Hyperlawhypertext legal database Lambton (County) v. Canadian Comstock Co. Ltd. [1960] SCR 86

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Lambton (County) v. Canadian Comstock Co. Ltd.

[1960] SCR 86 Court SCC Decision date 1959-11-30 English

Decision Majority · Judgment of the Court · Judgment of the Court

Contents

Majority

In my view it had the necessary power and, in deciding wM. Mon- whether or not it should exercise that power, it did act judicially.
et al.
jd
ONr.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that this appeal COACION should be dismissed with costs.
Martland J.
ROBERT KOLSTAD ....................
APPELLANT; *Nov. 4
AND
Dec. 21
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ........
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALBERTA, APPELLATE DIVISION
Criminal law-Bribery-Reward given to government employee in connection with dealings with Government-Disposition of bribe money- Criminal Code, 1958-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 102(1)(b),.581(d), 584(1)(b), 595, 630(1), (9).
The accused was acquitted at a non-jury trial of the indictable offence of bribery under s. 102(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Subsequently, the trial judge issued an order directing the return to the accused of the $400 bribe money, filed as exhibit in support of the charge. On appeal by the Crown, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of acquittal, directed that a verdict of guilty be entered and that the bribe money remain in Court until further order. The accused appealed to this Court against the conviction and the order. Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
Per Curiam: The appeal against the conviction failed. The accused had dealings of some kind with the Government and the fact that a trap was set had no bearing on the commission of the offence.
Per Kerwin C.J. and Abbott and Martland JJ.: Section 630(2) of the Code, under which the order of the trial judge for the return of the money was made, had no application. The trial judge had acquitted the accused and had not found that an indictable offence had been committed by someone else. Nor was his jurisdiction assisted by Kerwin C.J. and Taschereau, Fauteux, Abbott and Martland JJ
Rule 909(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Alberta respecting criminal appeals, since he did not make a special order as to the custody or conditional release of any exhibit.
The submission that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction because no question of law was involved as required by s. 584 of the Code, must fail. The trial judge purported to act under s. 630(2), and in view of ss. 581(1)(d) and 595, the Crown could, by virtue of the extended meaning of "sentence", appeal under s. 584(1) (b) with leave. It should be taken that such leave was granted, as the Court of Appeal proceeded to deal with the matter.
Even if there were jurisdiction in this Court to hear an appeal from an order carrying those reasons-that the money should remain in Court until further order-into effect, and whether it be a separate order or part of one setting aside the acquittal and finding the accused guilty, there was no substance in the appeal.
Per Taschereau and Fauteux JJ.: This Court was without jurisdiction to deal with the order in relation to the bribe money. The question involved was not one coming within the ambit of any of the Criminal Code appellate provisions related to appeals to this Court in indictable offences. Goldhar v. The Queen, [19601 S.C.R. 60.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Alberta, Appellate Division', reversing a judgment of Primrose J. acquitting the accused. Appeal dismissed.
N. D. Maclean, Q.C., for the appellant.
H. J. Wilson, Q.C., and J. W. Anderson, for the
THE CHIEF JUSTICE:-This is an appeal against a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Province of Alberta' setting aside the acquittal of the present appellant on a charge that on or about April 16th, A.D. 1958 at Edmonton he gave to an employee of the Government of Alberta a reward as consideration for an act in connection with dealings with the said Government of Alberta, contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada. The applicable provision of the Code is s. 102(1) (b) reading as follows: 102.
(b) having dealings of any kind with the government, pays a commission or reward to or confers an advantage or benefit of any kind upon an employee or official ,of the government with which he deals, or to any member of his family, or to any one for the benefit 1123 C.C.C. 170, 30 C.R. 176.
80666-1-31
I agree with the reasons of Hugh J. MacDonald J.A., speaking on behalf of the Appellate Division, that the appellant did have dealings of some kind with the Government and that the fact that a trap was set has no bearing on the commission of the offence and I have nothing to add. So far, therefore, as the Appellate Division allowed the appeal from the trial judge and directed a verdict of guilty to be entered, the appeal fails. We have not been furnished with a copy of any formal order made by the Appellate Division but we were advised that on or about May 1959, in pursuance of its direction the accused appeared before it and was fined $500 and that this amount has been paid. The Crown had also appealed to the Appellate Division from an order of the judge of first instance made subsequent to the acquittal directing that there be paid out to the appellant the sum of $400 which the latter.had given to two employees of the Government of the Province of Alberta. The four bills comprising that sum had been made exhibits at the trial. The argument of the present appellant that subs. (2) of s. 630 of the Code applied found favour with the trial judge. That subsection reads as follows:
The Appellate Division considered that this subsection had no application and with that I agree. The trial judge had acquitted the accused and had not found that an indictable offence had been committed by someone else. Counsel for the accused at the trial had suggested to the judge that the two witnesses who had been paid had committed a fraud, but when counsel for the Crown was arguing the trial judge asked him:
And later, this occurred:
THE COURT: It is an exhibit in court. This money was taken by the police and put in court as an exhibit. Now, do I lose my power to deal with it?
.Kerwin CJ. MR. SHORTREED: You don't lose your power to deal with it, you never had any when you found that no crime had been committed. THE COURT: Oh, I think I have. I will order return of the money following the expiry of the time for appeal.
In view of this it cannot be maintained that the Court had found an indictable offence had been committed and the trial judge therefore had no jurisdiction under s. 630(2) of the Code to make the order he did. Nor is his jurisdiction assisted by one of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Alberta respecting criminal appeals to which counsel for the appellant referred. In his factum he sets out subs. (2) of Rule 910, Order LVI, but by an amendment made some time ago the Rule is really subs. (2) of 909 although in the same terms. It is as follows:
909. (2) The judge or magistrate who presided at the trial of any person, or any judge of the Court in which he was tried, may at any time after the trial make a special order as to the custody or conditional release of any such documents, exhibits, or other things as the special circumstances or special nature thereof may make desirable and proper, and upon such terms as he may impose.
The trial judge did not make a special order as to the custody or conditional release of any exhibit.
The appellant takes the position that s. 584 of the Code giving the Attorney General the right to appeal against a judgment, or verdict of acquittal on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone, applies both to the judgment of acquittal and the order of payment out, whether the order be considered part of the judgment, or supplementary to it; that in neither case was a question of law involved, and that, therefore, the Appellate Division had no jurisdiction. However s. 581(d) and s. 595 of the Code provide:
581. In this Part,
(d) "sentence" includes an order made under section 628, 629 or 630 and a direction made under section 638; and;
While I have already stated that I agree with the Appellate Division that s. 630(2) is not applicable, the trial judge purported to act under it. Therefore, by virtue. of the extended meaning of "sentence", the Attorney General could appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 584(1) (b), with leave of the Appellate Division or a judge thereof. It should be taken that such permission was granted, as the Appellate Division proceeded to deal with the: matter. Their reasons stated that the money should remain in Court until further order.
Even if there were jurisdiction in this Court to hear an appeal from an order carrying those reasons into effect, and whether it be a separate order or part of one setting aside the acquittal and finding the appellant guilty, there is no substance in the appeal and it should be dismissed. J.:-I agree with the Chief Justice that the Appellate Division of the Province of Alberta was right in allowing the appeal from the trial judge and directing a verdict of guilty to be entered.
On the second branch of the case concerning the order of the trial judge directing that there be paid out to the appellant the sum of $400, which order was reversed by the Appellate Division, I agree with Mr. Justice Fauteux that this Court has no jurisdiction on this matter.
The appeal should be dismissed.
J.:-Charged with an indictable offence under s. 102(1) (b), the appellant was, on September 24, 1958, acquitted by Primrose J., sitting without a jury, in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta. The charge being:
On October 3, 1958, he applied before the trial Judge for an order directing the return to him of a sum of $400, filed as exhibit in support of the charge, as being the reward given by him to an employee of the Government. This application was granted and the order was issued.
Both the acquittal and the order were appealed by the Crown to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta. This appeal was allowed and the Court directed that a verdict of guilty of the offence charged be entered, and directed the bribe money to remain in Court until further order.
The appellant now appeals to this Court against this judgment which set aside his acquittal, as well as the order of the trial Judge.
For the reasons given by the Chief Justice, I agree that the appeal against the conviction fails.
With respect to the order made by the Court of Appeal in relation to the bribe money, I am of opinion that this Court is without jurisdiction; for the question involved is not one coming within the ambit of any of the Criminal Code appellate provisions related to appeals to this Court in indictable offences. Goldhar v. Her Majesty the Queen. I would dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed. Solicitor for the appellant: N. D. Maclean, Edmonton. Solicitor for the respondent: The Attorney-General for the Province of Alberta.
'
PROGRESS FURNITURE MANU- *Dec
FACTURERS LIMITED (Plaintiff)
APPELLANT Dec. 21
AND
EASTERN FURNITURE LIMITED
(Defendant) ...........
.TE
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Peremption-Nothing done after filing of joint case in Court of Appeal- Motions to have suits perempted-Limitation period-Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 279, 280a, 128(2), 1239.
A certificate of last proceedings, dated September 8, 1958, showed that the last proceeding in these two cases was the filing of the joint case before the Court of Appeal on August 22, 1956. The Court of Appeal declared the peremption on the motions made on September 8, 1958, by the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to this Court. Held: The appeals should be dismissed.
The first submission made by the plaintiff to the effect that the time limitation had been suspended since the delay had been agreed to by the attorney for the defendant, could not be entertained. The plaintiff had the burden of proving such agreement, and had not done so.
The second submission that the motions were premature since art. 1223(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the party a 15-day period to file a memorandum and since the computation of the delay did not commence to run before the end of the day of September 8, the 7th being an excepted Sunday, also failed. Article 280a of the Code of Civil Procedure states that the period of peremption runs from the first day on which a party could take another useful proceeding. Even if this submission were accepted, the motions were not premature because 15 clear days had passed since the day when the plaintiff was to produce its memorandum. In the matter of peremption, a Sunday or holiday must be counted when it is the last day of the period granted.
The third submission was that the three extra days, which the plaintiff had, after the factums were to be produced, to inscribe before the Court of Appeal, should have been added before the time limit ran out. That submission also failed on the wording of art. 1223(2). To benefit from this provision, the plaintiff had to file a factum and this was not done.
APPEALS from two judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec', granting two motions for peremption of suits. Appeals dismissed. Taschereau, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux and Abbott JJ. 1[19591 Que.
P. Bourque, for the plaintiff, appellant.
fo thePROGRESS J. Leduc, for the defendant, respondent.

Judgment of the Court

s'agit de deux motions pour faire d6clarer pbrim6es deux instances jugdes par la Cour sup6rieure si6geant h Montr6al et inscrites en appel A la Cour du banc de la reine.
Tant sur la demande principale que sur la demande reconventionnelle, les certificats du d6put6-greffier des appels constatent que le dernier errement a 6t6 la production du dossier conjoint en date du 22 aofit 1956.
Le 10 d6cembre 1958, la Cour du banc de la reine', saisie de ces motions, les a maintenues toutes les deux et a d6clar6 les deux instances p6rim6es avec d6pens, le tout suivant les dispositions des articles 279 et 1239 C.P.C.
L'appelante dans les deux causes soulkve trois moyens pour combattre ces deux motions. Elle soutient, en premier lieu, et elle appuie sa pritention sur des affidavits de ses procureurs, h l'effet qu'apris le 22 aofit 1956, date oft 'appendice conjoint a 6t6 produit, une entente serait intervenue avec les procureurs de 1'intim6e prolongeant les d6lais l6gaux pour la production des proc6dures subs6quentes, et qu'en cons6quence les d6lais de p6remption ont t6 suspendus. Le fardeau d'6tablir 1'existence de cette entente, et dont la suspension d6coulerait, reposait clairement sur I'appelante, mais comme la d6fenderesse, par l'affidavit de ses procureurs, nie cette assertion, il s'ensuit qu'elle n'est pas 6tablie et que ce moyen doit 6tre 6cart6.
En second lieu, I'appelante invoque 1'article 1223(2) C.P.C. qui est h 1'effet qu'elle avait quinze jours pour produire au greffe son m6moire, apris la production de l'appendice conjoint, et que la computation des d6lais de p6remption ne commengait h courir que le soir du 8 septembre vu que le 7 6tait un dimanche. II s'ensuivrait que les certificats du d6put6-greffier des appels seraient irr6guliers et les motions pr6matur6es.
Je ne puis accueillir cette pritention parce qu'en vertu de Particle 280(a) C.P.C., qui est un amendement adopt6 par la L6gislature en 1941 (5 Geo. VI, c. 68, art. 2), le dblai de pdremption se compte depuis le premier jour le poursuivant pouvait, apris la production de la dernibre proc6dure utile, faire une autre proc6dure utile. Le dblai ayant commenc6 A courir le 23 aott 1956, il s'ensuivrait que les motions en date du 8 septembre 1958 n'6taient pas pr6matur6es. Vide: Anctil v. Deschines'.
Ces motions auraient pu 6tre faites l6galement A cette date du 23 aofit, car c'6tait A partir de ce jour 1 que l'appelante devait, apris la production de la dernibre proc6dure utile, en faire une autre qui aurait interrompu la piremption, ce qu'elle n'a pas jug6 h propos dd faire., Dans l'alternative, mime si on doit accepter la pritention de 1'appelante, voulant que les dilais n'ont commence h courir que le soir du 8 septembre ou le matin du 9, parce que le 7 6tait un jour f6ri6, les motions ne seraient pas davantage pr6matur6es. Il s'6tait en effet 6coul6 quinze jours francs depuis la date oii l'appelante devait produire son m6moire, soit depuis le 22 aoftt au soir au 7 septembre. En matibre de p6remption, un jour firi6 doit 6tre compt6 dans la computation des d6lais, lorsqu'il tombe le dernier jour de cette computation. La rigle de proc6dure (C.P.C. 9) voulant que si un d6lai expire un dimanche ou un jour firid, il est continu6 au jour juridique suivant, ne s'applique pas en matibre de p6remption. Cette derniare a le caractare de la prescription, et la prescription peut arriver h son terme un jou1r-firi6. Dechine v. La Citg de Montrial ; La Banque de Montrial v. Rancourt et al. ; Anctil v. Desch~nes'. Une autre pr6tention de 1'appelante est qu'elle avait trois jours apris la date oi les factums devaient 6tre produits pour inscrire la cause devant la Cour du banc de la reine, et qu'en cons6quence, il fallait computer ces trois jours additionnels avant que la p6remption ne puisse 6tre acquise. L'argument est ing6nieux mais ill6gal. En effet, 'article 1223 C.P.C. (2) (iii) en dispose facilement et il se lit ainsi:
II fallait done que 'appelante eat produit son m6moire pour b6n6ficier de cette disposition de la loi. Comme cette formalit6 n'a pas 6t6 remplie, il 6tait interdit A l'appelante de signifier et produire une inscription qui lui aurait permis de procider ex parte.
Enfin, I'appelante invoque une irregularit6 qui appert au certificat du d6put6-greffier des appels sur la demande principale. Ce certificat en effet constate que le dossier conjoint a 6t6 produit le 22 aoit 1956, et il porte lui-mime la date du 8 septembre 1956. Si on compare ce certificat avec celui de la demande reconventionnelle en date du 8 septembre 1958, et avec les autres piices de procedure au dossier, y compris les certificats officiels du d6put6-greffier de la Cour du bane de la reine qui constatent la date oii ils ont 6t6 obtenus, il faut n6cessairement, avec la Cour du bane de la reine, conclure qu'il s'agit en 1'espice d'une erreur cl6ricale qui ne vicie pas la proc6dure qui a 6t6 faite.
Pour ces raisons, je suis d'opinion que les deux appels doivent 6tre rejetis avec d6pens.
Appeals dismissed with costs. Attorneys for the plaintiff, appellant: Rappaport & Whelan, Montreal.
Attorneys for the defendant, respondent: Lacoste & Lacoste, Montreal.
ROY McMONAGLE (Plaintiff) .......... LA SOCIETE DE REHABILITATION
INCORPOREE ERNEST FRE- DETTE (Defendants) ..............
A car driven by the plaintiff and one driven by the defendant F collided on a straight stretch of road. After the collision, the plaintiff's car was resting on the right shoulder of the road, and the car driven by F was on the wrong side, directly across the path of the plaintiff's. The driver F claimed that the accident happened as the result of a sudden emergency created by the plaintiff who was attempting to overtake a truck. The trial judge maintained the action, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal relying on a statement made by the plaintiff that he might have been trying to overtake a truck.
Held: The appeal should be allowed and the action maintained. In view of the contradictory evidence given by the parties, the Court should look at the more objective witnesses to obtain a picture of what happened. The driver of the truck in question and a police constable had both testified that it was the car driven by the defendant F which was swerving out of control.
The defendants had the burden of proving that there existed a sudden emergency which caused F to swerve, and this they failed to do. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec', reversing a judgment of Cliche J. Appeal allowed.
P. de Grandprg, Q.C., for the plaintiff, appellant. G. Emery, for the defendants, respondents.

Judgment of the Court

TASCHEREAU J.:-Le demandeur-appelant r6clame des d6fendeurs-intim6s la somme de $5,000. II all~gue dans son action que le 12 octobre 1949, il a t6 la victime d'un accident d'automobile dont les d6fendeurs doivent 6tre tenus conjointement et solidairement responsables. La Soci6t6 de Rhabilitation est propridtaire de la voiture qui l'aurait frapp6. Elle 6tait conduite par l'autre d6fendeur, Ernest Fredette, son employ6, alors dans l'exercice de ses fonctions. M. le Juge Cliche a maintenu cette r6clamation pour un montant de $2,882.40 avec int6rits et d6pens, mais la Cour du banc de la reine' en est arriv6e h une conclusion diff6rente et a maintenu l'appel et rejet6 1'action.
L'appelant conduisait sa voiture, dans laquelle il 6tait seul, dans une direction nord-sud sur la route de Windsor- Mills a Sherbrooke, et 1'intim6 Fredette, accompagn6 du R6v6rend Perreault qui fut tu6 au cours de l'accident, se dirigeait en sens inverse. Ce jour 1h il pleuvait, mais personne ne se plaint de la visibilit6. La route, sur une longueur 1[1956] Q.B. 631.
de 1,200 pieds, 6tait droite et non accident6e, mais h chaque extr6mit6 de cette distance se trouvait une courbe. L'accident se serait produit h moiti6 chemin de ces deux Sock courbes alors que les deux voitures filaient h environ
40 milles h 1'heure, sur une route asphaltie d'une largeur de 22 pieds.

J. Le v6hicule du demandeur-appelant, se dirigeant vers

Sherbrooke, 6tait pr6c6d6 d'un camion conduit par Henri
Paul Bourgeois, et h c6t6 de qui avait pris place un nomm6
Vadnais. La preuve r6vile que le v6hicule des intim6s, qui venait en sens inverse du camion, 6tait la seule voiture sur la route que le conducteur du camion pouvait voir.
Bourgeois, corrobor6 par Vadnais, dit dans son t6moignage qu'h deux ou trois cents pieds en avant de lui la voiture des intim6s "a gliss6 sur l'asphalte et s'en venait de biais". Elle a recontr6 le camion toujours en gardant cette mime position, et quelques instants apris,
Bourgeois a entendu le choc de la collision avec la voiture de l'appelant, qui venait en arribre de lui. Au mme moment, Bourgeois a regard6 en arribre par la fenitre de son camion, et a vu ce qui venait de se passer.
La preuve rivble en outre que la voiture de l'appelant roulait du c6t6 droit de la route, et c'est 6videmment la voiture des intim6s qui, apris avoir rencontr6 le camion, a continu6 h filer "de biais" sur la route et s'est dirig6e du c6t6 gauche pour ensuite frapper la voiture de l'appelant.
L'officier de la Sfret6 provinciale qui s'est rendu sur les lieux assure que le v6hicule de 1'appelant, apr&s 1'accident, reposait sur le c6t6 droit de la route, pris du foss6, et que celui des intim6s 6tait "de travers dans le chemin". Sa roue de droite avant touchait la ligne centrale de la route, et l'arribre 6tait pr~s de 1'accotement, du c6t6 oi' se trouvait
1'auto de 'appelant.
C'est le c~t6 gauche avant de la voiture de l'appelant qui fut bris6, et le c6t6 droit avant de celle des intim6s. Ce sont les faits que le juge au proces a retenus, et il a raisonnablement conclu que 1'accident 6tait arriv6 du c6t6 droit de la route, c'est-h-dire du c6t .sur lequel filait la voiture de l'appelant, et que c'est le conducteur de la voiture des intim6s qui, apris avoir rencontr6 le camion, et apr&s qu'il l'eit d6pass6, est venu frapper l'autre v6hicule.

Statutes and regulations cited