Goldhar v. The Queen

JUDSON J.:-The judgment of the Court of AppealP awards to the four respondents liens against the Home for the Aged, a public building recently built by the appellant, the Corporation of the County of Lambton. In 1954 the county entered into a contract with Town and Country Construction Limited for the construction of this building ' (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 583.

for the sum of $665,008. The respondents are sub-contractors who were paid 85 per cent. of their claims. The 15 L o per cent. holdback, amounting to $77,000, was paid by the county to the general contractor on February 29, 1956, but none of this money reached these sub-contractors and they et al.

filed claims for liens.

With the exception of one part of the claim of Canadian Comstock Company Limited, where the right to lien was undisputed, and the claim of Hospital and Kitchen Equipment Company Limited, the claims were disallowed at trial. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the disallowed claims were allowed in full and the county now appeals from this judgment.

Two main submissions were made on this appeal. The first was that because these respondents had acknowledged in writing that they had completed their work, they were estopped from denying that the time for filing their claims for liens commenced to run from the date of these acknowledgments. The second was that these sub-contractors had in any event completed their contracts on or before January 4, 1956, within the meaning of s. 21(1) of The Mechanics' Lien Act and that they were out of time because they failed to file their claims within thirty-seven days of this date.

On December 21, 1955, the architect wrote to the general contractor stating that all work had been substantially completed and that he wished to be in a position to certify substantial completion of the whole job by December 31. He then said: "To allow this notice of substantial completion, we should have one of two things-a notice from the sub-trades that they have completed their work and/or a waiver of lien." On December 23, 1955, the general contractor wrote to each sub-contractor stating that the architect had asked for a notice certifying that his work was completed. Waiver of lien as an alternative was not mentioned. The four respondents each answered this request and acknowledged that they had completed their contracts, two of them in absolute terms and two of them referring to minor matters to be attended to within a few days. The general contractor sent these letters to the architect on February 2, 1956.

On December 29, 1955, the architect sent progress estimate no. 12 to the County Treasurer. This showed 100 per cent. completion. In January the general contractor, . having received the necessary funds from the county, disbursed the balance of the monies owing to these respondents less the 15 per cent. holdback. This payment was therefore made on the basis of 100 per cent. completion of the sub-contracts. On February 6 and February 17, 1956, two sub-contractors other than these respondents filed claims for liens, and on February 29, 1956, the county paid to the general contractor the balance of the monies owing under the contract amounting to $77,000, retaining only sufficient funds to settle the claims of the two sub-contractors who had registered liens. The respondents subsequently registered liens and they now claim that they had not completed their work within the meaning of s. 21(1) of The Mechanics' Lien Act when they gave their written acknowledgments and that they are not estopped by these acknowledgments from asserting this fact.

The learned trial judge found as a fact that on December 31, 1955, three of these four sub-contractors had substantially completed their contracts and that they had acknowledged full completion in writing not later than January 4, 1956. He rejected the submission of counsel for the defendant municipality that substantial completion of a sub-contract was enough to start the time running for filing a lien under s. 21(1) of the Act. Nevertheless he did hold that time began to run from January 4, 19560 It is therefore apparent that he decided the case on the basis of estoppel when he rejected the claims of Comstock, Bernardo and Williamson, with the exception of one part of the Comstock claim, which was undisputed. The ratio of his judgment is emphasized by his separate treatment of the claim of Hospital and Kitchen Equipment Company Limited. Although this sub-contractor had given the same acknowl- -edgment as the others, he held that both parties knew that this sub-contract had not in fact been completed, since a -compressor for one of the refrigerators had not been installed. This work was not done until March 22, 1956, and the claim for lien of this sub-contractor was held to be in time. On appeal the claims of the three unsuccessful claimants were allowed, the Court of Appeal being of the opinion that there was no estoppel and that time did not LaV.N begin to run under 21(1) of the Act until completionnot substantial completion-of the sub-contracts.

The contract of Canadian Comstock Company Limited was for the plumbing, heating, ventilating and electrical J

Jwork and totalled $199,000. In addition, two other contracts were made by this company for the installation of a hydro-pneumatic pump and a fire pump. I agree with counsel for the appellant that these were additional, separate and distinct contracts and that they were not extras. The appellant admits that Comstock had a lien for these contracts but this fact has no bearing upon the determination of this litigation. Work on these additional contracts does not extend the time. Comstock's lien, if any, for the balance of its payment under the $199,000 main contract must stand on its own feet. Work done and materials supplied under separate contracts for the same owner or contractor cannot be run together in a general account so as to extend the time for filing the lien: Fulton Hardware Co. v. Mitchell'. Although Comstock, on December 27, 1955, certified completion of the original contract "excepting such minor details as balancing the heating system which will be carried out within the next few days", the fact is that this sub-contractor did much work in January, February and March, 1956. This work is all outlined in the reasons of the Court of Appeal. Some of it was trivial, some of it was not. Some'of it was by way of completion of the contract; some of it was to remedy defects in work already done; some of it was in connection with the hydro-pneumatic pump and the fire pump; some of it was done on the specific instructions of the architect. None of it was done surreptitiously or for a colourable purpose and all of it was done to the knowledge of the architect. The Court of Appeal has held that this respondent had not completed its work on January 4, that the architect knew this and that the claim for lien had not been lost. There is ample evidence to support this finding. The plea of substantial completion as the point at which time begins to run under the statute against a contractor sub-contractor was rejected.

Williamson Roofing and Sheet Metal Limited acknowledged completion of its work by letter dated January 4, 1956. This contractor had supplied the architect with a bond that the roofing was completed on July 22, 1955, but it was still under obligation to make water-tight and do flashing on stacks subsequently installed on the roof by other trades. It was called back by the main contractor to do this flashing on March 5, 1956. This was minor work but it was undoubtedly part of its contract. The work was done on March and the lien filed on March 13.

Bernardo Marble Terrazzo and Tile Company Limited is in much the same position. This company gave an acknowledgment of completion on January 4, 1956, but on January 26, 1956, it was called back by the main contractor to do some grinding that should have been done and had been overlooked on a terrazzo floor in one of the washrooms. This work was of a minor character and was done on February 8 and the lien filed on March 15.

Hospital and Kitchen Equipment Company Limited came back at the request of the architect. He informed this company on February 27, 1956, that a refrigerator would not work and that there were certain minor defects in some of the equipment. The refrigerator was the main complaint and it appears that the compressor unit had not been installed. It had been shipped in November, 1955, but had not been installed for some reason or other by the local electrician employed by this sub-contractor. This was done on March 22, 1956. Further complaints about the operation of the equipment were made on April 2 and May 15, 1956. The company made the necessary alterations and adjustments and filed its lien on May 24, 1956.

After a full review of the facts the Court of Appeal found that none of the contracts in question were completed at the time when the acknowledgments were given and that each of these sub-contractors did work after January 4, 1956, without which they could not have successfully sued for the balance of their contract price and that this was not work done after completion and in pursuance of the warranty clause in their contracts. I agree with this conclusion. The fact that in three of the cases-Hospital & Kitchen Equipment, Williamson and Bernardo-the work was trivial when compared with the size of the contract makes no difference if it was done in good faith to complete the contract. Russell v. Ont. Foundation & Engineering Co.', overruling Summers v. Beard', and Neil v. Carroll'. I can well understand that in the case of these three sub-contractors the work was so trivial that it was overlooked when the acknowledgments were given. These omissions were, however, brought to the attention of these sub-contractors by the owner, its architect or the main contractor and were remedied. Comstock's case that it had not completed its contract is much more clearly defined-so much so that I have difficulty in understanding how it could possibly give this acknowledgment, except for the purpose of urging on payment of the balance of its account. This company's sub-contract was by far the largest of the four and amounted to $199,000. It had many odds and ends to complete and at least 20 items are listed in the reasons for judgment of the Court of Appeal. I agree with counsel for the appellant that when one measures the work remaining to be done on January 4, 1956, against the size of their contracts, all of these four subcontractors had substantially completed their contracts when they gave these acknowledgments. He submits that this is the completion which starts time running under s. 21(1) of The Mechanics' Lien Act, R.S.O. 1950, which reads:

He sought to draw a distinction between this subsection and subss. (2) and (4), which deal with liens for materials and services. Time runs in these cases from the furnishing of the last material (subs. (2)) or the completion of the service (subs. (4)). These are readily identifiable events and the course of judicial decision in Ontario summed up in the Russell case demonstrates a literal adherence to the wording of the subsections in the determination of these matters. Time only begins to run from the events mentioned in the subsections, regardless of triviality and regardless of lapse of time from the substantial performance of the contract. I can see no basis for the application of any different rule to a lump sum contract under s. 21(1), and there are very sound reasons for refusing to depart from this principle.

We were pressed with the authority Day v. Crown Grain', to the effect that time begins to run when the contractor can sue "as for a completed contract", the submission being that this could be something short of completion. When the facts of the case are examined I do not think that this case lays down any rule different from that which has always been followed, namely, that time does not begin to run until there has been such performance of the contract as would entitle the contractor to maintain an action for the whole amount due thereunder.

The doctrine of substantial performance, as illustrated by such cases as Dakin v. Lee and Hoenig v. Isaacs , has no relevancy to the present problem. The fact that a contractor, who has substantially completed his work, may sue for the contract price, subject to deductions for minor defects or omissions, if there are any, does not and cannot determine when time begins to run against him under The

Mechanics' Lien Act. Completion means what it says. I do not think that time begins to run under s. 21(1) until it can

1(1907), be said that the contractor or sub-contractor has done all that he promised to do and is entitled to maintain his action for the full amount.

Having found as a fact, in agreement with the finding of the learned trial judge, that these sub-contracts had not J. been completed when the acknowledgments were given, the Court of Appeal next rejected the defence of estoppel because the county did not rely on the representations and alter its position to its prejudice. I agree with the Court of Appeal that progress estimate no. 12 given by the architect to the county, certifying 100 per cent. completion and asking for all the money less the fifteen per cent. holdback, was issued before these acknowledgments were received. I agree also with the finding of the Court of Appeal that to the knowledge of the architect all three appellants did work under the provisions of their sub-contracts after January 4, 1956. Therefore, although these acknowledgments were obviously given by the sub-contractors for the purpose of inducing payment of the balance of their monies, it is equally clear that their representations, even if they were made to the county through its main contractor and architect, did not in fact induce the payment of the holdback. What did induce payment was the assumption of the architect that time was running against these sub-contractors from a date not later than January 4, 1956.

What the county is really seeking to do is to turn the acknowledgment into an agreement that the work had been completed, regardless of the actual and known state of facts and to set this up as a waiver of lien under the Act. I can readily find that by the giving of these acknowledgments, these sub-contractors hoped to get their money faster and that they knew that they would be used by the county for the purpose of computing the time when it would be safe to pay out the holdback. But the Act provides (s. 5(1)) that "Unless he signs an express agreement to the contrary" a person who does certain things shall have a lien. The acknowledgments given in this case do not, in my opinion, amount to an "express agreement to the contrary" as required by the Act. There is nothing in them to indicate that those who signed them were renouncing the application of the Act and the remedies provided by it.

of the Act. They still have their lien but they must assert it within a certain time for time begins to run against them from the date of their acknowledgments. This argument does not overcome s. 5(1) of the Act. An acknowledgment from which it is inferred by the other side that time under the Act is running against the claimant when the facts of the case and the Act provide that it is not running, can only have legal effect if it is a waiver of lien under the Act.

I would not make any inroad on the principle laid down in

Anderson v. Fort William Commercial Chambers Limited', that estoppel cannot do what the section says only a signed express agreement can do.

I am therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the

Court of Appeal on this branch of the case was well founded both on fact and law and that the argument based on estoppel fails.

I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for Canadian Comstock Co.: Lerner, Lerner &

Bitz, London.

Solicitor for Bernardo Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co.: R. E.

Fairs, London.

Solicitor for Williamson Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.:

W. B. Henderson, London.

Solicitors for Hospital & Kitchen Equipment Co.: Taylor,

Jamieson, Mallon, Fowler & Oliver, Sarnia.

LIMITED (Defendant) ............

JOSEPH PROTEAU (Plaintiff) .........

truck-Fatal APPEALS from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec', affirming a judgment of Desmarais J. Appeal dismissed.

J.:-Le 7 d6cembre 1953, Armand Roy et son 6pouse Alph6da Roy ont 6t6 les victimes d'un accident de la route et sont d6c6d6s le m6me soir. Roy 6tait au volant de sa propre voiture, une Plymouth 1953, dans laquelle avaient pris place son 6pouse, sa belle-sceur madame Proteau, et son enfant R6jeanne Ag6e de 4 ans. Il suivait la route qui conduit d'East Angus A Weedon, dans les Cantons de 1'Est, et 6tait pric6d6 d'un camion lourdement charg6 de rails de chemin de fer. Les deux voitures filaient du c8t6 droit de la route.

Ce camion 6tait la propri6t6 de 1'appelante "Eastern Metals Corporation Limited", et 6tait conduit par l'employ6 de cette dernibre, Alphonse Duval, qui alors 6tait dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions. Soudainement, vers 4.45 p.m. de cette journ6e du 7 d6cembre 1953, la voiture de Roy frappa l'arribre de ce camion avec le triste rsultat que Roy et sonTachereauJ. 6pouse perdirent la vie, tandis que madame Proteau et la jeune enfant ne subirent aucune 16sion.

Joseph Proteau, intim6, &s-qualit6 dans la pr6sente cause, fut nomm6 tuteur aux huit enfants mineurs des parents d6cid6s, et institua la prdsente action, dans laquelle il r6clama de 1'appelante la somme de $81,330. M. le Juge Gaston Desmarais, de la Cour supdrieure, si6geant Sherbrooke, a maintenu cette action jusqu'h concurrence de $32,780, et la Cour du banc de la reine a confirm6 ce jugement. M. le Juge Casey, cependant, a enregistr6 sa dissidence, 6tant d'opinion qu'il y avait faute contributive de la part des deux conducteurs.

Ce genre d'accident n'est pas rare sur les routes de la province, et sa multiplication devrait engager pour leur propre s6curit6 les conducteurs de v6hicules-automobiles qui suivent ces gros camions souvent trop charg6s, h faire usage de la plus extr8me prudence. Souvent voit-on de futiles r6clamations faites par des conductures imprudents qui, par n6gligence ou inhabilet6, viennent frapper l'arribre de v6hicules commerciaux ou d'autres v6hicules circulant sur la route. De nombreuses d6cisions ont 6t6 rendues par les tribunaux mais, 6videmment, chaque cause doit 6tre jug6e suivant les faits qui se pr~sentent.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, la preuve n'est pas r6v6latrice de tous les incidents qui ont sans doute entour6 cette trag6die. En effet, nous n'avons le t6moignage ni de monsieur ni de madame Roy, tous deux dic6d6s. Quant A madame Proteau, passagbre assise seule sur le banc arridre de la voiture Plymouth, elle dormait, et ce n'est qu'au moment du choc qu'elle s'6veilla. Elle ne peut done jeter aucune lumibre sur les circonstances qui ont imm6diatement pric6d6 cet accident. La fillette Rijeanne, trop jeune, n'a pas timoign6 devant les tribunaux. Seul Duval, conducteur du camion, 6tait sur les lieux au moment oii les v6hicules sont venus en contact. Il arrita imm6diatement son camion, s'empressa de se rendre vers la voiture de Roy, et rencontra madame Proteau qui elle aussi 6tait sortie de la voiture dans laquelle elle 6tait passagbre. Les passants arr~t~rent et la Sixet6 fut d6pichie sur les lieux.

La preuve r6vile, et c'est ainsi que 'a apprici6 le juge au procks, que 1'accident s'est produit vers 4.45 p.m. A 1'endroit oi i1 est arriv6, le chemin est 16girement accident6, mais pr6sente une ligne droite sur une distance d'environ un demi-mille. I est certain qu'il bruinait h des intervalles irr6guliers, que le temps 6tait sombre et qu'h cette saison, & cause de la noirceur hative, la visibilit6 6tait substantiellement r6duite.

Le camion de l'appelante portait une charge de plusieurs milliers de livres, qui consistait en une vingtaine de rails de chemin de fer, qui exc6daient de neuf pieds la partie arrihre du v6hicule. Le panneau post6rieur du coffre 6tait baiss6 de fagon A permettre aux rails de reposer horizontalement sur le camion.

A l'arrire du camion, il n'y avait qu'une seule lumibre rouge, plac6e au centre A 1'extr6mit6 du chassis, qui fonctionnait au moment de l'accident. Elle se trouvait sous le panneau renvers6, et 4galement sous les rails qui d6passaient, et qui ndcessairement oscillaient sous 1'effet des accidents de la route. Normalement, il y a h l'arribre de ce camion trois lumibres, dont deux ne fonctionnaient pas. De plus, il n'y avait pas d'autres r6flecteurs, et mime la lumibre qui devait 6clairer la licence 6tait hors d'usage. Un petit drapeau rouge de 24 x 10 pouces 6tait plac6 au centre, 1'extr6mit6 des rails, et 6tait susceptible, d'aprbs le t6moignage de Duval, conducteur du camion, d'obstruer la vue h certains moments de la seule lumibre qui 6tait allum6e. A cause du mauvais 6tat de la route, et de la visibilit6 r6duite, Duval conduisait son camion a une vitesse de dix A douze milles h l'heure, et il a lui-mime jur6 qu'il faisait assez noir pour allumer ses phares d'avant, ce qu'il avait fait depuis queque temps. Roy 6galement avait allum6 les siens, et filait h peine plus vite que le camion qui le pric6dait. Le choc l6ger qui s'est produit d6montre que sa vitesse ne pouvait pas 6tre excessive, mais qu'au contraire, elle devait 6tre trbs mod6r6e.

L'article 27 de la Loi des Vhicules Automobiles d6crite: Tout v6hicule automobile doit dans un chemin public, ftre muni de deux lanternes A feu blanc & l'avant et d'une lanterne A feu rouge A l'arri&re.

Lorsque le v6hicule automobile est sur un chemin public, entre une heure apris le coucher du soleil et une heure avant son lever, les lanternes sur ce v~hicule, qu'il soit arrt&6 ou en mouvement, doivent chacuneTaschereau J. produire une lumibre 6clairant A une distance d'au moins cent pieds en avant et visible A une distance d'au moins cent pieds en arrire, et la lanterne A 1'arrire doit avoir une capacit6 d'au moins quatre chandelles, et doit projeter une lumire rouge horizontalement et une lumire blanche verticalement, de fagon que la lumibre blanche 6claire la plaque 1'arribre 6galement sur toute sa surface, et suffisamment pour lire le num6ro sur cette plaque A une distance d'au moins cent pieds.

En outre des lanternes prescrites par les paragraphes ci-dessus, tout autobus, v~hicule de commerce et v6hicule de livraison, mesurant plus de quatre-vingts pouces de largeur, circulant dans un chemin public entre une heure apris le coucher du soleil et une heure avant son lever, devra porter A l'avant une lanterne A feu vert et A l'arribre une lanterne A feu rouge et un riflecteur rouge dispos6s pas plus de six pouces du c6t6 extr~me gauche du v6hicule, de manibre A bien d6limiter la partie de la route occup6e de ce c8t6 par le v~hicule, le signal lumineux des dits lanternes et r6flecteurs devant Stre visible A une distance d'au moins cinq cents pieds.

En outre des lanternes prescrites par lesdits paragraphes, tout autobus, v~hicule de commerce et v6hicule de livraison mesurant plus de quatrevingts pouces de largeur ou plus de trente pieds de longueur, circulant dans un chemin public entre une heure aprbs le coucher du soleil et une heure avant son lever, devra porter A l'avant trois lanternes A feu vert et A 1'arrire trois lanternes A feu rouge align6es horizontalement et espac6es de pas moins de six pouces les unes des autres et de pas plus de douze pouces, le signal lumineux des dites lanternes devant tre visible A une distance d'au moins cinq cents pieds. Ces lanternes devront 6tre pos6es au centre et aussi prbs du sommet du v6hicule que sa structure permanente la permettra.

Ce que cette loi ordonne, c'est que la voiture de l'appelante qui avait plus de 80 pouces de largeur, devait porter h 1'arribre cinq lumibres, mais cette obligation n'6tait impos6e qu'une heure apris le coucher du soleil. Or, il est 6tabli que le soleil n'6tait couch6 que depuis quarante-huit minutes avant 1'accident. Cette disposition imp6rative de la loi ne dispense pas cependant les conducteurs de vhicules automobiles de prendre les pr6cautions voulues que commandent les rigles les plus 616mentaires de la prudence. Il s'agit li d'un minimum que la loi exige et rend celui qui la viole passible d'une amende. La loi n'6tablit pas un "standard" de prudence auquel il faut se limiter quand une prudence additionnelle est n6cessit6e par les circonstances. 9g Ce soir-1h, il faisait presque nuit, la visibilit6 6tait tris r6duite h cause de 'incl6mence de la temp6rature, tous les automobilistes avaient allum6 leurs phares, et il 6tait certainement imprudent de circuler sans avoir pris cette pr6- PaomEAu caution 616mentaire. D'ailleurs, il est clair que 1'appelante TaschereauJ.n'a pas allum6 ses cinq lumibres situ6es 'a l'arridre du camion, et la raison, nous dit Duval, c'est qu'une seule fonctionnait.

Comme le disait M. le Juge Galipeault, maintenant juge en chef de la Cour du banc de la reine, dans Shawinigan Water & Power Co. v. Laprise':

La d4fenderesse, a mon sens, si elle ne violait pas la lettre de l'art. 27, par. 2, de la loi des v6hicules automobiles, (S.R.Q.

1925, ch. 35) 6dictant que tout v~hicule automobile sur le chemin public, doit, une heure apris le coucher du soleil, 6tre muni de lumibre, et il se peut qu'au moment de l'accident le soleil ne fift pas couch6 depuis une heure encore, en a certes viold l'esprit.

La loi qui impose l'obligation, une heure apris le coucher du soleil, aux conducteurs de vhicules moteurs de faire briller leurs phares, ne dit pas qu'ils ne seront pas tenus de recourir au mime soin, si auparavant, pour la stret6 du public, il y a lieu d'utiliser les lumibres.

Subs6quemment, dans la cause de Brousseau v. Lamontagne , la Cour d'Appel a d6cid6 dans le m~me sens, et le jug6 est le suivant:

The Court of Appeal, by a majority judgment, declares that, although the Motor Vehicles. Act (RS.Q. 1941, ch. 142, art. 27) requires a motor vehicle, when operated on a public highway, to carry the lights therein prescribed only between one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise, there is an obligation at common law for every driver to conduct himself in such a manner as to avoid dangers to others and that when the visibility is difficult prudence requires that lights be shown notwithstanding the lack of a statutory obligation to do so. Defendant driving at a high speed or being inattentive, both parties were at fault. Tel est aujourd'hui l'6tat de la jurisprudence dans la province de Qu6bec.

Je crois donc que, sur ce point, il y a eu n6gligence de la part de l'appelante. De plus, je crois que 1'un des plus grands dangers de la circulation est de toldrer que les camions commerciaux puissent ainsi transporter de lourdes charges, excidant de beaucoup la longueur des v6hicules, sans que des pr6cautions exceptionnelles ne soient prises. Comment un conducteur peut-il se douter, dans l'obscurit6, que des mat6riaux excedent de 9 ou 10 pieds le v6hicule qui le 1[19421 Que. K.B. 212 at 213.

[19521 Que. Q.B. 76.

pr6chde? Dans le cas qui nous occupe, seul un obscur pavil- Ion, qui voilait probablement la seule lumibre h 1'arrihre du camion, 6tait suppos6 indiquer le danger qui a cause la mort 2 vs de monsieur et madame Roy. Je ne puis en cons6quence admettre la pr6tention de 1'appelante qu'elle n'a pas commis de fautes qui engendrent sa responsabilit6 civile.

Taschereau J. Dans 1'alternative, I'appelante a soumis A la Cour que si elle doit supporter une part de la responsabilit6 civile, la victime doit 6galement, dans une certaine proportion, 6tre tenue responsable de sa propre n6gligence. C'est d'ailleurs la conclusion h laquelle est arriv6 M. le Juge Casey, dissident & la Cour du banc de la reine. Avec respect je crois que cette pr6tention doit 6tre rejet6e.

En effet, les seules fautes que je crois prouvees, que je retiens, et qui ont ditermin6 cet accident, sont celles commises par l'appelante et que j'ai mentionn6es pr6c6demment. Avec la preuve qui a 6t6 offerte, je crois qu'aucune faute ne peut 6tre imputie h Roy. Affirmer qu'il n'a pas port6 1'attention voulue, que ses lumibres ou ses freins 6taient d6fectueux, qu'il a 6t6 inhabile dans la conduite de sa voiture, ce serait entrer dans le domaine des hypothises, des conjectures et des possibilit6s. II est interdit aux tribunaux de sp6culer dans de pareils domaines pour attribuer des responsabilit6s d6lictuelles ou quasi-d6lictuelles. Ce sont les probabilit6s et non les possibilitis qui doivent guider les juges.

Comme j'ai eu 1'occasion de le dire d6jh, et particulibrement dans la cause de Rousseau v. Bennett':

L'honorable Juge de premibre instance a jug6 suivant la balance des probabilit6s, ce qui est la preuve requise en matibre civile, et je crois que le jugement de la Cour d'Appel est erronn6 en droit quand cette dernibre conclut qu'il n'y a pas de prisomption tellement forte qu'elle exclut toute autre possibilit6. Ce n'est pas ce que la loi requiert. Il y a une distinction fondamentale qu'il faut faire entre le droit criminel et le droit civil. En matibre criminelle, la Couronne doit toujours prouver la culpabilit6 de l'accus6 au deld d'un doute raisonnable. En matibre civile, la balance des probabilit6s est le facteur d~cisif. Comme le disait M. le Juge Duff dans la cause de Clark v. Le Roi (1921, 61 Can. S.C.R. 608 at 616):

'Broadly speaking, in civil proceedings the burden of proof being upon a party to establish a given allegation of fact, the party on whom the burden lies is not called upon to establish his allegation in a fashion so rigorous as to leave no room for doubt in the mind of the tribunal with whom the decision rests. It is, generally speaking, 1[19561 S.C.R. 89.

(Jr6me Prudential at Ltd. S.C.R. at at

Quand un d6fendeur qui a 6t6 n6gligent veut 6tablir la faute contributive de celui qui r6clame, c'est lui qui a l'obligation de faire cette preuve. Ici, il n'a pas r~ussi h 6tablir aucune faute de la part de Roy. Toutes les probabilit6s indiquent que, comme cons6quence du d6faut de lumihres et de cet exc6dent de rails qui d~passaient le camion, Roy est venu le frapper, ne se doutant pas de la pr6sence de ces obstacles qui obstruaient sa route et qui 6taient presque invisibles A 1'heure de 1'accident.

Le montant des dommages d6termin6 par le juge au procks n'est pas contestd. Je m'accorde avec les conclusions auxquelles sont arriv6es la Cour superieure et la Cour du banc de la reine, et je rejetterais le pr6sent appel avec d6pens.

J.:-D'accord avec mon colligue, M. le Juge Taschereau, je maintiendrais les conclusions auxquelles en sont arriv6es la Cour sup6rieure et la Cour du bane de la reine.

Au regard des rigles de la simple prudence, il 6tait, dans les circonstances s'est produit cet accident, excessivement dangereux de conduire ce camion sur la voie publique sans clairement signaler aux conducteurs des voitures venant h 1'arribre, l'obstacle r6sultant de la projection des rails sur une longueur de neuf pieds au la boite du camion en lequel ils 6taient transport6s. L'obscurit6, la temp6rature et la diff6rence entre la vitesse de dix milles A 1'heure adopt6e par Duval, le conducteur du camion, et la vitesse sup6rieure que pouvaient raisonnablement adopter les conducteurs de v6hicules automobiles de promenade venant h 1'arribre, 6taient autant de circonstances exigeant que ce danger fHit conjure par un signalement ad6quat. Les petits drapeaux attach6s h 1'extr6mit6 des rails et l'unique lumibre A feu rouge A l'arribre du camion, fix6e au centre du chissis, ne pouvaient, en 1'espice, constituer un tel avertissement. Dans la mesure oii ce feu rouge pouvait 8tre visible,-et ce, de fagon intermittente en raison du petit drapeau plac6 vish-vis cette lumibre mais h 1'extr6mit6 de la charge,-ce feu rouge pouvait peut-6tre signaler 1'extr6mit6 de la boite du camion, mais non 1'extr6mit6 de l'obstacle r6sultant de la projection des rails. En somme, ce signalement, outre d'8tre insuffisant, pouvait 6tre trompeur. La faute de Duval, pr6pos6 de l'appelante, ne peut faire aucun doute.

Mais, dit l'appelante, assumant cette faute de Duval, rien dans la preuve ne permet d'inf6rer une relation de causalit6 entre cette faute et l'accident; car, poursuit-on, d'autres hypothises, tel un manque d'attention de la part de Roy, le conducteur du v6hicule de promenade, peuvent expliquer le fait de l'accident. Pour des raisons diverses indiqu6es par M. le Juge Taschereau, aucun des passagers de la voiture de Roy n'a pu t6moigner des circonstances imm6diatement contemporaines A la collision; Duval en est le seul t6moin. Mais si le demandeur poursuivant en dommages doit prouver la faute du d6fendeur et 6tablir entre cette faute et le fait dommageable, une relation de causalit6, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'il ait h se disculper de fautes hypoth6tiques que la loi ne prisume pas. En l'espice, si, comme en ont jug6 toutes les Cours, la conduite de Duval 6tait fautive, c'est pr6cis6ment parce que, dans les circonstances, cette conduite avait comme cons6quence normale, sinon in6vitable, de r6aliser 1'accident qui s'est produit. Entre cette conduite de Duval et le fait de 1'accident, les Cours inf6rieures ont jug6 qu'il y avait un lien de causalit6. C'6tait lh une d6duction qui pouvait raisonnablement 6tre tir6e de la preuve au dossier.

Je renverrais 1'appel avec d~pens.