'homicide involontaire, la mise en garde n'est pas n6cessaire. Dans les deux cas, le r6sultat est le m6me et I'appel doit 6tre maintenu.

La loi avant 1'addition au Code 'Criminel du paragraphe 4(d) de Particle 285. La jurisprudence canadienne sur le point s'est divis6e. D'une part, invoquant l'inviolabilit6 de la personne de 1'accus6, les rbgles gouvernant l'admissibilit6 de ses aveux extrajudiciaires et le principe nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, on a conclu que les rigles r6gissant 1'admissibilit6 des aveux s'appliquaient ou, au moins, devaient 6tre suivies, faute de quoi le rapport au procks des conclusions de l'expertise r6sultant de la prise de sang 6tait inadmissible. (Rex v. Ford (1); Rex v. Fr6chette (2); Rex v. Gagnon (3)).

D'autre part, on a jug qu'il n'y avait aucune analogie entre la prise de sang sans consentement et la prise d'une d6claration ou d'une confession non volontaire et que, ni cette th6orie de l'inviolabilit6 de la personne d'un accus6, ni le principe nemo tenetur seipsum accusare ne pouvaient justifier la conclusion d'inadmissibilit6 de cette preuve.

(Rex v. McNamara (4), confirm6e par la Cour d'Appel d'Ontario (5), Rex v. McIntyre (6)).

La source du conflit, dans la jurisprudence canadienne, parait proc6der d'une m6prise par les tenants du premier groupe et non du second, sur la raison et l'objet de la rbgle excluant les aveux extrajudiciares de 1'accus6 et la raison et I'objet de la maxime nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, assurant A une personne contrainte par la loi de r6pondre a des questions, le privilige de faire 1'objection qui aura pour effet d'empicher que la r6ponse donn6e ne soit utilis6e contre elle. La raison et l'objet de ces deux principes, aussi bien que la diff6rence existant entre eux, sont, de fagon concise, indiqu6s comme suit dans Wigmore, On Evidence, Vol. 3, 3e 6d. (1940) h la page 250:that Dans les deux cas, on ne vise done que des d6clarations, soit celles d'un accus6 dans le premier cas et celles d'un t6moin dans le second. Et par application de ces rigles, les aveux extrajudiciares de 1'accus6, faits h des personnes en autoriti, ne sont admissibles que lorsqu'ils sont volontaires; l'accus6 ne peut 6tre contraint h rendre t6moignage dans son procks, et la personne qui est contrainte par la loi h r6pondre peut, en faisant objection, se prot6ger contre l'usage futur de la rdponse qu'elle donne. Bref, ces rigles n'ont d'autre objet que la substance m~me des d6clarations faites verbalement, par 6crit ou par signes, par l'accus6 ou les t6moins. Aussi bien, et dans Rex v. Voisin (1), la Cour d'Appel d'Angleterre d~clarait admissible en preuve un ecrit fait de la main de l'accus6 et requis d'icelui par la police, uniquement pour fins de comparaison avec un document trouvb sur les lieux du crime et ce, nonobstant le fait que l'accus6 6tait d6tenu et qu'aucune mise en garde ne lui avait t6 faite.

Au cours de 1'argument, h la page 533, 'un des membres de la Cour signalait:but Et on jugea que:to Dans Rex v. Nowell (1), la mime Cour d6clarait admissible en preuve le r~cit d'un examen clinique du m6decin de la police, bien que cet examen ait 6t6 fait sans le consentement de I'accus6, sans mise en garde et alors qu'en raison de son 6bri6t6, Nowell ne pouvait validement consentir. Dans les deux causes pricit6es, la Cour d'Appel d'Angleterre n'a done pas jug6 qu'il y avait lieu, en pareils cas, d'appliquer la rkgle relative aux aveux ou la maxime nemo tenetur seipsum accusare. El1e n'a davantage donna effet cette th6orie de l'inviolabilit6 de la personne dont il est question dans Rex v. Frichette (supra). Je ne sache pas non plus qu'on ait jamais, pour ces motifs, exclu, comme inadmissible, de la preuve au procks, le rapport de faits incriminant difinitivement l'accus6 et que lui-mime suppl6e involontairement, tel que par exemple:-sa tenue, sa d6marche, son v6tement, sa fagon de parler, son 6tat de sobri6t6 ou d'6bri6t6; son calme, son 6nervement ou son h6sitation, ses marques d'identit6, son identification lorsqu'h ces fins il est mis en ligne parmi d'autres personnes; la pr6sence sur lui-mime d'objets vol6s ou d'objets dont la possession uniquement constitue une infraction h la loi et donne lieu h des poursuites criminelles, telle la possession de narcotiques, de spiritueux ill6galement manufactur6s oti import6s, et autres. Sans doute, la m6thode employ6e pour l'obtention de certaines de ces preuves peut, dans certains cas, 6tre ill6gale et mime donner lieu h des recours d'ordre civil ou m~me criminel, contre ceux qui 'ont utilis6e, mais on ne discute plus de la proposition voulant qu'en ces cas, l'ill6galit6 entachant la m6thode d'obtention de la preuve n'affecte pas, per se, l'admissibilit6 de cette preuve au proces.

Telle 6tait la situation de la loi, au moment de 1'amendement apport6 A Particle 285, sur l'admissibilit6 en preuve des conclusions d'une expertise aux fins de laquelle un accus6 a contribu6 en fournissant, sans avoir 6t6 mis en garde, les 616ments nicessaires h sa tenue.

Depuis lors, il a d6jh td jug6 que les dispositions des paragraphes 4(d) et 4(e) de l'article 285 n'avaient pas affect6 cette situation de la loi. (Rex v. Baker (1)). En l'espice et comme d6jh indiqu6, la Cour d'Appel, pour en arriver h une vue contraire, a appliqu6 la maxime expressio unius est exclusio alterius. En tout respect, je dois dire qu'h mon avis, la maxime est inapplicable A l'esp~ce. Dans l'amendement, je ne vois aucune intention de changer la loi g6n6rale sur le point. Au surplus, et sur l'application de la maxime, la citation suivante extraite de Maxwell "On Interpretation of Statutes", 9e 6d., 318, me parait A.G. pertinente:- Provisions sometimes found in statutes enacting inperfectly or for particular cases only that which was already and more widely the law Fauteux J. have occasionally furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such cases.

The only inference which a Court can draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is that the Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive caution. If the law be different from what the Legislature supposed it to be, the implication arising from the statute, it has been said, cannot operate as a negation of its existence, and any legislation founded on such a mistake has not the effect of making that law which the Legislature erroneously assumed to be so.

En somme, I'intim6, tel que not6 par la Cour d'Appel, a consenti A la prise de sang; ce consentement, il 'a donn6 quelque quatre heures apris son arrestation, A un moment oii, suivant 1'expertise mime du docteur Roussel, il n'6tait affect6 que d'une 16gbre 6bri6t6 et n'6tait pas, pour cette raison, empich6 de donner un consentement valide; il avait, de plus, 6t6 clairement inform6 qu'il n'y avait aucune obligation pour lui de se soumettre A cette expertise. C'est lI la cause que nous avons A juger. En de telles circonstances et pour les raisons ci-dessus, il m'est impossible de conclure que le savant Juge au procks, M. le Juge Pr6vost, a ill6galement permis que le r6sultat de cette expertise soit port6 A la connaissance des jurs.

Je maintiendrais 1'appel, annulerais le jugement de la Cour d'Appel et r6tablirais le verdict de culpabilit6 rendu par les jurbs.

Appeal allowed; conviction restored.