Eastern Metals Corporation v. Proteau

La Cour du bano de la reine a cependant conclu de fagon diff6rente, et elle appuie son jugement sur les consid~rants suivants:

Consid6rant que la cause d6terminante de cet accident riside dans le fait que l'intim6, de son propre aveu, a tent6 de doubler, dans une c6te, Taschereau J.un camion, alors que la voiture de l'appelante venant en sens inverse, procidait A la descente de cette c6te;

Considdrant qu'en agissant ainsi 1'intim6 a transgress6 la loi et a m6connu les rbgles les plus 616mentaires de la prudence;

Et dans ses raisons 6crites, que les autres membres du tribunal ont approuvies, M. le Juge Bissonnette cite 1'extrait suivant du t6moignage de 1'appelant A l'enquite du coroner: Did you declare at the Coroner's Inquest that there was a truck on the scene of the accident prior to the accident, when you were examined at the Coroner's Inquest?

I believe I did at that time.

Is it not a fact at that time you told the Coroner that the truck was proceeding in the opposite direction, in front of the car in which Simon Perreault was in?

Do I just have to answer or not?

Did you or did you not?

Yes.

Did you also declare, Mr. McMonagle, that the first time you noticed the car with which you collided, was when swerving from behind that truck?

Yes.

You declared that at the Coroner's Inquest?

That's right.

Et il conclut ainsi:

Ces aveux de l'intim6 corroborent nettement la version donne par I'appelant Fredette, de sorte que toute la preuve ne se concilie qu'avec une seule conclusion h I'effet que c'est le geste imprudent de l'intim6 qui a 6t6 la cause d6terminante et unique de I'accident.

Voyant sa route interceptie dans une c8te qu'il descendait, 1'appelant, devant I'imminence du danger, n'avait alors que la ressource de ses freins. Vu sa tris faible allure, on ne peut lui imputer faute.

Il y a ici, je crois, erreur sur la topographie des lieux. En effet, de l'avis de tous les t6moins entendus sur ce point, I'accident s'est produit sur un terrain plat, et s'il se pr6sentait h l'une des extr6mit6s de cette route droite sur une distance de 1,200 pieds, une pente 16gire, ce n'est pas lh que s'est produit l'accident, mais bien k 600 pieds plus loin. C'est d'ailleurs ce que nous disent 1'appelant McMonagle, l'intim6 Fredette lui-mime, et Bergeron

'officier de circula tion.

De plus, je ne crois pas que ce t6moignage de McMonagle, donn6 h 1'enquite du coroner, corrobore la version de Fredette; je crois plut~t que les deux sont contradictoires. C'est une partie isol6e du timoignage de McMonagle qui a INC. 6t6 retenue, et qu'il faut n6cessairement concilier avec toutTaschau J cc qu'il a dit au prochs et hors de Cour. Dans son t6moignage regu hors de Cour, du consentement des parties, McMonagle explique qu'apris avoir t6moign6 h l'enquite du coroner, il est retourn6 sur les lieux de 1'accident, et il s'est rendu compte qu'il n'6tait pas exact que le char de Fredette ait tent6 de d6passer un autre camion, et mime qu'il n'y avait pas d'autre camion en avant de Fredette. Voici comment il s'exprime:

Q. You presumed, after the accident, that that truck was there?- A. After going back, after the accident, I would say 'yes'.

Q. How long after the accident did you go back over there?-A. That was two weeks after the inquest; at least two weeks, maybe longer; maybe longer than that.

Q. At the time-in the few seconds that preceded the accidentwere you presuming there was a truck, or were you seeing it?-A. I think I said that when I went back over the scene of the accident. I mentioned that before. The way you're putting the question- Q. What I would like to know is whether, at the time, in the seconds that preceded the accident, whether you personally saw that there was a truck going in the same direction as the car with which you had an accident?-A. Right today, I would say 'no', I didn't see any car. I said that before. I didn't see any; After going back over the scene of the accident. Isn't that clear?

Q. So that I understand that on the scene of the accident, the other car didn't try, according to you, to pass a truck?-A. That's right.

Et ailleurs, il explique de la fagon suivante comment l'accident est arriv6:

Q. You mean that when you first saw the other car, it was on the same side of the road as you were?-A. He was on my left.

Q. On his right?-A. His right.

Q. Each on his side?-A. Yes.

Q. What happened, afterwards?-A. Well, when I saw the car, he was swerving just like a car on an icy road; the back was swinging; you know how they go. And, I saw, I figured there was a lot-that he had control of it; he came up the crest of the hill, into the turn at that far end, it was like a kind of double-like a 'U' or half-circle, almost. I saw it; I gave him plenty of rooom; I figured he had plenty of room, if he kept control of it which, it looked as if he had. I kept edging as far as I could on my right side, and very suddenly, just like a shot of a gun almost, the car swerved directly across in front of me. At the time of impact, my car was off the pavement, the right hand side-the right wheels were off the pavement.

On voit done qu'h 1'enquite du coroner, McMonagle pr6- Taschereau J tend qu'un camion pr6c6dait Fredette, et dans son t6moignage hors de 'Cour i1 dit qu'il n'y en avait pas, mais nulle part peut-on tirer de ce timoignage qu'il admet avoir luimime voulu d6passer un camion qui se trouvait en avant de lui, et que ce geste imprudent a t6 la cause d6terminante et unique de l'accident. Mais, h tout 6v6nement, ces t6moignages ne sont pas satisfaisants, car il est bien clair dans la preuve que le camion pric6dait la voiture de 1'appelant.

Je ne vois pas que ces deux t6moignages de McMonagle corroborent de quelque fagon que ce soit le t6moignage de l'intim6 qui conte une histoire entibrement diffirente. Selon lui, la collision aurait eu lieu apris que l'appelant eut d6pass6 le camion qui le pr6c6dait, et voici ce qu'il dit h ce sujet h 1'enquite du coroner:

Q. quel endroit de la route avez-vous frapp6 l'auto, chauffeur qui s'en venait; sur quel c6t6?-R. Je 1'ai frapp6 A ma gauche. Q. De son c6t6 A lui?-R. Oui.

Q. Etes-vous certain que le char qui s'en venait a eu temps de d~passer la camion avant que vous ]'ayez frapp6?-R. Oui.

Est-ce que le char qui s'en venait 6tait de son c6t6?-R. Pas directement quand on l'a frapp6, il venait pour prendre sa place. II avait eu le temps de d~passer; il n'avait pas pris sa place directement, entibrement.

Entendu hors de Cour, au procks, il donne une version diff~rente a la question suivante:

Q. Est-ce que vous nous dites que 1'accident est arriv6 en avant ou en arribre du camion dont vous nous avez parl6 tantit?

Il r6pond:

R. Cela, je ne le sais pas, monsieur, je ne peux pas l'assermenter, je ne sais pas si c'est arriv6 en avant ou en arribre.

Le juge. au proces a done eu raison de dire dans son jugement:

Consid~rant que le d~fendeur Fredette ne peut pas se rappeler si l'accident est survenu avant ou aprbs qu'il eut rencontr6 le camion de Bourgeois et que son timoignage A 1'enquite quant A la tentative qu'aurait faite demandeur de d6passer sur la gauche le camion de Bourgeois n'a en consiquence que trhs peu de valeur.

Evidemment, il y a confusion, et je crois, devant ces contradictions, que c'est vers des timoins plus calmes, plus objectifs et moins surexcit6s par l'imminence d'une collision, qu'il faut se tourner pour voir 1'image v6ritable de ce qui s'est produit. Je n'entretiens aucun doute que 1'accident est arrive 1'arribre du camion, h la droite de la route ou sea u trouvait 1'appelant, qui conduisait h une vitesse raisonnable, presque sur l'accotement du c~t6 oit la loi exige qu'il se tienne. Bourgeois et Valdais t6moigent positivement en ce sens, et ils sont corrobor6s par l'officier de la circulation, qui

6tait sur les lieux quelque 15 minutes plus tard et qui jure positivement que le v6hicule de l'appelant circulait sur la droite de la route, car il en a v6rifi6 les traces. Voici son t6moignage:

Les t6moignages de Bourgeois, Valdais et Bergeron contredisent donc compl6tement la pr6tention des intimbs h l'effet que, parce que 1'appelant aurait tent6 de d6passer le camion qui le pr6c6dait, 1'appelant aurait une situation d'urgence, un "sudden emergency", et que dans l'agonie de la collision, Fredette a tourn6 vers la gauche, afin de

1'6viter. Les intim6s avaient le fardeau de prouver cette

"agonie de la collision", ce dernier effort qu'ils auraient tent6 pour 6viter l'accident. Ils en avaient le fardeau, et ils ont totalement failli de 1'6tablir. Tous les timoins entendus sur cet aspect de la cause le contredisent. Je crois donc que cet accident est. uniquement imputable h, la conduite inhabile de Fredette qui, sur un pav6 glissant, a perdu le contr6le de sa voiture et est venu sur le mauvais c~t6 de la route frapper celle de l'appelant, qui proc6dait sa droite derridre le canion de Bourgeois.

Cette Cour n'est pas g6ndralement dans l'obligation d'analyser toute la preuve dans une cause de ce genre. Mais, comme il existe un conflit entre la Cour sup~rieure et la

FROBISHER LIMITED (Plaintiff) ........ APPELLANT; AND

*Feb. 2,3,

4,5

CANADIAN PIPELINES & PETROLEUMS LIMITED, Dec.14

LAWRENCE C. MORRISROE, E. GEORGE MESCHI, A. OAK, A. AMREN, S. DAIGLE, JOCK MACKINNON AND D. J. SHERIDAN (Defendants) . .. RESPONDENTS. ON APPEAL FROM THE OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Real property-Mines and Minerals-Option to purchase mineral claims- Second option given to different company-Specific performance of first option sought-Whether option created equitable interest in land- Failure of optionee to comply with statutory requirement to hold licence-Pleadings-Amendments at trial-Regulations 8(1), 9(1), 124 of the Mineral Resources Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 47.

On June 25, 1955, the plaintiff, through its agent H, took an option to purchase certain mining claims from four prospectors. The option provided that it should remain open to June 30, and set out the terms of purchase involving the transfer of the claims on or as close as possible to June 30 whereupon a certain sum would be paid; a further sum to be paid in stated instalments and the formation of a new company in which the vendors would receive per cent. of the authorized stock. On June 29, the prospectors gave an option to purchase the same claims to the defendant P Co., which not only took with notice of the first option but actively induced the breach of it. The plaintiff sued P Co. and the four prospectors for specific performance and an injunction against any dealings with the claims by the defendants.

Towards the end of the trial, the defendants moved to amend by pleading regulations 8 and 9 of the Regulations made under the Mineral Resources Act, providing that no mining company shall be granted a licence unless it is registered under the Companies Act and that no person or company, not a holder of a licence, shall prospect for minerals, stake out or record any location or "acquire by transfer, Locke, Cartwright, Abbott, Martland and Judson JJ. assignment or otherwise howsoever, any mineral claim or any right or interest therein". The trial judge refused leave to amend and - FROBISHER gave judgment for the plaintiff. The majority in the Court of Appeal ruled that the amendment should have been allowed and ordered a new trial restricted to the issue raised by the amendment. In all other respects the appeal was dismissed.

PETLEUIS The plaintiff appealed to this Court and two of the prospectors crossappealed. The plaintiff admitted before this Court that its agent H had no licence until July 27, 1955; that the plaintiff did not register under the Companies Act until March 9, 1956, and that it acquired its Miner's licence on March 1956. Counsel all agreed that this admission should be regarded as evidence given before this Court under s. 67 of the Supreme Court Act.

Held (Locke and Martland JJ. dissenting): The appeal and the crossappeals should be dismissed. The action must also be dismissed. Per Curiam: The Court of Appeal exercised its discretion rightly in permitting the defendants to amend their defence so as to plead regulations 8(1) and 9(1).

Per Locke, Abbott, Martland and Judson JJ.: There was no necessity to decide as to the validity of regulation 124, providing compensation for the wrongful registration of a caveat, since it was clearly shown that no damage arose from the registration of the caveat and that the filing of it was completely justified under the circumstances. Per Cartwright, Abbott and Judson JJ.: No valid distinction could be drawn between the position of the plaintiff during the period from June 25 to June 30 and what would have been its position if the first payment had been made. The option created an equitable interest in the claims and was rendered void because it was given and taken against the express prohibition contained in regulation 9(1). Londol, and South Western Railway v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, followed.

The plaintiff's case was not assisted by the fact that the claims were to be transferred not the plaintiff but to a company to be incorporated. Its legal position was the same whether the transfer was made direct to the new company or to the plaintiff and from the latter to the new company.

The analogy which the plaintiff sought to draw with the cases dealing with the rule against perpetuities did not lead to the suggested result that the contract could still be enforced as a personal obligation. The case at bar was not concerned with that rule. Whether or not the contract, on the true construction of regulation 9, was forbidden, depended upon the rights which it conferred. By the contract, specific performance of which the plaintiff was seeking as construed by the trial judge, the plaintiff, during the currency of the option, acquired the exclusive right to enter upon, drill and explore the claims and the right to compel the conveyance of the claims upon completion of the option payments. The plaintiff, therefore, acquired a right or interest in the claims.

Per Abbott and Judson JJ.: The position of the optionee under the agreement was the same throughout all its stages; the plaintiff obtained an irrevocable offer for certain stipulated periods on payment of certain stipulated sums. The payments, if completed, constituted the purchase price and all that then would remain to be done was to form the new company, transfer the claims and allot to the prospectors per cent. of the stock.

80666-1-41

An option to purchase land creates an equitable interest because it is F specifically enforceable. There is a right to have the option held open and this is similar to the right that arises when a purchaser under a firm contract may call for a conveyance. In both cases there is an equitable interest but in the case of the option it is a contingent one, LINESS& the contingency being the election to exercise the option. Judicial reexamination from time to time since the case of London and South Western Railway v. Gomm, supra, has resulted only in an affirmation of the rule that an option holder has an equitable interest. An interest in these claims having been acquired, the agreement was void and of no effect because it was given and taken against the express prohibition contained in regulation 9.

Regulation 124, if valid, has no application when there is a bona fide dispute; registration of a caveat "wrongfully and without reasonable cause" means something in the nature of an officious intermeddling without any colour of right.

Per Locke J., dissenting: Assuming that on the authority of the Gomm case an option to purchase land vests in the optionee an equitable interest in the land in respect of which the option is granted when the land is to be transferred to the optionee, the case at bar was distinguishable in that the claims here were to be transferred not to the optionee but to a company to be incorporated. Consequently, the optionee in this case acquired no equitable interest in the claims. Its right was a personal right enforceable in a Court of equity by a decree of specific performance, and as such, was not affected by regulation 9. Per Martland J., dissenting: The Gomm case was not to be considered as laying down, as a general proposition of law, that any option relating to land of necessity vests in the optionee, forthwith upon the granting of it, an interest in land. The word "option" was not a term of art; its meaning depended upon the context. Here, the option did not confer upon its exercise a right to the optionee to call for a conveyance of the title to the claims. Therefore, even on the reasoning of the Gomm case, the optionee did not acquire an equitable property interest in the claims.

An option for the purchase of land creates contractual rights and, accepting the reasoning in the Gomm case, its effect may be to create also a contingent limitation of land which may take effect in the future. If that limitation was rendered void by regulation 9, the contractual right remained. Consequently, the option in the case at bar was not rendered void by the regulation, and specific performance could be granted even though no interest in land was created.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan', granting leave to amend the defence, ordering a new trial restricted to the issue raised by the amendment and otherwise affirming the judgment at trial. Appeal dismissed and action dismissed on admitted facts, Locke and Martland JJ. dissenting.

1 D.L.R. (2d) W.W.R.

:-This is an action for specific performance and the plaintiff is the appellant.

The agreement sought to be enforced was signed at Uranium City, Saskatchewan, and reads as follows:

Date-25th day of June, 1955. We, the undersigned, the sole owners of mineral claims-EO-1 to 16 Missing Link 1 to 9 incl.

IO-1 to 12 incl.

In all 37 claims contiguous, Located on or near Stewart Island, Lake, Athabasca, Province of Saskatchewan, Canada-do hereby grant to James A. Harquail, Mining Engineer-Suite 2810, 25 King St. West, Toronto, Ontario-in consideration of the sum of $1.00 (one dollar), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, an option effective to 12 noon- June 30, 1955-to purchase said mineral claims from the undersigned under the terms of the following deal:

On receiving transfers to above claims in good order-on, or as close as possible to June 30, 1955--said transfers to be turned over to Uranium City Bank of Commerce branch at which time sum of $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) will be issued to MacKinnon and partners. (Vendors).

New company to be formed in which vendors will receive 10% (ten per cent) of authorized stock.

Firm cash. Option Payments

1st option-Nov. 1, ....................

$ 2nd option-March 1, ................

3rd option-Nov. 1, ..................

4th option-July 1, ..................

The above agreement shall be binding on the executors, heirs, etc. of the people signing.

"Albin Amren"

Daigle"

"Jock MacKinnon"

Witness to above four signatures.

Signed in the Settlement of Uranium City, Saskatchewan.