Sur r4ception de cet envoi, Me LaMarsh invita 1'appelant A son bureau ce dernier et son 6pouse se rendirent apris leurs heures de travail et 1'heure de fermeture du bureau de leur avocat. Les formules envoy6es ayant 6t6 compl6t6es par I'appelant, avec 1'assistance de son 6pouse et son avocat, furent sign6es et asserment6es par lui, puis conformiment aux instructions de Callaghan, plac6es dans une enveloppe adress6e A ce dernier et dfiment affranchie, et le soir mime, mise h la poste par LaMarsh personnellement.
Par la suite, 1'appelant et son 6pouse communiquirent p~riodiquement avec leur avocat pour s'enqu6rir du riglement de la r6clamation et apprendre de lui qu'il 6tait sans nouvelles. De son c6t6, l'intim6e 6crivait, le 17 septembre, h Callaghan pour se plaindre de n'avoir regu, en l'affaire, aucune communication de son bureau depuis le 31 mai, et lui demander de 1'informer, par retour du courrier, des ddveloppements. Ce h quoi Callaghan r6pondit qu'il avait envoy6 les formules de preuve de perte h l'avocat LaMarsh en lui demandant de les compl6ter et les lui retourner, mais qu'il n'avait depuis entendu parler de rien. Ni la compagnie intimbe ni son enquiteur ne jugirent qu'il 6tait h propos de communiquer avec l'avocat LaMarsh pour s'assurer si, en r6ponse A la lettre qu'il avait adress6e, le 3 avril, h la compagnie intim6e, il avait regu la lettre du 14 avril et les f0rmules y incluses que Callaghan lui avait adress6es par la poste. On pr~fira garder le silence. Eventuellement, deux jours avant que ne soit 6coul6e l'annie durant laquelle s'6tait produit 1'incendie, un avocat de Montr6al, saisi du J. soin des int6rits de l'assur6, prit action contre la compagnie intim6e, pour lui r~clamer $10,000.
L'ittimbe admit au d6but de 1'audition en Cour sup6rieure, comme d'ailleurs devant cette Cour, le contrat et le montant de 'assurance, la totalit6 de la perte subie, le caractbre accidentel du sinistre, la perte de $40,000 en r6sultant, et le droit de 'appelant de lui r6clamer les sommes de $8,000 et $2,000, pour la perte de 1'immeuble et des meubles, respectivement. Pour seule et unique d6fense, l'intim6e plaida que l'action 6tait primatur6e, all6guant au soutien de ce moyen, dans un amendement fait h l'issue de 1'enquite, qu'elle n'avait pas regu les formules de preuve de perte.
La Cour sup~rieure, acceptant le t6moignage de LaMarsh, consid6ra que ces formules, dont copie 6tait d6pos6e en preuve, avaient 6t6 complit6es, signies et asserment6es, puis remises au service des postes dans une enveloppe affranchie, A l'adresse de Callaghan. L'intim6e fut done condamnde A payer A l'appelant la somme de $10,000. Par une decision majoritaire, la Cour d'Appell cassa jugement. En substance et s'appuyant sur les clauses 13 et 17 de l'art. 240 du 299, S.R.Q. 1941 et sur l'art. 2478 C.C., on jugea que l'assur6 ne pouvait-sauf renonciation expresse ou tacite de la part de la compagnie intimbe-poursuivre cette dernibre sans lui avoir remis ces preuves de perte; que l'affirmation de Me LaMarsh quant A la mise A la poste de la lettre adress6e au repr6sentant autoris6 de la compagnie ne pouvait faire preuve "de la remise (delivery)" des formules de preuve de perte h l'intim6e ou a son representant si, en effet, ceux-ci, comme ils en ont t6moign6, ne les ont jamais reques. On consid6ra 6galement que l'assur6 ne pouvait invoquer une renonciation expresse ou tacite de la part de la compagnie sans 1'avoir alligude dans ses proc6dures.
Suivant la loi rigissant le contrat d'assurance intervenu entre les parties, 1'assureur avait droit d'exiger la remise (delivery) des preuves de perte. Cette position, il pouvait la modifier ou autoriser un agent nomm6 par lui h ce faire. Et voilh bien, h mon avis, qui s'est produit en 1'espbce.
LaMarsh n'avait pas h questionner le mandat et 'entibre discr6tion qu'en sa lettre du 3 avril, Callaghan lui dinongait avoir regus de la compagnie. Dans l'ex6cution de ce mandat et 1'exercice de cette discr6tion, Callaghan invitait virtuellement, par sa lettre, Me LaMarsh h lui retourner les formules par le service des postes, interm6diaire dont lui-m~me s'4tait servi pour les lui envoyer. A cela s'arr~tait l'obligation de Me LaMarsh et, A cette obligation, il s'est conform6.
Dans Magann v. Auger', cette Cour, pour r6soudre une question de juridiction territoriale, eut A d6terminer l'endroit oii s'6tait form6 un contrat, entibrement n~goci6 par correspondance, par la pr6cision du moment oii s'6tait fait l'accord des volont6s. Apris examen de la doctrine en
France, M. le Juge Taschereau, rendant le jugement pour la Cour, vint la conclusion que la loi du Qu6bec, sur la question, 6tait la m6me qu'en Angleterre, qu'il n'6tait pas n6cessaire pour la perfection du contrat que 1'acceptation de l'offre soit parvenue i la connaissance de celui qui
1'avait faite, et que le contrat s'6tait form6 au moment et au lieu oi l'acceptation, de l'offre faite par la poste, avait elle-mime t mise h la poste. On consid6ra, ainsi que s'en exprime subs6quemment M. le Juge en chef Anglin dans
Charlebois v. Baril , que celui qui fait une offre en utilisant le service des postes constitue ce service comme son agent pour recevoir l'acceptation et la lui transmettre. C'est lt le principe sur lequel se fonde juridiquement la d6cision.
La livraison tardive ou la perte subs6quente de la lettre manifestant l'accord des volonts n'affecte en rien la validit6 du principe et de son jeu. Ceci on l'affirme et en donne la raison dans Household Fire Insurance Co. v.
Grant', dans les termes suivants:
the acceptor himself had put his letter into the hands of a messenger Isent by the offerer himself as his agent to deliver the offer and receive vica the acceptance.
MER- CoA.LEI.
Dans Henthorn v. Fraser', Lord Herschell formule la rigle comme suit:
Fauteux J.
Where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is posted.
Et on trouve, sur la question, le commentaire ci-apres dans Anson's Law of Contract, 21e 4d., A la page 47: One of the more obvious consequences of this rule is that the offeror must bear the risk of the letter of acceptance going astray. Indeed, it is sometimes said that there is a general rule that where the offeror either expressly or impliedly indicates the mode of acceptance, and this, as a means of communication, proves to be nugatory or insufficient, he does so at his own risk.
Sans doute il ne s'agit pas ici de la formation d'un contrat mais d'une modification, sugg6rde et accept6e, aux conditions de son ex4cution. Apprici6e dans l'arribre-plan de toutes les circonstances particulibres A cette cause, la lettre de Callaghan A Me LaMarsh permettait raisonnablement h ce dernier de considdrer que l'assureur 6tait satisfait que les preuves de perte soient confides au service des postes, auquel il s'en remettait entibrement pour en obtenir livraison. Le silence et l'inaction de la compagnie intim6e et de son mandataire, tous deux notoirement notifi6s par avocat de la volont6 de 1'assur6 d'exiger 1'ex6cution du contrat, aussi bien que la nature de l'unique moyen plaid6 en d6fense h laction, sont, dans le cas qui nous occupe, incompatibles avec la bonne foi qui doit pr6sider A 1'ex6cution de ce contrat d'assurance.
Comme M. le Juge St-Jacques, dissident en Cour d'Appel, je suis d'avis que le dispositif du jugement de premibre instance est bien fond6.
Quant au motif de proc6dure invoqu6, comme ddjh mentionn6, par 1'un des Juges de la majorit6, je ne crois pas, en toute d6f6rence, qu'il y ait lieu de le retenir. Au para. 8 de la d6claration, le demandeur a suffisamment 1 [18921 2 Ch. 27.
indiqu6 a la compagnie d6fenderesse les faits dont il entendait se pr6valoir pour inf6rer en droit la renonciation de la compagnie h s'en tenir rigidement A la loi rigissant le contrat en ce qui concerne la production des preuves de perte. Ces faits, 'intim6e en connaissait tous les d6tails;
c'6tait les siens ou, et h son entibre connaissance, ceux de son agent. L'intim6e n'a fait d'ailleurs aucune objection h la preuve de ces faits.
Je maintiendrais 1'appel, r6tablirais le jugement de premibre instance, avec depens, tant en cette Cour qu'en
Cour d'Appel.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Attorneys for the plaintiff, appellant: Garmaise &
McNally, Rouyn-Noranda.
Attorney for the defendant, respondent: Philippe
Pothier, St. Hyacinthe.
BRITISH COLUMBIA ELECTRIC
RAILWAY CO. LTD. ............
' THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA, BRITISH COLUMBIA LUMBER MAN- UFACTURERS'
ASSOCIATION, THE CORPORA- TION OF THE CITY OF VICTORIA, THE COR- PORATION OF THE DISTRICT OF OAK BAY,
THE CORPORATION
OF THE DISTRICT
OF
SAANICH,
CORPORATION
OF
THE
TOWN- SHIP OF ESQUIMALT AND CITY OF VANCOU- VER ...
..........................
The first of a series of questions submitted for the consideration of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, in a case stated for the opinion of the Court, asked if the Public Utilities Commission of that Province was right in deciding "that no one of the matters and things referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 16 of the "Public Utilities Act" should as a matter of law be given priority over any other of those matters or things and that, if a CoMMIssIoN conflict arises among these matters or things, it is the Commission's duty to act to the best of its discretion."
The question was answered in the affirmative. The appellant appealed from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal which comprised this answer.
Held (Kerwin C.J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. Per Locke J.: There is an absolute obligation on the part of the Commission on the application of the utility to approve rates which will produce the fair return to which the utility has been found entitled, and the obligation to have due regard to the protection of the public is also to be discharged. It is not a question of considering priorities between "the matters and things referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of s. 16", but consideration of these matters is to be given by the Commission in the light of the fact that the obligation to approve rates which will give a fair and reasonable return is absolute.
Per Cartwright, Martland and Ritchie JJ.: The combined effect of the two clauses referred to is that the Commission, when dealing with a rate case, has unlimited discretion as to the matters which it may consider as affecting the rate, but it must when actually setting the rate, meet the requirements specifically mentioned in clause (b), i.e., the rate to be imposed should be neither excessive for the service nor insufficient to provide a fair return on the rate base. These two factors should be given priority over any other matters which the Commission may consider.
Although there is no priority directed by the Act as between these two matters, there is a duty imposed on the Commission to have due regard to both of them, and accordingly there must be a balancing of the interests concerned.
Per Kerwin C.J., dissenting: The statute does not require that any weight be given to the matters and things referred to in the two clauses after they have been considered, and therefore the weight to be assigned is a question of fact for the Commission to decide in each instance.
APPEAL from a portion of a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia', comprising the answer to the first of five questions submitted to it by the Public Utilities Commission. Appeal allowed, Kerwin C.J. dissenting.
J. W. de B. Farris, Q.C., A. Bruce Robertson, Q.C., and R. R. Dodd, for the appellant;
1(1959), 29 W.W.R. 533.
J. A. Clark, Q.C., for The Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia, respondent;
T. P. O'Grady, for The Corporation of The City of Victoria, The Corporation of The District of Oak Bay, The PU Corporation of the District of Saanich and Corporation of CouMissioN The Township of Esquimalt, respondents;
or B.C. R. K. Baker, for City of Vancouver, respondent. THE CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting):-Pursuant to s. 107 of the Public Utilities Act of British Columbia, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 277, the Public Utilities Commission stated a case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal for that Province. The case was stated in respect of five questions but we are concerned only with Question 1 as, by order of this Court, British Columbia Electric Railway Company, Limited was granted leave to appeal only from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal comprising the answer given thereto. That question is as follows:
1. (a) Was the Commission right in deciding as appears in the said Reasons for Decision of 14th July, 1958, that no one of the matters and things referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 16 of the "Public Utilities Act" should as a matter of law be given priority over any other of those matters or things and that, if a conflict arises among these matters or things, it is the Commission's duty to act to the best of its discretion?
(b) If the answer to question (1) (a) is "No", what decision should the Commission have reached on the point?
The Court's answer to Question 1 reads:
The Commission was right in deciding as appears in its Reasons for Decision of 14th July, 1958 that no one of the matters and things referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 16 of the Public Utilities Act R.S.B.C. 1948, chapter 277 should as a matter of law be given priority over any other of those matters or things and that, if a conflict arises among these matters or things, it is the Commission's duty to act to the best of its discretion.
At the conclusion of the argument the judgment of the Court of Appeal appeared to me to be correct and further consideration has confirmed me in that view. Reasons were given by Sheppard J.A. on behalf of himself and the other four members of the Court who heard the argument on the stated case. I adopt all that he said and would have nothing to add were it not for an argument presented on behalf of the appellant. Section 16(1) (a) and (b) read as follows: (1) In fixing any rate:- (a) The Commission shall consider all matters which it deems proper as affecting the rate:
(b) The Commission shall have due regard, among other things, to the protection of the public from rates that are excessive as being more than a fair and reasonable charge for services of the nature and quality Kerwin CJ. furnished by the public utility; and to giving to the public utility a fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of the property of the public utility used, or prudently and reasonably acquired, to enable the public utility to furnish the service:
Mr. Farris submitted that the Court of Appeal had not taken into consideration the words in (1) (b) "The Commission shall have due regard.......... and to giving to the public utility a fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of the property of the public utility used, or prudently and reasonably acquired, to enable the public upon a review of the reasons of Sheppard J.A., relevant to Question 1, and particularly of the extract transcribed below, which is the substance of his reasoning upon the matter, that he did consider and apply these words. The extract reads:
A further inquiry is what weight should be given to the matters required to be considered by Sec. 16 (1) (b) and particularly to the "fair and reasonable return". Under See. 16 (1) (b), the Commission is required to consider "the protection of the public" and the "giving to the public utility a fair and reasonable return". Although clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. (1) require certain matters to be considered, they do not state what weight is to be assigned by the Commission. Consequently, the Statute requires only that the Commission consider the matters falling within Sec. 16 (1) (a), namely, "all matters which it deems proper as affecting the rate" and those falling within Sec. 16 (1) (b), namely, "the protection of the public" and "a fair and reasonable return" to the Utility. But the Statute does not require more, and does not require any weight to be given to these matters after they have been considered. Hence the weight to be assigned is outside any statutory requirement and must be a question of fact for the Commission in each instance. Furthermore, as Mr. Clark pointed out, the Commission when dealing with the electric rates applications, had, under heading "III.-A Fair Return", discussed that subject; and that in their reasons for decision with reference to the transit fares applications the Commission speaks "of the misunderstanding which arose from the recent decision on electric rates"; and that later, in the same paragraph, they said: "The 6.5o rate remains the standard of the fair and reasonable return to which the Commission has due regard". The appeal should be dismissed but there should be no costs.PUBLIC
J.:-The sections of the Public Utilities Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, 277, which must be considered in deciding the first question are quoted in the reasons of my brother Martland which I have had the advantage of reading. The real question might have been stated more clearly had it asked whether as a matter of law a duty rested upon the Commission to approve rates which would produce for the appellant a fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of the property used or prudently and reasonably acquired by it to enable it to furnish the service described in the Act when the fact as to what constituted a fair return had previously been determined by the Commission. This is the matter to be determined.
Some assistance in interpreting the sections of the Act is to be obtained by an examination of the earlier legislation dealing with the control of rates charged for electrical power in British Columbia.
The first statutory provision dealing with the matter appears in the Water Act Amendment Act of 1929 which appeared as 67 of the statutes of that year. This Act provided for the control of such rates and imposed upon a power company producing electrical energy by water power the duty of supplying electrical energy to the public in the manner defined. Power companies were required to file schedules of their tolls with the Water Board constituted under the Water Act, R.S.B.C. 1924, c. 271.
"Unjust and unreasonable"
as applied to tolls was declared to include injustice and unreasonableness, whether arising from the fact that the tolls were insufficient to yield fair compensation for the service rendered or from the fact that they were excessive as being more than a fair and reasonable charge for service of the nature and quality furnished.
Section 141B authorized the Board upon the complaint of any person interested that a toll charge was unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory to enquire into the matter, to disallow any rate found to be excessive, and to fix the tolls to be charged by the power company for its service or respecting the improvement of the service in such manner as the Board considered just and reasonable.
Section 141C read:
Section 141D read in part:
These amendments to the Water Act appeared as ss. 138 to 157 in the Revision of the Statutes of 1936 and these sections were repealed when the first Public Utilities Act was passed by the Legislature, c. 47 of the statutes of 1938. It will be seen by an examination of the Public Utilities Act that in large measure the language of the amendments to the Water Act made in 1929 was adopted. The definition of the terms "unjust" and "unreasonable", which appeared in the 1929 amendment as part of s. 2, was reproduced in s. 2 of the Act of 1938. The prohibition against levying any unjust and unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or unduly preferential rate appearing as s. 8 of the Public Utilities Act merely expresses in slightly different terms the prohibition contained in s. 141B. The expression "shall have due regard" which appears in s. 16(1) (b) of the Public Utilities Act was apparently taken fromoss. 141C and D.
The Public Utilities Act, however, did not, when first enacted, and does not now contain any section which declares in express terms, as did s. 141C of the Water Act Amendment Act, that the power company shall be entitled to a fair return on the value of its property. Had the present Act contained such a provision it appears to me to be perfectly clear that the answer to be made to the first question should differ from that given by the Court of Appeal. Whether its omission affects the matter is to be determined. As it has been pointed out, the utility in the present matter is required by the Act to maintain its property in such condition as to enable it to supply an adequate service to the public and to furnish that service to all persons who may be reasonably entitled thereto without discrimination COMIINs and without delay. It may not discontinue its operations or B.C. without the permission of the Public Utilities Commission. The utility has, so far as we are informed, a monopoly on Locke J. the sale of electrical energy in the Cities of Vancouver and Victoria and in my opinion at common law the duty thus cast upon it by statute would have entitled it to be paid fair and reasonable charges for the services rendered in the absence of any statutory provision for such payment. I consider that, in this respect, the position of such a utility would be similar to that of a common carrier upon whom is imposed as a matter of law the duty of transporting goods tendered to him for transport at fair and reasonable rates. This has been so from very early times. In Bastard v. Bastard', in an action against a common carrier in the Court of King's Bench for the loss of a box delivered to him for carriage, in delivering judgment for the plaintiff it was said that, while there was no particular agreement as to the amount to be paid for the carriage, "then the carrier might have a quantum meruit for his hire".
In Great Western Railway v. Sutton, Blackburn J. said in part:
The obligation which the common law imposed upon him was to accept and carry all goods delivered to him for carriage according to his profession (unless he had some reasonable excuse for not doing so) on being paid a reasonable compensation for so doing.
The result of the authorities appears to me to be correctly summarized in Browne's Law of Carriers, at p. 42, where it is said:
We have already seen that the law imposes very onerous duties, and very considerable risks, upon a person who is designated a common carrier. As to his duty, he is bound by law to undertake the carriage of goods. Another man is free from any such duty until he has entered into a special agreement; but the law holds that the common carrier, by the very fact of his trade and business, has, on his side, entered into an agreement with the public to carry goods, which becomes at once a complete and binding contract when any person brings him the goods, 1 (1679), 2 Show. 89 E.R. 807.
2 (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 226 at 237, 38 LJ Ex. 177.
83923-3-21 and makes the request that he should carry them to a certain person or place. To make such a contract binding upon him as a common carrier, it is not necessary that a specific sum of money should be promised or agreed upon; but where that is not the case, there is an implied undertaking upon the part of the bailor that the remuneration shall be reasonable.
cOM M.Co
The Water Act Amendment Act of 1929 appears to have followed closely the form of public utilities legislation in Locke J.
certain of the United States. There had been statutes of this nature in force in various parts of the Union for a considerable time prior to the year 1929.
I do not find that the American statutes generally declared in terms as did s. 141C of the Water Act Amendment Act that a power company providing service to the public should be entitled to a fair return on the value of all property acquired by it and used in providing service to the public. This method, however, of establishing a fair and reasonable rate would appear to have been followed universally.
The authorities in the American cases are to be found summarized in Nichols-Ruling Principles of Utility Regulation, at p. 49-where a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Public Service Commission' is quoted reading:
Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the time it is being used to render the service are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives the public utility company of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is so well settled by numerous decisions of this court that citation of the cases is scarcely necessary.
In New Jersey Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Company', Butler J. said:
The just compensation safeguarded to the utility by the Fourteenth Amendment is a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the time that it is being used for public service. And rates not sufficient to yield that return are confiscatory.
While without the provision made in s. 141C of the Water Act Amendment Act a power company compelled by the amendment to furnish electrical service on demand U.S. 23 at 1 U.S.
upon the conditions prescribed would in my opinion have been entitled to a fair and reasonable payment for such service, the Legislature, by s. 141C, defined the manner in which fair and reasonable rates should be established.
As I have said, the Public Utilities Act does not contain any provision which in terms declares the right of the utility to a fair return on the value of its property. It does, however, by the definition of the terms "unjust" and "unreasonable" adopted from the Water Act Amendment Act declare that these expressions include rates that are insufficient to yield fair compensation for the service rendered, and the Public Utilities Commission in the present matter have interpreted this in its context as indicating the yardstick to be used in determining the fair and reasonable return to which the appellant was entitled. Under the powers given to the Commission by s. 45 of the Act the value of the property of the appellant used, or prudently or reasonably acquired to enable the company to furnish its services was determined as at December 31st, 1942, and since then has been kept up to date. On September 11th, 1952, the Commission, after public hearings, decided that until some change in the financial and market circumstances convinced the Commission that a different rate should be applied, the Commission would apply the rate of 6.5 per cent. on the rate base as a fair and reasonable rate of return for the company.
That decision remains unchanged and is not questioned by anyone in these proceedings.
In interpreting the statute, the position at common law of the utility after the repeal of the sections of the Water Act must be considered. Had the statute imposed upon the appellant the obligation to furnish service of the natures defined upon demand, without more, it would have been entitled as a matter of law to recover from a person demanding service reasonable and fair compensation. It will not in my opinion be presumed that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive a utility of that common law right.
In Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners', the Judicial Committee said: In Maxwell on Statutes, 10th ed., at p. 286, the authorities are thus summarized:
Subsection 6 of s. 23 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 1, directs that every Act shall receive such fair, large and libefal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act. In- my opinion the true meaning of the relevant sections of the Public Utilities Act is that a utility is given a statutory right to the approval of rates which will afford to it fair compensation for the services rendered and that the quantum of that' compensation is to be a fair and reasonable rate of return upon the appraised value of the property of the company referred to in s. 16(1) (b).
The appellant in addition to the sale of electrical energy operates a public transportation system and sells gas and by an Order-in-Council made under the provisions of s. 15(1) (c) of the Statutes of' 1938 it was directed that these three categories of service should be considered as one unit in fixing the rates. In the the Commission upon the application to increase the rates for electricity,- it, is said that the. appellant has never earned the approved rate of return and that the rates proposed by it, and which were not approved, would not enable it to do so even in respect of the electrical system alone.
Rates that fail to yield fair compensation for the service rendered are declared by s. 2 to be unjust and unreasonable as they were by s. 2 of the Water Act Amendment Act of 1929. The Commission is directed by s. 16(1)(b) to have due regard to fixing a rate which will give to the utility a fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of its property used or prudently and reasonably acquired to enable it to furnish the service. It is the inclusion of the expression "shall have due regard" which has led the Commission and the Court of Appeal to conclude that this means that allowing a fair return upon the appraised value is simply one of the matters to be considered by the Commission in fixing the rate. Clearly no such interpretation could have been placed upon this expression under the provisions of the Water Act in view of the express provisions of s. 141C, and with great respect I think no such interpretation should be given to it in the present statute.
The fair compensation referred to in s. 2 of the Water Act Amendment Act of 1929 referred, and could only refer, to an aggregate produced by tolls sufficient to yield to the power company the fair return on the value of its property to which s. 141C declared it was entitled. The fair compensation referred to in s. 2 of the Public Utilities Act is in its context, in my opinion, to be construed in the same manner. The Order of the Commission of September 11th, 1952, determined what that compensation should be. The rates to be put into force to yield such fair compensation, which, at least in the case of electricity, vary in accordance with the use to which it is put and the quantities purchased, are matters to be determined by the Commission., The direction to the Commission in s. 16(1) (b) to have due regard to the protection of the public from rates that are excessive as being more than a fair and reasonable charge for the services requires it, in my opinion, to approve rates which are in its judgment fair and reasonable having in mind the purpose for which the electricity is used, the quantities purchased and such other matters as it considers justify the approval of rates which differ for different users.
I can find nothing in this legislation indicating an intention on the part of the Legislature to empower the Commission to deprive the utility of its common law right to be paid fair compensation for the varying services rendered or to depart from the declared intention of the Legislature in the Water Act Amendment Act that such companies upon RAIc whom these obligations are imposed are entitled to have the quantum of such fair compensation determined as a fair return upon the appraised value of the properties required. I do not think it is possible to define what constitutes a fair return upon the property of utilities in a manner applicable to all cases or that it is expedient to attempt to do so. It is a continuing obligation that rests upon such a utility to provide what the Commission regards as adequate service in supplying not only electricity but transportation and gas, to maintain its properties in a satisfactory state to render adequate service and to provide extensions to these services when, in the opinion of the Commission, such are necessary. In coming to its conclusion as to what constituted a fair return to be allowed to the appellant these matters as well as the undoubted fact that the earnings must be sufficient, if the company was to discharge these statutory duties, to enable it to pay reasonable dividends and attract capital, either by the sale of shares or securities, were of necessity considered. Once that decision was made it was, in my opinion, the duty of the Commission imposed by the statute to approve rates which would enable the company to earn such a return or such lesser return as it might decide to ask. As the the Commission show, the present appellant did not ask the approval of rates which would yield a return of 6.5 per cent. to which it was entitled under the Order of the Board.
I do not consider that Question (1) can be answered by a simple affirmative or negative. The obligation to approve rates which will produce the fair return to which the utility has been found entitled is, in my opinion, absolute, which does not mean that the obligation of the Commission to have due regard to the protection of the public, as required by s. 16(1) (b), is not to be discharged. It is not a question of considering priorities between "the matters and things referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of s. 16". The Commission is directed by s. 16(1) (a) to consider all matters which it deems proper as affecting the rate but that consideration is to be given in the light of the fact that the obligation to approve rates which will give a fair and reasonable return is absolute.
In my opinion the answer to be made to Question (1) (a) is that the Commission was wrong in deciding that it was not required to approve rates which in the aggregate would produce for the utility the fair return which by its order of September 11, 1952, the Commission found it to be entitled or such lower rates as the utility might submit for approval. The duty of the Commission to have due regard to the protection of the public from excessive rates referred to in the al. first four lines of s. 16(1) (b) refers to the approval of rates Locke J. according to the use to be made by and the quantities supplied to those to whom the service is rendered.
The second part of Question (1) reads:
As to this I agree with the answer proposed by my brother Martland.
I would allow this appeal but make no order as to costs.
J.:-Pursuant to the provisions of subs. (1) of s. 107 of the Public Utilities Act of British Columbia, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 277, the Public Utilities Commission of that Province stated a case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia. Five questions were submitted for the consideration of the Court, of which the first was as follows:
Question (1) (a) was answered in the affirmative. The appellant, by special leave of this Court, has appealed from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal which comprises the answer given by it to question (1). The other four questions and the answers given to them are not in issue in this appeal.
The relevant circumstances involved are contained in the case stated by the Public Utilities Commission and are as ELEIC follows:
110S
The appellant and British Columbia Electric Company Limited (together called "the Company") are related compames and between them own and operate equipment and facilities for the transportation of persons and property by al.
railway, trolley coach and motor buses and for the production, generation and furnishing of gas and electricity, all for the public for compensation.
The Company is regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia (called "the Commission") pursuant to the provisions of the Public Utilities Act. By appraisal the Commission ascertained the value of the property of the Company used, or prudently and reasonably acquired, to enable the Company to furnish its services. The appraisal was made as of December 31, 1942, and since then has been kept up to date. The appraised value is referred to as "the rate base".
By Order-in-Council No. 1627, approved on July 16, 1948, the Commission was directed to consider the classes or categories of the regulated services of the Company as one unit in fixing the rates.
On September 1952, the Commission after public hearing made "Findings as to Rate of Return" and decided that, "until changed financial and market circumstances convince the Commission that a different rate should be applied, the Commission will in its continuing examination of the Company's operations apply the rate of 6.5%" on the rate base as a fair and reasonable rate ,of return for the Company. This decision remains unchanged.
The Company from time to time amended its rate schedules with the consent of the Commission and filed with the Commission schedules showing the rates so established. On April 23, 1958, it applied for the consent of the Commission, under s. 17 of the Public Utilities Act, to file amended schedules containing increased rates for its electric service on the Mainland and on Vancouver Island. On July 28, 1958, it also applied for the consent of the Commission to file amended schedules containing increased transit fares for its transit systems in Vancouver and other Mainland areas and in Victoria and surrounding areas. Public hearings were held by the Commission and it handed down its decision with respect to the electric applications on July 14, 1958, and with respect to the transit EAELWAY applications on October 30, 1958.
Briefly, the decisions of the Commission accepted the proposed rate schedules submitted by the Company, except that it refused to approve the proposed increases in the principal residential electric rates on the Mainland and on - Vancouver Island. It directed that those rates be scaled Martland J. down by approximately 25%. In its decision with respect to electric rates the Commission stated:
The Commission has therefore consented to the filing to be effective July 15th, 1958, of all the rate schedules submitted by the Company for the Mainland and Vancouver Island, as modified and supplemented by the Company during the course of the hearings on its application, except the residential rate schedules and Mainland Rate 3035 for industrial users. The Commission has decided that the principal residential rate on the Mainland (Schedule 1109) and the principal residential rate on the Island (Schedule 1110 under which the principal divisions are Billing Codes 1110 and 1112) should be adjusted to yield not more than threequarters of the additional revenue proposed. The adjustment must be applied primarily to reduce sharp changes in impact and lessen disproportionately large percentage increases in the consumption range of 60 KWH to 280 KWH per month. Comparable adjustments must also be made in some of the related special residential rates of lesser importance. Most of the relief would be given to the small residential user.
At the same time the Commission decided that further increases in the commercial and industrial rates to compensate for this reduction in the proposed residential rates would not be justified.
During the hearings it was contended by counsel for the Company that, the Commission, having determined on a fair and reasonable return to the Company, namely, 6.5o, the Commission should authorize rates which would yield that return, or whatever lesser return the Company's application requested for the time being. The Commission did not accept this contention and the rates which were approved by the Commission would yield approximately $750,000 less per annum than those applied for by the Company would yield. The rates for which the Company sought approval themselves would not have yielded to the Company the full allowed rate of return of 6.5%.
The relevant portions of s. 16(1) of the Public Utilities Act provide as follows:
(1) In fixing any rate:-
(a) The Commission shall consider all matters which it deems proper as affecting the rate:
ELECTIC
(b) The Commission shall have due regard, among other things, to the protection of the public from rates that are excessive as being more than a fair and reasonable charge for services of the PUBLIc nature and quality furnished by the public utility; and to giving to the public utility a fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of the property of the public utility used, or prudently and reasonably acquired, to enable the public utility to furnish the service:
Martland J.
(c) Where the public utility furnishes more than one class of service, the Commission shall segregate the various kinds of service into distinct classes or categories of service; and for the purpose of fixing the rate to be charged for the service rendered, each distinct class or category of service shall be considered as a selfcontained unit, and the rates fixed for each unit shall be such as are considered just and reasonable for that unit without regard to the rates fixed for any other unit. If it is considered by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council that the rates as so determined might be inequitable or contrary to the general public interest, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may direct that two or more classes or categories of service shall be considered as one unit in fixing the rate:
In the reasons given for its decision the Commission deals with the effect of clauses (a) and (b) of s. 16(1) and says:
With great respect, the Commission considers that although for this purpose the statutory duty of the Commission to have due regard to all matters which the Commission deems proper as affecting the rate might without any significant inaccuracy be described as the right of the Commission, and its statutory duty to have due regard to giving the utility a fair and reasonable return might without significant inaccuracy be described as the Commission's responsibility for giving the utility a fair and reasonable return, there is nothing in the Act to relieve the Commission in the case now before it from complying with the language of the Act and giving due regard to all those matters to which the legislature has directed the Commission to give due regard in fixing a rate. No one of those matters should, in the opinion of the Commission, be given as a matter of law priority over any other of those matters and if, as the legislature appears to have thought possible, a conflict arises among those matters, the Commission considers that it is its duty to act to the best of its discretion.
The Court of Appeal concurred in this view. The judgment of the Court', delivered by Sheppard J.A., refers to this question in the following words:
A further inquiry is what weight should be given to the matters required to be considered by Sec. 16(1)(b) and particularly to the "fair and reasonable return". Under Sec. 16(1)(b), the Commission is required '(1959),
29 W.W.R. 533 at 538.
From this decision the present appeal is brought. To determine the intent and meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of s. 16(1) of the Act it is necessary to consider them in relation to the other provisions of the Act, with which they must be read.
Section 5 imposes upon a public utility the duty to maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to furnish, and to furnish, service to the public in all respects adequate, safe, efficient, just and reasonable. Section 7 prevents a public utility which has been granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a franchise from ceasing its operations or any part of them without first obtaining the permission of the Commission. Section 6 requires every public utility, upon reasonable notice, to furnish to all persons who may apply therefor, and be reasonably entitled thereto, suitable service without discrimination and without delay.
Sections 38, 42 and 43 contain provisions whereby, in the circumstances therein defined, a public utility may be ordered by the Commission to extend its existing services. These four sections last mentioned involve a statutory obligation on the part of a public utility to make capital outlays for extensions of its service. A public utility which operates in a rapidly expanding community may be required to make substantial expenditures of that nature in order to keep pace with increasing demands. It must, if it is to fulfil those obligations, be able to obtain the necessary
Cases cited
- 29 W.W.R. 533 29 W.W.R. 533
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Interpretation Act
- s. 23 of the Interpretation Act
- s. 16(1)
- s. 15(1)
- s. 2
- s. 16(1)(b)
- s. 16
- Section 5
- Section 7
- Section 6
- Sections 38
- 42
- 43
-
Unresolved citations
- subsection (1)
- Section 16
- s. 16
- s. 107 of the Public Utilities Act
- Section 16 of the Public Utilities Act
- Section 16(1)
- ss. 138
- 157
- s. 2
- s s. 8 of the Public Utilities Act
- s. 16(1)
- s. 45
- s. 2 of the Water Act
- s. 2 of the Public Utilities Act
- subs. (1)
- s. 17 of the Public Utilities Act
- s. 16(1) of the Public Utilities Act