PROVINCE OF QUEBEC (Inter- RESPONDENT. venant) ......
................
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
R.S.Q. 1941, c. 52, is ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature. Fineberg v. Taub (1939), 77 Que. S.C. 233, overruled.
Per Kerwin C.J. and Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux and Nolan JJ.: The statute is legislation in respect of criminal law which, under head 27 of s. 91 of the British North America Act, is within the exclusive competence of the Parliament of Canada. Bidard v. Dawson et al., [19231 S.C.R. 681, distinguished.
Per Rand, Kellock and Abbott JJ.: The subject-matter of the statute is not within any of the powers specifically assigned to the Provinces by s. 92 of the British North America Act and it constitutes an unjustifiable interference with freedom of speech and expression essential under the democratic form of government established in Canada. Per Taschereau J., dissenting: The legislation is not in respect of criminal law but deals with property in the Province, under head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act. It is calculated to suppress conditions favouring the development of crime and to control properties in order to protect society against illegal uses that may be made of them. Bidard v. Dawson et al., supra, applied.
Courts-Supreme Court of Canada-Jurisdiction-Whether lis remains between parties-Intervention of Attorney-General.
The plaintiff sued for cancellation of a lease on the ground that the defendant, the lessee, had committed a breach of a provincial statute.
The defendant, in his plea, contested the validity of the statute and gave notice of this contestation to the Attorney-General under art. 114 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. The Superior Court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the claim for cancellation but dismissed a further claim made by her for damages; it also maintained the intervention and declared the statute valid and effective. This judgment was affirmed by a majority of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side. The defendant then appealed, by leave of the Kerwin CJ. and Taschereau, Rand, Kellock, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott and Nolan JJ.
provincial Court, to the Supreme Court. The plaintiff took no part in the appeal, stating by her counsel that she would rely on the argu- SWITzMAN ment to be adduced on behalf of the intervenant.
Held (Taschereau J. dissenting): The Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and should dispose of it. The appellant's claim in the intervention should be considered on the merits and, since the result of that claim affected the plaintiff's claim in the original action, it also should be decided.
Cot v. The James Richardson Company (1906), 38 S.C.R. 41; Bidard v. Dawson et al., supra, applied.
Per Taschereau J., dissenting: Since the lease from the plaintiff to the defendant had expired long before the appeal was brought to this Court, and the claim for damages had been dismissed, the only issue that remained between the original parties was as to costs. The intervenant claimed nothing except a declaration that the statute was intra vires of the Province and this was not a reference in which the Court was called upon to express its opinion as to the validity of the statute in an abstract way but an ordinary action where the statute was challenged only in relation to the main action. The intervention was not an "aggressive" one as in Cot v. Richardson, supra.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Quebec (1), affirming (Barclay J. dissenting) the judgment of Collins J. at trial. Appeal allowed.
Abraham Feiner, F. R. Scott and J. Perrault, for the defendant, appellant.
L. Emery Beaulieu, Q.C., and Lucien Tremblay, Q.C., for the intervenant, respondent.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE:-This appeal was brought by John Switzman pursuant to leave granted by the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) for the Province of Quebec from its judgment (1) confirming that of the Superior Court cancelling and annulling a certain lease between the plaintiff, Freda Elbling, and the defendant Switzman and maintaining the intervention of the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec and declaring "An Act to Protect the Province against Communistic Propaganda", R.S.Q. 1941, c. 52, to be intra vires of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec. It is quite true that if no lis exists between parties this Court will decline to hear an appeal, even though leave has been granted by a provincial Court of Appeal: Coca- Cola Company of Canada Limited v. Mathews (2), where the earlier cases are collected. While, in the present case, it is suggested that the time has elapsed when the appellant had any interest in the lease to him from Freda Elbling, (1) Que. Q.B. 421.
(2) [19441 S.C.R. 385, [19451 1 D.L.R. 1 and therefore as between those two parties it is argued that there was nothing left in dispute except the questions of costs, the intervention of the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec, pursuant to art. 114 of the Quebec Code of
Civil Procedure, raises an issue between him and the present appellant as to the constitutionality of the statute mentioned.
The plaintiff Freda Elbling presented no factum and took no part in the appeal, a letter being filed in this Court from her counsel to the attorneys for the appellant stating that he would rely upon the argument to be adduced on behalf of the intervenant. Mr. Beaulieu did not argue that we had no jurisdiction, or that we should not deal with the constitutionality of at least part of the statute, but both points were considered by the members of this Court and all except Mr. Justice Taschereau are of opinion that the appeal is competent and should be disposed of. No question as to the amount or value in controversy arises since the appeal is brought by leave and it cannot be said that there is no issue between the appellant and the Attorney- General of the Province of Quebec. The decision in Cotg v. The James Richardson Company (1) is important as there it was decided that the demand as between the intervenant and the opposite party is that contained in the intervention. Here the appellant's claim in the intervention should be considered on the merits and, as the result therein affects the claim of the plaintiff in the original action, it also, under the circumstances, should be decided.
I am unable to agree with Mr. Beaulieu's contention that there is in issue the constitutional validity of only part of the statute. The order signed by the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec, dated January 27, 1949, recites the provisions of both ss. 3 and 12 of that Act and in his intervention the Attorney-General asked the Court to declare the said Act in its entirety constitutional and valid and in full force and effect.
Section 1 provides:
This Act may be cited as Act Respecting Communistic
Propaganda.
Sections and 12 read:
Sections 4 to 11 provide that the Attorney-General, upon satisfactory proof that an infringement of s. 3 has been committed, may order the closing of the house; authorize any peace officer to execute such order, and provide a procedure by which the owner may apply by petition to a judge of the Superior Court to have the order revised. Section 13 provides for imprisonment of anyone infringing or participating in the infringement of s. 12. In my opinion it is impossible to separate the provisions of ss. 3 and 12. The validity of the statute was attacked upon a number of grounds, but, in cases where constitutional issues are involved, it is important that nothing be said that is unnecessary. In my view it is sufficient to declare that the Act is legislation in relation to the criminal law over which, by virtue of head 27 of s. 91 of the British North America Act, the Parliament of Canada has exclusive legislative authority. The decision of this Court in B6dard v. Dawson et al. (1) is clearly distinguishable. As Mr. Justice Barclay points out, the real object of the Act here under consideration is to prevent propagation of communism within the Province and to punish anyone who does so-with provisions authorizing steps for the closing of premises used for such object. The B6dard case was concerned with the control and enjoyment of property. I am unable to agree with the decision of Greenshields C.J. in Fineberg v. Taub It is not necessary to refer to other authorities, because, once the conclusion is reached that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is in relation to criminal law, the conclusion is inevitable that the Act is unconstitutional.
The appeal should be allowed, the judgments below set aside and the action dismissed with costs, but there should be no costs as between the appellant and the respondent
Elbling in the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) or in this Court. The intervention of the Attorney-General should be dismissed and it should be declared that the statute is ultra vires of the Legislature of the Province of
Quebec in toto. The appellant is entitled, as against the
Attorney-General, to his costs occasioned by the intervention in all Courts.
(dissenting) :-La cause qui est soumise
A la consid6ration de cette Cour, a pris naissance de la fagon suivante: L'intim6e, demanderesse en Cour Supdrieure, a lou6 un immeuble situ6 dans la cit6 de Montr6al h un nomm6 Max Bailey, avec droit de sous-louer.
Ce dernier, s'autorisant de ce droit, a c6d6 son bail h 1'appelant dans la pr6sente cause, et d6fendeur en Cour Sup6rieure.
L'intimbe alligue dans son action en r6siliation de bail, que l'appelant, sous-locataire, s'est servi et a permis qu'on se serve de l'immeuble en question, pour la diffusion de la doctrine communiste, et qu'il a ainsi viold une loi provinciale d'ordre public, intitul6e "Loi prot6geant la province contre la propagande communiste", S.R.Q. 1941, 52.
Le 27 janvier 1949, le procureur g6ndral de la province de
Qu6bec a en effet 6mis une ordonnance, tel que la loi l'autorise, prescrivant la fermeture de la maison pour toute fin quelconque, pour une p6riode d'une ann6e. La maison fut done "cadenass6e", et c'est maintenant la pritention de
1'intimbe qu',i. cause de 1'usage ill6gal que l'appelant en a fait, elle est en droit d'exiger la r6siliation du bail, l'6viction de l'occupant, et des dommages qu'elle a 6valu6s dans ses conclusions h $2,170.
L'appelant a admis s'6tre servi de l'immeuble pour la propagation de la doctrine communiste, mais a sp6cifiquement plaid6 que ladite loi (S.R.Q. 1941, c. 52) est ultra vires de la l6gislature de Quebec, et qu'elle constitue un empidtement sur le pouvoir l6gislatif de l'autorit6 f6d6rale qui seule pourrait 16gif6rer en la matibre. Comme la constitutionnalit6 d'une loi provinciale 6tait attaquie, avis a
6t6 donn6 au procureur g~ndral de la province de Qu6bec, suivant les dispositions de 1'art. 114 C.P.C., et ce dernier a produit une intervention, oii il a soutenu la validit6 compl~te de la 16gislation.
M. le Juge Collins de la Cour Sup6rieure a maintenu annul6 le bail, d6clard bien fond6e l'intervention du j.procureur g6n6ral, et a reconnu en consequence la validit6 de la loi. Ce jugement a t6 confirm6 par la Cour du Banc de la Reine, avec la dissidence de M. le Juge Barclay. Il se pr6sente dans cette cause une premiere question tris s6rieuse qui m6rite quelques observations.
L'action en r6siliation de bail a 6 institu6e au mois de f6vrier 1949, et le bail se terminait, en raison de la clause de renouvellement dont on a pris avantage, le 30 avril 1950. Il s'ensuit que quand l'appel a 6t6 port6e devant cette Cour en juillet 1954, le bail se trouvait expir6, et quant A l'appelant et l'intimbe, il ne restait qu'A d6terminer une question de frais. Il n'y a aucune somme d'argent en jeu, vu que le juge de premiere instance n'a pas accord6 de dommages.
Le "substratum", ce sur quoi reposait le litige, 6tait done disparu. C'est la jurisprudence constante qu'en pareil cas, cette Cour refuse d'entretenir l'appel vu qu'il ne reste rien A 6tre d~cid6 entre les parties: Glasgow Navigation Company v. Iron Ore Company (1); Moir v. The Village of Huntingdon et al. (2); McKay v. The Township of Hinchinbrook (3); Conmissioner of Provincial Police v. The King (4); Coca-Cola Company of Canada Limited v. Mathews (5).
On soutient cependant qu'un autre litige subsiste entre l'appelant et I'intervenant, dans lequel doit 6tre d6terminde la validit6 de la l6gislation contest6e. II s'agirait bien dans l'occurrence d'une intervention aggressive, dans laquelle l'intervenant soutient ses propres droits, et non pas d'une simple intervention accessoire faite dans l'inter~t de l'une des parties et qui doit n6cessairement tomber quand disparait le "substratum" entre les principaux litigants, soit demandeur et le d6fendeur: La Soci6td Immobilibre Maisonneuve Limitge v. Les Chevaliers de Maisonneuve (6).
Cette dernidre cause, et la cause actuelle, se pr6sentent sous un jour entibrement diff6rent.
Dans la cause des Chevaliers de Maisonneuve, supra, les intervenants r~clamaient pour leur b6ndfice, la propri6t6 de certains biens, et demandaient qu'un titre leur soit consenti cet effet. importait peu, par cons6quent, qu'il n'y cut point d'appelTaschereau J. sur 'action principale qui avait t6 rejet6e, vu que la contestation devenait exclusivement entre le demandeur et les intervenants.
Ici, tel n'est pas le cas; l'intervenant ne r~clame rien, sauf une d6claration que la loi est constitutionnelle, dans le but unique de faire d6clarer la r6siliation d'un bail. Il ne s'agit en aucune fagon d'une "rif4rence", oil cette Cour serait appel~e A se prononcer sur la validit6 ou sur l'invalidit6 d'une loi d'une fagon purement abstraite, mais bien d'un cas concret, d'une action ordinaire, oft n'est contestie la loi en question que par rapport Faction principale. Dans ces cas, nous ne devons retenir que les points essentiels A la d6termination de la cause: Winner S.M.T. (Eastern) Limited (1).
Comme dans le cas pr6sent, il n'y a rien h d6terminer dans l'action principale, il me semble rationnel de dire que nous ne pouvons juger de la validit6 de l'intervention et que nous ne devrions pas entretenir le prisent appel. Je ne vois pas de matibre essentielle n6cessaire h un litige civil; il n'y a pas de fond dans ce proces. Le seul point en litige est la r6siliation du bail, et si l'appel 6tait maintenu, il faudrait d6clarer que le bail n'est pas r6sili6 et, cependant, il y a six ans qu'il n'existe plus. Il ne s'agirait donc que d'une question de frais. Comme le disait Sir Lyman Duff dans Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King, supra:
Je n'oublie pas la d6cision de cette Cour dans la cause de Cot6 v. The James Richardson Company (1), oil il a 6t6 d6cid6 que l'intervention ne tombe pas n6cessairement, si, A.G.oF a cause d'un d6faut de juridiction, cette Cour ne peut etre saisie de 1'action principale. I s'agissait dans cette cause Taschereau J.non pas d'un d6bat purement acadimique, mais bien d'un cas ou l'intervenant r6clamait comme 6tant sa propridtd, une certaine quantit6 de bois que le demandeur avait saisie entre les mains du d6fendeur, et qui avait une valeur d'au delh de $2,000. Il s'agissait, contrairement au cas qui nous occupe, d'une intervention agressive, oit l'intervenant ne supportait pas les droits du ddfendeur, mais, au contraire, affirmait uniquement les siens.
Dans Cot6 v. Richardson, supra, le jug6 est le suivant: An intervention filed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Province of Quebec is a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of section 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, and a final judgment thereon is appealable to the Supreme Court of Canada where the matter in controversy upon the intervention amounts to the sum or value of 82,000 without reference to the amount demanded by the action in which such intervention has been filed.
Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, alors juge en chef, parlant pour la majorit6 de la Cour, s'exprime d'une fagon bien cat6gorique lorsqu'il dit, h la page 44:
The intervening party stands in the same position as a plaintiff. L'intervention n'est que l'exercice d'une action; Rousseau & Laisney, Vol. 5, p. 494, n. 8. When, as in the present case, the intervenant is a third party who comes into the case, not to maintain nor contest the principal demand, but to assert a right personal to himself, new issues are raised which may be disposed of independently of the main suit: Walcot v. Robinson, L.C. Jur. 303.
A la page 46, il souligne qu'il s'agit d'une revendication de la part de l'intervenant, par cons6quent, d'une intervention agressive, cr6ant n6cessairement un lis entre ce dernier et l'une des parties. Voici ce qu'il dit:
Here the proceeding in intervention is to all intents and purposes an action in revendication. Miller v. Dichbne, 8 Q.L.R. 18.
Dans la mime cause, h la page 52, l'honorable juge Girouard dit:
If an intervention is a mere incident, it seems to me impossible to conceive that it can survive the principal demand.
(1) (1906), 38 S.C.R. 41.
Dans Mulholland v. Benning et al. (1), approuv6 par cette Cour dans la cause de Cot6 v. Richardson, supra, la Cour du Banc de la Reine de la province de Qu6bec, a d6cid6 que le d6sistement de la demande principale ne peut mettre fin A une intervention, lorsque cette intervention a pour objet de revendiquer la chose saisie dans la demandeTaschereauJ. principale. On voit done que la Cour du Banc de la Reine de la province de Qu6bec, conditionne 1'existence d'une intervention h la revendication par I'intervenant d'un droit susceptible d'une appr6ciation p6cuniaire.
La pr6sente cause doit 6tre distingu6e de celle de Bgdard v. Dawson et al. (2).
Dans cette dernibre, la question de juridiction entre l'appelant et l'intervenant a 6t6 soulev6e,
A cause de 1'absence devant cette Cour d'un appel sur le litige principal.
Mais il existait tout de m6me un "substratum", car le litige principal subsistait toujours, vu que le dossier avait 6t6 retourn6 par la Cour d'Appel A la Cour
Sup6rieure, pour preuve additionnelle, et 6tait en cons6quence susceptible d'8tre entendu de nouveau pour 6tre d6termin6 finalement h la lumibre du jugement rendu par la Cour Supreme sur l'intervention.
M~me si j'entretenais encore quelque doute sur 1'interpr6tation h ftre donn6e h cette dernibre cause, il devrait nicessairement disparaitre apris les jugements rendus dans la cause des Chevaliers de Maisonneuve, supra, et surtout dans la cause de Winner, supra, d'od il ressort clairement, que quand il ne s'agit pas d'une r6f6rence, mais bien d'une intervention comme celle qui nous est soumise, il ne faut en retenir que ce qui est n6cessaire pour la d6termination de 1'action principale.
Parce que les points que je viens d'exprimer ne rencontrent pas les vues de la majorit6 de cette Cour, je crois qu'il devient n6cessaire de dire ce que je pense de la validit6 de la loi dont on conteste la constitutionnalit6.
Il ne fait pas de doute qu'en vertu de l'art. 91 de 1'Acte de l'Amirique britannique du Nord (s. 27), le droit criminel est une matibre qui relkve exclusivement de l'autorit6 f6d6rale, sur laquelle cette derniere seule a le pouvoir de
16gif6rer. Et dans un cas conme celui-1h, la th6orie dite de .unoccupied field" ne peut trouver son application, et ne peut justifier une 16gislature provinciale de s'arroger un pouvoir que la constitution lui refuse: The Fisheries Case (1); Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for j.Canada et al. (2).
La loi dite "Loi prot~geant la province contre la propagande communiste" stipule qu'il est illgal pour toute personne qui posshde ou occupe une maison dans la province, de 1'utiliser ou de permettre h une personne d'en faire usage pour propager le communisme ou bolch6visme par quelque moyen que ce soit. La loi autorise le procureur g6n6ral, sur preuve satisfaisante d'une infraction, d'ordonner la fermeture de la maison pour une p6riode n'exc6dant pas une ann6e. Le recours conf6r6 par la loi au propri6taire de la maison, est de pr6senter une requite h la Cour pour faire reviser Fordonnance, en prouvant qu'il 6tait de bonne foi, qu'il ignorait que la maison fit employ6e en contravention A la loi, ou que la maison n'a pas 6t employ6e pour les fins qu'on lui reproche.
L'appelant pr6tend que cette 16gislation relve exclusivement du droit criminel, et qu'en cons6quence, elle d6passe la comp6tence l6gislative de 1'autorit6 provinciale. Je m'accorderais volontiers avec lui, si la 16gislature avait d6cr6td que le communisme 6tait un crime punissable par la loi, car il y aurait Ih clairement un empi6tement dans le domaine f6d6ral, qui frapperait la 16gislation d'ill6galit6 et la rendrait "ultra vires" de la province. Mais tel n'est pas le cas qui se pr6sente h nous. La 16gislature, en effet, n'a 6rig6 aucun acte au niveau d'un crime, et elle n'a nullement donn6 le caractbre de criminalit6 h la doctrine communiste. Si la l6gislature n'a pas le droit de cr6er des offenses criminelles, elle a le droit de ligifdrer pour pr6venir les crimes, les d6sordres, comme la trahison, la sedition, les attroupements ill6gaux, d6clar6s des crimes par 1'autorit6 f6d6rale, et pour faire disparaitre les conditions qui sont de nature h favoriser le d6veloppement du crime. Pour atteindre ces buts, je n'entretiens pas de doute qu'elle peut validement 1gif6rer sur la possession et 1'usage d'un immeuble, car ceci est exclusivement du domaine du droit civil, et relive en vertu de l'art. 92 de l'Acte de l'Amrique britannique du Nord (s. 13) de l'autorit6 provinciale. La cause de Bddard v. Dawson et al., supra, pr6sente beaucoup de similitude avec le litige actuel.
LA encore la validit6 d'une loi provinciale intitul6e "Loi concernant les propri6taires de maisons employees comme maisons de d6sordre", 10 Geo. V (1920), 81, a 6t6 attaqu6e. Cette loi d6clarait qu'il 6tait ill6gal pour toute personne qui posside ou occupe une maison ou bAtisse de quelque nature que ce soit, de l'utiliser ou de permettre A une personne d'en faire usage comme maison de d6sordre.
Une copie certifi6e de tout jugement d~clarant une personne coupable d'un acte criminel, ou d'une infraction en vertu des arts. 228, 228a, 229 ou 229a de l'ancien Code criminel, constituait une preuve h prennre vue que la maison avait servi aux fins pour lesquelles la condamnation a 6t6 obtenue. Apris avis donn6 h la partie int6ress6e, si cette maison continuait d'6tre employ6e comme maison de d6sordre, une injonction pouvait 6tre dirig6e contre le propri6taire ou le locataire, leur d6fendant de s'en servir ou de tol6rer l'usage de cette bAtisse pour les fins susdites. La Cour pouvait ordonner, apris un d6lai de dix jours, la fermeture de cette maison. La Cour Supreme du Canada, confirmant la Cour d'Appel de la province de Qu6bec (1), a d6cid6 que cette loi 6tait constitutionnelle, et bien que la loi criminelle et les rbgles de proc6dure qui s'y rapportent soient du ressort exclusif du Parlement f6d6ral, le Parlement provincial avait droit de lgif6rer sur toutes les matibres civiles en rapport avec le droit criminel, et de sanctionner ses lois par une p6nalit6. Le jug6 (2) de cette cause est le suivant:
M. le juge Idington s'exprime dans ses raisons de la fagon suivante (1):
I have long entertained the opinion that the provincial legislatures have such absolute power over property and civil rights, as given them by section 92 of the B.N.A Act, item 13 thereof, that so long as they did not in fact encroach upon the powers assigned by the said Act to the Taschereau j.Dominion Parliament it would be almost impossible to question any such exercise of power so given unless by the exercise of the veto power given the Dominion Government. That veto power was originally designed to prevent an improper exercise of legislative power by the provincial legislatures.
M. le juge Duff exprime ainsi son opinion (2):
The legislation impugned seems to be aimed at suppressing conditions calculated to favour the development of crime rather than at the punishment of crime. This is an aspect of the subject in respect of which the provinces seem to be free to legislate.
I think the legislation is not invalid.
De son cit6, M. le juge Anglin trouve la loi constitutionnelle et s'exprime ainsi (3):
The judgment of the Superior Court maintaining the intervention of the Attorney General on the other hand was confirmed and in that proceeding there is a final judgment upholding the constitutionality of the Quebec Statute Geo. V, c. 81).
Substantially for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Greenshields, I am of the opinion that this statute in no wise impinges on the domain of criminal law but is concerned exclusively with the control and enjoyment of property and the safeguarding of the community from the consequences of an illegal and injurious use being made of it-a pure matter of civil right. In my opinion in enacting the statute now under consideration the legislature exercised the power which it undoubtedly possesses to provide for the suppression of a nuisance and the prevention of its recurrence by civil process.
M. le juge Brodeur partage les mimes vues et dit (4): Le parlement f6d6ral peut d6clarer criminelle une action quelconque; mais cela ne saurait empicher les provinces de 16gif6rer sur la m~me matihre en tant que les droits civils sont concerngs.
Enfin, M. le juge Mignault n'est pas moins cat6gorique lorsqu'il affirme (5):
C'est cette loi que I'appelante attaque pr6tendant qu'elle empi6te sur la juridiction du parlement canadien sur le droit criminel.
A mon avis, il n'y a pas li 16gislation criminelle. La lgislature veut empgcher qu'on ne se serve d'un immeuble pour des fins immorales; elle ne punit pas l'ofjense elle-m~me par l'amende ou l'emprisonnement, mais elle ne fait que statuer sur la possession et l'usage d'un immeuble. Cela rentre pleinement dans le droit civil.
(1) [1923] S.C.R. at 683.
(2) At p. 684.
(3) At p. 685.
(4) At p. 686.
(5) At p. 687.
Dans une cause de Lymburn et al. v. Mayland et al. (1), le Conseil Priv6 a eu A d6cider de la constitutionnalit6 de la "Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1930, of Alberta".
Cette loi stipulait que personne ne pouvait faire le commerce de valeurs mobilibres, h moins d'6tre enregistr6 au d6partement du procureur g6n6ral. Effectivement cette loiTaschereau d6fendait h une compagnie publique de vendre ses actions h moms que ce ne fut par 1'interm6diaire d'une personne enregistr6e, ou que la compagnie elle-mime fut enregistr6e.
En vertu de la loi, le procureur g6n6ral, ou son d616gu6, pouvait enquiter si quelque acte frauduleux avait t6 ou
6tait sur le point d'6tre commis.
La loi imposait des p6nalit6s pour toute violation de ses dispositions, et, en vertu de l'art. 20 de la loi, c'6tait une offense de commettre un acte frauduleux qui n'6tait pas punissable en vertu des dispositions du Code criminel du Canada. Le Conseil Priv4 en est venu h la conclusion que cette loi 6tait dans les limites des pouvoirs de la l6gislature provinciale en vertu de l'art.
92 de 1'Acte de l'Amirique britannique du Nord, qu'elle n'6tait pas invalide en ce qui concerne les compagnies f6d6rales parce qu'elle ne leur d6fendait pas de vendre h moins qu'elles ne soient enregistr6es, mais les assuj6tissait simplement L certaines r6gles applicables A toutes les personnes faisant le commerce des valeurs mobilibres.
Le
Conseil Priv6 a aussi conclu qu'il ne s'agissait pas lh d'une tentative d6tournde pour empi6ter sur le pouvoir l6gislatif f6d6ral, en ce qui concerne le droit criminel.
Lord Atkin s'exprime de la fagon suivante, h la page 323:
Et plus loin, t la page 327, il dit ce qui suit:
companies. The provisions therefore of Part II of the Act appear to be SWITMAN competent Provincial enactments dealing with property and civil rights and have to be obeyed by persons subject to them.
Enfin, dans la cause The Provincial Secretary of Prince Edward Island v. Egan (1), la Cour Suprime du Canada a -d4cid6 que l'art. 84(1) du Highway Traffic Act, 1936 de l'lle ascere
J.du Prince Pdouard 6tait valide, malgr6 qu'il autorisait la confiscation par l'autorit6 provinciale de la licence de conducteur de toute personne conduisant son v6hicule, alors qu'elle 6tait sous l'influence de liqueurs enivrantes. On a soutenu qu'il s'agissait d'une offense criminelle pr6vue par l'art. 285(4) du Code criminel, et que cette loi provinciale imposait une sanction additionnelle. La Cour a rejet6 ces pritentions et Sir Lyman Duff, alors juge en chef, a dit ce qui suit (2):
It is, of course, beyond dispute that where an offence is created by competent Dominion legislation in exercise of the authority under section 91(27), the penalty or penalties attached to that offence, as well as the offence itself, become matters within that paragraph of section 91 which are excluded from provincial jurisdiction.
There is, however, no adequate ground for the conclusion that these particular enactments (section 84(1) (a) and (c)) are in their true character attempts to prescribe penalties for the offences mentioned, rather than enactments in regulation of licences.
Rinfret J. parlant pour lui-mgme et pour Crocket et Kerwin JJ. s'est exprim6 de la fagon suivante, h la page 414: It cannot be open to contention for a moment that the imposing of such a penalty for enforcing a law of the competency of Prince Edward Island is an interference with criminal law, under section subs. 27. Regina v. Watson (1890), Ont. A.R. 221, at 249. It is not an additional penalty imposed for a violation of the criminal law. It provides for a civil disability arising out of a conviction for a criminal offence. Et, plus loin, h la page 415, il ajoute:
It does not create an offence; it does not add to or vary the punishment already declared by the Criminal Code; it does not change or vary the procedure to be followed in the enforcement of any provision of the Criminal Code. It deals purely and simply with certain civil rights in the Province of Prince Edward Island. Such legislation can rely upon the decision, in this Court, of Bidard v. Dawson and the Attorney-General for Quebec [supral.
Hudson J. partage les mimes vues h la page 417:
The section in question does not create a new but makes provision in regard to the licence which has been issued under the provincial authority. I do not think that this can be regarded as an addition (1) S.C.R. D.L.R. C.C.C.
At
Et, h la page 418, Taschereau J. dit:
in Je suis clairement d'opinion que si une province peut validement 16gif6rer sur toutes les matibres civiles en rapport avec le droit criminel, si elle peut adopter des lois destinges & supprimer les conditions qui favorisent le crime, et contr8ler les propri6t6s afin de protiger la soci6t6 contre tout usage illegal qu'on peut en faire, si elle a le pouvoir incontestable de r~glementer les courtiers dans leurs transactions financi6res pour prot6ger le public contre la fraude, si, enfin, elle a le droit d'imposer des incapacit6s civiles comme cons6quence d'une offense criminelle, je ne vois pas pourquoi elle n'aurait pas 6galement le pouvoir de d6cr6ter que ceux qui prichent et 6crivent des doctrines de nature A favoriser la trahison, la violation des secrets officiels, la s6dition, etc., soient priv6s de la jouissance des immeubles d'oiL se propagent ces th6ories destinies a saper h ses bases, et renverser 1'ordre 6tabli.
L'expirience, il nous est permis d'en prendre une connaissance judiciaire, nous enseigne, en effet, que des Canadiens, il y a moins de dix ans, malgr6 les serments d'all6geance qu'ils avaient prits, n'ont pas h6sit6 au nom du communisme h violer les secrets officiels, et A mettre en p6ril la s6curit6 de l'O'tat. La suppression de la diffusion de ces doctrines subversives par des sanctions civiles, est sfirement aussi importante que la suppression des maisons de d6sordre.
Je demeure convaincu que le domaine du droit criminel, exclusivement de la comp6tence f6d~rale, n'a pas 6t6 envahi par la l6gislation en question, et qu'il ne s'agit que de sanctions civiles 6tablies pour la privention des crimes et la sicuritg du pays.
On a aussi pr6tendu que cette 16gislation constituait une entrave A la libert6 de la presse et A la libert6 de parole. Je crois h ces libert6s: ce sont des droits ind6niables dont b6n6ficient heureusement les gens de ce pays, mais ces libert6s ne seraient plus un droit, et deviendraient un privilige, si on permettait h certains individus d'en abuser et de s'en servir pour diffuser des doctrines malsaines, qui conduisent n6cessairement h de flagrantes violations des lois tablies.
Ces libertis, dont jouissent les citoyens et la presse, d'exprimer leurs croyances, leurs pens6es et leurs doctrines, sans autorisation ou censure pr6alables, ne sont pas des droits absolus. Elles sont n6cessairement limit6es, et doivent s'exercer dans le cadre de la 16galit6. Quand les bornes sont d6passies, elles deviennent abusives, et la loi doit alors intervenir pour exercer une action r6pressive, et prot6ger les citoyens et la soci6t6.
Le m~me raisonnement doit n6cessairement servir a rencontrer 1'objection soulev6e par l'appelant h l'effet que la loi attaqu6e, est une entrave h la libre expression de pens6e de tout individu, candidat h une 6lection. Les id6es destructives de 1'ordre social et de l'autorit6 6tablie, par des m6thodes dictatoriales, n'ont pas plus de droits en temps 6lectoraux qu'en aucun autre temps.
Cette loi, dans l'esprit de certains, peut paraitre sbv&re, il ne m'appartient pas d'en juger la sagesse, mais la sivdrit6 d'une loi adopt6e par le pouvoir comp6tent ne la marque pas du caractbre d'inconstitutionnalit6.
Pour toutes ces raisons, je suis d'avis que le pr6sent appel doit 6tre rejet6 avec d6pens payables par 1'appelant h l'intervenant. Je ne crois pas qu'il doit y avoir d'ordonnance en ce qui concerne les frais devant cette Cour entre 1'appelant et l'intim6e.
J.:-By 1 Geo. VI, 11, passed by the Legislature of the Province of Quebec and entitled "An Act to Protect the Province against Communistic Propaganda" (now R.S.Q. 1941, 52), the following provisions are enacted: The word "house" is defined to extend to any building or other construction whatever. By s. 4 the Attorney-General, . . . upon satisfactory proof that an infringement of section 3 has been committed, may order the closing of the house against its use for any purpose whatsoever for a period of not more than one year; the closing A.G. OF order shall be registered at the registry office of the registration division wherein is situated such house, upon production of a copy of such order Rand J. certified by the Attorney-General.
When a house is closed, an owner who has not been in possession may apply to the Superior Court to have the order revised upon proving that in good faith he was ignorant of the use being made in contravention of the Act or that the house has not been so used during the twelve months preceding the order.
Conversely, after an order has been so modified or terminated, the Attorney-General may, on application to the same Court, obtain a decree reviving it. No remedy by resort to a Court is extended to the person in possession against whom the order has become effective. The Attorney-General may at any time permit reoccupation on any conditions thought proper for the protection of the property and its contents or he may revoke the order.
The action in this appeal was brought by an owner against a tenant to have a lease set aside and for damages on the ground of the use of the leased premises for the illegal purpose so defined and their closure under such an order. As the validity of the Act was challenged by the defence, the Attorney-General intervened and that issue became the substantial question in the proceedings.
Je, soussign6, procureur g6n6ral de la province de Qubbec, croyablement inform6 des infractions et violations ci-dessus, vous enjoins de fermer pour toutes fins quelconques, pendant un an A compter de I'ex~cution de cet ordre, la maison portant numbro civique de 1'avenue du Parc, dans la cit6 de Montrial, et de plus, vous 6tes par les prisentes autoris6, et je vous donne les instructions en consdquence, it saisir et confisquer tout journal, revue, pamphlet, circulaire, document ou 6crit quelconque imprim6, publi6 ou distribu6 en contravention h la dite loi, en particulier et sans restrictions h saisir et ?. d6truire les exemplaires du journal "Combat".
From this it is clear that the order was based upon both sections.
In the intervention, conclusion C was in these words: A.D
In conformity with this and the conclusions in the action, the judgment of the Superior Court declared the statute in all respects to be valid, allowed the claim for resiliation, but dismissed that for damages because they had not been sufficiently proved. On appeal by the defendant that judgment was affirmed.
Mr. Beaulieu, for the Attorney-General, as a preliminary point, urged that the dismissal of the claim for damages removed the relevancy of s. 12 to the issue on the intervention and that this Court should consider only s. 3, a point which, if upheld, would entail a modification of the judgments below. But the validity of the entire statute was put in issue by the intervention and maintained by the Courts below; and in the circumstances of the case, apart from any question of severance and of prejudice to the rights of the appellant in relation to the judgment on the claim as well as against those executing the order should it not be upheld, I see no sufficient warrant at this stage to limit the scope of the appeal.
The first ground on which the validity of s. 3 is supported is head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, "Property in the Province", and Mr. Beaulieu's contention goes in this manner: by that head the Province is vested with unlimited legislative power over property; it may, for instance, take land without compensation and generally may act as amply as if it were a sovereign state, untrammelled by constitutional limitation.
The power being absolute can be used as an instrument or means to effect any purpose or object. Since the objective accomplishment under the statute here is an Act on property, its validity is self-evident and the question is concluded.
I am unable to agree that in our federal organization power absolute in such a sense resides in either legislature. The detailed distribution made by ss. 91 and 92 places limits to direct and immediate purposes of provincial action. Under head 13 the purpose would, in general, be a "property" purpose either primary or subsidiary to another head of the same section. If such a purpose is foreign to powers vested in the Province by the Act, it will invade the field of the Dominion.
For example, land could not be declared forfeited or descent destroyed by attainder on conviction of a crime, nor could the convicted person's right of access to provincial Courts be destroyed.
These would trench upon both criminal law and citizenship status. The settled principle that calls for a determination of the "real character", the "pith and substance", of what purports to be enacted and whether it is "colourable" or is intended to effect its ostensible object, means that the true nature of the legislative act, its substance in purpose, must lie within s. 92 or some other endowment of provincial power. That a power ostensibly as here under a specific head cannot be exercised as a means directly and immediately to accomplish a purpose not within that endowment is demonstrated by the following decisions of the Judicial Committee: Union Colliery Company of British Columbia, Limited et al. v. Bryden (1), holding that legislative power in relation to employment in a coal mine could not be used as a means of nullifying the civil capacities of citizenship and, specifically, of persons qualifying under head 25 of s. 91, Naturalization and Aliens; Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General for Quebec et al. (2), holding that the Dominion, under its power in relation to criminal law, could not prohibit the manufacture of margarine for the purpose of benefiting in local trade one class of producer as against another. The heads of ss. 91 and 92 are to be read and interpreted with each other and with the provisions of the statute as a whole; and what is then exhibited is a pattern of limitations, curtailments and modifications of legislative scope within a texture of interwoven and interacting powers.
In support of the legislation on this ground, Bidard v. Dawson et al. (3) was relied on. In that case the statute provided that it should be illegal for the owner or occupier of any house or building to use it or allow it to be used as a disorderly house; and procedure was provided by which the Superior Court could, after a conviction under the Criminal Code, grant an injunction against the owner restraining that use of it. If the use continued, the Court could order the A..
building to be closed for a period of not more than one year. This power is seen to have been based upon a conviction Rand J. for maintaining a public nuisance.
Under the public law of England which underlies that of all the Provinces, such an act was not only a matter for indictment but in a civil aspect the Court could enjoin its continuance. The essence of this aspect is its repugnant or prejudicial effect upon the neighbouring inhabitants and properties.
On that view this Court proceeded in Bidard. Idington J. at p. 684 says:
Indeed the duty to protect neighbouring property owners in such cases as are involved in this question before us renders the question hardly arguable.
There are many instances of other nuisances which can be better rectified by local legislation within the power of the legislatures over property and civil rights than by designating them crimes and leaving them to be dealt with by Parliament as such.
Anglin J. at p. 685:
. . I am of the opinion that this statute . . is concerned exclusively with the control and enjoyment of property and the safeguarding of the community from the consequences of an illegal and injurious use being made of it-a pure matter of civil right. In my opinion in enacting the statute now under consideration the legislature exercised the power which it undoubtedly possesses to provide for the suppression of a nuisance and the prevention of its recurrence by civil process.
Brodeur J. at pp. 685-6:
La 16gislature provinciale de Qubbec, sachant que ces maisons affectaient consid6rablement la valeur des propri6tis du voisinage et rendaient plus difficile la r6glementation policibre, a jug6 & propos d'ordonner leur fermeture si, apris avis, les propri6taires ne voyaient pas ; y faire cesser le commerce immoral qui s'y faisait.
est incontestable que si une personne maintient une maison ou fait une chose qui constitue une nuisance, et que cet acte soit consid~r6 criminel par le parlement fid~ral, nos tribunaux peuvent 6tre autorisis par des lois provinciales b 6mettre une injonction pour mettre fin 'k ces violations du droit public.
That the scene of study, discussion or dissemination of views or opinions on any matter has ever been brought under legal sanction in terms of nuisance is not suggested. For the past century and a half in both the United Kingdom and Canada, there has been a steady removal of restraints on this freedom, stopping only at perimeters where the foundation of the freedom itself is threatened. Apart from sedition, obscene writings and criminal libels, the public law leaves the literary, discursive and polemic use of language, in the broadest sense, free.
The object of the legislation here, as expressed by the title, is admittedly to prevent the propagation of communism and bolshevism, but it could just as properly have been the suppression of any other political, economic or social doctrine or theory; and the issue is whether that object is a matter "in relation to which" under s. 92 the Province may exclusively make laws.
Two heads of the section are claimed to authorize it: head 13, as a matter of "Civil Rights", and head 16, "Local and Private Matters". Mr. Tremblay in a lucid argument treated such a limitation of free discussion and the spread of ideas generally as in the same category as the ordinary civil restrictions of libel and slander. These obviously affect the matter and scope of discussion to the extent that it trenches upon the rights of individuals to reputation and standing in the community; and the line at which the restraint is drawn is that at which public concern for the discharge of legal or moral duties and government through rational persuasion, and that for private security, are found to be in rough balance. But the analogy is not a true one. The ban is directed against the freedom or civil liberty of the actor; no civil right of anyone is affected nor is any civil remedy created. The aim of the statute is, by means of penalties, to prevent what is considered a poisoning of men's minds, to shield the individual from exposure to dangerous ideas, to protect him, in short, from his own thinking propensities.
There is nothing of civil rights in this; it is to curtail or proscribe those freedoms which the majority so far consider to be the condition of social cohesion and its ultimate stabilizing force.
It is then said that the ban is a local matter under head 16; that the social situation in Quebec is such that safeguarding its intellectual and spiritual life against subversive doctrines becomes a special need in contrast with that for a general regulation by Parliament. A similar contention was made in Re Section 6 of The Farm Security Act (1944) of Saskatchewan (1).
What was dealt with there was the matter of interest on mortgages and a great deal of evidence to show the unique vicissitudes of farming in that Province was adduced. But there, as here, it was and is obvious that local conditions of that nature, assuming, for the purpose of the argument only, their existence, cannot extend legislation to matters which lie outside of s. 92. Indicated by the opening words of the preamble in the Act of 1867, reciting the desire of the four Provinces to be united in a federal union with a constitution "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom", the political theory which the Act embodies is that of parliamentary government, with all its social implications, and the provisions of the statute elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus which they create or contemplate. Whatever the deficiencies in its workings, Canadian government is in substance the will of the majority expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies.
This means ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society, the effectiveness of which, as events have not infrequently demonstrated, is undoubted.
But public opinion, in order to meet such a responsibility, demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas.
Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under selfrestraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles. Under that government, the freedom of discussion in Caanda, as a subjectmatter of legislation, has a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion. With such dimensions it is ipso facto excluded from head 16 as a local matter.
This constitutional fact is the political expression of the primary condition of social life, thought and its communication by language. Liberty in this is little less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence. As such an inherence in the individual it is embodied in his status of citizenship. Outlawry, for example, divesting civil standing and destroying citizenship, is a matter of Dominion concern.
Of the fitness of this order of government to the Canadian organization, the words of Taschereau J. in Brassard et al. v. Langevin (1) should be recalled:
Prohibition of any part of this activity as an evil would be within the scope of criminal law, as ss. 60, 61 and 62 of the Criminal Code dealing with sedition exemplify. Bearing in mind that the endowment of parliamentary institutions is one and entire for the Dominion, that Legislatures and Parliament are permanent features of our constitutional structure, and that the body of discussion is indivisible, apart from the incidence of criminal law and civil rights, and incidental effects of legislation in relation to other matters, the degree and nature of its regulation must await future consideration; for the purposes here it is sufficient to say that it is not a matter within the regulation of a Province.
Mr. Scott, in his able examination of the questions raised, challenged also the validity of ss. 4 et seq. which vest in the Attorney-General the authority to adjudicate upon the commission of the illegal act under s. 3 and to issue the order of closure; but in view of the conclusions reached on the other grounds, the consideration of this becomes unnecessary.
I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgments below, dismiss the action and direct a declaration on the intervention that the statute in its entirety is ultra vires of the Province. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of the action in the Superior Court against the respondent Elbling and the costs occasioned by the intervention in all Courts against the Attorney-General.
J.:-I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my brother Rand, with which I agree. I only desire to add a reference to my own judgment in Saumur v. The City. of Quebec (1), and particularly to the statement there reproduced from Mr. Justice Mignault's work, vol. 1, J. p. 131, as follows:
In my opinion, legislation of the character of that here in question cannot be supported as being in relation to civil rights in the Province within the meaning of head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, and equally, it cannot be said to be in relation to matters of a merely local or private nature in the province.
No objection was raised by the Attorney-General to the entertaining of this appeal on the ground that there no longer remained any lis as between the appellant and the respondent Elbling, but the point should perhaps be noticed. In my view, any such objection, had it been made, would be completely answered by the decision of this Court in Bidard v. Dawson et al. (2). There the action had been taken by the respondent Dawson with regard to certain premises alleged to have been used or allowed to be used by the appellant contrary to a statute of the Quebec Legislature entitled "An Act respecting the Owners of Houses used as Disorderly Houses". The constitutional validity of the statute having been brought into question by the appellant, the Attorney-General intervened. The Superior Court maintained the action and the intervention, but by the judgment of the 'Court of King's Bench, Appeal Side, the main action between the plaintiff and the defendant was remitted to the Superior Court to permit of further proof being adduced in regard to the defendant's ownership of the property in question.
That judgment, not being a final judgment, was not the subject of appeal to this Court.
On the other hand, the judgment of the Superior Court maintaining the intervention of the Attorney-General was confirmed by the Court of King's Bench. This was a final judgment and was the subject of the appeal to this Court, which overruled an objection to the entertaining of the appeal on the ground that the main action, having been referred back, had still to be dealt with by the trial Court.
I am unable to distinguish, in substance, the circumstances of that case from the present.
I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgments below, dismiss the action and direct a declaration on the intervention that the statute in its entirety is ultra vires of the Province. The appellant should have the costs of the action in the Superior Court against the respondent Elbling and the costs occasioned by the intervention in all Courts against the Attorney-General.
J.*:-This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) (1) dismissing an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court and maintaining the intervention of the Attorney-General for the
Province of Quebec.
By a lease dated December 29, 1947, the respondent
Freda Elbling leased to one Max Bailey the premises bearing civic number 5321 Park Avenue in the city of Montreal for the term of 15- months from January 15, 1948.
On December 30, 1947, the respondent Elbling granted to the lessee Bailey an option to renew the lease for an additional period terminating on April 30, 1950.
On February 5, 1948, the lessee Bailey assigned the lease and option to the appellant.
The option was exercised and the appellant, on January 27, 1949, was in possession of the premises under a lease which expired on April 30, 1950.
On February 15, 1949, the respondent Elbling commenced an action against the appellant, praying for cancellation of the lease and for damages in the amount of $2,170.
ground of action was the alleged use of the premises for the purpose of propagating communism contrary to the provisions of "An Act to protect the Province against Communistic Propaganda", R.S.Q.
1941,
52, hereinafter referred to as the Padlock Act.
The appellant admitted that the premises were used to propagate communism, but pleaded that the Padlock Act was wholly ultra vires of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec. In accordance with art. 114 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, notice of his intention to contest the constitutionality of the legislation was given to the Attorney- General, who intervened in the action.
The learned trial judge ordered cancellation of the lease and rejected the claim for damages. There was no appeal on the question of damages.
The learned trial judge also held that the Act was constitutional and, in pith and substance, was not criminal law and was not related to any matters exclusively reserved to the Dominion Parliament. He found that it was related to property and civil rights in the Province and was a matter of merely local or private nature.
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side), Barclay J. dissenting.
On January 27, 1949, the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec ordered the director of the provincial police to close the premises for a period of one year from the execution of the order and to seize and confiscate all newspapers, reviews, pamphlets, circulars, documents or writings published in contravention of the Padlock Act.
The pertinent sections of the Padlock Act read as follows: The main question for determination on this appeal is whether or not the enactment in question is in relation to "Criminal Law" as that term is used in head 27 of s. 91 of the British North America Act.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for Ontario v. The Hamilton Street Railway Company et al. (1) and by this Court in Re Section 498A of the Criminal Code (2) that the term "Criminal Law" means criminal law "in its widest sense" and is in no way confined to what was criminal law by the law of England or of any Province in 1867. It must extend to the power to make new crimes.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant before this Court that the legislation, judged by its true nature and purpose, is related to public wrongs rather than private rights and is, therefore, criminal law within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.
The respondent took the position that the legislation was in no sense criminal law, but was related to property and civil.rights and to matters of a local or private nature in the province.
The history of the legislation is not without interest. In 1919 the Criminal Code was amended (9-10 Geo. V, c. 46, s. 1) by adding thereto ss. and 97B, which provided that any assoication the purpose of which was to bring about any governmental, industrial or economic change within Canada by the use of force was an unlawful association. Penalties were imposed on anyone who acted as an officer or member (1) 7 thereof, or who published or imported any literature on their behalf. Sections and later became s. 98 in R.S.C.
In 1930 s. 133A (which is substantially embodied in the present s. 61) was added to the Criminal Code (by 20-21 J. Geo. V, s. 2) and ameliorated the sedition laws. In 1934 the Legislature of Quebec enacted "An Act respecting certain public meetings endangering public, social or religious order", entitled the Certain Meetings Advertising Act (24 Geo. V, 51), which forbade the distribution of certain circulars in towns or villages unless prior approval had been obtained from the chief of police, and prohibited approval if the printer, maker or author of the circular was not domiciled in the Province.
In 1936 s. 98 of the Criminal Code was repealed by 1 Edw. VIII, c. 29, s. 1, and by s. 4 of the same Act a new subs. (4) was added to s. 133 of the Criminal Code (now s. 60, subs. (4)) as follows:
In 1937 the Legislature of Quebec enacted the Padlock Act (1 Geo. VI, c. and on the same day repealed the Certain Meetings Advertising Act (by 1 Geo. VI, 79). At the outset it becomes necessary to consider the judgment of this Court in Bdard v. Dawson et al. (1), which held that another padlock law, namely, "An Act respecting the Owners of Houses used as Disorderly Houses" (now R.S.Q. 1941, c. 50), was intra vires.
Section 3 of that Act provides:
Section 9 of the Act authorizes a judge to order the closing of a disorderly house.
This Court held that the legislation was intra vires of the Provincial Legislature, as it dealt with a matter of property and civil rights by providing for the suppression of a nuisance and not with criminal law by aiming at the punishment of a crime. Anglin J. (later C.J.C.) said at p. 685:
it-a In my view B6dard v. Dawson et al. may be distinguished on the ground that the statute there considered was concerned with the control or enjoyment of property and with safeguarding the community from the consequences of an illegal or injurious use being made of property, whereas that in the present case is aimed at the prevention of the propagation of communism. The question of the suppression of a local nuisance does not arise.
In Johnson v. The Attorney General of Alberta (1) Locke J., referring to B6dard v. Dawson et al., supra, said at p. 157:
(1) 2 1. Moreover, in Bddard v. Dawson et al. the offence was created under the Criminal Code of Canada (ss. 228, 228a, 229 and 229a) and not under the provincial legislation (the Disorderly House Act).
The provincial legislation merely provided what would be the civil effect on the owner of a house in which such an offence had been committed. The facts that in Bddard v. Dawson et al. the offence committed was defined in the Criminal Code, whereas in the present case it is not; that the nature of the offence dealt with in Bidard v. Dawson et al. was so different from that under consideration in the present case as to preclude comparison; and that there is a radical difference in the procedural aspects of the two cases, all impel me to the conclusion that the two cases are clearly distinguishable. (1) 2 1. B6dard v. Dawson et al. was followed by Greenshields C.J. in Fineberg v. Taub (1).
In that case the constitutionality of the Act now under consideration in the present case, was subjected to attack on similar grounds. In upholding the constitutionality of the legislation Greenshields C.J., at p. 237, said:
With respect, I am unable to agree that the legislation under attack is purely and simply to determine the civil consequences of a criminal act. Clearly it affects the use of property within the Province, but, in my view, it is not related to property and civil rights or to matters of a local or private nature in the Province, but its true nature and purpose is the suppression of communism by creating a new crime with accompanying penal provisions.
It should be pointed out that both ss. 3 and 12 were specifically referred to in the order of the Attorney-General closing the house. Moreover, the appellant in his notice of plea of unconstitutionality, given pursuant to art. 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stated that he had pleaded the unconstitutionality of the whole of the statute and the Attorney-General intervened on the ground that the whole of the statute was intra vires of the Provincial Legislature. In my view, therefore, the constitutionality of both ss. and 12 is properly before this Court for adjudication.
It was also contended by the respondent the Attorney- General that ss. 3 and 12 of the Act created two separate and independent illegalities imposing different penalties and that consequently the sections were severable and the invalidity of one would not affect the validity of the other. On this point I agree with the contention of the appellant that the two separate sections in the statute are so interconnected that they must be read together as expressing a single legislative purpose.
In addition the question of severability could only arise if one or other of these sections were held to be intra vires, so that the valid might be severed from the invalid. If both are invalid there can be NolanJ. no severance.
The respondent the Attorney-General contended that, there being no provision in the Criminal Code, or in any law passed by the Parliament of Canada, which made communism a crime or which forbade the propagation of communism, the field was unoccupied and the provincial legislation was valid. I do not agree with this contention. In Union Colliery Company of British Columbia, Limited et al. v. Bryden (1), Lord Watson, in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, made it clear that the abstinence of the Dominion Parliament from legislating to the full limit of its powers could not have the effect of transferring to any Provincial Legislature the legislative power which had been assigned to the Dominion by s. 91 of the Act of 1867.
Attention is also drawn to Attorney- General for Canada v. Attorneys-General for Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada; Attorneys-General for Quebec and Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General for Canada (2), and to Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada et al. (3), both to the same effect.
The appellant took the position before this Court that the legislation in question deals with sedition and seditious literature and is an encroachment upon ss. 133 and 133A of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927, 36. It was contended that these sections provide a complete series of rules governing freedom of discussion and governing the publication of printed matter dealing with political and governmental affairs and consequently the theory of the unoccupied field was inapplicable.
In my view of the matter it is unnecessary to decide upon the merit of this contention because, whether or not the Dominion Parliament has made commumsm a crime or forbidden its propagation, it has the exclusive jurisdiction so to do.
J.
Holding, as I do, that the legislation under attack, judged by its true nature and purpose, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada, it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds put forward by the appellant in support of the appeal.
I would dispose of the appeal as proposed by my brother Abbott.
J.:-The question in this appeal is whether c. 52 of R.S.Q. 1941, formerly 11 of the statutes of Quebec, 1937, 1 Geo. VI, entitled "Act to protect the Province against Communistic Propaganda", hereinafter referred to as the Act, is intra vires of the Legislature. The relevant circumstances and the nature of the arguments addressed to us sufficiently appear in the reasons of other members of the Court.
In my opinion the Act is invalid in toto, as being in pith and substance legislation in relation to the criminal law, a matter assigned by s. 91, head 27, of the British North America Act to the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.
The nature and purpose of the legislation clearly appear from the words of the Act. The propagation of communism or bolshevism is regarded as an evil and such propagation, by any means whatsover in a house within the Province and by any writing whatsoever elsewhere in the Province, is forbidden under punitive sanctions.
The circumstance that the penalty prescribed for a breach of the provisions of s. 3 is the closing of a house within the Province has not the effect of making the enactment one in relation to property and civil rights in the Province, and I find myself unable to relate the Act to any provincial purpose falling within head 13 or 16 of s. 92 of the British North America Act. The purpose and effect of the Act are to make criminal the propagation of communism or bolshevism which the Legislature in the public interest intends to prohibit. It is legislation in relation to what is conceived to be a public evil not in relation to civil rights or local matters.
Having reached this conclusion I do not find it necessary A to deal with any of the other grounds upon which the validity of the Act was impugned.
I would dispose of the appeal as proposed by my brother Abbott.
J.:-L'action en r6siliation de bail, intent6e par 1'intim6e A l'appelant, se fonde uniquement sur la Loi concernant la propagande communiste, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 52. La constitutionnalit6 de cette loi a td attaqu6e par ce dernier, soutenue par le procureur gin6ral et maintenue, en premibre instance, par un jugement confirm6 par une d6cision majoritaire de la Cour d'Appel. Subs6quemment, et consid6rant que la question en 6tait une de "consid6rable importance", la Cour d'Appel autorisa un pourvoi devant cette Cour. La loi attaqu6e est intitul6e "Loi prot6geant la province contre la propagande communiste" et peut 6tre cit6e sous le titre de Loi concernant la propagande communiste (art. 1). Le statut comporte deux dispositions de substance: 'art. 3 d6clare ill6gale 1'utilisation d'une maison pour la diffusion du communisme ou du bolch6visme; et (ii) 'art. 12 d6clare ill6gales 1'impression, la publication, la distribution de tout 6crit quelconque propageant ou tendant h propager l'une ou 1'autre de ces doctrines. La violation de l'une ou l'autre de ces dispositions constitue une infraction sanctionn6e, dans le premier cas, par la fermeture de la maison pour toutes fins quelconques pendant une p6riode n'exc6dant pas un an (art. 4) et, dans le second cas, par un emprisonnement d'au moins trois mois et d'au plus douze mois (art. 13).
Bref, et sauf la propagande verbale h ciel ouvert, la loi prohibe toute propagande des doctrines indiqu6es, que ce soit au moyen d'6crits ou de la parole. D'autres dispositions de la loi incrimin6e assurent, par des d6finitions compr6hensives et par une proc6dure exceptionnelle et exp6ditive, l'atteinte en pl6nitude des fins vis6es aux deux articles de substance. C'est ainsi que (art. 2): et c'est ainsi que l'6mission des ordonnances de fermeture, de saisie, de confiscation et de destruction des 6crits, 6chappe A la juridiction normale des tribunaux pour demeurer de la comp6tence exclusive du procureur g6n6ral (arts. 4 et 14). Enfin, les autres articles donnent, dans certaines circonstances et A certaines conditions, un pouvoir de revision de l'ordonnance de fermeture A la Cour Sup6rieure ou au procureur g6n6ral.
De cet examen, il apparait qu'il ne s'agit pas ici d'une loi complexe, c'est-h-dire une loi ayant des dispositions embrassant plusieurs matibres, au sens des arts. 91 et 92 de 1'Acte de l'Am6rique britannique du Nord, 1867. Il s'agit au contraire d'une loi simple et dont les deux articles de substance, les arts. 3 et 12, ne portent que sur une mime matibre, manifestant ainsi l'unit6 de leur objet et de celui de la loi entibre, soit: la prohibition de la propagande communiste. Et ce, dans la mesure et par des sanctions pr6cis6es. Pour d6terminer la nature et le caract~re v6ritable de la loi, on ne saurait cons6quemment-soit dit en toute d6f6rence pour ceux qui entretiennent une opinion contrairesous le pr6texte que le litige se fonde uniquement sur l'art. 3 ou qu'il ne s'agisse pas ici d'une r6f6rence, limiter le champ de la consid6ration ce dernier article, h 1'exclusion de 'art. 12. On ne saurait de plus, pour d6terminer 1'objet de cet art. 3, 'extraire du contexte de la loi ou il se trouve pour, le consid6rant ainsi isol6ment, lui assigner un objet diff6rent de celui que sa pr6sence dans le cadre de la loi et que le titre d'icelle doivent normalement lui donner. C'est d'ailleurs conform6ment A ces vues que le problime a 6t6 compris et envisag6, en premibre instance, tant par 1'appelant, le procureur g6ndral et le juge: ils ont consid6r6 l'art. 3 comme faisant partie d'un tout en attaquant, soutenant et maintenant respectivement la constitutionnalit6 de la loi dans son entier.
Que l'unique objet lgal de cette loi soit de prohiber, avec sanctions p6nales, la propagande communiste, ou plus pr6cis6ment, de faire de la propagande communiste un acte criminel, la chose, je crois, ne peut 6tre plus manifeste. Quiconque "commet une infraction h l'article 12", dit l'art. 13, est passible d'emprisonnement.
Ici, la punition prend la forme d'une main-mise de l'Itat sur la personne du coupable; c'est la restriction de la libert6.
Le procureur g6n6ral "sur preuve satisfaisante d'une infraction h l'article 3", dit l'art. 4, peut ordonner la fermeture de la maison utilis~e en contravention de cet article.
Ici, la punition prend la forme d'une main-mise de l' tat sur les biens; c'est l'atteinte au droit de propri6t6, d'usufruit ou d'usage, du coupable ou d'une personne qui ne l'est pas mais que la loi pr6sume l'6tre jusqu'.t preuve de sa bonne foi (art. 6(a)). Dans les deux cas, la violation de la loi constitue une infraction qu'elle punit. Peu importe la forme de la loi, 1'agencement des articles et les mots employ6s. Comme le signale le Lord Chancelier, le Vicomte Caldecote, dans Board of Trustees of The Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District et al. v. Independent Order of Foresters; The King v. Independent Order of Foresters (1), au premier paragraphe de la page 534: "The substance and not the form of the enactment in question must be regarded."
Dans cette dernibre cause, le Comit4 Judiciaire du Conseil Priv4 n'a pas hisit6, pour rechercher l'essence et la v6ritable substance, "the pith and substance", d'une 16gislation, faire entrer dans la consid6ration de la question, l'examen des lois contemporaines de la mime L6gislature, examen qui r6v6la l'unit6 d'objet, d'essence et de substance de ces diff6rentes l6gislations; et en d6clarant ultra vires la 16gislation sous consid6ration, on a appliqu6 le principe qu'on ne peut faire indirectement ce qu'on n'a pas le pouvoir de faire directement.
Bref, la loi incriminde prohibe et punit la propagande communiste par la perte temporaire d'un droit -celui de la libert4 ou de la propri6t6-et non par la perte d'un privilige.
En cela, elle rencontre intigralement les conditions de la formule classique 6tablie par Lord Atkin aux pages 324-5 dans Proprietary Articles Trade Association et al. v. Attorney-General for Canada et al. (2), pour conclure h la nature criminelle d'un acte: "Is the act prohibited with penal consequences?"
Qu'une L6gislature provinciale ait le pouvoir de prohiber avec sanctions p6nales certaines actions ou omissions, la chose est 614mentaire. C'est un pouvoir que le para. 15 de 1'art. 92 6tablit, mais limite dans les termes suivants: Manifestement, ce pouvoir donn6 h une L6gislature d'infliger des punitions est, de son essence-contrairement A ce qui est le cas du pouvoir du Parlement d'6tablir des crimes-un pouvoir auxiliaire, "ancillary". Aussi bien, la validit6 d'une disposition 16gislative d'ordre p6nal dcrit6e par une L6gislature, en vertu du para. 15 de F'art. 92, est subordonn6e A la validit6 de la disposition 16gislative principale dont la disposition auxiliaire tend h assurer 1'ex6cution. En 1'espice, la mati&re de la disposition principaleprohibition de la propagande communiste-n'en est certes pas une qui en soi tombe dans la cat6gorie des sujets 6numbr6s en 'art. 92 comme 6tant de la comp6tence de la L6gislature.
Seul le Parlement, 14gif6rant en matiare criminelle, a comp6tence pour d6cr6ter, d6finir, d6fendre et punir ces matibres d'un 6crit ou d'un discours qui, en raison de leur nature, lsent 1'ordre social ou la s6curit6 de littat. Tels sont, par exemple, les libelles diffamatoires, obschnes, blasph6matoires ou s6ditieux.
Dans ces cas, il ne s'agit plus de 16sion de droits individuels donnant droit h compensation mon6taire. Il s'agit de 16sion des droits de la soci6t6, emportant punition.
Ceci n'implique pas 6videmment que la L6gislature ne peut validement adopter aucune disposition 16gislative d'ordre p6nal affectant indirectement la libert6 d'expression; telle serait, par exemple, une prohibition avec sanctions p6nales de la tenue de toute assembl6e publique dans les 24 heures pr6cddant le jour du scrutin. En ce cas, la disposition 16gislative est une disposition auxiliaire h une disposition principale portant sur une matibre qui est de la comp6tence de la L6gislature, soit la r6glementation des 6lections dans la province.
Aussi bien, les tribunaux tiendront comme n'6tant pas des empi6tements sur le droit criminel les dispositions p6nales d'ordre provincial 6tablies dans le but d'assurer l'ex6cution d'une loi de la Province, sur une matibre 6galement -tenue comme 6tant de sa comp6tence. C'est lh le fondement des d6cisions de cette Cour dans B6dard v. Dawson et al. (1) et dans The Provincial Secretary of Prince Edward Island v. Egan (2).
On a soumis, en invoquant la d6cision de Bddard v. Daw- A.G.o son et al., supra, que la matibre de l'art. 3 tombait sous le Fmteux J. para. 13 de 1'art. 92: "13. La propri6t6 et les droits civils dans la province."
L'article 3, dit-on, ne vise qu'h r6glementer la possession et 1'usage des maisons. Pour ainsi interpriter 1'art. 3, on 'a isol6 du texte de la loi entiare intitul6e "Loi prot6geant la province contre la propagande communiste". A la v6rit6, l'objet v6ritable de 1'art. 3, aussi bien que la technique l6gislative adopt6e pour r6aliser cet objet, ne pouvaient tre dinonc6s en des termes plus clairs que ceux apparaissant h 1'extrait suivant des raisons de jugement de l'un des juges de la majorit6 en Cour d'Appel, dans la pr6sente cause:
Dans P'espce, la Ioi sous attaque ne d6finit pas le communisme pour une excellente raison, c'est qu'elle n'entend pas en faire un crime.
Ce qu'elle veut r6primer, ce sont les activitis de ce mouvement subversif. II est 6vident que la L6gislature se serait rdjouie de pouvoir mettre le communisme hors la loi en faisant, des adeptes de cette doctrine, des criminels au sens du droit criminel.
Elle savait fort bien qu'elle n'avait pas ce pouvoir, mais elle n'ignorait pas non plus qu'elle avait la responsabilit6, dans le cadre de sa comp~tence 16gislative, de chercher, par tous moyens de r6glementation, A paralyser I'action de ces gens et I rdprimer la propagation de cette doctrine. Le champ de la propri6t6 et des droits civils lui
6tait ouvert et elle s'en est privalue.
Mais, ainsi qu'on l'affirme implicitement dans la dernibre phrase de cette citation, la L6gislature pouvait-elle validement utiliser son pouvoir de 16gif6rer sur la propri6t6 et les droits civils comme moyen pour arriver a sa fin v6ritable, soit A faire une 16gislation relativement a une matiare
6chappant a sa comp6tence?
La n6gative n'est pas douteuse: Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers et al. (3); Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney- (1) [19231 S.C.R. 681, [19231 4 D.L.R. 293, 40 C.C.C. 404, [19231
3 W.W.R.
(2) [19411 S.C.R. 396, [19411 3 D.L.R. 305, 76 C.C.C. 227.
A.C. 328, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 789, C.C.C. 336, 11924]
2 W.W.R..397.
General for Canada et al. (1).
Dans Ladore et al. v. Bennett et al. (2), Lord Atkin, A la page 482, d6clare: En tout respect, aucune raison ne permet de diff~rencier, quant h leur nature et h leur caractbre v6ritable, "pith and substance", les dispositions de l'art. 3 de celles de l'art. 12 qui prohibe, avec sanctions p6nales, l'impression, la publication et la distribution d'4crits propageant ou tendant A propager le communisme, pour en diduire que la L6gislature n'a vis6, par l'art. 3, qu'h r6glementer la possession et l'usage des maisons.
Signalons, de plus, deux diff6rences fondamentales entre la pr6sente loi et la "Loi concernant les propri6taires de maisons employees comme maisons de d6sordre", dont la constitutionnalit6 fut affirm6e par cette Cour dans B6dard v. Dawson et al, supra. Dans la Loi des maisons de d6sordre, il n'y a pas, comme dans la pr6sente loi, une disposition de l'ordre de 'art. 12, mais simplement une de l'ordre de 1'art. 3, c'est-h-dire une disposition d6clarant ill6gale
1'utilisation d'une maison comme maison de d6sordre. De plus, dans la Loi des maisons de disordre, on a, par r6f6rence, adopt6 comme d6finition de "maison de d6sordre", la d6finition de cette expression au Code criminel. On a ainsi intigralement subordonn6, dans son principe et dans sa mesure, l'existence et l'op6ration de la loi provinciale sur 'existence et l'op6ration des dispositions 6tablies au Code criminel. Aussi bien a-t-on jug6 que la L6gislature n'avait pas cr66 un crime mais simplement d6cr6t6 des cons6quences civiles r6sultant de la commission d'un crime 6tabli par l'autorit6 comp6tente, et supprim6 les conditions conduisant h la commission de ce crime. Voilh bien la base qui manque en l'espbce; ici, ce n'est pas le Parlement mais c'est la L6gislature qui a cr66 le crime. Cet aspect de la question ne se pr6sentait pas dans la cause de B6dard v. Dawson et al., supra; il se pr6sentait, mais n'a pas 6t6 consid6r6, dans celle de Fineberg v. Taub (3). Pour ces raisons, ni la d6cision de cette Cour dans la premibre cause, ni la d6cision de la Cour Sup6rieure dans la seconde, ne peuvent 6tre invoqu6es au soutien de la proposition qu'il s'agit ici de "La propri6t6 et les droits civils dans la province", tombant sous le para. 13 de l'art. 92.
On a soutenu aussi que la matibre de la loi incrimin6e tombait sous le para. 16 de l'art. 92: "16. G6n6ralement toutes les matibres d'une nature purement locale ou priv6e dans la province".
Ce serait une tache insurmontable que d'assumer de d~montrer que la propagande communiste est une matibre locale. Dans son essence, la doctrine elle-mime a un caractbre international. Mais, dit-on, il existe dans la province de Quebec, contrairement h ce qui pourrait 6tre la situation dans le reste du Canada, une n6cessit6 particulibre de prot6ger la population de la province contre la propagande communiste.
Cette affirmation est peut-ftre plus ing6nieuse que flatteuse, mais elle n'a pas 6t6 d~montr6e. On invoque aussi la declaration de Lord Watson dans Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion et al. (1).
A la page 365, le savant juriste indique qu'au para. 16 de l'art. 92 est compris un pouvoir pour la L6gislature de faire des lois pour la paix, l'ordre et le bon gouvernement de la province relativement aux matibres d'une nature purement locale ou priv6e dans la province.
On reconnait, cependant, aux raisons du jugement faisant I'objet du pr6sent appel, que ce pouvoir ne justifie pas la L6gislature d'6tablir des crimes; et tel que d6jh. indiqu6, la matibre de la loi n'en est pas une "d'une nature purement locale ou priv6e dans la province". Qu'il y ait ou non, au pays, une propagande communiste agissante; que les invitations des propagandistes soient ou non fructueuses; qu'il en r6sulte ou non un danger ou une possibilit6 de danger; qu'il y ait lieu ou non pour le l6gislateur de conjurer ce danger ou sa possibilit6 en ajoutant aux mesures visant d6ji la s6dition, des mesures coercitives de censure et de main-mise sur la personne et sur les biens, tel que pourvu en la loi incrimin6e, plut6t que de laisser h. la conscience 6clair6e des citoyens le soin de rejeter ou combattre les invitations de cette propagande: voilh autant de questions qui, en raison de la s6paration des pouvoirs, 6chappent aux tribunaux pour etre et demeurer exclusivement de la juridiction du l6gislateur. Dans notre systime f6d6ratif de gouvernement oft la comp6tence lgislative se partage, suivant la matibre de la loi, entre le Parlement, d'une part, et les Legislatures de dix provinces, d'autre part, le corps l6gislatif qui, d'apris la constitution, a exclusive- J ment cette comp6tence 16gislative, la responsabilit6 et le droit d'6tablir et contr6ler les moyens pour y satisfaire, seul a jurisdiction pour consid6rer et d6cider de ces questions. Ces questions, qui s'61vent aux dimensions de la s6curit4 de l'tat, ne peuvent 6tre consid6r6es comme une matibre "d'une nature purement locale ou priv6e dans la province", ni 6tre tenues comme 6tant en relation avec "la propri6t6 et les droits civils dans la province". Le pouvoir qu'une L6gislature peut avoir de decr6ter les cons6quences civiles d'un crime 6tabli par l'autorit6 compitente, ou de supprimer les conditions qui conduisent h ce crime, n'inclut pas celui de cr6er un crime pour la pr6vention d'un autre crime validement 6tabli, tel, par exemple, celui de la s6dition.
Ptant d'avis que la matibre veritable de la loi incrimin6e est une matibre de droit criminel et, comme telle, de la competence exclusive du Parlement, il n'est pas n6cessaire de consid6rer les autres moyens soulevis par l'appelant pour disposer de cet appel et conclure h l'inconstitutionnalit6 de la loi.
Sur le point soulev6 par mon colligue M. le Juge Taschereau, en pr6liminaire et en marge du m6rite de la question constitutionnelle, j'adopterais les raisons de jugement de mon colligue M. le Juge Kellock. Sur le m6rite, je rendrais l'ordonnance propos6e par M. le juge en chef. ABBOrr J.:-The sole question in issue in this appeal is the constitutional validity of a statute of the Province of Quebec commonly known as the Padlock Act, the official title -of which is "An Act to protect the Province against Communistic Propaganda".
The Act in question was passed in 1937 and was 1 Geo. VI, c. of the statutes of Quebec of that year. It is now R.S.Q. 1941, 52.
Section 3 of the Act declares it to be illegal for any person who possesses or occupies a house within the Province, to use it or allow it to be used to "propagate communism or bolshevism by any means whatsoever". Section 12 declares it to be unlawful to print, publish or distribute in the Province any newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, circular, document or writing "propagating or tending to propagate communism or bolshevism".
No attempt has been made in the Act to define coMmunism or bolshevism but the term "house" is defined in the broadest possible terms and under s. 4 the Attorney- General "upon satisfactory proof" that a house has been used to propagate communism (as to which he is to be the sole judge) may order it closed for a period of not more than one year. This is the only sanction provided for the contravention of s. 3.
Contravention of s. 12 renders the offender liable to prosecution and penalties under the Quebec Summary Convictions Act.
Appellant was the tenant of premises in Montreal, which were the subject of a padlock order by the Attorney-General under the Act referred to. Sued by his landlord for cancellation of the lease and damages under art. 1624 of the Civil Code on the ground that the premises were used for illegal purposes, namely the propagation of communism, appelant in defence pleaded the unconstitutionality of the Padlock Act and, as required by art. 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, gave notice to the Attorney-General of Quebec of the questions that he intended to raise. Attorney-General intervened in the action, as he was entitled to do under the provisions of arts. 114 and 220 C.C.P., and in the conclusions of his intervention asked that the Padlock Act, in its entirety, be declared to be within the legislative competence of the Province. learned trial judge maintained the action and cancelled and annulled appellant's lease but did not award damages on the ground that these had not been proved.
In the same judgment he maintained the intervention of the Attorney- General, and this judgment was confirmed in the Court below, Barclay J. dissenting.
Appellant has attacked the constitutional validity of this legislation upon a number of grounds of which I find it necessary to deal with one only.
The first question to be determined is whether the impugned legislation, in pith and substance, deals with the use of real property or with the propagation of ideas. As Mr. Scott put it to us in his very able argument: (1) the motive of this legislation is dislike of communism as being an evil and subversive doctrine, motive, of course, being something with which the Courts are not concerned; (2) the purpose is clearly the suppression of the propagation of communism in the Province, and (3) one means provided for effecting such suppression is denial of the use of a house. Abbott J.
In my opinion the Act does not create two illegalities which are separate and independent, as was suggested to us by Mr. Beaulieu, it creates only one, namely, the propagation of communism in the Province. Both s. 3 and s. 12 are directed to the same purpose, namely, the suppression of communism, although different means are provided to achieve that end. The whole Act constitutes one legislative scheme and in my opinion its provisions are not severable. Since in my view the true nature and purpose of the Padlock Act is to suppress the propagation of communism in the Province, the next question which must be answered is whether such a measure, aimed at suppressing the propagation of ideas within a Province, is within the legislative competence of such Province.
The right of free expression of opinion and of criticism, upon matters of public policy and public administration, and the right to discuss and debate such matters, whether they be social, economic or political, are essential to the working of a parliamentary democracy such as ours. Moreover, it is not necessary to prohibit the discussion of such matters, in order to protect the personal reputation or the private rights of the citizen. That view was clearly expressed by Duff C.J. in Re Alberta Statutes (1), when he said: Under the constitution established by The British North America Act, legislative power for Canada vested in one Parliament consisting the Sovereign, an upper house styled the Senate, and the House of Commons. Without entering in detail upon an examination of the enactments of the Act relating to the House of Commons, it can be said that these provisions manifestly contemplate a House of Commons which is to be, as the name itself implies, representative body; constituted, that to say, by members elected by such of the population of the united provinces as may be qualified to vote. The preamble of the statute, moreover, shows plainly enough that the constitution the Dominion is to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.
The statute contemplates a parliament working under the influence of public opinion and public discussion.
There can be no controversy that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free public discussion of affairs, from criticism and (1) S.C.R. at D.L.R. affirmed sub nom. Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada et al., A.C. D.L.R. W.W.R. answer and counter-criticism, from attack upon policy and administration and defence and counter-attack; from the freest and fullest analysis anS examination from every point of view of political proposals.
This signally true in respect of the discharge by Ministers of the Crown of their responsibility to Parliament, by members of Parliament of their duty to the electors, and by the electors themselves of their responsibilities in the election of their representatives.
The right of public discussion of course, subject to legal restrictions; Abbott J. those based upon considerations of decency and public order, and others conceived for the protection of various private and public interests with which, for example, the laws of defamation and sedition are concerned. In a word, of discussion means, to quote the words of Lord Wright in James ealth, at "freedom governed by law."
Even within its legal limits, it liable to abuse and grave abuse, and such abuse is constantly exemplified before our eyes; but it is axiomatic that the practice of this right of free public discussion of public affairs, notwithstanding its incidental mischiefs, the breath of life for parliamentary institutions.
. . . Any attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress the traditional forms of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legislatures of the provinces, or to the legislature of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the provisions The British North America Act, which the Parliament of Canada established as the legislative organ the people of Canada under the Crown, and Dominion legislation enacted pursuant to the legislative authority given by those provisions. subject matter of such legislation could not be described as a provincial matter purely; as in substance exclusively matter of property and civil rights within the province, or a matter private or local within the province.
It would not be, to quote the words of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Great West Saddlery Co. The King, A.C. at "legislation directed solely to the purposes specified in section 92"; and it would be invalid on the principles enunciated in that judgment and adopted in Caron v. The King, at The Canada Elections Act, the provisions of the British North America Act which provide for Parliament meeting at least once a year and for the election of a new parliament at least every five years, and the Senate and House of Commons Act, are examples of enactments which make specific statutory provision for ensuring the exercise of this right of public debate and public discussion.
Implicit in all such legislation is the right of candidates for Parliament or for a Legislature, and of citizens generally, to explain, criticize, debate and discuss in the freest possible manner such matters as the qualifications, the policies, and the political, economic and social principles advocated by such candidates or by the political parties or groups of which they may be members.
.92260-9- This right cannot be abrogated by a Provincial Legislature, and the power of such Legislature to limit it, is restricted to what may be necessary to protect purely private rights, such as for example provincial laws of defamation.
It is obvious that the impugned statute does not fall within that category.
It does not, in substance, deal with matters of property and civil rights or with a local or private matter within the Province and in my opinion is clearly ultra vires. Although it is not necessary, of course, to determine this question for the purposes of the present appeal, the Canadian constitution being declared to be similar in principle to that of 'he United Kingdom, I am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate. The power of Parliament to limit it is, in my view, restricted to such powers as may be exercisable under its exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect to criminal law and to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the nation.
For the reasons which I have given, I would allow the appeal and dismiss the action against the respondent Elbling with costs in the trial Court, dismiss the intervention of the Attorney-General with costs occasioned by such intervention in all Courts, and declare the Act I Geo. VI, now R.S.Q. 1941, 52, ultra vires of the Legislature of Quebec.
The respondent Elbling was a party to the appeal in the Court below and in this Court but was not represented by counsel at the hearing before us. In the circumstances, there should be no order as to costs against her here or in the Court of Queen's Bench.
Appeal allowed, J. dissenting.
Cases cited
- Bidard v. Dawson et al. Bidard v. Dawson et al., supra
- Coté v. The James Richardson Co. scr-38-41 para 16
- Cot v. Richardson Cot v. Richardson, supra
- des Chevaliers de Maisonneuve des Chevaliers de Maisonneuve, supra
- Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King Commissioner of Provincial Police v. The King, supra
- Dans Cot6 v. Richardson Dans Cot6 v. Richardson, supra
- de Cot6 v. Richardson de Cot6 v. Richardson, supra
- Chevaliers de Maisonneuve Chevaliers de Maisonneuve, supra
- Winner Winner, supra
- La cause de Bddard v. Dawson et al. La cause de Bddard v. Dawson et al., supra
- B6dard v. Dawson et al. B6dard v. Dawson et al., supra
- Bddard v. Daw- A.G.o son et al. Bddard v. Daw- A.G.o son et al., supra
- 1 D.L.R. 789 1 D.L.R. 789
- Cour dans B6dard v. Dawson et al Cour dans B6dard v. Dawson et al, supra
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- s. 91 of the British North America Act
- s. 92 of the British North America Act
- ss. 3
- 12
- Section 1
- Sections 4
- 11
- s. 3
- Section 13
- s. 12
- section 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act
- s. 27
- s. 13
- section 92
- art. 84(1)
- Section 6 of The Farm Security Act