General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Canada v. Federation Insurance Co. of Canada

had been singled out from other mining activities and subjected to a tax at this extraordinary rate it was thus pointed out the means by which they could recoup themselves. Since the Judicial Committee based their finding that 58 of the Forest Act was ultra vires on the ground that the real nature of the tax was an export tax and the further ground that, as such, it was indirect, it was apparently regarded as unnecessary to deal with the question as to whether it was also invalid as infringing upon the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate in relation to the regulation of trade and commerce. For the same reason, it is not necessary for the determination of this appeal to deal with that issue.

I would allow this appeal and direct that judgment be entered declaring that the Mineral Property Taxation Act, being c. 60 of the Statutes of British Columbia for 1957, is ultra vires the legislature of that province. The appellant is entitled to its costs in this Court.

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE

CORPORATION OF CANADA, LIM- ITED (Plaintiff) ...................

FEDERATION

INSURANCE

COM- PANY OF CANADA (Defendant)

one of the partners-Claim by owner of amount paid to recover possession of car from third party-Whether guarantor liable-The Motor Vehicles Act, R.S.Q. 142, s.

Ac- Certain automobiles were sold by their purchasers to H.P. Automobile Co., a licensed dealer, in defiance of the fact that they were still the property of the plaintiff. H.P. Automobile Co. resold them to third parties, thereby dealing in stolen property. The plaintiff, in order to recover its property, had to indemnify the third parties, and subsequently sued the defendant as guarantor under a bond or guarantee policy covering H.P. Automobile Co. under of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Originally, H.P. Automobile Co. was owned by two partners doing business under that name. Together they had applied for and received from the defendant a bond or guarantee policy under The partnership was subsequently dissolved, but one of the partners continued alone under the firm name, and it was he who had acquired and resold the plaintiff's automobiles.

The trial judge allowed the action, but this judgment was reversed by a majority in the Court of Appeal. The defendant argued in this Court that, following the dissolution of the partnership, both the licence and the guarantee policy had become obsolete with the consequence that neither the policy nor of the Act could be invoked by the plaintiff. Held: The appeal should be allowed and the action maintained. Per Curiam: By the terms of the guarantee policy furnished to the provincial Treasurer, the defendant and the two partners bound themselves and their successors, and stipulated that this obligation would remain until the licence was terminated. Although the defendant had reserved to itself the right to cancel its undertaking given written notice to the provincial Controller of Revenue, not only had it not done so, but it had renewed it for another year. The defendant was, therefore, hound vis-a-vis the provincial Treasurer for the duration of a definite period, and could not, in the circumstances of this case, disengage itself of that obligation by invoking contingency which and the terms of the guarantee policy do not recognize as having that effect. To hold otherwise would render the provisions of s. 21 illusory and would produce results irreconcilable with the true object of the special provision making an exception to the common law in matters concerning motor vehicles. Per Martland J.: There is nothing in the Act which would suggest that a licence issued to two or more persons carrying on a business should cease to have effect merely on the death or withdrawal from business of one of them. In this case, the cancellation might have been justified, but it was not, in fact, made. Since the defendant must have intended to give a bond which would comply with s. that bond remained effective so long as one of the partners, by virtue of the existence of the dealer's licence, continued to be enabled to act as a dealer.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec', reversing a judgment of Salvas J. Appeal allowed.

S.C.R.

c .

FAUTEUX J.:-Au cours de f6vrier 1954, Hilaire Paquette et Marcel de Blois, faisant affaires ensemble sous la raison sociale "Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie", obtenaient de 1'intimbe un cautionnement dont la production, entre les mains du Tr6sorier provincial, est exig6e de toute personne recherchant un permis pour faire le commerce de v6hicules automobiles. Loi des v~hicules automobiles, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 142, art. 21. Le cautionnement fourni, et accept6 par l'autorit6, est dans la forme d'une obligation assum6e h 1'endroit du Trisorier de la province, suivant laquelle 1'intim6e et Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie se sont engag6s conjointement et solidairement et ont, de la mime fagon, li6 leurs successeurs respectifs pour la durie de la p6riode de temps s'6coulant du 28 f6vrier 1954 au 28 fivrier 1955 inclusivement. Cette obligation est dans les termes suivants: "Bond No.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that we, HILAIRE PAQUETTE AUTOMOBILE CIE. hereinafter called the "DEALER" and FEDERATION INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA hereinafter called the "SURETY" are severally held and jointly bound into THE HONORABLE THE TREASURER OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC, in the penal sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) of lawful money of Canada, to be paid unto the said "Treasurer" for which payment well and truly to be made, we jointly and severally bind ourselves and our respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, firmly by these presents.

SEALED with our seals and dated this 18th day of February, 1954. WHEREAS the Dealer hath applied The Honorable the Treasurer of the Province of Quebec for a Licence which when issued, will permit the Dealer to sell motor vehicles, under the provisions of the Quebec Motor Vehicle Act R.S.Q. 1925, from the 28th day of February, 1954 to the last day of February 1955 both days inclusive.

NOW THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, such licence being granted, if the Dealer has paid or caused to be paid, all sums which he is or may become liable to pay to any owner as described in Section of said "Act", then this obligation shall be void and of no effect, but otherwise shall be and remain in full force and virtue.

WHEREAS by virtue of Section 103 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, as amended by R.S.C. 1952, c. 335, and the Statutes of Canada, 1956, c. 48, the undersigned Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada are empowered to make general rules and orders as therein provided;

IT IS ORDERED that the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada be and they are hereby amended in accordance with the paragraphs numbered 1 to 3, both inclusive, which follow:

RULE 3. At any time after the service or filing of a notice of appeal, whichever happens first, the respondent may apply to the Court for an order quashing the appeal.

RULE 59. Unless the appeal is brought on for hearing by the appellant within one year next after the service or filing of the notice of appeal, whichever happens first, it shall be held to have been abandoned without any order to dismiss being required, unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise order, and the Registrar may upon -application by the respondent tax costs and issue a certificate of dismissal.

100. It shall not, under any circumstances, be necessary for a respondent to give notice of motion by way of cross-appeal, but if a respondent intends upon the hearing of an appeal to contend that the decision of the court below should be varied, he shall, within fifteen days after the service of the notice of appeal, or such further time as may be prescribed by the Court or a Judge in Chambers, give notice of such intention to all parties who may be affected thereby. The omission to give such notice shall not in any way interfere with the power of the Court on the hearing of an appeal to treat the whole case as open, but may, in the discretion of the Court, be ground for an adjournment of the appeal or for special order as to costs.

The said amendments shall come into force on the 1st day of January, And the Registrar of the Court is directed to take all necessary action to effect the tabling of this Order before the Houses of Parliament in the manner provided by Section 103 of the Supreme Court Act.

DATED at Ottawa, this 1st day of November, 1960.

P. KERWIN C.J.

ROBERT TASCHEREAU

C.

J. R. CARTWRIGHT

GRRALD FAUTEUX

D.

R. MARTLAND

W. JUDSON

ROLAND A. RITCHIE

ORDONNANCE GtNtRALE

CONSIDRRANT que larticle 103 de la Loi sur la Cour suprime, chap. 259 des Statuts revis6s du Canada de 1952, modifi6e par le chap. 335 des Statuts revisis du Canada de 1952 et le chap. 48 des Statuts du Canada de 1956, autorise les juges soussignis de la Cour suprime du Canada h 6dicter des rigles et ordonnances gindrales de la manibre y pr~vue; IL EST, PAR LES PRRSENTES, ORDONN que les Rgles de la Cour supreme du Canada soient modifides en conformit6 des paragraphes 1 A 3, inclusivement, qui suivent, et elles sont, par les prisentes, ainsi modifi6es:

RtGLE 3. En tout temps apris la signification ou la production d'un avis d'appel, selon la premibre qui a eu lieu, I'intim6 peut demander A la cour une ordonnance en annulation d'appel.

RGLE 59. A moins que l'appelant n'inscrive 1'appel pour audition dans l'ann6e qui suit la signification ou la production de 1'avis d'appel, selon la premiere qui a eu lieu, I'appel est cens6 avoir 6t6 abandonn6 sans que soit necessaire une ordonnance de rejet, sauf si la cour ou un juge en ordonne autrement, et le registraire, h la demande de I'intim6, peut taxer les frais et 6mettre un certificat de rejet.

RkGLE 100. Il n'est n6cessaire, en aucune circonstance, qu'un intim6 donne avis de motion par voie de contre-appel, mais si un intim6 a 1'intention, lors de l'audition d'un appel, d'all6guer que la decision du tribunal inf6rieur devrait ftre modifide, il doit, dans les quinze jours qui suivent la signification de l'avis d'appel, ou dans tout autre d6lai que peut prescrire la cour ou un juge en chambre, notifier son intention h toutes les parties qui peuvent y ftre int~ressies. Le d6faut de donner ledit avis ne peut en aucune manire restreindre le pouvoir de la cour, h 1'audition d'un appel, de consid6rer la cause entibre comme ouverte; mais il peut, h la discrition de la cour, constituer un motif pour l'ajournement de l'appel, ou pour une ordonnance spiciale quant aux frais.

Lesdites modifications entreront en vigueur le premier jour de janvier Le registraire de la Cour est charg6 de prendre les mesures nicessaires pour effectuer le dip6t de la pr~sente ordonnance devant les Chambres du Parlement, de la manibre pr6vue par Particle 103 de la Loi sur la Cour supreme.

DATEE, h Ottawa, ce premier jour de novembre 1960.

P. KERWIN J.C.C.

ROBERT TASCHEREAU

C.

J. R. CARTWRIGHT

GPRALD FAUTEUX

D.

R. MARTLAND

W. JUDSON

ROLAND A. RITCHIE

Sur remise, A l'autorit6 provinciale concern6e, de cette obligation et de la demande du permis de commergant, en laquelle apparaissaient les noms des deux soci6taires cidessus mentionn6s, la licence fut accordde et 6mise au nom de la raison sociale Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie. En satisfaction des exigences de l'art. 21, cette licence fut, demeura et 6tait affich6e en 6vidence, dans l'6tablissement oa se faisait ce commerce d'automobiles, lorsque se sont produits les faits ci-aprbs, donnant lieu au pr6sent litige. Advenant le 5 juin 1954, de Blois, qui n'avait pas encore apport6 sa contribution en biens h la soci6t6, s'en retira. Le fait de cette dissolution de soci6t6 et le fait de la continuation du commerce sous la mime raison sociale, par Hilaire Paquette seul, furent, le m8me jour, dbnonc6s par des enregistrements appropri6s au bureau du protonotaire du district judiciaire en lequel 6tait conduit ce commerce. Mais rien dans la preuve ne suggbre que ces mimes faits aient t6 d6nonc6s au bureau des licences et ce qui est certain, c'est que cette licence, expirant le dernier jour de f6vrier 1955, n'a pas t r6voqu6e par 1'autorit6.

Dans le cours des op6rations subsiquentes A cette dissolution de soci6t6, soit le 18 novembre 1954, Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie vendait A Peter Oprici un Oldsmobile, au prix de $4,323.90, pay6 comptant. Cette voiture 6tait la propri6t6 de 1'appelante; et il est admis qu'elle lui avait 6t6 vole par un certain Deschambault de qui Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie 1'avait achet6e. Pour en recouvrer la possession, 'appelante remboursa Oprici du prix qu'il avait pay6 et invoquant 1'engagement pr6cit6 et les dispositions de l'art. 21 de la Loi des v6hicules automobiles, demanda par action en justice A ce que l'intim6e et Hilaire Paquette soient condamnis in solidum A lui rembourser le montant pay6 par elle A Oprici. L'intim6e contesta cette action et Hilaire Paquette et L. N. Buzzell, ce dernier 6s-qualit6 de or syndic A la faillite d'Hilaire Paquette, produisirent une intervention oi ils d6clardrent s'en rapporter A justice. La Cour sup6rieure fit droit A cette demande et son jugement fut infirm6 en appel par une d6cision majoritaire. D'oil le pourvoi devant cette Cour.

1'audition devant nous, I'intim6e a d6clar6 abandonner tous les moyens soulev6s par elle en Cour sup6rieure et en Cour d'Appel, sauf le suivant. Elle a soumis en substance que, par suite et de la date de la dissolution de soci~t6, la licence de commergant 6mise au nom d'Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie, aussi bien que l'engagement consenti conjointement et solidairement par les membres de cette soci6t6 et l'intim6e A 1'endroit du Tr6sorier provincial, sont devenus caducs, avec la cons6quence qu'Hilaire Paquette Automobile Cie avait cess6, depuis juin 1954, d'6tre licencid et que, depuis lors, ni cet engagement ni les dispositions de l'art. 21 ne pouvaient Stre validement invoquis par 1'appelante au soutien de son action.

De son c~t6, I'appelante a soumis que l'acceptation de ces pr6tentions de l'intim6e rendrait illusoires les dispositions de l'art. 21 et produirait des r6sultats manifestement irr6conciliables avec l'objet v6ritable de cette disposition sp6ciale faisant exception au droit commun en ce qui concerne le commerce de vhicules automobiles.

L'interpr6tation des dispositions de 1'art. 21 doit se faire conform6ment aux r6gles d'interpr6tation idict6es A la Loi concernant les statuts, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 1, dont 'art. 41, particulibrement, prescrit ce qui suit:

Dans Industrial Acceptance Corporation v. Couture M. le Juge Rand note avec justesse, A la page 45, que les dispositions de 'art. 21 doivent 6tre interpr6ties en les consid6rant dans l'arribre-plan des arts. 1487 et seq. C.C.,