Chaput v. Romain

and

ROGER

(Defendants) ...

LINDEN

CHAR- RESPONDENTS; AND

THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

QUEBEC ...................

OF

INTERVENANT; AND

THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF

CAN AD A .......................

INTERVENANT. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH,

APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

Acting on orders from their superior, the respondents, members of the provincial police, broke up an admittedly orderly religious meeting conducted by a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses in the appellant's house, seized a Bible, some hymn books and a number of booklets on religious subjects, and ordered those present to disperse. The entry and the seizure were made without a warrant. No charge was at any time laid against any of the participants in8luding the appellant and the items seized were not returned.

The appellant took action against the three police officers for damages and for the value of the articles seized. This action was dismissed by the trial judge and by the Court of Appeal.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the damages assessed at $2,000. Per Kerwin C.J., Taschereau and Estey JJ.: The respondents committed an illegal act: a violation of ss. 199 and 200 of the Criminal Code, by obstructing a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses in officiating at a religious meeting.

The Provincial Police Force and Liquor Police Force Act and The Magistrate's Privilege Act afforded the respondents no protection. These Acts do not relieve the authors of a delict or quasi-delict from the Kerwin C.J., Taschereau, Rand, Kellock, Estey, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux and Abbott JJ.

liability resulting from Art. 1053 C.C.

Moreover, they grant certain privileges only when good faith is established by the evidence, which is not the case here. They, therefore, do not apply.

As the action of the respondents was forbidden by law, the defence of reasonable and probable cause cannot be invoked, nor in this particular case, can the defence that the respondents acted by order of a superior officer be raised. The appellant had the indisputable right to convene such a meeting at his house. In this country, there is no state religion and all denominations enjoy the same degree of freedom of speech and thought.

The action instituted by the appellant is not barred by any Quebec statute, and the appellant is entitled to moral damages.

In the Province of Quebec, exemplary or punitive damages are not recognized.

Damages that may be awarded in such a case as the present are of an exclusively compensatory nature.

Per Rand and Kellock JJ.: The Magistrate's Privilege Act and the Police Force Act provided no substantive defence to the actions of the respondents.

Furthermore, from a procedural point of view, the Magistrate's Privilege Act had no application, since there was not only a total absence of authority for the conduct of the respondents but such conduct was specifically prohibited by law.

Per Locke J.: The actions of the respondents were wholly unlawful and criminal in their nature.

The Provincial Police Force Act and the Magistrate's Privilege Act had nothing to do with the substantive questions raised in the action, and Art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure was equally inapplicable. The appellant was entitled to recover substantial general damages. Per Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.: There was nothing to suggest that any violation of the law had been, was actually or about to be committed by anyone.

By no text of law has it been sought to justify the authority assumed, in the circumstances, by the respondents. In itself, the intervention of the respondents was, at the least, unlawful if not criminal, and they must answer for the damages resulting therefrom. The operation of the Magistrate's Privilege Act is conditioned upon the existence of good faith and, in its substance, does not constitute a bar to the responsibility decreed under Art. 1053 C.C.

The provisions of this special law imply, on the contrary, the application of Art. 1053.

Per Abbott J.: The respondents were acting in good faith and in the execution of their functions when they entered the appellant's house, as the meeting being held there was a public meeting advertised as such.

When they dispersed this meeting however, they could no longer be considered in good faith and in the execution of their functions.

They had no right to disperse such a meeting, and the Magistrate's Privilege Act provided them with no defence either on the merits or from a procedural point of view. The appellant was, therefore, entitled to moral damages.

J.:-Le demandeur-appelant est un ministre du culte des T6moins de J6hovah.

Le 4 septembre 1949, un autre ministre qui professe la mime religion, se rendit & Chapeau, et chez le demandeur, prisida A une c6rimonie religieuse. Dans le domicile de 1'appelant, oil 6taient r6unies environ trente ou quarante personnes, il exposa les doctrines auxquelles il croyait, lut certains passages de la Bible, et la preuve ne r6vile pas qu'il n'y. ait rien eu de dit qui fut s6ditieux. Tout se passa dans le calme le plus complet. La r6union 6tait convoqu6e pour deux heures de 1'aprismidi, mais trois-quarts d'heure plus tard, les trois d6fendeurs, membres de la Police provinciale et du service de la circulation -de la Voirie, firent irruption chez l'appelant, ordonn&rent A tous de quitter les lieux, conduisirent le ministre invit6 Gotthold h Pembroke, et s'emparbrent de la Bible et de toute la litt6rature qui 6tait sur la table, pris de laquelle parlait l'orateur. Tous ob6irent h l'odre donn6, et se dispershrent paisiblement.

Quelque temps apris, le demandeur Chaput, propri6taire de la maison oil se tenait la r6union, institua une action contre les trois policiers, r6clama des dommages au montant -de $5,000.00 en outre de $5.15, valeur des pamphlets saisis. La Cour Sup6rieure a rejet6 cette action, et la Cour du Banc de la Reine (1) a unanimement confirm6 ce jugement.

Le Juge de premibre instance est arriv6 A la conclusion que la responsabilit6 des trois d6fendeurs n'6tait pas engag6e.

Apris avoir cit6 Particle 7 des Statuts Revis6s de la province de Qu6bec, 1941, c. 18, qui est la "Loi regissant les priviliges des Juges de Paix, des Magistrats et autres Officiers, remplissant des pouvoirs publics", il a d6cid6 que les intim6s 6taient de bonne foi, alors qu'ils agissaient sur l'ordre d'un officier sup6rieur. Cet article se Taschereau J. lit ainsi:- La Cour du Banc de la Reine a d6cid6 qu'il n'y avait pas mal jug6 dans le jugement rendu par la Cour Sup6rieure et a confirm6 ce jugement.

M. le Juge Bissonnette, qui a 6crit le jugement unanime de la Cour, s'inspire de 1'article ci-dessus, et dit que cette disposition mettait sur les 6paules de 1'appelant le fardeau de prouver la mauvaise foi des intim6s de mime que, sans cette loi particulibre, il lui incombait d'4tablir absence de cause raisonnable et probable. Il conclut que sur les deux points, l'appelant a nettement failli A cette thche, et que ceci suffit pour disposer du litige.

Dans leur factum, les intim6s ont de nouveau invoqu6 cet article 7 du chapitre 18 des Statuts Revis6s de Qu6bec, et en plus le chapitre 47 des mimes Statuts Revises qui est la "Loi de la Sf^ret6 Provinciale", mais h 1'audition leur procureur a justement affirm6 qu'aucune de ces deux lois n'accordait d'immunit6 h ses clients et a refus4 de s'en pr6valoir. En effet, la "Loi des Privil6ges des Officiers Publics" ne va pas au deli que de dire que les officiers ont droit a la protection et aux privilkges accord6s par la prdsente loi, quand ius ont agi de bonne foi; mais les privildges accord6s par la loi sont tris limitis.

11s n'excusent en aucune manibre la responsabilit6 d6lictuelle ou quasi-d6lictuelle qui rdsulte de 1'artice 1053 du Code Civil. Leur cadre est tris restreint. Ainsi, les officiers publics mentionn6s h la loi ont droit au b6n6fice de larticle 88 du Code de proc6dure civile, qui veut qu'ils ne peuvent 6tre recherch6s en justice iraison d'un acte dommageable fait dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, h moins qu'avis de cette poursuite ne leur soit donn6 au moms un mois avant 1'6mission de 1'assignation. Apris r6ception de cet avis, ils peuvent offrir de payer une compensation A la partie 16s6e.

Si l'offre est refus6e, elle peut 6tre renouvelie de nouveau et consignde en Cour, et l'action devra 6tre rejet6e quant au surplus, si elle est trouv6e suffisante. De plus, 1'action doit 6tre institutie dans les six mois qui suivent la commission de l'infraction. En outre, avant Taschereau J.d'intenter une action ou de prendre une proc6dure contre un juge de paix pour dommages-int6r~ts h raison des actes faits par lui dans 1'ex6cution de ses fonctions, et avant de pr&senter une requite pour obtenir un bref de certiorari ou un bref de prohibition, le demandeur est tenu de d6poser au greffe de la Cour un montant de $50.00 pour garantir des frais qui peuvent r6sulter de ces procidures. Si le demandeur qui poursuit un officier public, ne se conforme pas aux rigles ci-dessus, les dispositions de l'article 177 et suivants du Code de proc6dure s'appliquent, mutatis mutandis. Enfin, au cours de l'instance sur motion -du d6fendeur, le juge peut ordonner au demandeur de produire un d6p6t additionnel dont il fixe le montant, et 1'instance est alors suspendue jusqu'A ce que le d6p6t additionel ordonn6 par le juge ou le tribunal ait 6t6 fait. Un article du mime chapitre veut qu'il ne peut 6tre adjug6 de frais contre un juge de paix dans aucune instance sur un bref de certiorari ou de prohibition, a moms que sur preuve de mauvaise foi du juge de paix, le tribunal n'en ordonne autrement. Il me semble clair que cette loi ne prothge pas les intimis, et qu'ils ne peuvent l'invoquer pour s'excuser ou justifier les actes qu'ils ont poss. Tout ce que dit la loi, c'est que quand des officiers publics ont agi de bonne foi, dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils ne beneficient que des priviliges accordes par ce statut sp6cial.

I n'y a pas d'immunitg contre les dilits ou quasi-ddlits, et c'est en cons6quence ailleurs que les intim6s doivent chercher leur justification, si elle existe.

La "Loi de la Sfiret6 Provinciale" ne s'applique pas davantage. Elle d6termine les devoirs et les fonctions de la Stiretd, les services qu'elle doit rendre, la direction qui lui a 6t6 impos6e, sa composition, ainsi que les conditions d'admission, de mime que les riglements qui peuvent 8tre adoptis. Nulle part y trouve-t-on une clause dont 1'effet serait de disculper un officier public qui commet un d6lit ou un quasi-d6lit, qu'il agisse ou non dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions.

L'appelant a voulu soutenir que ces deux lois 6taient ultra vires des pouvoirs de la L6gislature, mais sur le Banc, cette Cour, parce qu'elle pensait que ces lgislations n'avaient pas d'application h la question essentielle, a refus6 d'entendre des arguments qui n'auraient servi qu'k aider h la d6ter- J mination de questions abstraites et acad6miques. Les d6fendeurs ont en plus pr6tendu qu'en se rendant h Chapeau comme ils l'ont fait, ils ont agi avec cause raisonnable et probable, et qu'ils n'ont qu'ob6i aux instructions de leur officier sup6rieur.

Ici, un bref examen de la preuve s'impose. Les faits sont substantiellement les suivants:-L'un des d6fendeurs, Roger Chartrand, au cours du mois de septembre 1949, alors qu'il faisait partie du corps que l'on appelle la Police judiciaire, se tenait en permanence dans le district de Pontiac. La preuve r6vile qu'il fut inform6 par quelques personnes et par le cur6 Harrington de Chapeau, qu'il devait se tenir chez 1'appelant, le dimanche h deux heures de l'apr&s-midi, le 4 septembre 1949, une r6union des Timoins de J6hovah. Il t6l6phona h son officier superieur h Montr6al, le sergent Perreau, qui lui dit de se rendre chez l'appelant, de disperser 1'assembl6e et de saisir tous les pamphlets qui se trouveraient sur les lieux. Il se fit accompagner des deux autres intim6s Young et Romain, tous deux attach6s h la Stret6 provinciale en qualit6 d'afficiers de circulation, et qui, pour les fins judiciaires, relivent de Chartrand. Rendus & Chapeau, vers 2:45 heures P.M. les trois officiers se rendirent chez l'appelant et stationnbrent leur voiture dans sa cour derribre sa maison.

Pendant que Romain v6rifiait le num6ro de la licence de l'automobile de 1'appelant, ce dernier sortit de sa maison, et on lui demanda s'il y avait une assembl6e h l'int6rieur. Ayant regu une r6ponse affirmative, ils demand6rent la permission d'entrer, qui leur fut imm&diatement -donn6e. Les intim6es se tinrent debout dans la salle durant quelques minutes, et Chartrand demanda alors h Gotthold qui 6tait le pr6dicateur, de discontinuer 1'assembl~e.

Il s'empara d'une Bible, et avec l'aide de ses deux compagnons il saisit tous les autres pamphlets. Tous les auditeurs se lev&rent et quittirent paisiblement la maison. n'y eut aucun trouble, aucune manifestation.

Quant h Gotthold, on le conduisit en automobile A Desjardinsville, afin qu'il puisse prendre le traversier pour se rendre h Pembroke et retourner en Ontario.

e a

Je n'ai pas de doute que les trois intim6s ont pos6 un acte J.hautement repr6hensible, de nature h blesser profondiment le demandeur-appelant. En effet, il avait le droit indiscutable de convoquer dans sa demeure, l'assemblie oa se sont r6unies environ quarante personnes, et d'y convier Gotthold en sa qualit6 de pr6dicateur. Dans notre pays, il n'existe pas de religion d'Etat. Personne n'est tenu d'adh6rer h une croyance quelconque. Toutes les religions sont sur un pied d'6galit6, et tous les catholiques comme d'ailleurs tous les protestants, les juifs, ou les autres adherents des diverses d6nominations religieuses, ont la plus entibre libert6 de penser comme ils le d6sirent. La conscience de chacun est une affaire personnelle, et l'affaire de nul autre.

Il serait d6solant de penser qu'une majorit6 puisse imposer ses vues religieuses A une minorit6. Ce serait une erreur ficheuse de croire qu'on sert son pays ou sa religion, en refusant dans une province, h une minorit6, les mimes droits que l'on revendique soi-m~me avec raison, dans une autre province. Mais dans les circonstances de la pr6sente cause, on ne faisait qu'exposer des doctrines religieuses, sans 'doute contraires aux vues de la majoriti des citoyens de la localit6, mais I'opinion d'une minorit6 a droit au meme respect que celle de la majorit6.

Les avocats des intims ont soutenu que le 4 septembre 1949, date oa la r6union fut dispersie, la Cour d'Appel de la province de Qu6bec avait dans une cause de Boucher v. Le Roi (1), pratiquement d6clar6 hors la loi les T6moins de J6hovah.

Ceci constitue une interpr6tation erron6e du jugement rendu dans cette cause, d'ailleurs infirm6 par cette Cour (2). Seul un certain pamphlet distribu6 -dans la province de Qu6bec a 6t6 d6clar6 siditieux par la Cour d'Appel, mais ceci 6videmment ne pouvait justifier qui que ce soit de g6n6raliser, et de conclure qu'on doit n6cessairement presumer une intention s6ditieuse h toutes les c6rimonies religieuses de cette secte.

A moins qu'il faille se baser sur d'autres raisons que j'examinerai bient6t, pour en arriver a une opinion contraire, il est certain que 1'appelant a droit h un d6dommagement pour le pr6judice subi. En vertu de 1053 C.C. l'obligation de r6parer d6coule de deux 61ments essentiels: un fait dommageable subi par la victime, et la faute de 1'auteur du d6lit ou du quasi-d6lit.

Mme si aucun dommage p6cuniaire n'est prouv6, il existe quand m6me, non pas un droit a des dommages punitifs ou exemplaires, que la loi de Quebec ne connait pas, mais certainement un droit A des dommages moraux. La loi civile ne punit jamais l'auteur d'un d6lit ou d'un quasi-ddlit; elle accorde une compensation a la victime pour le tort qui lui a 6t6 caus6. La punition est exclusivement du ressort des tribunaux correctionnels. French v. H6tu (1), Guibord v. Dallaire (2), Goyer v. Duquette (3), Duhaime v. Talbot (4). Le dommage moral, comme tout dommages-int6rits accords par un tribunal, a exclusivement un caractbre compensatoire.

Il comprend certainement le pr6judice souffert dans la pr6sente cause. Il s'entend en effet de toute atteinte aux droits extrapatrimoniaux, comme le droit h la libert6, h 1'honneur, au nom, h la libert6 de conscience ou de parole. Les tribunaux ne peuvent refuser de 1'accorder, comme par exemple, si les sentiments religieux ou patriotiques ont t blessis. (Dalloz, Nouveau R6pertoire, Vol. 3, page 831). Mais les intim6s pritendent que m~me si leur acte est repr6hensible, ils ont agi avec une cause raisonnable et probable, et suivant les ordres d'un officier sup6rieur. Le cas qui nous est soumis doit-il 6tre assimil6 au cas de d6nonciation malicieuse? Dans la province de Qu6bec, une jurisprudence constante et unanime veut que lorsque la preuve r6vile l'existence de cette cause raisonnable et probable, et c'est sur le demandeur que repose le fardeau de prouver son absence, la victime ne peut r~clamer. Greffard v. Girard (5), Desmarteau v. Lord (6), Bowie v. Bolan (7), at

Q.R. Roy v. Silver (1), Plouffe v. Leblanc (2), C6t6 v. C6t6 (3), Normandeau v. Leroux (4), Renaud v. Dion (5), Lggard v. Gignac (6), Frawley v. Keefier (7).

]Mais ici, il existe une distinction qu'il est imp6ratif de faire. I ne s'agit nullement en effet d'un cas de d6nonciation malicieuse, oil, m~me si la victime souffre d'un pr~judice, comme cons6quence d'un acte erron6, 1'auteur du quasi-ddlit ne peut 6tre recherch6 en dommages. Si ce dernier a agi avec cause raisonnable et probable; lorsque 1'acte dommageable est pos6 comme r6sultat d'informations qu'il a reques d'une autre personne, en qui il a justement raison de mettre sa confiance, il ne commet pas de faute, et sa responsabilit6 civile n'est pas engag6e.

Mais il y a faute toutes les fois que 1'acte dommageable est express6ment difendu par la loi (Dalloz, Dictionnaire de Droit, 1951, p. 1108), et dans le cas qui nous occupe la violation de la propri6t6 du demandeur-appelant 6tait une contravention des dispositions du Code Criminel. En effet, en vertu des articles 199 et 200 C. Cr. est coupable d'une offense et passible de deux ans d'emprisonnement, celui qui cherche h d~tourner ou empiche ill6galement un eccl6siastique ou autre pasteur de c6l6brer l'office divin, ou d'officier par ailleurs dans une 6glise, chapelle, temple, maison d'6cole ou autre lieu servant au culte pulic.

Il me semble impossible de dire en cons6quence que les intim6s ont agi avec cause raisonnable quand un statut leur interdit de poser 1'acte qui leur reproch6.

De plus, on ne saurait invoquer le fait que les intim6s auraient agi en ob6issance h Pordre d'un sup6rieur. L'ob6issance h l'ordre d'un sup6rieur n'est pas toujours une excuse. Le subordonn6 ne doit pas agir inconsid6r6ment, et quand il se rend raisonnablement compte du non-fond6 des faits qui ont provoqu6 Fordre qu'il a regu, il doit reculer. (Mazeaud, Responsabilit4 Civile, Vol. 1, 4e ed. page 451) (Planiol et Ripert et Esmein, Les Obligations, Vol. 6 page 768). C'est bien le cas de 'intim6 Chartrand. En arrivant sur les lieux, les trois intimbs n'ont fait aucune enquite, n'ont lu aucun des pamphlets, n'ont rien vu ni rien entendu qui fut s~ditieux ni mime contraire a la loi. Evidemment, ils ont dfi se rendre compte facilement de la futilit6 de la plainte du cure Harrington. Ils n'avaient aucune information s6rieuse pour justifier leur acte, et je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent ftre excusis d'avoir agi comme ils l'ont fait.

Mais ceci ne dispose pas du litige. En vertu du chapitre 18 des Statuts Refondus de 1941, personne ne peut intenter une action en dommages-int6rits contre un officier public sans lui donner un avis, conform6ment aux dispositions de l'article 88 du Code de proc6dure civile. Or, cet article stipule que cet avis de la poursuite doit lui 6tre donna au moms un mois avant l'6mission de 1'assignation.

De plus, nulle action ne peut ftre intent6e contre lui, h moins qu 'elle ne soit commencie dans les six mois qui suivent la commission de l'infraction.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le quasi-d6lit aurait 6t6 commis le 4 septembre 1949.

Avis de cette action a 6t6 donna le 4 octobre 1949, h Romain et A Young, mais n'a t6 donn6 h Chartrand que le 18 mars 1950.

Le bref a 6t6 dirig4 contre Young, Romain et Albert Chartrand de Buckingham. II a td signifi6 A ce dernier le 9 d6cembre 1949, A Young le 10 d6cembre, et h Romain le 12 d6cembre de la m&me ann6e. Evidemment, le demandeur s'est apergu qu'il avait commis une erreur, car l'officier de la Police provinciale ne s'appelait pas Albert Chartrand, mais se nommait bien Roger Chartrand de Gracefield. Le demandeur a demand6 permission d'amender son bref pour y substituer le nom de Roger au lieu d'Albert, et M. le Juge Rh6aume a rendu jugement sur cette motion le 20 mars 1951. Ce n'est que le 7 avril de la mime annee que 1'action a 6t6 signifi6e au pr6sent d6fendeur Roger Chartrand. Comme l'offense a 6t0 commise le 4 septembre, il s'ensuit que l'action contre Roger Chartrand, si on doit appliquer le chapitre 18 des Statuts Refondus de 1941, serait prescrite, vu qu'elle n'a pas t6 signifide tel que le veut la loi dans les six mois qui suivent la commission de l'infraction. Le procureur du demandeur alligue qu'il s'agit d'un quasi-d6lit et qu'en vertu des dispositions de l'article 1106 du Code Civil, il y aura solidarit6, et que dans le cas de solidarit6 l'action intent6e contre l'un ou deux des auteurs solidaires, interrompt la prescription quant aux autres. (Code Civil 2222, 2224 et 2230).

Ce raisonnement me semble erron6. En premier lieu, pour des raisons que j'expliquerai plus tard, je ne crois pas que le chapitre 18 des Statuts Refondus de Taschereau J.1941 s'applique; mais mime s'il s'appliquait, la prescription nexisterait pas, car il s'agit dans le cas qui nous occupe d'une dichgance d'action et non pas de la prescription. Cette d6chiance d'action est qualifi6e de d6lais prefix, et ces d6lais sont impartis par la loi, et ont un caract&re fatal. Une fois 6coul6s, le droit ne peut plus 6tre exerc6, et 1'acte ne peut plus 6tre accompli.

Ces d6lais prefix sont regis par un tout autre statut que celui de la prescription. Ils ne comportent ni suspension, ni interruption; par d6finition mime, ils doivent s'appliquer au jour dit, sans que la d6chiance puisse . tre diffir6e, et en cons6quence, la rigle contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio est sans application. (Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Frangais, Vol, 2, page 528) (Dalloz, Jurisprudence G6n6rale, 1934, recueil p6riodique, 2&me partie, page 33).

Mais comme je l'ai signal6 pr6c6demment, je ne crois pas que le chapitre 18 des Statuts Revis6s de 1941 trouve son application, et que le d6fendeur Chartrand puisse invoquer en sa faveur la d6ch6ance de six mois. En effet, en vertu de Particle 7, un officier public agissant dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions, ne peut b6nificier des priviliges de ce statut, qu'en autant qu'il a agi de bonne foi. S'il 6tait de mauvaise foi, ce n'est pas cette loi sp6ciale, mais la loi g6n6rale qui doit r6gir le cas qui nous int6resse.

La bonne foi, c'est en quelques mots un 6tat d'esprit consistant A croire par erreur que 1'on agit conform6ment au droit, et dont la loi tient compte pour prot6ger 1'int6ress6 contre les consdquences de 1'irrigularit6 de son acte. se peut bien, mais il est permis d'en douter, qu'au d6but il y ait eu chez les intim6s une apparence de bonne foi, mais je ne puis croire h la possibilit6 de sa persistance, si elle a jamais exist6.

Il me semble en effet inexplicable qu'un officier public investi d'assez graves responsabilit6s, et h qui incombe le devoir, non pas de remplir un r6le de pers6cuteur, mais bien d'appliquer les lois du pays, ne se soit pas apergu quand il est arriv6 sur les lieux, que tout se passait dans la plus stricte 16galit6. La situation eut peut-6tre 6t6 diff6rente s'ils eussent t6 les porteurs d'un mandat, mais ici, Chartrand, instigateur de cette malheureuse randonn6e, ne pouvait pas ne pas constater, comme ses compagnons d'ailleurs, qu'ils avaient commis une erreur, et c'6tait une n6gligence engendrant une faute que de persister comme ils al. I'ont fait, malgr6 la constatation 6vidente de 1'absence de J toute ill6galit6, A saisir les pamphlets et A ordonner 1'expulsion des gens que le demandeur avait l6gitimement convi6s dans sa demeure. Ils ont pos6 un acte fautif, et ils doivent en subir les cons6quences.

Certainement, ils ne peuvent 6tre absous. Ils n'avaient aucune justification de disperser cette paisible assembl6e.

Vu 1'absence de bonne foi, 1'article 7 du chapitre 18 S.R.Q. 1941, ne s'applique donc pas, mais c'est bien Particle 2261 du Code Civil qui ne d6nie F'action qu'aprbs deux ans de la commission du quasi-d6lit, qui doit nous gouverner. Or, comme le quasi-d6lit a 6t6 commis le 4 septembre 1949, et que laction a 6t6 signifide & Chartrand le 7 avril 1951, soit moins de deux ans apris le fait dommageable, il n'y a pas de d6ch6ance.

Quant au demandeur, il a subi des dommages moraux, pour lesquels il a droit A une r6paration.

Evidemment, comme dans toutes les causes de ce genre, il est difficile d'en d6terminer exactement le montant, ainsi que s'il s'agissait de dommages p6cuniaires. Les tribunaux, dans des cas semblabes, doivent agir comme un jury, et en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances qui ont entour6 la commission du quasi-d6lit ainsi que du pr6judice souffert, is doivent accorder un montant suffisant pour justement compenser la victime, mais. pas si 6lev4, qu'il soit disproportionn6 aux dommages subis.

Je crois que les fins de la justice seront 6quitablement servies en fixant h $2000.00 le montant du pr6judice moral souffert par le demandeur. L'appel doit donc 6tre maintenu jusqu'h concurrence de $2000.00 contre les d6fendeurs-intim&s, conjointment et solidairement, avec d6pens de toutes les cours. Il n'y aura pas d'ordonnance quant aux frais des intervenants.

J.:-On the afternoon of Sunday, September 4, 1949, the three respondents, members, in uniform, of the provincial police, entered the yard of the appellant's premises at the village of Chapeau, Quebec. Within the house, a religious meeting, attended by some thirty people invited by the appellant, was being conducted by a Mr. Gotthold, a minister of

"Jehovah's Witnesses", the denomination to which the appellant belonged. On observ- J. ing the respondents, the appellant went outside and on being asked if they might enter his house, consented. The respondents went inside and, according to them, after observing the proceedings for approximately two minutes, Chartrand told the minister, then reading from the Bible, to discontinue, that the meeting would have to be broken up and those present dispersed.

Gotthold's request to be allowed to finish, which he said would take some twenty minutes, met with refusal, and he was compelled to stop. The respondents than seized the Bible Gotthold had been reading, the hymn books, a number of booklets on religious subjects published by Jehovah's Witnesses and the collection box, dispersed the meeting, and conducted Gotthold to the ferry which plies across the Ottawa River between Chapeau and Pembroke, Ontario, upon which they placed him. No charge of any kind was at any time laid against any of the participants in the meeting and none the items seized have ever been returned.

Later the same day the respondents reported their action to the Director of the Provincial Police. This reads as follows:

Instruction

Et Appres avoir appele le Bureau de Montreal et sous les Instruction du SGT. Perreault de Montreal me disan de rencontre les deux Officier de la circulation qui sont L. Yong. et E. Romin de Fort Coulonge. et me donnat les Ordre comme suit. de se rendre a Chapeau pour 01.00 pm. de la meme journ~e et de tout saisir la papetrie et tout ce qui aurait puis Kellock J. servir dans cette assemble. en ce qui concerne la Jehovoh Religion. et la meme journee sous les ordre tel que donne j'ai rencontre les deux Officier de Circulation tout les trois nous somme parti pour chapeau. a notre arrive a chapeau nous somme dirige ver cette endroit C'est a dire Chez MR Eseymir Chaput et de la sous la Permission de Mr. Chaput nous somme entre dans la Maison et a ce Moment la MR. Gootthold F.A. etait en plin Coeur de son assemble appres S'etre Identifie Comme officier de la Police et bien poliment on lui demande de sesse L'assemble immediatement a ce moment il refuse mais Appres lui avoiu fait comprendre que C'etait les ordre que nous avion recu il Consenti Mais il ne voulait pas Q'il N'ait pas de cau contre lui. et nous avon tout saisie tout les livres qui avait dans la maison.

les Livres Saisies. etait une Sainte bible (I) livre Conspiracy aigainst democracy. et 48 libres de la Jehovoh et une boite Kindom Contribution. et appers avoir tout saisie nous avon demande a MR Gootthold de venir avec nous comme les ordres. etait de le reconduire au bateau pour Q'il retourne a Pembrook.

Conclusion

Acette assembel il avait 38 Personne. Tout C'est bien passe dans L'ordre et nous avon depose les Obgets saisie.

au bureau de la police Provincial de Campbell Bay.

Esperant que ce report sera A votre entibre satisfaction.

The report lists the books seized and was signed by the three respondents.

As to his instructions from Montreal, Chartrand said he was not told to "make any arrests or anything like that but "to keep law and order and prevent any trouble which might occur."

Asked as to how he pretended his actions were "maintaining law and order", he said that according to his information there was a lot of people against that and that is why we were sent down there to maintain law and order in case there would be trouble and to prevent trouble-we were ordered to dismiss the meeting.

Q. You told us a few minutes ago you were just sent there to maintain law and order.

Now you are changing your story?

A. No, that is part of the instructions I had, to go inside of the house and abolish the meeting, support the public.

The respondent Romain testified that en route to Chapeau, Chartrand told them they were going to the appellant's house where there was a meeting of the Witnesses which was to be stopped. That was all Chartrand said rAPUT about the matter and Romain asked no questions. As to his RoMAIN state of mind, he said:

Of course we understand that's illegal in Quebec, and that's the reason Kellock j. why there were no other questions necessary.

.

Q. You understand it is illegal in Quebec?

A. That's what I'm given to understand.

Q. What gave you the impression it was illegal for Jehovah's Witnesses to hold meetings in Quebec?

A. Well, I read it in the papers-I don't know-and their meetings were stopped.

Q. Where?

A. I read it in the paper; I don't know the place.

Q. You never bothered about the law, to see if it was illegal? A. No; I have nothing to do with that.

On the other hand, Young says that Chartrand did not state the nature of the errand but that he "just went with Mr. Chartrand at his request; I did not definitely understand why we were going," but "there ought to be some reason for us going there . . . When he gets orders there must be something wrong."

On the respondents' arrival everything was quiet and peaceful inside and outside the appellant's premises and the meeting was admittedly perfectly orderly. The respondents also admit that no offence of any kind was being committed and that their entry and seizure were made without a warrant of any kind having been obtained or even applied for. The respondents filed identical defences which, so far as material, allege that

(1) That the plaintiff belongs to an organization that had decided to distribute literature which contained seditious libel;

(2) Plaintiff was in possession of pamphlets containing seditious libel and was creating animosity and hate between different classes of society; (3) The defendant, at the date mentioned in the declaration was a public officer fulfilling the duties of a peace officer belonging to the Provincial Police of Quebec and having been appointed in accordance with the Provincial Police Act for the maintenance of peace, order and public security, and he was on the date mentioned in the declaration acting in the scope of his duties as a member of Provincial Police;

(4) The defendant was acting in good faith with colour of right and without malice against the plaintiff;

(5) The defendant had received instructions from his superior officer to maintain law and order and to do what he did; in accordance with the Provincial Police force act;

Chartrand set up the further defence that the proceedings had not been taken within six months after the events complained of. This refers to the Magistrate's Privilege Act, R.S.Q., 1941, 18, s. 5.

There was the further completely frivolous plea by all the respondents that

This was entirely unsupported by any evidence and, quite understandably, was not mentioned in the judgments below nor in the argument before this court.

No evidence was adduced in support of the allegation that the appellant belonged to an organization of the character mentioned, nor that he was in possession of any pamphlets of the description pleaded.

Chartrand deposed that he did not know why he had been instructed to seize the literature on the premises and it never occurred to him to ask.

As to the seized literature, Romain testified:

In fact the witness said as to the word "seditious" that he did not know "exactly what that word is."

Young's evidence was that before going into the house Chartrand told him that the literature would have "to be taken for evidence to find out if it was of a seditious nature or not."

There was therefore no evidence to support the first two grounds of defence pleaded. I therefore pass to the other grounds of defence.

Nothing in the Provincial Police Act, R.S.Q., 1941, c. 47, which is pleaded by the respondents, is at all relevant to Ro the issues raised, and we so determined at the hearing. The court also decided that the Magistrate's Privilege Act did Kellock J. not provide any substantive -defence but reserved the question as to whether or not this statute has any bearing from a procedural point of view. Ss. 2, 5 and 7 are as follows: 2. Any justice of the peace, officer or other person fulfilling any public duty, and sued in damages by reason of any act committed by him in the execution thereof, may, at any time within one month after the service of the notice mentioned in article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, offer to pay a compensation to the party complaining or his advocate, by actual tender thereof; and, if the same be not accepted, may plead such offer in bar to the action brought against him, with any other plea, and deposit the amount offered.

It will be observed that the statute proceeds upon the footing that the act of the defendant in excess of authority conferred upon him by the substantive law involves liability to the person injured. The statute affords no defence on the merits, and we so held on the hearing. As stated by Denman C.J., in Hazeldine v. Grove (1) "these statutory protections suppose an illegality, so that there is no defence on the merits."

The learned trial judge dismissed the action upon the "considerant" that the main feature of the present litigation is the immunity acknowledged and established by the statutory law in favour of police officers of the province, acting in good faith in the execution of orders received from their superior, and acting reasonably, peacefully and without malice in performing only what has been asked them to do.

(1) (1842) 3 Q.B. 997 at

In so doing the learned judge misconceived the effect of the statute, failing to observe that the only assistance afforded to defendants is procedural.

In the Court of Appeal (1) Bissonnette J. The erro- Kellock J. neous view of the learned trial judge appears also to have been the view of that learned judge. He concludes his judgment by stating:

En r~sum6, I'appelant n'a pas 6tabli qu'il avait un int6rit l6gal personnel A ester en justice, il n'a pas non plus d6montr6 l'absence de cause raisonnable et probable, pas plus qu'il a repouss6 la pr6somption que les intimbs ont agi de bonne foi et avec 1'autorit6 l6gale qui s'attache A leurs fonctions.

In the course of his judgment, Bissonnette J., expressed the opinion that because the appellant had by circular invited members of the public to his home he had lost any right to complain. The learned judge does not amplify his view and I find no basis upon which it may be supported. The learned judge also considered that the fact the respondents were acting under instructions constituted a complete defence but he did not refer to any authority in support of this view.

Bissonnette J. considered also, that it was "far from certain" that the respondents were without authority to break up the meeting and seize the literature. The learned judge said:

11 est prouv6 que les t~moins de J6hovah avalent 6t6 chassis de cette localit6 et l'intim6 Chartrand avait regu des plaintes h leur sujet. Mais peu importe. Aux intim6s comme A leur sup~rieur, comme A tout citoyen de cette province, il 6tait notoire que les t6moins de J~hovah avaient des activitis d'un caractbre s~ditieux (art. 133a, al. c, C.Cr.), particulibrement en raison de leurs attaques inqualifiables contre la religion catholique. On n'ignorait pas h ]a Sfret6 provinciale que des centaines de plaintes 6taient pendantes devant les tribunaux. Tous savaient qu'ils 6taient honnis du Qubbec et il n'y a rien de chang6 h leur 6gard.

Or, A l'6poque se situent les faits du litige, notre Cour d'appel avait, quelques mois auparavant, statu6 que les pamphlets de ce groupe 6taient siditieux. Boucher v. Regem, 1949 B.R. 238.

Quel 6tait l'effet de ce jugement, tant pour les intimds que pour leur sup6rieur supreme, I'honorable Procureur g~n6ral? C'6tait l'expression judiciaire formelle que I'action de ce groupement contrevenait A la loi du pays et que ses membres devaient en subir les sanctions. Aussi, quand une personne est dans la commission d'un acte criminel, tout agent de la paix a l'autorit6 et le devoir d'en rdprimer l'accomplissement (art. 32, 35 et passim C.Cr.). (1) Q.R. [19541 Q.B. 794.

En cons6quence, quand les intimis, sous l'autorit6 qui leur 6tait d616gu6e, empichaient cette r6union et saisissaient les pamphlets s6ditieux, ils savaient qu'ils pouvaient agir ainsi, puisque la plus haute autorit6 judiciaire autorisait leur acte auquel s'attachait une prisomption irrifragable que ce qu'ils faisaient 6tait 16gal.

Que plus tard, apris des d6bats Kelck J. dont on connait la nature, les phases complexes, les opinions partag~es A une 6galit6 quasi math6matique, on ait statu6 que les timoins de J6hovah ne sont pas des citoyens recourant A la s6dition, il n'en d~coule certes pas que celui qui les considrait comme des fauteurs de la paix publique commettait une illgalit6, quand il se faisait l'interprkte de la loi que le plus haut tribunal de sa province lui permettait de faire respecter.

Du fait qu'aujourd'hui la situation ou davantage la solution juridique pourrait 6tre diff6rente, il n'en d6coule pas qu'entre janvier 1949, date de l'arrit Boucher, et d6cembre 1950, date du jugement de la Cour supreme, les t~moins de Jehovah ne pouvaient 6tre recherch6s et poursuivis. Or, les faits de cette cause se situent dans cette p6riode interm6diaire, soit septembre 1949.

Pour les intim6s, rien ne devait leur apparaitre une meilleure autorit6 que l'arrit de la Cour d'appel et cette autorit6 valait bien un mandat. When the learned judge says that it was proven that Jehovah's Witnesses had been chased away from the locality in question, he is speaking outside the record. There is no such evidence. Had there been it would have been entirely irrelevant, -as he himself says.

When, however, the learned judge says that it was well known to the respondents and to their superior that Jehovah's Witnesses were carrying on activities of a seditious character, he is again speaking outside the record. None of the respondents so testified and the superior, Sergeant Perrault, was not called.

Nor am I able to say what the learned judge means by his statement that

Tous savaient qu'ils 6taient honnis du Qubbec et il n'y a rien de chang6 & leur 6gard.

It can hardly be meant that such a fact, even if proved, would have deprived the appellant of the protection of the courts. Such a suggestion would amount to outlawry. Further, Bissonnette J., as well as Hyde J., (who placed his judgment upon this ground), are under complete misapprehension as to what was actually decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in Boucher v. Regem (1).

The charge in that case was that:

Le ou vers le d6cembre 1946 & St. Joseph dans le district de Beauce, Aim6 Boucher de Ste. Germaine a publi6 un libelle s~ditieux en le faisant lire. In montrant et le d6livrant dans le but de le faire lire par plusieurs (1) Q.R. [19491 K.B. 238.

Nothing else was in issue. Even the pamphlet mentioned in the charge in Boucher's case was not among those taken by J the respondents from the appellant's premises.

The judgment below cannot, therefore, be supported and it becomes necessary to consider the right of the appellant to the damages which he claims.

The first question which arises is as to the true interpretation of the Magistrate's Privilege Act, for although the respondents Romain and Young received the statutory notice and were sued within six months of the conduct complained of, the same does not apply to Chartrand. What is the meaning to be given to the words in s. 2:

that is, "in fulfilling any public duty", in conjunction with the words in s. 7:

In order to appreciate the question involved it is necessary to consider the history of the statute.

The statute was first enacted in 1851 and was modelled upon the Imperial statute of 1848, & 12 Vict., 44. The provisions to be found in the present statute dealing with notice of action, tender of amends, payment into court, plea of tender and the pleading of the "general issue" by a defendant, as well as the limitation of the period within which an action may be brought to six months, are all traceable back through the statute of 1848 to the Constables Protection Act, 1750, 24 Geo. II, c. 44. The Act of 1848, which was a consolidating statute, did not extend to Canada; (see s. 15).

For that reason the Act of 1851 was no doubt enacted as

The statute recites that "there are divers Acts of Parliament in force in Canada, both public, local and personal, whereby certain protections and privileges are afforded to Magistrates and others", and the desirability of bringing about uniformity and reducing all these statutes to one Act. The Act applied both to Upper and Lower Canada. By s. 2 it is enacted that no writ shall be issued against Kellock J. any justice or other officer or person fulfilling any public duty for anything -done by him in the performance of such public duty.

whether such duty arises out of the common law, or is imposed by Act of Parliament, either Imperial or Provincial, and the later sections contain the other matters already referred to.

It is therefore clear that this statute was enacted having in view the background of English common law and not the civil law, subject to such statute law as had the force of law in Canada. The reason for this is clear.

Lareau, in his "Histoire du Droit Canadien" says at p. 54: Le changement de domination, subi en 1760 par la conquite et en 1763 par la cession d6finitive du Canada A l'Angleterre, a introduit dans la colonie le droit public anglais. Le droit public et politique du vainqueur remplace le droit public de la nation conquise, quand bien m~me elle conserverait sont droit priv6.

Questions which concern the relation of the subject to the administration of justice in its broadest sense are part of the public law and, therefore, governed by the law of England and not by that of France;

Corporation d'Arthabaska v. Patoine (1).

As Walton in his work on the "Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code" says at p. 43:

It is a fundamental principle of our public law that if an official wrongs a private person he is accountable to the ordinary courts, and it is no defence that he acted in good faith, or in obedience to the order of a superior official.

The highest minister of the Crown and the humblest official are equally answerable for the legality of their acts to the ordinary tribunals. Dicey puts the principle thus in his "Law of the Constitution", 9th Ed., p. 193:

lawful authority.

A colonial governor, a secretary of state, a military officer, and all subordinates, though carrying out the commands of their offcial superiors, are as responsible for any act which the law does not CP authorize as is any private and unofficial person.

The italics are mine.

In Raleigh v. Goschen (1), Romer J., as he then was, said Kellock J. at p. 77:

It appears to me that if any person commits a trespass (I use that word advisedly as meaning a wrongful act or one not justifiable) he cannot escape liability for the offence, he cannot prevent himself being sued, merely because he acted in obedience to the order of the executive Government, or of any officer of State; and it further appears to me, as at present advised, that if the trespass had been committed by some subordinate officer of a Government Department or of the Crown, by the order of a superior official, that superior official-even if he were the head of the Government Department in which the subordinate official was employed, or whatever his official position-could be sued; but in such a case the superior official could be sued, not because of, but despite of, the fact that he was an officer of State.

By way of contrast, the law which prevailed in France was the Roman law, which, starting from the point of view of the government rather than from that of the individual, provided, in the interest of governmental efficiency, that the officers of government could during their term of office be brought to account and made responsible for damages only with the consent of their superior officer. In France, this consent was to be given by the council of the King, which, before granting such consent, determined the question of jurisdiction, i.e., whether the officer had acted contrary to the law; and the suits had to be brought before special tribunals over whose organization the King had full power, and not in the ordinary courts; Dareste, La Justice Administrative en France, 2nd ed., pp. 515 ff; Pandectes Fran- 9aises, s.v. Autorit6 Administrative, n. 8, and n. 215; Goodnow, Comparative and Administrative Law, pp. 169 if. As an example, Goodnow cites, at p. 175, the case of a prefect who shut up a factory while acting in accordance with instructions issued by one of the Ministers in order to execute a law but who could not be held responsible before the ordinary courts even though his act was not authorized by the law.

This is utterly foreign to the footing upon which the Act of 1851 proceeds, which accepts the theory of the common law that the unauthorized act of a public officer is a wrong (1) [18981 1 Ch. 73.

cognizable by the ordinary courts and confers upon the person wronged the right to recover damages.

Accordingly, English authorities are relevant upon the question as to the proper construction of the statute; Renaud v. Lamothe (1). is obvious that if the words "sued in damages by reason of any act committed by him in the execution thereof", i.e., "in fulfilling any public duty", in s. 2 of the Act were to be read literally, the statute would be meaningless, as such acts need no protection proceduraly or otherwise.

This was pointed out by Pollock B., in Hughes v. Buckland (2): The Act there in question was 7 & Geo. IV, 29, s. 75, which provided, inter alia, that "For the protection of persons acting in the execution of this Act," notice of action and suit within six months was required.

The English Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, 61, s. 1, in using the words merely restates the doctrine enunciated from the bench in numerous cases under earlier statutes in which the word "intended" was not included.

S. 7 of the Quebec statute makes it clear that it is subject to the same construction.

It provides that the protection which the statute provides is limited to cases where the officer but acted "in good faith in the execution of his duty." What is required in order to bring a defendant within the terms of such a statute as this is a bona fide belief in the existence of a state of facts which, had they existed, would have justified him in acting as he did. This rule was laid down in Hermann v. Seneschal (3).

The contrast is with an act of such a nature that it is wholly wide of any statutory or public duty, i.e., wholly unauthorized and where there exists no colour for supposing that it could have been an authorized one. In such case there can be no question of good faith or honest motive. Lord Denman, C.J., in Cann v. Clipperton (1), held that a person would not be protected "if he has not some ground in reason to connect his own act with the statutory provision" (governing the existence or non-existence of the supposed duty).

In Cook v. Clark (2), Tindal C.J., in referring to the decision in Edge v. Parker (3) (in which assignees of a bankrupt entered premises of a third person to seize goods of the bankrupt, without a warrant) said at p. 21 that in so doing the officer "must have been conscious that he was not acting in discharge of his duty"; in other words, that the absence of grounds demonstrated absence of good faith. Mere belief by a magistrate that he has authority to make an order is not sufficient; he must believe in the existence of facts which, had they existed, would have clothed him with the requisite authority.

Thus, in Agnew v. Jobson (4), the defendant, a magistrate, ordered the plaintiff, who had been taken into custody on the charge of concealing the birth of an illegitimate child, to be medically examined. It was held by Lopes J., as he then was, that as there was a total absence of authority to do the act, although he acted bona fide, there was nothing upon which such a belief might be founded, and he was accordingly outside the statute there in question.

Reference may also usefully be made to the judgment of Letourneau J., as he then was, in Trudeau v. Kennedy (5), a decision of the Court of Appeal. As stated in the headnote:

In Lachance v. Casault (1), it was held by the Court of Appeal that a sheriff who seized books and papers in the hands of the appellant without listing them in detail, as required by the order of the court which alone was his J. authority to deal therewith, was not "un officier public dans le sens de cet article (art. 88)" and was not acting "dans 1'ex6cution de ses devoirs."

In the case at bar it is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the Code providing for the granting and execution of search warrants and the right of arrest with or without warrant. The respondents were completely outside all of these provisions. Nor could the order of Chartrand avail the co-respondents any more than the order of Perreault could avail Chartrand. Moreover, it is specifically provided by the Criminal Code, s. 199, that:

In Cann v. Clipperton, ubi cit, Patterson J., said at p. 589: Williams J., said on the same page:

This discussion raises the question as to what was the public duty here which the respondents were executing? not a duty to their superior to carry out his direction: the public duty is that annexed by law to the office of a peace officer, a duty to maintain the peace, to enforce the law by preventing violations of it and by taking appropriate action to bring transgressors to justice. Every proper act of an officer against or by way of invading the ordinary rights a citizen must be done with such a purpose; there must be the existence or the belief in the existence of facts which give rise to the duty and call for action.

At the moment the respondents became aware of the nature and facts of the meeting-and there is no question a belief in the existence of any other matter-what duty on their part arose? The total circumstances were innocent and the only duty that arose was to do nothing in the way of interfering with the owner, the meeting, or the other persons attending it. There was not a semblance of fact to call for any adverse or preventive action. What they did was not in execution of a public duty but in carrying out an illegal instruction.

I assume their belief was that, in some way or other, by holding the meeting, those present were committing an offence; but such a mistake, a mistake as to what is criminal, can never give rise to a public police duty, and cannot, therefore, bring within the protection of the statute an officer who acts upon it.

The same considerations govern the expression "good faith" in s. 7: it defines the state of mind in excuting a duty: the officer must have acted in "good faith", i.e., believing in facts which, if true, would have justified what he did.

In addition to that, his property was seized and kept.

He was humiliated in his own home before a considerable number of people.

In so far as recent decisions in the provincial courts are founded upon the view that the civil courts of the province have no "jurisdiction" to order recovery of anything in the nature of a penalty, it being for the criminal courts to impose punishments, they are not, in my opinion, to be accepted.

I refer to French v. Hetu (1), Guibord v. Dallaire (2); Savignac v. Boivin (3); Duhaime v. Talbot (4). In these decisions no reference appears to have been made to the provisions of head 15 of s. 92 of The British North America Act giving jurisdiction to provincial legislatures to legislate in relation to "the imposition of punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relation to any matter" coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in the section. In so far, however, as they are based upon the construction Art. 1053, I respectfully agree. The language of the Article is "damage caused."

In Lachance v. Casault, ubi cit, the Court of Appeal, after argument on the point, felt entitled to award punitive damages and did so. Whether that result was in harmony with the view that the defendant had ceased to bear the character of a public officer engaged in the performance his duty need not be here considered. In a case to which the statute is applicable it may be that the right to recover "such damages as they (the court or jury) think proper" (s. 2 R.S.Q., 18) is to be construed, like other provisions of the statute, in accordance with English law, and authorizes an award of common law damages. The statute is a special, while the Code is a general Act. Both have stood side by side since the enactment of the Code in 1866. It is, however, not necessary to decide that question on this occasion.

While the appellant is not, in my opinion, entitled to recover punitive damages, he is entitled to recover "moral" damages, a term, which, for present purposes, may be said to be analogous to "general" damages in the common law; Dalloz, Nouveau Rgpertoire, Vol. III, n. 205.

I would therefore allow the appeal and direct the entry judgment in favour of the appellant for $2,000.00 against the respondents jointly and severally. The appellant should have his costs throughout. There should be no costs against either Attorney-General.

LOCKE J.:-The following passages from the evidence given by the appellant at the trial describe the occurrence which gave rise to the present action:- They came in the yard with their car-I seen them from inside the house and I walked out to see what they wanted-they walked to the house to meet me-Mr. Chartrand asked me if there was a meeting at my house-I said yes-he asked if they could come in-I said yes.

Q. Chartrand alone came in your house?

A. The three police came in-they told me they were going to break up the meeting-they walked in- Q. Just a minute. They asked you if they could come in before they said they were going to break up the meeting?

A. Yes-then they walked in-I walked in behind them and they stood alongside the speaker for two minutes I would say and Mr. Chartrand said he was going to break up the meeting-he asked the speaker, he told him he was going to break up the meeting so the speaker said he had twenty more minutes to go-they would not stand back and let him finish his sermon-so Mr. Chartrand said no-so they grabbed the Bible out of his hand-Mr. Chartrand stepped up ahead of the minister and he took the Catholic Bible out of his hand, which was a Douay version Bible, my own Bible and Mr. Young and Mr. Romain, they gathered up the literature which was on the table and also a small wooden box we have for contributions and they told him that the meeting was broken up-Mr. Chartrand and Mr. Young told the speaker that the meeting was broken up-the speaker kept on speaking ahead-the police went out-they put the literature in their car.

Q. Did they take the Bible also?

A. The Bible also-then they walked back in again, the three policemen- Q. They took the Bible?

A. Yes-and the three policemen came back in again and told Mr. Gotthold, the minister that was with us delivering the talk that day, to stop preaching, that the meeting was broken up-so Mr. Gotthold asked if he was under arrest-he asked Mr. Chartrand-Mr. Chartrand says no- "Well", he says, "I am not going to stop until I am under arrest", so, as he said that, Mr. Young stepped up and he said, "Let us take Mr. Gotthold" -so they walked back to the people which was in my own home, told them all to get up and get out, of my own home, so they all got up and Mr. Chartrand and Mr. Young took Mr. Gotthold by the arms and took him out and they placed him in the car and took him away to the ferry. Q. To take him out, did they take hold of him?

A. Yes, they took hold of him by the arms.

On September 4, 1949, when these acts were committed by the three respondents, ss. 199 and 120 of the Criminal Code read as follows:- 199. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment who, by threats or force, unlawfully obstructs or prevents, or endeavours to obstruct or prevent, any clergyman or other minister in or from celebrating divine service, or otherwise officiating in any church, chapel, meeting-house, school-house or other place for divine worship, or in or from the performance of his duty in the lawful burial of the dead in any churchyard or other burial place.

The actions of the respondents were thus wholly unlawful and criminal in their nature and they were liable to prosecution and imprisonment.

With due respect to the learned judge by whom this action was tried and the three members of the Court King's Bench who have expressed a contrary view, there is, in my opinion, no defence to this action.

Before the conclusion of the argument, counsel for the respective parties were informed that the Court was unanimously of the opinion that the Magistrate's Privilege Act (c. 18, R.S.Q. 1941) and the Act respecting the Provincial Police Force (c. 47, R.S.Q. 1941) had nothing to -do with the substantive questions raised in the action.

S.7 of the former Act says that any justice of the peace, officer other person shall be entitled to the protection and privileges granted by the Act in all cases where he has acted in good faith in the execution of his duty. I must confess my inability to understand how it can be suggested that a police officer is acting in execution of his duty in committing a criminal offence. I ai equally unable to understand how a person can deliberately commit a crime or a tort in good faith.

The only other suggested defence, and one which would be available to the respondent Chartrand alone, was under the provisions of Article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires notice to be given to a public officer when damages are claimed "by reason of any act done by him in the exercise of his functions" at least one month before the issue of the writ of summons. As to this, it is sufficient to say that to commit torts or criminal offences is no part of the functions of any public officer and the article has no application.

Since the learned trial judge was of opinion that the action failed, there has been no assessment of damages. It is, in my opinion, in the interest of the due administration of justice that this litigation, commenced nearly six years ago, should be brought to a conclusion and that damages should accordingly be assessed by this Court. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment to be delivered in this matter by my brother Taschereau, in which he has discussed the circumstances in which moral damages, as distinguished from punitive damages, have been allowed in the courts of Quebec, and indicated that, in his opinion, those awarded in the present matter should fall within the former category. The moral damages allowed in cases of this kind in Quebec do not differ in their nature from the general damages allowed at common law for wrongs such as those inflicted upon the appellant by the respondents in this matter.

In considering the nature and the extent of these injuries and the question of the quantum of damage, I obtain some assistance from the Bissonnette J. (1).

From these I learn that it was at that time well known to every citizen of the Province of Quebec that Jehovah's Witnesses were carrying on activities of a seditious nature and that:- It is further said that it had been decided by the Court of Appeal in Boucher's Case (2) that the pamphlets of the group were seditious and, as to this:- It is unnecessary to discuss the accuracy of the belief entertained by the citizens of the province or of the statement of the learned judge as to what had been decided in Boucher's Case by that court, or the accuracy of its conclusion. That these views as to the nature of the religious belief and practices of Jehovah's Witnesses were generally entertained in the neighbourhood means, of necessity, that when, in this small community and the surrounding country, it was learned that police officers had entered the appellant's house prevented the carrying on of a religious service. dispersed those assembled and ejected the Minister who had been conducting the service, it would be generally understood that the appellant had been carrying on activities of a criminal nature and, with others, participated in J. the commission of the offence of sedition. The fact that a so called "raid" had been made, that books and pamphlets had been seized and the meeting in the appellant's home broken up, also received wide publicity by being reported in both an Ottawa and a Pembroke newspaper.

The appellant, as a resident of the Province of Quebec, was entitled to the privileges enjoyed 'by all of His Majesty's subjects in that province under the provisions of 175 of the Statutes of Canada 1851, by which it is declared:- The flagrant violation of that right by the respondents was a grievous wrong to the appellant and the damages sustained were undoubtedly greatly aggravated by the matters which I have above referred to. The offence was committed at the Village of Chapeau on September 4, 1949, and from that time until the trial of the action on April 22, 1952, the appellant suffered from the false imputation that he had been engaged in committing the criminal offence of sedition at the time referred to. The appellant's right to maintain his good name and to enjoy the privileges conferred upon him by the Statute of 1851 are absolute and very precious rights and he is entitled to recover substantial general damages.

While, in my opinion, the damages should be assessed at a higher amount, I defer to the views of the other members of the Court that they should be fixed at the sum of $2,000. I would allow this appeal, with costs throughout, and direct that judgment be entered against all of the respondents jointly and severally in that amount. There should be no order as to the costs of the intervenants.

J.:-Comme mon collgue, M. le Juge Tascher- Rt eau, et g6n6ralement pour des motifs substantiellement similaires, je maintiendrais cet appel.

Rien, dans le dossier ou de l'argument fait h l'audition, ne suggire qu'au cours, A l'occasion ou en raison de cette r6union paisible, tenue le 4 septembre 1949, dans la maison de l'appelant, au village de Chapeau, une violation quelconque de la loi ait 6t6, 6tait actuellement ou 6tait sur le point d'ftre commise par qui que ce soit. A la. v6rit6, l'unique information reque par la police, suivant la preuve, 6tait qu'on devait tenir, A Ia r6sidence de 1'appelant, une r6union de t6moins de Jehovah; et, sur ce: l'ordre de disperser cette assemblie. Par nul texte de loi a-t-on cherch6 h, justifier 1'autorit6 assum6e, en les circonstances, par les intim6s pour interrompre et mettre fin h cette r6union, pratiquer une saisie et reconduire au traversier de Pembroke celui qui adressait la parole au groupe.

En soi, cette intervention des intim6s est pour le moins illicite si elle ne contrevient pas au Code p6nal-ce qu'il n'est pas nicessaire de d6terminer.

En droit, cette intervention leur est 6galement imputable, et, dis lors, ils doivent r6paration pour le dommage en r6sultant. Les arguments invoqu6s ne peuvent, en l'espice, les excuser.

On a d'abord reconnu, a l'audition, que sous le r6gime de la Loi concernant les priviliges des juges de paix, des magistrats et autres officiers remplissant des devoirs publics (S.R.Q. 1941 18), 1'op6ration de cette loi est conditionn6e par 1'existence de la bonne foi et que, dans sa substance, cette loi sp~ciale ne constitue pas un obstacle h la responsabilit6 6dict6e & Particle 1053 du Code civil; les dispositions de cette loi 9p6ciale impliquent, au contraire, 1'application de cet article. De plus, ni 1'ordre inconsid6r6 du sergent Perrault, sup6rieur immidiat des intim6s, ni l'erreur alligu6e quant h ce qu'on croyait 6tre la loi-en raison 'd'une d6cision de la Cour d'Appel alors en revision devant cette Cour, et oii l'unique question en litige 6tait de savoir si un certain pamphlet 6tait s6ditieux-ne peuvent valablement 6tre invoqu6s au soutien de la pritention de bonne foi des intim6s alors que, sur place, ils n'ont pu, de tout ce qu'ils y ont vu et entendu, assigner aucun caractbre ill6gal h cette r6union que plus rien, d~s lors, ne pouvait les justifier de disperser; d'ailleurs et par la suite, cette r6union ou cette saisie qu'h tout risque on y avait al.

pratiqu6e ne donnbrent lieu A aucune action judiciaire contre l'appelant ou ses invites.

Comme r6paration de tous dommages subis par l'appelant, la somme suggr6e de deux mille dollars me parait suffisante.

Je maintiendrais l'appel et Faction de l'appelant contre les intim6s, conjointement et solidairement, pour un montant de deux mille dollars; le tout avec d~pens de toutes les Cours. n'y aura pas d'ordonnance quant aux frais des intervenants.

ABBorT J.:-Les faits et les lois qui trouvent leur application sont exposes dans le jugement de mon colligue le Juge Taschereau, que j'ai eu l'avantage de consid6rer.

Dans mon opinion, il ne peut y avoir de doute que les intim6s, qui sont tous officiers de la Police Provinciale de Quebec, avaient le droit de se rendre h Chapeau, et d'assister h 1'assembl6e qui se tenait dans la maison de 1'appelant. Il s'agissait d'une assembl6e publique, annoncie comme telle, et en fait, comme le rdvile la preuve, on ne s'est pas object6 h leur pr6sence. En cons6quence, jusqu'a ce moment, il semble clair que ces officiers agissaient de bonne foi et dans 1'ex6cution de leurs devoirs.

La preuve 6tablit que quand les intim6s arrivirent h l'assembl6e, le ministre Gotthold 6tait h lire des extraits de la Bible, et tout se passait d'une fagon paisible. Aprbs qu'il eut 6cout6 durant quelques minutes, l'intim6 Chartrand donna ordre au ministre d'interrompre 1'assembl6e, et avec l'aide des deux autres intim6s, s'empara de la Bible ainsi que d'un certain nombre de pamphlets, et arr~ta l'assembl6e.

Aucune tentative ne fut faite de mettre personne sous arrit.

En arrivant h la r6union, les intimbs purent imm6diatement se rendre compte de son caractbre religieux, et que tout se passait dans 1'ordre et la paix.

En dispersant 1'assembl6e, les intimbs en consequence, ne pouvaient plus 6tre consid6rds comme agissant de bonne foi, et dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions. Ils devaient savoir qu'ils n'6taient investis d'aucun droit les justifiant d'entraver cette r6union. Dans mon opinion, on ne peut faire de distinction entre Chartrand qui 6tait en charge, et les deux autres officiers. A. II a 6t6 d6cid6 par cette Cour lors de l'audition, (et admis -t par le procureur des intim6s) que la Loi concernant les Privilges des Officiers remplissant des devoirs publics, (S.R.Q. 1941, c. 18) n'accordait aucune d6fense fondamentale h Faction qui a 6t6 institu6e.

Pour les raisons donn6es par mon collkgue, M. le Juge Tachereau, je suis aussi d'opinion que les intimbs ne peuvent davantage avoir recours h ce statut pour invoquer les priviliges qu'il confire et les rigles de proc6dure qu'il 6dicte.

Je crois que l'appelant a le droit de r6clamer des intim6s des dommages pour le pr6judice qui lui a 6t,6 caus6 par leurs actions ill6gales, suivant les dispositions de la loi civile de la province de Qu6bec, ofi la cause d'action a pris naissance. Comme le signale mon colligue M. le Juge Taschereau, il est depuis longtemps 6tabli que le droit civil de Qu6bec ne connait pas les dommages punitifs oi exemplaires. Il admet cependant une compensation pour les dommages moraux. Ainsi que le dit M. le Juge Rivard dans Duhaime v. Talbot (1):

En droit civil, le pr6judice caus6 par un dblit ou un quasi-d6lit ne peut donner lieu h une condamnation devant servir uniquement de punition ou d'exemple; c'est l plut~t le domaine du droit p6nal. Sous l'empire de Particle 1053 du Code civil, les dommages-intrits qui peuvent 6tre accord6s A la victime d'un dWlit s'entendent de la compensation pour le tort subi; c'est la rdparation p6cuniaire d'un pr6judice.

Ce pr6judice peut 8tre mat6riel;

les consdquences picuniaires en sont ais6ment appr6cides et doivent faire l'objet d'une preuve sp6cifique.

Il peut aussi 6tre moral: atteinte A l'honneur, h la r6putation, chagrins, inqui6tudes, etc. En soi, le pr6judice moral se prite mal h une 6valuation en argent; il ne donne pas moins ouverture A une indemnit6 p6cuniaire, car, bien qu'il n'atteigne pas directement 1'individu dans sa fortune ou dans son corps, il est susceptible d'avoir un contre-coup d'ordre 6conomique, et il constitue done une sorte de dommage mat6riel ayant une cause morale; I'appr6ciation de ce dommage moral, toujours plus ou moins arbitraire, peut 6tre laiss~e h la discrition du juge. Dans tous les cas qu'il soit mat6riel ou moral, le pr6judice, pour devenir l'objet d'une r6paration p6cuniaire, ne doit pas moins 6tre r6el, actuel et appr6ciable en argent. (1) Q.R. (1937) 64 K.B. 386 at 391.