Henry Birks & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. City of Montreal

(Judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec, Q.R. [19541 Q.B. 679, reversed).

Per Kerwin C.J., Taschereau, Estey, Cartwright, Fatiteux and Abbott JJ.: In its true nature and character, the impugned statute authorizes municipal councils to compel Feast Day observance;

Similar legislation in England is, as is Sunday observance legislation, assigned to the Kerwin CJ. and Taschereau, Rand, Kellock, Estey, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux and Abbott JJ.

domain of criminal law.

Furthermore, in its essence, the statute is prohibitory and not regulatory. As such, it is beyond the legislative competence of the legislature as infringing on criminal law. In & these views, neither the abstinence of Parliament to legislate in the matter nor the territorial restriction as to the operation of the legislation can validate the same.

Per Rand J.: The history of the legislation relating to Sundays and Holy Days demonstrates their association, and the prohibition here, A.G.

with sanctions, of carrying on business on days given their special and common characteristic by Church law being in the same category as the law of Sunday observance, is, likewise, within the exclusive field of the Dominion as criminal law.

The statute was also enacted in relation to religion since it prescribed what is in essence a religious obligation and, therefore, was beyond the provincial authority (Saumur v. City of Quebec [19531 2 S.C.R. 299).

Per Kellock and Locke JJ.: The division of jurisdiction in 1867 by ss. 91 and 92 was on the footing of what would be understood by an English legislature at that time as falling within the domain of criminal law, and legislation in relation to Sundays and Holy Days at that time in England was part of the criminal law, and accordingly exclusively within the jurisdiction conferred upon Parliament by s. 91(27). Even if it could be said that such legislation is not properly "criminal law", it would still be beyond the jurisdiction of a province as being legislation with respect to freedom of religion.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), reversing, Galipeault C.J.A. and Barclay J.A. dissenting, the decision of the trial judge declaring ultra vires the legislation and the by-law impugned.

C. Choquette, Q.C. and P. E. Belanger for the City of Montreal.

13 Geo. VI c. 61 pour amender Particle 2 de la loi intitul6e "Loi de la fermeture A bonne heure" (S.R.Q. 1941 c. 239), en y ajoutant Particle 2a 6dictant que:- S'autorisant de cet amendement de 1949, le Conseil de la cit6 de Montr6al adoptait, le 2 novembre 1951, le r~glement 2048 pour modifier le riglement 695, d6jh 6tabli I'autorit6 de la "Loi de la fermeture A bonne heure", en y ins~rant apris Particle 2, 1'article 2a d6cr6tant que:- Dans une action conjointe, les appelants, contribuables et exploitants de magasins dans la cit6, demandirent que ce riglement 2048, aussi bien que la loi de 1949 en autorisant 1'adoption, soient d6clar6s ultra vires respectivement de la Cit6 et de la Legislature. Cette demande fut contest6e par la Cit6 et le Procureur G6n6ral de la province.

Le Juge de premiere instance, vu la similitude des termes du riglement et de la loi, en est venu A la conclusion-et, sur ce point, les parties sont d'accord-qu'une d6cision sur la constitutionnalit6 de la loi serait decisive du litige; et ayant form6 l'opinion que les objet et but v6ritables de la loi de 1949 6taient de contraindre, dans une certaine mesure, h l'observance des jours de fete religieuse y mentionn6s, et qu'en Angleterre, pareille 16gislation participait, au mime titre que la l6gislation relative A l'observance du dimanche, du domaine du droit criminel, d6cida qu'en raison du paragraphe 27 de Particle de l'Acte de l'Am&rique Britannique du Nord (1867), la L6gislature n'avait pas la comp6tence l6gislative en la matibre et d6clara la loi de 1949 (13 Geo. VI c. 61) et le riglement 2048 ultra vires respectivement de la Lgislature et de la Cit6.

Port6 en appel (1), cet arrit fut cass6 par un jugement majoritaire affirmant la validit6 de la loi et du riglement et ce pour des raisons diverses dont la seule commune aux trois Juges de la majorit6, MM. les Juges Marchand, Casey et Rinfret, est qu'en raison des termes de l'Acte de Qubbec (1774), la l6gislation en Angleterre sur 1'observance des Jours de fete religieuse n'a jamais td introduite au Canada. M. le Juge en chef Galipeault, dissident, d6clare simplement confirmer le jugment de premibre instance; et M. le Juge Barclay, 6galement de la minorit6, accepte, en substance, V. odans ses raisons de jugement, le raisonnement et la conclusion du Juge de premibre instance.

D'oii le pourvoi devant cette Cour.

Nature et caractbre de la loi de 1949. Sur ce point qu'il J. est d'abord essentiel de determiner pour pouvoir d6cider ensuite sous quel paragraphe des articles 91 ou 92 de l'Acte de l'Am6rique Britannique du Nord se classe la loi incriminde (Russell v. The Queen (1)), les parties ont soumis les pritentions suivantes:-D'une part, disent les appelants, l'objet de la loi est d'ordre moral et religieux et le but poursuivi est la promotion de l'observance des jours de fete religieuse, autres que les dimanches, dans la province de Qu6bec dont la population est, de fagon pridominante, catholique. D'autre part, le Procureur G6n6ral soumet que cette loi tend h adoucir les conditions de travail des commis dont 1'emploi consiste h vendre des marchandises au public, en leur accordant six jours additionnels de cong6.

Enfin, la Cit6 pr6tend que le v6ritable but de la r6glementation autorisbe est que tous les magasins dans la cit6 soient ouverts ou fermis A la mime p6riode de temps dans le meilleur intir~t des propridtaires de magasins, et qu'ils soient ferms durant certaines heures et certaines journ6es pour le bien-6tre de leurs employds.

Il est A peine n6cessaire de rappeler que suivant la jurisprudence du Comit6 Judiciaire du Conseil Priv6, il n'est pas toujours suffisant pour d6celer la nature et le caractbre d'une loi dont la constitutionnalit6 est attaquie, de s'arr~ter a la d6termination de son effet 16gal mais qu'il faut souvent rechercher dans le texte de la loi, -dans son historique, dans les faits 6tablis au dossier ou ceux tenus comme 6tant g6n6ralement de la connaissance judiciaire, s'il n'est pas de raisons de supposer que 1'effet 16gal n'6tablit pas v6ritablement la nature, le but et 1'objet de la loi. (Russell v. The Queen (1); Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden (2); Attorney- General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers and Others (3); Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada (1); Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney- General for Canada (2); Canadian Federation of Agricul- & ture v. Attorney-General for Quebec and Others (3)). La loi avant l'amendement de 1949.

Adopt6e en 1894 (57 Vict. c. 50), "La loi de la fermeture bonne heure" fut d'abord amend6e en 1904 (4 Jdouard VII 29) pour autoriser l'imposition d'une sanction pinale et, de nouveau, lors de la revision des statuts en 1925 (S.R.Q. 1925, 127) pour 6tablir le titre sous lequel elle pouvait tre cit6e; c'est sans autre changement qu'elle fut ensuite reproduite aux Statuts Revis6s de 1941 (S.R.Q. 1941, c. 239). En somme, et dans 1'6tat oii elle se trouve avant I'amendement de 1949, seul l'article 2 est de droit substantif; il y est prescrit que:- Cette loi, d'application g6n6rale, habilite done tout Conseil municipal de toute municipalit6 de cit6 ou de ville, dans la province, de r~glementer, comme le titre de la loi l'implique, la fermeture h bonne heure des magasins.

Mais, on le remarquera, la L6gislature n'y autorise pas une fermeture durant toute la journ~e mais pr6cise, au contraire, qu'aucune fermeture n'est autoris6e entre sept heures du matin et six heures dii soir; de plus, le choix des jours cette fermeture peut 6tre ordonn6e reste h 1'entibre discr6tion du Conseil municipal de chaque municipalit6, discr6tion dont I'exercice, suivant la loi, ne s'inspire ni s'entrave d'aucune consid6ration d'ordre national, religieux ou autre. Attaqu6e et consid6r6e dans City of Montreal v. Beauvais (4), la constitutionnalit6 de cette loi fut affirm6e par cette Cour. A 1'audition, on supporta la validit6 de cette loi d'avant 1949 en invoquant les paragraphes 13 et 16 de Particle 92 doniant aux L6gislatures -le pouvoir exclusif de 16gif6rer respectivement sur les dr6its civils et sur toute matibre purement locale et de nature priv6e, dans la province, alors que pour soutenir l'invalidit6, on pr6tendit que la 16gislation tendait r6glementer le commerce au sens du paragraphe 2 de 1'article 91. ]cartant cette dernibre pr6tention comme mal fondie, cette Cour en vint h la conclusion que, s'il 6tait discutable de pouvoir affirmer avec justesse qu'il s'agissait de droits civils, il n'y avait aucune raison de dicider qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une matibre strictement locale et de nature privee.

La loi avec l'amendement de 1949. La loi demeure toue Jjours d'application g6n6rale et habilite, en plus, le Conseil municipal de toute municipalit6 de cit6 ou de ville dans la province h ordonner, h des jours sp6cifi&s, et pendant les vingt-quatre heures de tels jours, la fermeture des magasins. En fait, il est av6r6, et les intim6s ne le contestent pas, que les six jours sp~cifis par la loi de 1949 sont, suivant le droit canonique, tous des jours d'obligation et, de plus, les seuls jours d'obligation, autres que les dimanches, et qui ne tombent pas n6cessairement toujours un dimanche, qui sont c6l6br6s par 1'Pglise catholique au Canada avec, pour les fidbles, une obligation d'observance, de mesure identique h celle impos6e par le m~me droit pour les dimanches. De plus, la dur6e de la fermeture autoris6e par la loi civile pour ces jours de fete religieuse est exactement la mime que celle prescrite par la loi religieuse.

Cette mise en contraste de la loi d'avant et d'apris 1949, aussi bien qu'une comparaison de la question constitutionnelle telle que pos6e dans la cause pr6cit6e et telle qu'elle se pr6sente en l'espce, marquent bien, quant au caractbre et la nature de la 16gislation, la diff6rence radicale entre la loi d'avant et la loi d'apris 1949, et entre la question constitutionnelle pos6e sous le r6gime de chacune de ces lois. Aussi bien, et sauf en tant que 1'6nonc6 g6n6ral de principes en matibre constitutionnelle est concern6, la decision de cette Cour dans City of Montreal v. Beauvais (supra) n'est d'aucune pertinence h la solution de cette premiere question en 1'espice. De plus, et consid6rant la loi de 1949 en toute objectivit6, il est impossible de ne voir dans ce conformisme int6gral de cette loi civile h la loi religieuse, qu'un simple accident plut~t qu'une intention manifeste et ad6quatement r6alis6e d'adapter la premiere sur la seconde en autorisant le Conseil de foute municipalit6 de cit6 ou de ville, peu importe l'importance ou non de sa population, sa composition et son degr6 d'homog6n6it6 au point de vue de d6nomination religieuse, d'astreindre par rbglement le propri6taire ou les copropri6taires de magasin, leurs employ6s s'il en est, et tout le public, A suspendre durant les vingt-quatre heures de ces jours de fite religieuse, toute or op6ration de 1'6tablissement.

Le mot "ferm6s" dans la loi n'a pas le sens restreint que lui donne, par d6finition, le riglement de la Cit6; et cette fermeture, que la loi autorise de d6cr6ter, n'est pas non plus assujettie aux exceptions qu'on retrouve aux dispositions du m6me rkglement.

L'exercice en pl6nitude de ce pouvoir donn6 dans la loi d'ainsi astreindre propri6taires, employ6s et public dans toute municipalit6, n'a d'autre r6sultat recherch6-et il n'est pas besoin d'entrer dans le domaine de la sp6culation pour arriver A cette conclusion; cette adaptation int6grale de la loi civile A la loi religieuse manifeste cet objet-que de promouvoir, dans la mesure indiqu6e, l'observance de chacun de ces jours de f6te religieuse qui, au calendrier de toute ann6e, ne tomberait pas le dimanche.

Dans ce r6sultat apparaissent v6ritablement cette nature et ce caractbre de la loi de 1949.

Telle est aussi, sur ce premier point, la conclusion du

Juge de premire instance et des deux Juges de la minorit6 en Cour d'Appel. Quant aux Juges de la majorit6, d'accord pour rejeter cette conclusion, ils adoptent sur la question des vues contradictoires.

L'opinion de M. le Juge Casey apparait h l'extrait suivant de ses notes:- A mon avis, soit dit en toute d6f6rence, ce raisonnement s'inspire d'une interpr6tation donn6e h la loi telle qu'elle

6tait avant l'amendement et non de la loi telle qu'elle est devenue aprbs; il ne tient pas compte, par cons6quent, de la diff6rence radicale d6ji indiquie entre la loi d'avant et d'apris 1949 et se conditionne, au surplus, non sur I'existence-car de cela, il n'y a dans le texte de la loi de 1949 ou dans les faits, aucune indication-mais sur 1'hypothise de l'existence d'une intention de la L6gislature d'accorder des adoucissements additionnels en r6duisant les heures de travail de personnes engagdes dans l'opbration des magasins. Il n'y a donc, sur l'intention de la L6gislature, aucune conclusion d6finie mais simplement possible.

Dans les vues plus pr6cises soumises h 1'audition de la part du Procureur G6n6ral, la L6gislature aurait voulu accorder six jours de cong6 additionnels aux employ6s de magasins.

Pourquoi pas cinq ou sept ? Pourquoi le nombre des jours indiqu6 dans la loi et le caractbre de ces jours correspondent-ils tous et aux seuls jours de fete religieuse qui ne tombent pas n~cessairement un dimanche ? Pourquoi la L6gislature n'a-t-elle pas, suivant la pratique l6gislative normalement suivie pour assurer des cong6s, pourvu A ce que, dans le cas oii ces jours de fete religieuse seraient un dimanche, cette fermeture de vingt-quatre heures ait lieu le lundi suivant ce dimanche ? Pourquoi au contraire et en telle 6ventualit6, a-t-on virtuellement maintenu la prohibition de la loi d'avant 1949 de fermer entre sept heures du matin et six heures du soir ? Pourquoi cette loi d'application g6n6rale autorise-t-elle la fermeture des magasins, qu'il y ait ou non -des employ6s ? Autant de questions auxquelles seule l'interpr6tation donn6e par le Juge de premi&re instance et ceux de la minorit6 en Cour d'Appel offre une rdponse compatible avec le texte de la loi et les faits 6tablis au dossier ou g6n6ralement tenus comme 6tant de la connaissance judiciaire. Les consid6rations qui pr6cident sur ce point emportent une m6me conclusion quant aux pr6tentions d6jh indiqu6es de la Cit6 de Montrial, lesquelles participent aussi de la substance de celles du Procureur G6n6ral.

Pour sa part, M. le Juge Rinfret, refusant de voir dans la l6gislation l'intention d'accorder des cong6s additionnels, exprime l'avis qu'il s'agit de la r6glementation de la vente de marchandises.

Cette opinion s'appuie sur les dispositions du riglement de la Cit6 alors que c'est la validit6 de la loi qui est en question. Aussi bien, et en tout respect, je ne puis, pas plus que les intim6s d'ailleurs, y souscrire. Dans ses raisons, le savant Juge ajoute 1'argument suivant:- Je ne puis trouver, dans cet argument, aucune assistance car la v6ritable question est de d6terminer la nature et le caractbre de la 16gislation ou, en d'autres termes, de savoir si la loi incrimin6e est v6ritablement une 16gislation tendant a promouvoir l'observance des jours de f6te religieuse. Aussi bien, je ne vois pas en quoi il serait illogique qu'h une mme question se posant

1'examen d'une 16gislation d'une autre province, il faudrait, h raison d'616ments diff6rents riv6ls par le texte de la loi et les circonstances de faits, donner une r6ponse 6galement diff6rente A celle qui s'impose en l'espice.

Enfin, et aux notes de M. le Juge Marchand, on ne retrouve rien d'explicite sur ce premier point. Le concours qu'il donne g6ndralement aux vues de MM. les Juges Casey et Rinfret saurait difficilement avoir pour objet une approbation de leuis points de vue sur cette premibre question, puisque celui de 1'un contredit celui de 1'autre. Reste A d6terminer si cette l6gislation permettant de contraindre, par sanction p6nale, l'observance des fetes religieuses dans la mesure indiqu6e, participe du domaine du droit criminel, ainsi que l'affirment les appelants et que 1'ont d~cid6 le Juge de premibre instance et ceux de la minorit6 en Cour d'Appel, ou si, comme le soumettent les intim6s et l'affirment les Juges de la majorit6, il s'agit de droits civils ou d'une matibre strictement locale et de nature priv6e. On ne dispute plus qu'une l6gislation sur I'observance du dimanche fait partie du droit criminel au Canada comme en Angleterre et est, comme telle, en notre pays, de la comp6tence exclusive du Parlement.

(Attorney-General for Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway (1); Ouimet v. Bazin (2); Corporation de la Paroisse de St-Prosper v. Rodrigue (3)).

Il n'apparait pas que le Parlement ait 16gif~r6 sur 1'observance des fates religieuses. Mais il est certain qu'en Angleterre, oii il y a eu avant et depuis la R6forme, et oi il y a encore une telle lgislation (Voir: (1354) 28 Ed. III cap. XIV; (1448) 27 Hen. VI cap. V; (1464) 4 Ed. IV cap. VII; (1551-2) 5-6 Ed. VI cap. III; (1762) 2 Geo. III cap. XV; (1833) 3 et 4 William IV cap. XLII), cette 16gislation-dont cette loi d'avant la Rforme (1448) 27 Hen. VI cap. V, y est encore en vigueur (Voir: Statute Law Revision Fauteux J. Act of 1948; Halsbury's Statutes of England, 2nd ed. (Burrows) vol. 14 p. 1040)-atteste du fait qu'on a consid6r6 sur un m6me pied I'observance du dimanche et celle des jours de fete religieuse et qu'une telle 16gislation fait partie du droit criminel ou, suivant 1'expression du Vicomte Haldane dans Board of Commerce (1), h la page 198, est une 16gislation dont le sujet "is one which by its very nature belongs to the domain of criminal jurisprudence."

Aucun des Juges de la majorit6 ne conteste cette proposition; mais soit qu'on l'admette ou qu'on en assume simplement le bien-fond6, on dispose de l'argument qu'en tirent les appelants, savoir qu'il est impossible d'assigner, au Canada, une telle 16gislation h une autre branche du droit qu'h celle dont elle fait partie en Angleterre, en affirmant qu'en raison des dispositions de 1'Acte de Qubbec (1774) et de 1'arr~t du Conseil Priv6 dans Cooper v. Stewart (2), et de celui de la Cour d'Appel d'Ontario dans Shea v. Choat (3), cette 16gislation anglaise n'a jamais 6t6 introduite au Canada. A mon avis, la branche du droit A laquelle, en raison de sa nature et de son caractbre, appartient une 16gislation, et 1'application ou non de cette 16gislation dans un territoire donn6, constituent deux questions absolument 6trangbres 1'une h 1'autre, et deux questions A la solution desquelles entrent des consid6rations totalement diff6rentes.

A la v6rit6 et dans cet arrit du Conseil Priv6 et dans celui de la Cour d'Appel d'Ontario, il n'y a aucune r6f6rence h la premibre question et la deuxibme s'est pr6sent6e parce que, dans ces deux causes institu6es ailleurs qu'en Angleterre, on recherchait l'application de lois 6dict6es en ce dernier pays et le point h d6terminer 6tait de savoir si elles avaient 6t6 introduites LJ.

(3) 2 dans le territoire oft on les invoquait. De plus, et en ce qui concerne l'Acte de Qubbec (1774), il convient, je crois, d'ajouter ce qui suit. Le texte invoqu6 est le suivant:- Je ne vois pas que ce texte soit par lui-mime attributif de comp6tence l6gislative sur la matibre indiqu6e; dans ses termes, il est plut6t suspensif de l'op6ration de toute loi pass6e ou A venir, dont l'objet serait d'entraver ou goner le libre exercice de cette religion. Au surplus, cette assurance donn6e sp6cifiquement aux sujets de Sa Majest6 professant la religion indiqu6e, dans la province de Qu6bec, du droit de l'exercer librement, n'emporte pas la negation 'd'un droit similaire pour les non Catholiques et n'attribue, encore moins, un pouvoir de 16gif6rer pour astreindre les non Catholiques qui s'y trouvent aux obligations auxquelles les Catholiques sont assujettis par la loi religieuse les r6gissant. Nous n'avons pas A d6terminer, en 1'espbce, si les termes de ce statut imp6rial de 1774 ont 1'effet de restreindre, dans son exercice, le pouvoir g~n6ral subs6quemment attribu6 exclusivement au Parlement par le paragraphe 27 de 1'article 91; la seule question 6tant de savoir si, en raison du caractbre et de la nature de 1'amendement de 1949, la L6gislature du Qu6bec a 16gif6r6 en matibre criminelle et ainsi outrepass6 ses pouvoirs.

reste donc que, dans la conception du Parlement imp6rial, une 16gislation pour contraindre h une observance, m6me relative, des fetes religieuses, appartient A la branche du droit criminel. On ne peut, sans raison, 6carter cette conception qui est virtuellement celle du L6gislateur lui-mame, et de ce mame L6gislateur qui a d6fini les pouvoirs respectifs du Parlement et des L6gislatures.

Aussi bien, et pour premier motif qui me parait p6remptoire, faut-il conclure que cette loi de 1949, en raison du caractbre et de la nature qu'il est uniquement possible de lui attribuer, participe du droit criminel.

Ind6pendamment de cette premibre raison, je crois qu'il faut 6galement arriver A la mime conclusion. Dans Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.-G. for Canada (1), Lord Atkin, aux pages 324-5, faisait les d6clarations suivantes dont chacune, a mon avis, a, en l'espice, une & remarquable pertinence:- ;and if Parliament genuinely determines that commercial activities LTEs which can be so described are to be suppressed in the public interest, their Lordships see no reason why Parliament should not make them crimes. "Criminal law" means "the criminal law in its widest sense": A.-G. for Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway Company.

It certainly is not con- O fined to what was criminal by the law of England or of any Province in The power must extend to legislation to make new crimes. Criminal law connotes only the quality of such acts or omissions as are prohibited Fauteux J. under appropriate penal provisions by authority of the State. The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard but one: Is the act prohibited with penal consequences?

Sans doute, la L6gislature, comme le Parlement, a le pouvoir de prohiber et punir la, commission ou l'omission de certains actes; le paragraphe 15 de 1'article 92 y pourvoit dans les termes suivants:- The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section. II faut, cependant, donner un sens aux mots "for enforcing any law of the province made in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section." Et ce qui parait bien distinguer la nature de Faction ou de l'omission ainsi d6fendue et punie par la L6gislature suivant ce pouvoir, et la nature de Faction ou de l'omission d6fendue et punie par le Parlement en vertu de la jurisdiction exclusive qui lui est donn6e, en matibre criminelle, au paragraphe 27 de Particle 91, c'est que, dans le premier cas, la prohibition avec sanction p6nale est autoris~e non comme fin mais uniquement comme moyen d'assurer la r6alisation d'un ordre de choses qu'il est de la comp6tence de la L6gislature de r6glementer et que, de fait, elle r6glemente par la loi mime qui impose la prohibition et la punition; e.g. la Loi des liqueurs alcooliques S.R.Q. c. 255, la Loi des v6hicules moteurs S.R.Q. (1941) c. 142, etc.; alors que, dans le second cas,-sauf lorsqu'il s'agit de 16gislation de r6glementation, e.g. Loi des douanes S.R.C. (1952) c. 58, Loi d'accise S.R.C. (1952) c. 99, oii en raison de la proc6dure prescrite pour la poursuite de la violation, celle-ci est tenue comme criminelle (Loi d'interpr6tation S.R.C. (1952) c. 158, article 28)-la prohibition et la peine sont impos6es, non comme. moyens d'atteindre une fin, d'ordre r6glementaire, d6noncie par la loi les imposant, mais en reconnaissance de ce que requibrent, aux vues du

Parlement, le bien commun, la s6curit6 ou l'ordre moral,

& e.g. le meurtre, au Code criminel, les violations de la Loi sur le dimanche S.R.C. (1952) c. 171, etc. En ces derniers cas, c'est cette prohibition de 1'Etat, accompagn6e de sanction p6nale, qui caractdrise comme criminelle, ainsi que l'indique Lord Atkin dans la citation ci-dessus, l'action ou 1'omission qui en est 1'objet; et c'est ce caract~re que nous retrouvons dans la prohibition, accompagn6e de sanction p6nale, Fauteux J. prescrite par la loi de 1949.

En ce sens, cette l6gislation, comme celle de l'observance du dimanche, est essentiellement d'ordre prohibitif et non d'ordre r6glementaire.

Dans ces vues, ni 1'abstention du Parlement h 16gif6rer sur le point (Ontario Fisheries (1); Union Colliery v. Bryden

(supra), ni restriction territoriale de l'op6ration de la loi incrimin6e (City of Montreal v. Beauvais (supra), au dernier paragraphe h la page 215), ne peuvent valider la loi incriminee.

Je maintiendrais 1'appel et r6tablirais le dispositif du jugement de premibre instance; le tout avec d6pens de toutes les Cours.

J.:-The statutory provision, on which the appeal is raised, reads as follows:and the question is whether its enactment is a valid exercise of provincial legislative power.

The -days mentioned are known as "Holy" or "Feast"

days. They are, as the Oxford dictionary puts it, days set apart for religious observance usually in commemoration of some sacred person or event. The celebration is primarily a festival of consecration and rejoicing, in which the idea of worship is central. As stated in Vol. 9 of the Encyclopaedia

Britannica at p. 127, the celebration might be "grave or gay, carnal as the orgies of Baal or Astarte or spiritual as the worship of a Puritan Sabbath"; but "it is to be regarded as a festival or Holy Day" so long as it is professedly held in the name of religion.

For the purpose here and without reference to their historical development, these recognitions and observances are ordained by religious bodies or churches. The Sabbath, the last day of the week, has been claimed by some teachers to be of Divine fiat and Sunday is, to most Christians, its present day equivalent. In the judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench these two days are somewhat confused; but seems to be clear that Sunday is generally accepted as having been given its memorial character by the resolutions of men. The days enumerated are within the ordination the Roman Catholic church and the observance of most of them is of religious obligation: thus, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Conception day, December 8, in commemoration of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary; Christmas, the day of Christ's birth; New Year's day, His circumcision; Epiphany, January 6, His baptism; Ascension day, His ascent to heaven; All Saints' day, which the memory of martyrs and saints is kept fresh. Their compelled observance by any means involves the acknowledgment of the authority of a church to ascribe to them their special character, and of a duty in relation to them. Being the creation of a church, under a secular legislature and in the circumstances here they possess no significance unless by positive legislative enactment; and such an enactment cannot be taken otherwise than as having that character and that duty as the reason and purpose for the enjoined observance.

Centuries have witnessed the struggle between church and state for supremacy in human government which for England and this country was long ago settled.

In the course of that strife, legislation forbidding or compelling religious professions or celebrations or creating disabilities was the subject of many statutes.

The law relating to Sunday since the Conquest goes back to the reign Edward III and through three centuries to that of Charles I. As an example, by 1 of the first year of the latter's reign, 1625, it was forbidden to have "any meetings of people outside their own parishes on the Lord's Day for any sports or pastimes whatsoever".

Today we see the continuance of such enactments in the Lord's Day Act of Parliament. The association of other "holy" days with Sunday is demonstrated by the history of this legislation.

28 Ed. III, (1354), entitled "Upon which days wooll may be shewed in the staple, and in which not", which remained in force until 1863, treated all holy days alike. In 27 Hen. VI, (1448), a statute still unrepealed, was entitled "Fairs and Markets shall not be holden on Sundays and upon high feast days". In this enactment Parliament was giving effect to the rules of the canon law prescribing the celebration of the principal feast days. In 1464, 4 Ed. IV, 7, repealed in 1863, was entitled "Shoemakers prohibited from selling shoes on Sunday and Holy Days". Following the Reformation, c. 56 Ed. VI, still in force, was entitled "An Acte for the keeping of Hollie Daies and Fastinge Daies". Legislation of this nature was paralleled by the jurisdiction of

Ecclesiastical courts over such offences as heresy, blasphemy, brawling in churches or churchyards, profaning the Sabbath, etc.

Company (1).

The enactments reflecting the religious.

struggles of the 14-18th centuries were of public law within the classification under our constitution of Criminal Law:

they forbade or enjoined certain conduct under pain of punishment'. I cannot distinguish the prohibition here, with sanctions for non-compliance, of carrying on business on days given their special and common characteristic by church law from those of that past. It is in the same category as the law of Sunday observance.

But these considerations show equally that the statute is enacted in relation to religion; it prescribes what is in essence a religious obligation.

We are asked to find that the purpose of the legislation was either to give ease from labour to employees or to prevent the sale of goods as a measure of regulating local trade and commerce; but I regretfully find myself unable to treat either of these contentions as having the slightest basis or support in any pertinent consideration.

In this aspect, for the reasons given by me in the case of Saumur v. City of Quebec (1), as legislation in relation to religion the provision is beyond provincial authority to enact.

I would, therefore, allow the appeal and restore the judgment at trial with costs in the Court of Queen's Bench and in this Court.

:

KELLOCK J.:-On the question as to the true purpose and object of the legislation, the view of the learned trial judge was that it was to compel, so far as it went, the observance of the days mentioned because of their religious significance. In his opinion, the legislation was of the same nature as that relating to the observance of Sunday or the Lord's Day, both having formed part of the criminal law of England in 1774. He therefore concluded that the subject-matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament under head 27 of s. 91 of The British North America Act and was accordingly ultra vires the provincial legislature.

This judgment was reversed on appeal (2), Galipeault C.J., and Barclay J., dissenting, and it is relevant.to consider the grounds upon which that result was reached by the majority. Marchand J. agreed with Casey and Rinfret JJ., but, in doing so, the learned judge appears to have overlooked that the other two learned judges differed from each other upon the vital point as to the object of the legislation. Casey J., purporting to found himself upon a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Atkin in the Proprietary Articles case (3), held that the subjectmatter in question was not criminal law for the reason that the only way of determining what acts are crimes "is by asking whether the particular act has been declared a crime by Parliament," and Parliament had not so declared. The learned judge considered also, with which view Rinfret J., concurred, that while legislation with regard to the observance of the Lord's Day forms part of the criminal law of Canada, the days dealt with by the statute here in question were of an entirely different character "Since the Lord's Day is an institution of the Divine Law and it differs radically from Feast Days which have been brought into existence and can be abolished by the church."

In his opinion, the English legislation with respect to the days

& other than Sunday having been enacted when the Church of England was the "established church", although, no doubt, part of English criminal law, could not be taken to have been introduced into Canada along with legislation dealing with Sunday observance as such a view would bring it into conflict with the freedom of worship granted Roman

Catholics by the Act of 1774, as subjecting the latter to

Church."

The learned judge came to the conclusion that the purpose of the legislation was merely to grant further relief from work by constituting these days holidays. The legislation was, therefore, in his view, of the same nature as the statute it purported to amend, namely, "early closing" legislation, already held intra, vires in Montreal v. Beauvais (1).

Rinfret J., differed from Casey J., on this point.

The learned judge based his conclusion upon the definition of the word "closed" in the by-law, viz: "not open for the sale of merchandise".

In his view an employer could comply with the by-law and at the same time compel his employees to work so long as his store was not open for the purpose of making sales. If, therefore, any employees did not work on such days, that would be because of the volition of their employers and not by the force of the by-law. This consideration, in the opinion of the learned judge, removed from the by-law all character of enforcing religious observance.

It may be observed, however, that the definition in the by-law is not in the statute, and that the learned judge had commenced his inquiry into the question of ultra vires by stating that

Neither of the respondents sought to support this view of the learned judge, the Attorney-General in his factum expressly rejecting it. In the opinion of Barclay J., it was this very interpretation of the statute enabling employers to comply with the by-law by closing their stores so far as sales were concerned but retaining their employees at their & posts, which rendered it impossible to contend that the legislative object was to provide additional days of rest for these employees.

Whether or not this be the correct construction of the legislation it is not necessary to decide, and the statute is not to be construed by some limiting provision in the by-law which the statute itself does not authorize. Even if the J. by-law definition could be said to be declaratory of the statutory intention, it would be erroneous, in my opinion, to say that the interference by the legislation with the ordinary carrying on of the business of a store was not the prime cause of the employees' cessation from work merely because their employers might see fit to put them at some work other than the sale of goods to the public. The legislature is not, in my opinion, to be credited with enacting the legislation from any such standpoint.

The effect designed by the legislature must be taken to have been what the normal and natural effect of the legislation would be, namely, to bring about a cessation of work on the part of employees normally engaged in selling merchandise as well as to prevent the buying of such merchandise by the public.

In the view of Rinfret J., the purpose which the legislature had in enacting the legislation was merely the "r6glementation de la vente de marchandise."

This, however, could equally be said of legislation forbidding the sale of merchandise on Sunday but it has never been held that such a consideration was sufficient to render Sunday observance legislation within the competence of a provincial legislature. It would appear that had the learned judge not been misled by his reference to the definition in the by-law, he would have been of opinion that the legislation had for its object compulsory abstention from work in order to free the employees for the observance of the days mentioned because of their religious significance. He says:

libr6, The learned judge also found difficulty in reaching the view that the legislation was ultra vires for the reason that he considered that in a province where a particular day could not be said to have a religious significance in the minds of any considerable portion of the inhabitants, there would be no ground upon which it could be held to be incompetent for the legislature of such a province so to legislate. His conclusion was that if this be so, then

& With respect, this conclusion hardy follows as it is the purpose and object of the particular legislature in enacting the legislation which is the relevant inquiry in cases of this kind. While the learned Chief Justice gave no expression to the reasons which prompted him to dismiss the appeal, Barclay J., considered that there was no doubt that the object of the legislation was "to enforce the observance by all persons covered by the legislation of the Holy Days or Feast Days therein enumerated at least to the extent of prohibiting shops in carrying on the principal object of their business and preventing the general public from doing their ordinary shopping on those days."

In considering this question, it may first be observed that the days which are dealt with are, like Sundays, all made feast days "of obligation" by canons 1247 and 1248 of the "Codex Juris Canonicus" of the Roman Catholic Church, namely, the day of the circumcision of Our Lord, January 1; Epiphany, January 6; Ascension Day (forty days after Easter Sunday); All Saints Day, November 1; Conception Day, December 8; and Christmas Day, December 25. These days are the only feasts of obligation, other than Sundays, required by the canons to be celebrated on the actual days on which they fall and they are dealt with on exactly the same footing as Sundays. While the celebration of four other feast days is also provided for in canon 1247, their celebration is to take place on the Sunday following the days on which they fall.

It was also established in evidence that the great majority of the population of the Province of Quebec are adherents & of the Roman Catholic faith and it is stated in the factum of the respondent city that it is a matter of public knowledge in the province that "most business men" used to close their establishments on these six days. That factum also contains the statement that the evil at which the impugned legislation is aimed is

Of all these feast days, only one, namely, Ascension Day always falls on a week-day, Thursday. Each of the others falls upon a Sunday approximately once every six or seven years. One would have expected consistently with modern legislative practice, that had the true purpose of the legislation been to provide holidays, it would have provided that where any of these days fell upon a Sunday, stores should be closed the day next previous or following. The legislation does not so provide. It is concerned with the observance of these days as holy days and not simply as holidays. Moreover, the spacing of the six days chosen hardly suggests that rest and recreation was the object of the legislature but rather that the element which all of these days have in common as feast days was the true reason for their selection. Their choice could hardly have been a matter of accident.

In my opinion, these circumstances clearly indicate that the object of the legislation was not to provide additional holidays for persons engaged in the retail trade but, because of the religious significance of the days to large numbers of people in the province, to compel by law their observance by all storekeepers to the extent at least of prohibiting the buying and selling of merchandise on the days mentioned. That being the true legislative purpose, the contention of the appellants that the subject-matter falls within the field of s. 91(27) must next be examined.

In the passage in the judgment of Lord Atkin in the Proprietary Articles case (1), to which Casey J., referred, his lordship stated that

In the view that the subject-matter of the legislation here in question did not form part of the criminal law of England introduced into Canada, it is sought to found upon this statement the conclusion that because Parliament has not legislated on the subject, head 27 of s. 91 does not apply.

This was, as already indicated, the view of Casey J.

It is, however, trite to say that jurisdiction conferred by s. 91(27), or any of the other enumerated heads of the section, does not depend upon its exercise by Parliament. This needs no elaboration.

It will be found that Lord Atkin was laying down nothing to the contrary but merely pointing out that the "domain of criminal jurisprudence", words used by Viscount Haldane in the Board of Commerce case (1), was not fixed.

While the subject-matter of Sunday observance has a legislative history in Canada, there is also a legislative history of both Sunday and religious holy day observance in

England going back to early days.

By the Act 1448, 27 Hen. VI, 5, there is expressly included among the "high and principal Feasts", the

Ascension, the Assumption, All Saints Day, and all Sundays, upon all of which the Act prohibits the holding of fairs and markets and the showing of goods and merchandise.

In

1551, by and 6 Ed. VI, c. 3, entitled, "An Act for the keeping Holidays and Fasting-Days", all Sundays, the day of the Feast of the Circumcision (New Year's Day), the

Epiphany, the Purification of the Blessed Virgin, the Ascension, All Saints, the Nativity, were enjoined to be kept

"Holy-days" and that "none other Day shall be kept and commanded to be kept Holy-day, or to abstain from lawful bodily Labour".

In 1762, by 2 Geo. III, 15, s. 7, fish carriages were permitted to travel on Sundays and holy days. Again, in

1833, by 3 and 4 Win. IV, 42, s. 43, it was enacted that none of the days mentioned in the Act of 5 and 6 Ed. VI should be observed in the courts except Sundays, the Day of the Nativity, the three following days and Monday and

Tuesday in Easter week.

It may be observed that the Act of 1448 is still in force in England, having been amended in 1850 by 13-14 Vict., c. 23, and again in 1948 by 11-12 Geo. VI, c. 62, s. 1, schedule 1, when it was given the short title "The Sunday Fairs Act 1448". Similarly, the statute 5-6 Ed. VI, c. 3, was amended as to its title by the Statute Law Revision Act of 1948, 11-12 Geo. VI, c. 62, schedule 2, the title being "The Holy Days and Fasting Days Act, 1551". By the 1948 statute also, the statute 2 Geo. III, c. 15, was repealed and the Act J. 29 Car. II, c. 7, schedule 1, was amended in a minor respect. This latter Act, in the opinion of Fitzpatrick C.J., in Ouimet v. Bazin (1), was "part of the criminal law of England declared to be in force by the 'Quebec Act', 14 Geo. III, c. 83", while in the view of Anglin J., as he then was, in the same case at p. 528:

In the work referred to the authors include in their list the Acts of 1448 and 1677.

In Lord's Day Alliance v. Attorney General for Manitoba (2), Lord Blanesburgh pointed out that for many years after 1867 it had been apparently assumed in Canada that the power of legislating with reference to Sunday observance within a Canadian province was by s. 92 of the Act exclusively committed to the provincial legislatures either under heads 13 or 16, and that appropriate penalties for non-observance might be enacted under head 15, but by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Attorney General for Ontario v. Hamilton Street Ry. Co. (3), it was authoritatively established that such was not the case, the Ontario statute of 1897, c. 246, being held to be ultra vires the province. In the course of his judgment, Lord Blanesburgh pointed out the difference between legislation having for its object the non-observance of Sunday, as the Judicial Committee held was the case with regard to the Manitoba statute there in question, as distinct from the assumption of power on the part of a provincial legislature to enforce by penalties the "observance" of that day. It is a matter for comment that at the time of the decision in the Hamilton Street Railway case there was no legislation by Parliament on the subject-matter.

Following the decision of 1903, this court in Ouimet v. Bazin, supra, held that a Quebec statute prohibiting theatrical performances on Sunday was not of the character of local, municipal or police regulation but legislation designed to create offences against criminal law and consequently not within the provincial sphere.

Further, in Corporation de la Paroisse de St. Prosper.v. Rodrigue a by-law of the respondent municipality prohibiting the opening of restaurants on Sunday and the sale therein of any merchandise was declared ultra vires on the ground that such by-law was a direct dealing with Sunday observance, and therefore, an invasion of the domain of criminal law.

If, as Fitzpatrick C.J., and Anglin J., as he then was, considered in Ouimet's case, the statute 29 Car II, c. 7, was part of the common law of England introduced into this country in 1774, it is perhaps difficult to conclude that the legislation of 1448 and 1551, in so far as it enjoined the sale of merchandise or the doing of bodily labour, was not also introduced at the same time.

As already pointed out, Sundays were treated by this legislation on no different footing from any of the other days specified therein, all being intended to be observed in precisely the same way as holy days.

It is, of course, no objection that the post-rgformation legislation was enacted at a time when the Church of England had, legislatively speaking, taken the place of the Roman Catholic Church in England. This fact could not render the legislation inappropriate in Canada in 1774, nor constitute any conflict with the free grant of the exercise of their faith to the King's Roman Catholic subjects in Canada conferred by that Act, except in so far as such legislation might be said to call for the performance of anything inconsistent with the free exercise of that faith. In so far as the legislation enjoined what the canon law enjoined, it could have no such effect.

It is, however, not necessary, in my opinion, to decide the question as to whether the legislation with regard to days & other than Sundays was or was not introduced into Canada. The trial judge did not do so. The basis of the appellants' submission is that having regard to the existing state of the law in England in 1867, the division of jurisdiction made by ss. 91 and 92 of The British North America Act was on the footing of what would be understood by an English legislature at that time as falling within the domain of "Criminal law". There was then an existing body of law in England with relation not only to Sundays but to feast days which was undoubtedly part of English criminal law and which became, in my opinion, exclusively part of the jurisdiction conferred upon Parliament by s. 91(27).

Even if the true view be that this body of law, apart from Sunday observance legislation, was not introduced into Canada in 1774, legislation after 1867 upon that subject-matter could amount to nothing more than an attempt to give the force of law to ideas of religious morality then current in England and sanctioned by the criminal law. If this is to be done, it can only be done, in my opinion, by Parliament. That legislation prohibiting the sale of merchandise on Sunday has always been recognized in Canada, as in England, as enacted upon moral or religious grounds, is well illustrated by the Statute of Lower Canada of 1805, 4-5 Geo. III, c. 10, which contains the recital that it was enacted "in order, therefore, to remedy such immoral and irreligious practices". If Sunday observance legislation was designed to enforce under penalty the observance of a day by reason of its religious significance, there is no basis for distinction, in my opinion, historically or othewise, with respect to legislation directed to the enforcement of the observance of other days from the standpoint of their significance in any religious faith.

Legislation, to employ the language of Duff J., as he then was, in Ouimet's case at p. 526:

may well be of a different character.

With respect to the view expressed in the court below that Sunday is of "divine" origin, whereas the other feast days originated with the church, it would appear that, for present purposes at least, there is no such distinction. Both indiscriminately derive their origin from the Christian faith. While Sunday is often and popularly referred to as the Sabbath, the original Sabbath was, of course, not that day & at all. Blackstone long ago pointed out (vol. 4, p. 63) that Sunday became a special object of the attention of Parlia- " V. ment not only because of its significance in the Christian religion but because the keeping of one day in seven "as a time of relaxation and refreshment as well as for public worship, is of admirable service to a state, considered merely as a civil institution". No such twofold significance attaches to any of the six days mentioned in the present legislation. Their significance is based entirely on their religious aspect. To citizens of a faith other than Christian or of no faith, they have no significance. Accordingly, the enforcement of their observation as such by legislation of the character here in question can only be from the standpoint of the religious faith of those citizens to whom they have such significance and legislation from that standpoint or for that purpose is, in my opinion, competent only to Parliament.

Even if it could be said that legislation of the character here in question is not properly "criminal law" within the meaning of s. 91(27), it would, in my opinion, still be beyond the jurisdiction of a provincial legislature as being legislation with respect to freedom of religion dealt with by the statute of 1852, 14-15 Vict., c. 175, Can.

In my opinion, therefore, the learned trial judge reached the right conclusion upon proper considerations and his judgment ought not to have been disturbed. I would therefore allow the appeal with costs here and below.

Choquette & Berthiaume.