The respondent was convicted of unlawfully conveiting to her own use a sum of money, the property of a municipal corporation of which she was the treasurer and tax collector, and thereby stealing the same. The respondent admitted taking cash from the parking meter collections and depositing cheques due to the municipality from third persons in the parking meter bank account in order to balance that account and finally destroying the records of the transactions with these third persons. Her defence was .that she gave the money to the mayor of the municipality in the honest belief that he had authority to receive the same and that she took no money for herself. The mayor gave evidence for the defence and testified that he had been authorized by council to receive up to $2,600 per year in addition to his salary for charitable purposes. Nine cheques were used in this way. The accused admitted that all of these cheques, with the exception of the Beaudry cheque and the Noel cheque, were bona fide cheques payable to the municipality and should have been credited to other accounts and that these other accounts were falsified. As to the Beaudry cheque, the respondent denied having any knowledge of this transaction. Beaudry himself said that this cheque was for the purchase of a lot and that he had received a conveyance. As to the Nol cheque which was certified, the mayor said that Noal cashed this cheque with the municipality to meet a payroll; the accused said that she understood from the mayor that Noel was cashing the cheque to raise money in a hurry for a holiday in Florida; and Noil said that it was paid to the municipality as a deposit for services to be rendered to his company by the municipality. The Court of Appeal found non-direction as to these last mentioned cheques and ordered a new trial. The Crown was granted leave to appeal to this Court on the question as to whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the trial judge misdirected the jury as to the theory of the defence.
Held (Cartwright, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the conviction restored.
Per Taschereau C.J. and Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ.: As to the Beaudry cheque, the jury had the accused's explanation that she knew nothing about this particular item. They did not believe her. This aspect of the charge was adequate.
Taschereau C.J. and Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall and Spence JJ.
As to the Noil cheque, the jury were entitled to consider all the circum- QE stances-the concealment, the falsification of books, the whole operation of the parking meter account for improper purposes and the fact that this was a certified cheque. There could be no possibility of confusion or lack of understanding on the part of the jury. The brevity of the judge's reference to this cheque had not and could not have had the slightest effect in bringing about any lack of appreciation of the issues or the evidence in the minds of the jury. They could come to no conclusion other than the one that they did, namely, that there could be no honesty or honest opinion of right in these transactions. This appeal raised a question of law.
The accused did convert the money to her own use and the judge's instruction on this point was correct.
Per Cartwright and Hall JJ., dissenting: The Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The question on which leave to appeal was granted was one of law and all of the grounds on which the Court of Appeal held that the conviction should be quashed were grounds the validity of which depended upon the answers given by that Court to questions of law.
The charge of the trial judge in regard to the evidence relating to the Beaudry cheque and that relating to the Noiil cheque was insufficient. Since the trial judge instructed the jury that they should convict if satisfied that she had stolen the money represented by any one of the nine cheques, an Appellate Court could not know that the verdict was not based solely on the view that the guilt had been established as to the moneys represented by one or part of these two cheques. There was also misdirection when the trial judge directed the jury that they could convict if they found that the accused converted the money in question to the use of the mayor since such a conversion would not be within the scope of the charge as laid. Parliament has seen fit to treat conversion to an accused's own use and conversion by an accused to the use of another person as two alternative modes of committing the offence of theft by conversion. Subject to the making of an amendment, the prosecution was bound by the description of the offence contained in the indictment. On the charge of the trial judge read in the light of the evidence, it was open to the jury to find that she handed to the mayor some or all of the moneys covered by the nine cheques, that she made use of none of these moneys for herself, but that she had no belief that the mayor had any colour of right to the moneys so taken. On these findings, it would not have been open to them to convict her of converting the moneys to her own use. Per Spence J., dissenting: The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give to the jury the evidence as to the defence in a sufficient character to permit them to consider that defence. It has been held in this Court as a matter of law that the trial judge must review the substantial parts of the evidence and give to the jury the theory of the defence. There was therefore an appeal to this Court under the provisions of s. 598(1)(b) of the Code.
The ground relied upon by the Court of Appeal, namely, that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that they could only acquit the accused if they found that she believed she was under a legal compulsion to obey the mayor's orders, whereas it was sufficient if she honestly believed she was justified in following his orders even though she was not bound to do so, was not well taken. The trial judge pre- R.C..
. sented to the jury the defence as it was made and then added that even if on the facts what was shown was a position weaker than belief H in obligation and merely was belief in justification, it would, if established, have been a sound defence.
But the ground relied upon by the Court of Appeal that the trial judge while he put the theory of the defence to the jury did not discuss the evidence relating to that theory in a sufficiently comprehensive way, particularly in relation to the Beaudry and Noifl transactions, was well taken. In the light of the circumstances, it would seem that the trial judge was required to outline the evidence adduced by the defence upon these two transactions in some particularity. Failure to do so would, in essence, be failure to put to the jury the defence of the accused. Yet the reference to these two transactions was regrettably brief. This constituted non-direction amounting to misdirection and a new trial should be had.
The instruction by the trial judge on the form of the indictment that the accused could have been convicted had it been proved that she converted to her own use any sum was a proper instruction. When the accused took the funds she converted them to her use despite the fact that her use of them was to deliver them to the mayor.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario', setting aside the conviction of the respondent and directing a new trial on the ground of non-direction. Appeal allowed, Cartwright, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting. R. P. Milligan, Q.C., for the appellant.
G. A. Martin, Q.C.,.and B. Carter, for the respondent. JUDSON J.:-The Crown appeals with leave of the Court from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario' which set aside the conviction of the accused and directed a new trial on the ground of non-direction. The Crown contends on this appeal that the verdict of the jury should be restored and that the judge's charge was adequate.
The accused was convicted on the following indictment: That Adrienne Laroche did, between the 17th day of September, 1956 and the 17th day of May, 1960, at the Town of Eastview, in the County of Carleton, unlawfully convert to her own use money to the amount of $10,790.52, the property of the Municipal Corporation of the Town of Eastview and did thereby steal the same, contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.
In spite of the fact that the trial lasted two weeks, the issues in the case were simple. The accused was charged 1 C.C.C. C.R.
with taking money from the parking meter collections of the Town of Eastview. Periodically, the meters were emptied, the small coins counted and taken to the bank. J. Instead of being deposited in the proper account, the coins were converted into paper currency and brought back to the Treasurer's Department of the Town of Eastview and kept there. From time to time the Treasurer took money from this account and the total alleged to be missing is the amount mentioned in the indictment, $10,790.52.
This shortage had to be concealed in some way if the auditors were not to become aware of what was going on. The method adopted was to take a bona fide cheque payable to the Town of Eastview and put it in the parking meter collection account and deposit it in the bank. The parking meter account, therefore, showed no shortage. The account in the books of the town to which the bona fide cheque should have been credited was falsified or destroyed. Nine cheques were used in this way. They are as follows:
........
........
........................
..............
..............
................
......................
......................
The accused admitted that all of these cheques, with the exception of item No. (3), the Beaudry cheque, and item No. (6), the Notl cheque, were bona fide cheques payable to the Town of Eastview and should have been credited to other accounts and that these other accounts were falsified. There was some question about the Beaudry and NoRl cheques and I will deal with the evidence on this later. The accused commenced her employment with the Town of Eastview in the year 1947 as a clerk in the Treasurer's Department. In 1951, she was appointed Treasurer and Tax Collector and held this office until December 29, 1960. The accused admitted that she took cash from the parking meter collections and deposited cheques due to the municipality from third persons in the municipal bank account in order to balance the accounts, and she admitted that she destroyed the records of the transactions with the third persons. Her excuse was that she gave the money to the Mayor of the municipality in the honest belief that he had authority to THE receive the money and that she took no money for herself. Lavergne, the Mayor of the municipality, gave evidence Judsom J. for the defence. He was also a member of the Legislature of the Province of Ontario. He said that in 1955 and 1956 the municipal council wished to raise his salary to $5,000 from $2,400 but that he declined the increase because of the extra income tax that he would have to pay. He said that he made an informal arrangement with the council that he could draw in cash up to $2,600 a year to give to the poor and needy. He said that he did not exceed in any one year the total of $2,600 so authorized to be paid to him and that he used the money for the purposes stated. He did not keep any records of the amounts he received and Mrs. Laroche did not keep any records of the amounts that she gave to him. This outrageous defence, coming as it did from two public officials of long experience, was put to the jury by counsel for the accused and by the judge. It was put to the jury by the judge with gravity and respect, without criticism and without commendation. This is the way counsel for the accused put it to the jury:
If Mrs. Laroche had an honest belief that what Lavergne told her to do was all right, that she could do it, and that he had power and authority to order it, and she believed that he had such power and authority to order it, then what she did in allowing him to take money and what she did in not entering up these records as they should have been entered up, in a proper accounting system, in my respectful submission, is not a crime . . . whether Lavergne takes the money out of the box, or whether he tells her to take it out and give it to him, is immaterial in my respectful submission. If she honestly believed that Lavergne had the right, Council had said it is all right, charge it to whatever Department has the money. This is the way the judge put it to the jury by way of summary after full discussion:
Now here the theory of the defence as I understand it is that the accused honestly thought she was obliged to take this money as Lavergne had asked or ordered her to, because he was the Mayor, and had told her the Council had authorized him to have the money. Now if you believe her, or if you have a reasonable doubt in the matter, then you must acquit her, because she had not the fraudulent intent to steal.
I now turn to the two items on which the Court of Appeal found non-direction. The first is item No. (3) on the above list-the Beaudry cheque. Beaudry said that he gave his cheque payable to the town for the purchase of a lot and [1964]671 that he received a conveyance. The respondent denied hav- TE ing any knowledge of this transaction but the fact is that the Beaudry cheque, a bona fide cheque payable to the Js town, got into the parking meter collection account under her charge and was used at some date after April 25, 1958, to cover up the taking of the sum of $1,000. This was plain to the jury. They had her explanation that she knew nothing about this particular item. They did not believe her. This is what the judge said about the Beaudry cheque: I think that aspect of the charge was adequate.
The second of the two disputed items is No. (6) on the above list, the cheque of L. W. Nol Limited. This company was in the construction business. The cheque was a certified cheque for $2,000 payable to the Town of Eastview and Noel said that it was paid to the town as a deposit for services to be rendered to his company by the town for the installation of sewer pipes and water mains. Lavergne said that Noel cashed this cheque with the town to meet a payroll. Mrs. Laroche said that she understood from Lavergne that Noil was cashing the cheque to raise money for a holiday in Florida and that he wanted the money in a hurry. These are the three explanations of the use of the Noel cheque referred to in the judge's charge, and they could not fail to be clear in the minds of the jury.
This is what the judge said:
Noel was called as the last witness in reply by the Crown. He had by this time, of course, heard the explanations that he was cashing a cheque for a pay-roll or for a trip to Florida. He denied that he had ever cashed a cheque with the municipality and was again cross-examined at length, much of it repetition of what he had gone through before. The next day the case went to the jury. The $2,000 cheque was fully dealt with by counsel for the accused and he put it to them that the cheque was cashed. Counsel for the Crown put it to them that it was for a building permit and that whatever the purpose was, it was payable to the Town of Eastview and had nothing to do with the parking meter account and that the only purpose of getting it into that account was to cover up a defalcation of $2,000. The jury heard all this evidence, argument and instruction from the judge. They were entitled to consider all the circumstances-the concealment, the falsification of books, the whole operation of the parking meter account for improper purposes, and finally, the fact that this was a certified cheque that all the discussion was about. Why have a cheque certified in the afternoon if you are going to need cash? Why not get the cash instead of having the cheque certified?
I cannot see any possibility of confusion or lack of understanding on the part of the jury. I have already said that in my opinion, the issues were plain. The jury knew what these issues were and were in a position to form an opinion on the credibility of the two witnesses I have mentioned. The brevity of the judge's reference to the $2,000 cheque had not and could not have had the slightest effect in bringing about any lack of appreciation of the issues or the evidence in the minds of the jury. In my opinion they could come to no conclusion other than the one that they did, namely, that there could be no honesty or honest opinion of right in these transactions.
I would allow the appeal and restore the verdict of the jury and the sentence of the Court.
I agree with the reasons of Spence J.
(a) that this appeal raises a question of law,
(b) that the accused did convert the monies to her own use and that the judge's instruction on this point was correct.
J. (dissenting):-The course of the trial and the questions raised on this appeal are stated in the reasons of other members of the Court.
I agree with what I understand to be the opinion of all the other members of the Court that the question on which leave to appeal was granted is one of law, that all of the grounds on which the Court of Appeal' held that the conviction should be quashed were grounds the validity of which depended upon the answers given by that Court to questions of law and that, consequently, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
For the reasons given by my brother Spence and those given by McLennan J.A. I agree with their conclusion that the charge of the learned trial judge in regard to the evidence relating to the Beaudry cheque and that relating to the cheque was insufficient. This defect assumes added importance by reason of the fact that the learned trial judge had, in effect, instructed the jury that they should convict the respondent if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she had stolen the money represented by any one of the nine cheques listed in the reasons of my brother Spence. An appellate Court cannot know that the verdict of the jury was not based solely on the view that the guilt of the accused had been established as to the moneys represented by one or both of these two cheques.
My agreement on this point renders it unnecessary for me to examine the other grounds of law which were raised in the Court of Appeal and on which counsel for the respondent relies. I wish, however, to deal with the one which was stated as follows in the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal:
The charge on which the accused was indicted and tried was as follows:
The relevant words of s. 269(1) of the Criminal Code defining the offence with which the respondent was charged are as follows:
The corresponding words of the Criminal Code prior to the coming into force of the present code were the following, in s. 347:
In the present code Parliament has seen fit to treat (i) conversion to an accused's own use, and (ii) conversion by an accused to the use of another person, as two alternative modes of committing the offence of theft by conversion. The prosecution could, if so minded, have charged the respondent in the words of s. 269; in which case the defence might well have moved for particulars. However, when the prosecution sees fit to particularize in the indictment itself it is, subject to the making of an amendment in a proper case, bound by the description of the offence contained in the indictment.
On the charge of the learned trial judge read in the light of the evidence it was open to the jury to find, (i) that the respondent handed to Lavergne some or all of the moneys covered by the nine cheques, (ii) that she made use of none of these moneys for herself, but (iii) that she had no belief that Lavergne had any colour of right to the moneys so taken. If, as may be the case, these were the conclusions arrived at by the jury, it would have been their duty to convict the respondent, had she been so charged, with converting the moneys to the use of Lavergne; but it would not, in my opinion, have been open to them to convict her of -converting the moneys to her own use. It may be observed that at no stage of the proceedings did the Crown apply for .any amendment.
In the course of his charge to the jury the learned trial judge said:
For the reasons I have given above on this branch of the matter, I am of opinion that this was misdirection fatal to the validity of the conviction; and on this ground also I would have upheld the order made by the Court of Appeal. I would dismiss the appeal.
J. (dissenting) :-This is an appeal by the Crown from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for the Province of Ontario' directing a new trial of the accused. The appeal is taken by leave of this Court granted on May 6, 1963, and the appeal was permitted upon the following question: Counsel for the accused took the preliminary objection that the Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and directed a new trial upon two separate and independent grounds: (1) that the trial was unsatisfactory because the trial judge, while he put the theory of the defence to the jury, did not discuss the evidence relating to that theory in a sufficiently comprehensive way, and (2) that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that they ought to acquit the accused if the accused, honestly thought that she was obliged to give the money to the mayor and thereby conveyed to the jury the impression that they should acquit only if the accused believed she was under a legal compulsion to obey the mayor's orders, whereas it was sufficient, if she honestly believed that she was justified in following the mayor's orders even though she was not bound to do so. Counsel for the accused submitted that the first of those grounds was a ground of fact and that no appeal lay to this Court upon such ground. Where the provincial court of appeal has allowed an appeal on two grounds and no appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada on one of those grounds, no appeal will be considered with respect to the other of such grounds because the appeal would be devoid of practical results: Ouvrard v. Quebec Paper Box Co. Ltd. and The Queen v. Warner . It is true that in R. v. Cohen and Bateman', the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a mistake of the judge as to the fact or omission to refer to some point in favour of the prisoner is not a wrong decision on any point of law but merely comes within the words "on any grounds" as those words appear in 592(1) (a) (iii) of the Criminal Code, so that the appeal should not be carried beyond the Court of Appeal of Ontario, those words not appearing in s. 598(1) (b) of our Code.
I am of the opinion that it has been held in this Court as a matter of law that the trial judge must review the substantial parts of the evidence and give to the jury the theory of the defence.
The present Chief Justice of this Court, in Azoulay v.
The Queen', said at p. 497:
In the result, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the
Court of King's Bench (Appeal Side) reversed, and a new trial directed.
In Rex. v. Krawchuk , this Court considered an appeal by the Crown from the Court of Appeal of British Columbia quashing a conviction for murder and directing a new trial. In giving judgment dismissing the appeal, Kerwin J., as he then was, said at p. 223:
There is no word in the judgment as to any lack of jurisdiction to consider such a ground in the Supreme Court of
Canada.
In Brooks v. The King, this Court allowed an appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of Ontario which had dismissed an appeal by the
COUR SUPRtME DU CANADA accused from his conviction at trial. At p. 636 of the TE QuEEN judgment, it is said:
LAROcE
Misdirection in a material matter having been shown, the onus was Spence J. upon the Crown to satisfy the Court that the jury, charged as it should S have been charged, could not, as reasonable men, have done otherwise than find the appellant guilty . . That burden the Crown, in the view of the majority of the Court, has not discharged. There was non-direction by the learned trial judge in a vital matter, tantamount in the circumstances of this case to misdirection, and constituting a miscarriage of justice within subs. (1)(c) of s. 1014 of the Criminal Code.
That section is now s. 592(1) (a) and yet the Court considered it.
In Kelsey v. The Queen 1 , leave to appeal was granted the accused upon two questions. Question (a) being, did the learned trial judge err in failing to instruct the jury adequately as to the theory of the defence? Fauteux J. at p. 225 said:
It is suggested that the trial Judge should have commented on:- (h) The lack of any evidence of blood or signs of a struggle in the victim's taxi which serves strongly to contradict the appellant's statement to the police.
And at p. 226, commenting on this suggestion (h), said: In law, the general rule as again stated recently in Azoulay v. The Queen, [19521 2 S.C.R. 495, is that the trial Judge in the course of his charge should review the substantial part of the evidence and give the jury the theory of the defence so that they may appreciate the value and effect of that evidence and how the law is to be applied to the facts as they find them.
Again, there was no reference to any lack of jurisdiction in this Court.
Despite the sentence in the judgment of McLennan J.A. in the Court of Appeal, "I have come to the conclusion that while the trial judge told the jury what the theory of the defence was, he did not discuss the evidence relating to that theory in a sufficiently comprehensive way and that the trial was unsatisfactory.", I have come to the conclusion that what the learned justice in appeal found was the failure of the trial judge to give to the jury the evidence as to the defence in a sufficient character to permit them to consider that defence and that that complaint was a matter of law and that, therefore, there is an appeal to this Court under the provisions of s. 598(1) (b). The Court of Appeal of Ontario considered that such a failure to submit the defence 1 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 220, 16 C.R. 119, 105 C.C.C. 97.
R.C.S.
of the accused to the jury had been established. I shall deal with that question hereafter.
At the present time I turn to the second ground of appeal relied upon in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, namely, Sp that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that they could only acquit the accused if they found that she believed she was under a legal compulsion to obey the mayor's orders, whereas it was sufficient if she honestly believed she was justified in following the mayor's orders even though she was not bound to do so. If the evidence given by the accused and her counsel's address to the jury are carefully perused, it will be demonstrated that her defence was, in fact, that she was told by Lavergne that he was authorized to take these moneys, that she believed he was so authorized (she regarded him as the mayor, or as her "boss") and therefore that she was obliged to obey not merely that she was justified in obeying.
Since that was the defence which the accused submitted ii her evidence and which her counsel emphasized in his address to the jury, it was that defence which the trial judge should have submitted to the jury. The trial judge did so even prefacing this statement with the words, "Now here the theory of the defence is as I understand it . . ." It may well be that the accused could have advanced a sound defence by merely establishing that she honestly believed she was justified in following the mayor's orders even though not bound to do so, and even when that belief was without foundation: Regina v. Bernhard'. The distinction, in my view, is academic as there could be no belief in justification which the accused could imagine except her obligation as a municipal servant to obey the mayor's orders. The trial judge, however, went farther having informed the jury of the defence of her belief in her obligation to obey the mayor's order, he charged them toward the close of his summing up in these words:
Therein, the trial judge stressed that the accused's honest belief that her actions were honest "and what she was doing was alright" was a complete defence. What counsel for the accused sought to do in the Court of Appeal and here was to submit that the trial judge should have presented the accused's defence not as it was made but as it could have J been made. The trial judge presented to the jury the S Jdefence as it was made and then added that even if on the facts what was shown was a position weaker than belief in obligation and merely was belief in justification, it would, if established, have been a sound defence. I am therefore of the opinion that this ground of appeal was not well taken and should not have been accepted by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal also allowed the appeal of the accused on the ground that the trial judge while he put the theory of the defence to the jury did not discuss the evidence relating to that theory in a sufficiently comprehensive way, particularly in relation to the Noil and Beaudry transactions. These transactions were two of the nine as to which evidence was adduced by the Crown to prove the total conversion of $10,790.52. It would seem an accurate summary of the learned trial judge's charge to say that he regarded these two transactions as merely two of the nine and, in fact, he charged the jury very explicitly that even if the accused had not been proved to have converted the $3,000 represented in those two transactions but had been proved to have converted the sums involved in the other transactions, she should be found guilty. This shall be referred to hereafter but at this point we are only concerned with the importance of these two transactions. It must be remembered that the accused swore that she had not used the Beaudry cheque for $1,000 to replace any sum taken from the municipal coffers in order to give it to the mayor, Lavergne, and that she also swore that she merely cashed the $2,000 No6l cheque as a matter of courtesy when requested by the mayor to do so and gave the proceeds to the mayor to deliver them to No8l. Now there was the strongest evidence to throw doubt on the bona fides of the defence story as to either of these transactions and that evidence was referred to forcefully and properly by the trial judge in his charge, but the fact remains that if the defence evidence were true, then neither the amount of $1,000 in the case of Beaudry nor of $2,000 in the case of Noal was filched by the accused from the municipal treasury although both appeared in the deposits to make up the balance in the various accounts. Lavergne, when called as a defence witness, made no estimate at all of the amount received from the accused, and which he swore he used for various philanthropic gifts to citizens of the town, and persisted in this answer despite a very careful cross-examination. About the closest he came to such an estimate was to say that it was over $5,000 and not more than $2,600 per annum, i.e., $10,400.
The accused finally, in cross-examination, gave an estimated total of $6,300 as the amount which she had removed from the treasury upon the mayor's instructions and delivered to the mayor, but this was a most tentative estimate subject to qualification as to her ability to remember. The $6,300 in this estimate seems to be made up as follows: two Millcraft cheques for $906.81 and $923.81; a $1,200 Ottawa Gas cheque which was actually $1,231.05; another cheque which she described as a $900 cheque, i.e., the C. L. Laroche cheque for $977; and another cheque which she described as a $2,400 cheque, i.e., the Laroche cheque for $2,404.65. Those amounts total $6,443.32.
McLennan J.A., giving judgment for the Court of Appeal, set out the nine different cheques which were involved in the charge. Those cheques are as follows:
........
..............
..............
Nol ................
......................
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......................
It will be seen, therefore, that the accused acknowledges the delivery to Lavergne of funds represented by cheques Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 and 9 in that list. The Beaudry and Nobl cheques are Nos. 3 and 6, so this leaves unaccounted for only cheques Nos. 4 and 8, 4 being an Ottawa Gas Company cheque for $347.99, and 8 being a C. L. Laroche cheque for $1,000. It is possible that the accused, in her most inaccurate memory of those cheques which she had used to cover deliveries of cash to Lavergne, forgot those two items. If the accused's story had been believed that neither the Beaudry nor the Noil cheques represented any deduction from the assets of the town, it might have gone far towards supporting, in the minds of the jury, her defence that in all other cases she had acted on the orders of Lavergne and honestly SUPRtME believed she was justified in so doing, or at least it might TaE have raised in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt. If, on the other hand, she was not believed on these two, J the jury might well have felt that she had taken the $3,000 s
Jrepresented in those two cheques for herself personally and not to pass on to Lavergne, and so would have disbelieved her defence that she honestly believed she was under obligation to obey the orders of Lavergne. In the light of this situation, it would seem that the trial judge was required to outline the evidence adduced by the defence upon these two transactions in some particularity. Failure to do so would, in essence, be failure to put to the jury the defence of the accused. Yet the reference of the trial judge to these two transactions is regrettably brief. As to the Beaudry cheque, there is failure to point out the important fact that many persons had access to the drawer in which the cheque was kept and to the receptacles where the money in the various accounts reposed before such money was deposited in the bank, so that others beside the accused could have removed from these receptacles the amount equal to that represented by the cheque and cause the cheque to be placed amongst those to be deposited in the place of the cash. As to the Noil cheque, the brief reference thereto fails to mention the evidence of the accused that it was cashed from funds on hand merely as a courtesty, i.e., that it had been simply the delivery of money to the face value of a certified cheque after bank hours.
It is true, as has been pointed out above, that the evidence of the accused is contrary to much of the evidence proved on behalf of the Crown, and the jury might well have disbelieved the accused but since it was the gist of the defence the jury should have had called to their attention the evidence of the accused upon that theory of the defence, and, of course, quite properly, the evidence contra, so that they could have come to their decision whether the Crown had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. I, therefore, am in agreement with the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge's failure to do so constituted non-direction amounting to mis-direction and that a new trial must be had. That, of course, is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. However, some other grounds argued by counsel for the accused before the Court of Appeal and either not accepted by that Court or not dealt with in the Court of Appeal should be referred to, although briefly.
McLennan J.A., in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal, said:
Counsel for the appellant argued that each of the nine transactions should have been made the subject of a separate count and since they were not the conviction is void for uncertainty because a general verdict on Spence J. the indictment as it stands now does not reveal what amount the jury found that the appellant had stolen. This charge is, however, that the appellant between certain dates stole varying sums, in amounts and at times unknown, to a total sum of $10,790.52. In such a case it is proper to charge a general deficiency: Minchin v. The King, (1914) 23 C.C.C. 414. The proof of the nine transactions was necessary to show the general deficiency and apart from the first Milleraft cheque and the Nobl cheque, if that was a substitution for cash previously taken, there was no relation in time between the takings and the substitutions of the cheques. If the charge had been that of falsifying records under section 340 it would of course have been necessary to set out in a separate count each of the transactions referred to, but that is not this case. The appellant did not apply for particulars before or during the trial under section 497 or to amend or divide the count under section 500. I would not be disposed to quash the conviction on these grounds because in substance the charge is of one continuous act of theft. In any event it is not a rule of law but one of practice that in cases like this the charge should be divided into as many counts as possible: Regina v. Tomlin, (1954) 38 C.A.C. 82. However, if there is a new trial it will be desirable and of assistance in directing the attention of the jury to the issues to be determined by them if either particulars are given under section 497 of the means by which the offence was committed by referring to each transaction or if that count be divided into separate counts so as to separate, at least, the first Milleraft transaction and the Noel and Beaudry transactions from the others.
I am in agreement with the view of McLennan J.A. and have nothing to add thereto.
If McLennan J.A.'s suggestion is complied with at the new trial, there will be no need to consider any question of the accused being found guilty as charged, when in fact some amount smaller than the total of $10,790.52 was proved beyond reasonable doubt. I must, however, express dissent from the submission made by counsel during the argument of this appeal that on the indictment if the evidence disclosed that only a lesser amount of money had been stolen the jury could have returned a verdict of guilty of that lesser amount but not guilty as charged. In my view, the instruction on the form of the indictment presented at the former trial that the accused could have been convicted had it been proved that she converted to her own use any sum was a proper instruction.
The submission that the accused could not have been convicted on the indictment as laid, in that it alleged that she had converted the funds to her own use while the evidence at trial showed that at any rate as to some indeterminate amount, perhaps $6,300, the accused had converted the funds of the town so that they could be used by the mayor, J Lavergne, raises a rather difficult and important issue. To accede to the submission of the respondent's counsel herein, would enable an accused person to establish a sound defence by merely proving that the funds converted were handed over to the third party, be he a creditor or an ailing parent or an informal philanthropist such as Lavergne alleged he was. The trial judge charged the jury on the basis of the definition of theft in s. 269(1) of the Code that it mattered not whether the accused had converted the funds to her own use or that of another. Counsel for the accused, however, takes the position that the Crown had not charged theft generally, which would have permitted such an instruction to the jury, but had specifically charged the accused with conversion to her own use. It must be remembered that until the accused gave evidence in her own defence the allegation of conversion to the use of Lavergne had never been advanced. The answer to this contention, in my opinion, is that given by the learned trial judge when he said in his charge: In short, when the accused took the funds she converted the funds to her use despite the fact that her use of them was to deliver them to Lavergne. I distinguish cases such as R. v. Haurany' and R. v. Lurie', on the ground that there the charge was obtaining by false pretences while the evidence showed that what the accused did was to obtain the delivery of property to another by a false pretence and never had possession himself. In the latter case, Goddard L.C.J., at p. 118, said:
In the result, I would dismiss the appeal.
Appeal allowed, conviction restored, and JJ. dissenting.
Solicitor for the appellant: W. C. Bowman, Toronto. Solicitor for the respondent: G. Arthur Martin, Toronto. 1. Practice and procedure-Declaratory judgment in Quebec-Validity of provincial statute-Necessary interest required to institute action-An Act Respecting Freedom of Worship and the Maintenance of
Good Order, 1953-54 (Que.), c. 15-Code of Civil Procedure, art. 77.
et al. v.
2. Proc6dure-Jugement d6claratoire dans
Qubbec-Validit6 d'un statut provincial- Int6rt requis pour prendre action-Loi concernant la libert6 des cultes et le bon ordre, 1953-54 (Qu6.), c. 15-Code de
Proc~dure Civile, art. 77.
APPEALS
1. Practice and procedure-Customs and
Excise-Sales tax-Exemption-Refusal by
Exchequer Court of leave to appeal from
Tariff Board decision-Whether appeal lies to
Supreme
Court from refusal-Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, s.
82-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
259, s. 42.-Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
UTILITIES
LTD. et al. v.
2. Leave to appeal-Pleadings-Amendment to reply, withdrawing admissions- Estate Tax Act, 1958 (Can.), c. 29, s. 24(3)
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148,
3. Application to adduce new evidence- Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 67.
et et al.,
4. Right of-Practice and procedure- Consent judgment-Not subject to appeal
APPEALS-Concluded-Fin if acquiesced-Code of Civil Procedure, art. 5. See also-Voir aussi: Criminal law. ASSIGNMENT
1. Manufacturer entering into factoring agreement-Assignment of accounts receivable-Debt from assignor to debtor resulting from independent transaction- Whether debtor may exercise right of setoff against assignee which it would have had against assignor.
& INc., 238.
See also-Voir aussi: Banks and banking. ASSURANCE
Automobile-Clause omnibus-Propridtaire enregistr6-Int6rst assurable-V& hicule conduit exclusivement par le fils de l'assur6-Changement dans la nature et l'6tendue du risque-Action en garantie. Co. et al. v. al., 427.
AUTOMOBILE
1. Passagbre bless6e-Accident d A la faute d'un mineur au volant avee la permission d'un autre mineur A qui son phre permettait de se servir du v~hicule-Action intentde contre les deux phres-Responsabilit6- Code Civil, arts. 1054.
et al., 40. 2. Collision-Commettant et prdpos&-Ex- 6cution des fonctions-Utilisation du v& hicule pour aller prendre un repas-Code civil, art. 1054.
3. See also-Voir aussi: Assurance Money advanced for operations of companies in consideration of share in profits- Subsequent bankruptcies of companies- Loan claim-Security obtained for part of advance by way of equitable assignment- Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 14, s. 98- The Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 288, v. A. H. & Co.
et al., 459.
BANKS AND BANKING
Debts arising from sale by bank's customer of goods covered by security under s. 88 of Bank Act-Claim by customer's trustee in bankruptcy-Whether bank entitled to debts notwithstanding failure of assignment of books debts due to lack of timely registration-Bank Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 12, substituted 1953-54, c. 48-Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 14.
CERTIORARI
See-Voir: Labour.
CIVIL CODE
Article 597 (Succession).......
See-Voir: 6.
2.-Article 873 (Universal legatee).. 647
Article 962 (Substitution) ......
4.-Articles 1054 (Quasi-delict)
5.- Article 1054 (Quasi-delict).....
See-Voir: 2.
Article 1056 (Quasi-delict)......
7.-Article
8.-Article
(Lease of things)............................
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.-Article 50 (Supervisory powers of Superior Court) .....................
See-Voir: 4. Article (Interest in action).. . 252 3.-Article 94(3) (Place to institute action)........................... 4.- Article 1220 (Acquiescence in judgment)..................... See-Voir: 4. COMPANIES
1. See-Voir: Contracts
See also-Voir aussi: Costs
CONFLICT OF LAWS Wills-Personalty bequeathed under will of Ontario testator to "issue" grandson- Grandson and his two children domiciled in foreign jurisdiction-One child born out wedlock-Status of child-Whether entitled to share in estate.
v. et al., 317. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1. Land titles-Application for first registration-Jurisdiction Local Master Titles-The Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1960, 204-British North America Act, s. 96. BROOKS 108. 2. See also-Voir aussi: Criminal law. See also-Voir aussi: Habeas corpus. CONTRACTS
1. Option agreement-Obligation on part optionee to cause company to be incorporated by fixed date to hold claims under option-Letters patent sealed and issued after fixed date but bearing earlier date-Whether terms of option compiled with-Whether defence of equitable estoppel available to optionee.
Co. et al. v. CONTRACTS-Concluded-Fin
2. Breach of loan agreement-Notice of default sent by lender to borrower-Appointment of receiver-Validity of notice.
et al., 375.
Delay in completion of main contract resulting from performance by subcontractor
-Claim for damages against subcontractor
-Assessment of damages.
& HoRwIrz Co.
v. 589.
4. Acceptance-Letter proposing terms rental of tug-Verbal arrangements made for services and at rates set out in letter- Continuation of services beyond expressed period-Whether agreement implied from defendant's acquiescence.
COSTS
Practice and procedure-Companies- Petition for winding-up order-Discretion to grant order-Unsuccessful opposition preference shareholders-Disposition costs.
CRIMINAL LAW
1. Habeas corpus-Theft from mail and possession-Conviction sentence- Whether writ available.
In re
Appeals-Jurisdiction Supreme Court
Canada-Right to appeal limited to questions of law on which there was a dissent the Court of Appeal-Confession
-Whether voluntary-Dissent as to admissibility-Whether dissent on a question law-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), ss. (1) (a), (1) (a).
Indians-Game laws-Hunting with night light contrary to s. 31(1) of The Game and Fisheries Act, R.S.M. 1954, 94- Whether prohibition applies to Treaty
Indians-Whether word "hunt" in the Act subject to limitations in
-The
R.S.M. 1954, and THE 81.
CRIMINAL LAW-Continued-Suite 4. Possession stolen article-Proof possession within meaning of s. 296 of the Criminal Code.
5. Conspiracy to effect unlawful purpose- Obtaining from constable information which it was his duty not to divulge-Whether indictment disclosed an offence under Criminal Code-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), ss. 408(2)-The Ontario Provincial Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, 298- Rule the Supreme Court of Canada. Conviction for fraud-Acquittal charge of conspiracy-Whether inconsistency-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), ss. 592, 597.
Obscenity-Forfeiture of two magazines as obscene publications-Test applied- Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), 150(8) (as enacted by and s. 150A(4) (as enacted by 1959, c. 41, & (1962) V. 8. Arson-Whether bunkhouses mounted on wheels "buildings or structures" within the meaning 374(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.),
Sunday observance-Non-profit society providing dues-paying members with showings of films in a theatre on Sunday- No charge made for admission-Whether a performance elsewhere than in a church at which a fee was charged directly or indirectly contrary to the Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 6(1).
Capital murder-Crime committed during commission burglary-Trial judge's charge-Whether jury should have been charged as to suggested drunkenness accused-Whether jury properly instructed as to the distinction between capital and non-capital murder-Whether substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice-New trial ordered by Court of Appeal-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 21(2), 202(a)(i), 202A(2)(b)(i), 592(1)(b)(iii), 598 (1)(a).
CoTt, 358.
CRIMINALS LAW-Concluded-Fin
11. Capital murder-Deliberate and planned-Instructions to jury-Whether deliberation negatived by provocation and drunkenness-Whether necessary to charge jury in accordance with Hodge's case on issue of planning and deliberation-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 201,
202A(2)(a), 203.
12. Capital murder-Application by defence to adjourn trial to obtain further medical evidence-Application refused- Whether Court of Appeal right in refusing leave to adduce fresh evidence of mental disorder on issue of planned and deliberate.
Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss.
202A(2)(a), 589(1)(b).
13. Capital murder-Bank robbery-Killer disguised as Santa Claus-Testimony of accomplice-Corroborating evidence-Defence of alibi rejected by jury-Whether conviction justified-Criminal Code, 1953- 54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 202, 202A.
14. Non-capital murder-Expert evidence
Defence of automation following brain
-injury-Psychiatrist expressing opinion based on evidence of other witnesses- Whether evidence of psychiatrist admissible.
THE 561.
15. Constitutional law-Indians-Game laws-Shooting duck out of season in
Northwest Territories-Migratory
Birds
Convention Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 179, s.
16. Theft by conversion-Municipal treasurer giving municipal moneys to mayor on latter's instructions-Deficiencies concealed in accounts by treasurer-Defence of honest belief that accused was justified in following mayor's order-Court of Appeal ordering new trial-Whether trial unsatisfactory in regard to instructions to jury on defence's theory-Whether appeal to
Supreme Court raises question of law- Whether conversion of moneys to accused's own use as charged-Criminal Code, 1953- 54 (Can.), c. 51, sa. 269(1), 598(1)(b).
17. See also-Voir aussi: Droit criminel.
CROWN
Master and servant-Petition of right- Alleged brutal treatment by prison authorities-Liability for negligence of servants- Negligence must be shown-The Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 34-The Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.), c. 44-The Crown Liability Act, 1952-53 (Can.), c. 30.
THE 72.
DAMAGES
1. No interference by Supreme Court with amount allowed by Court of appeal unless error of principle on part of latter. et al., 376. 2. Liability-Employee injured-Explosion of jacket-heater-Employee indemnified by Workmen's Compensation Board-Claim by Board against owner of premises- Owner suing employer of injured employee in warranty-Findings of fact by lower Court-Whether they should be disturbed. al., 395. DEFENDANT
Individual defendant properly enjoined from continuance of illegal acts.
DROIT CRIMINEL
1. Possession d'un objet vold-Preuve de possession au sens de l'art. 296 du Code Criminel.
2. Meurtre qualifi6-Crime commis A l'occasion d'un vol qualifi6-Adresse du juge Reproche de ne pas avoir soumis un moyen de d6fense bas6 sur l'invresse-Reproche de ne pas avoir fait la distinction entre le meurtre qualifid et le meurtre simple- Tort important ou erreur judiciaire grave- Nouveau procks ordonn6 par la Cour d'Appel-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 21(2), 202(a)(i), 202A(2)(b)(i), 592(1)(b)(iii), 598(1)(a).
C6Tt, 358.
3. Meurtre qualifi6-Vol de banque- Meurtrier d6guis6 en
Phre
Noil-T4moignage d'un complice-Corroboration- DROIT CRIMINEL-Concluded-Fin
Ddfense d'alibi rejet6e par le jury-Justification du verdict-Code criminel, 1953- 54 (Can.), arts. 202, 202A.
MARcoTE v. 559.
4. See also-Voir aussi:Criminal law.
EVIDENCE
1. See-Voir: Motor vehicle.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Trials.
EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS
Direction in will to sell testator's shares in company for cash and to first offer them to person or persons holding other shares in company-Whether right of first refusal given to only other shareholder-Whether contract to sell to another party binding.
v. et al., 376.
EXPROPRIATION
1. Compensation fixed by Municipal Board
-Books of going business almost nonexistent-Valuation based on land values plus replacement cost of buildings less depreciation-Revision of Board's figures not to be attempted unless Board exercised judgment upon improper principles.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Municipal corporations.
HABEAS CORPUS
1. Constitutional law-Appellant committed to mental hospital for examination- Certification-Whether relevant sections of the Mental Hospitals Act authorized appellant's confinement-Whether ultra vires of the Legislature-The Mental Hospitals
Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 236-Criminal Code,
1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 524 (la) [enacted
1960-61, c. 43, s. 221.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Criminal law.
HUNTING
See-Voir: Criminal law.
HUBSAND AND WIFE See-Voir: Partnership.
IMMIGRATION
Person having ceased to be a nonimmigrant applying to become a permanent resident of Canada-Failure to comply with regulations as to visa and medical certificate -Deportation order-Jurisdiction Special Inquiry Officer-Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325.
INDIANS
See-Voir: Criminal law.
INVITOR AND INVITEE See-Voir: Negligence.
JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 1. Alternative remedies-Judgment not entered-Jurisdiction of trial judge to recall original judgment and substitute another. et al., 376. 2. See also-Voir aussi: Actions.
JURISDICTION
1. Bref de prohibition en matibre criminelle -Objection
A la juridiction de la Cour des Sessions de la Paix-Violations de la loi f6d6rale de l'Imp6t sur le revenu-Comp& 6mettre un tel bref-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 2, 424, 680.
Writ mattersto Court to hear complaints under the Income Tax Act-Competency
Court issue writ-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 2, 424, 680.
3. See also-Voir aussi: Criminal law. 4. See also-Voir aussi: Judgments and orders.
1. Collective agreement-Provisions imposed by arbitration award-Alleged error in retroactive clause-Power to amend- Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 162A, s. 17-An Act respecting Municipal and
School Corporations and their Employees,
1949, 13 Geo. VI (Que.), c. 26, s. 12.
al.,
2. Certification-Exclusion from unit of employees under sixteen years of age-Writ prohibition-Jurisdiction
Labour
Board-Question of law-Whether decision of Board reviewable-Labour
Relations
Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 162A, ss. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7,
27, 41a-Article 3(a) of By-law No. 1 of the Board.
Co. 342.
3. Certiorari-Discharge for union activity
-Reinstatement of complainant ordered by
Labour Relations Board-Finding that complainant exercised managerial functions
-Whether
"person" within protection of s. 65 of Labour Relations Act-Whether
Board had jurisdiction to order reinstatement-The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.
1960, c. 202, as. 1(3)(b), 50, 65, 80.
et al., 497.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Lease-Clause providing for renewal for successive 21-year terms in perpetuity- Validity of clause.
LIABILITY
1. See-Voir: Damages.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Negligence.
LIBEL malice-Defence privilege destroyed-Discretion of trial judge to permit plaintiff to postpone evidence in rebuttal of plea of justification until after defendant has given evidence in support of plea-Cross-examination.
et al., 291.
LOUAGE DE CHOSE Avis de risiliation-Insuffisance de l'avis. TRks MANDAMUS
See-Voir: Municipal corporations. MASTER AND SERVANT 1. See-Voir: Automobile.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Crown.
MINES AND MINERALS Petroleum and natural gas lease- Provision for extension of primary term if production obtained-Well drilled and made ready for fracturing treatment prior to expiry of term-Operations delayed beyond expiry date due to municipal road ban- Whether lease continued in force or terminated at end of primary term.
V. et al., 439. MISTAKE fee-Overpayment-Mistake as to existence of by-laws calling for licence fee on per day basis-Mistake of fact-Payments made under compulsion- Right of taxpayer to recover.
MORTGAGE
See-Voir: Real property.
MOTOR VEHICLE
1. Pedestrian-Fatal accident-Onus proof-Presumptions of facts-Possibilities -Balance of probabilities-Civil Code, arts. 1056, 1242-Motor Vehicles Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 142, s. 53.
2. Motorist colliding at night with road equipment-No statutory duty with respect to lighting of MOTOR VEHICLE-Concluded-Fin equipment-Negligence in failing to give adequate warning of presence of stationary packer on highway not established-The
Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act, R.S.A.
1955, c. 356, ss. 42, 46.
et al. v. et al., 260.
Collision-Owner's liability for driver's negligence-Whether possession of vehicle obtained by driver with implied consent of owner-The Vehicles and Highway
Traffic Act, R.S.A. 1955, 356, et al. v. et
4. Collision-Credibility witnesses-Expert evidence-Burden of proof-Preponderance of evidence-Finding of trial judge reversed by Court of Appeal.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
1. Mandamus-Adoption of new znning by-law-Vested rights land owner- Whether entitled to indemnity-Charter of the City of Montreal, art. 300, para. 44(a).
enacted in 1954-55, 3-4 Eliz. II, 52, art.
4(c)-Charter of the City of Montreal, art. 524, para. 2, enacted in 1959-60, 8-9
Eliz. II, 102-By-laws 1920 and 2414 the City of Montreal.
et al., v.
Expropriation-Compensation - Injurious affection-Damages for loss business
-Overpass built on street in front of plaintiff's property-No expropriation plaintiff's land-Claim for land injuriously affected-The City Act, R.S.A. 42,
303, 309, as amended by 1960 (Alta.), ss.
Use of building in contravention zoning by-law-Injunction-Whether municipality had status to maintain action-The
Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1950, 243, 497- The Planning Act, 1955 (Ont.), amended by 1960 (Ont.), 83,
4. Zoning by-law-Lands formerly used for industrial purposes classified as residential- Whether by-law discriminatory and an abuse power-Code Civil Procedure, art. 50.
CrT
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- Concluded-Fin
5. Welfare payments to indigent resident municipality-Whether payments recoverable by action for debt-The Municipal Act, R.S.M. 1954, 947(2) to See also-Voir aussi: Taxation. NEGLIGENCE
1. Invitor and invitee-Water accumulation on bank floor result of people entering with snow on footwear-Customer slipping and falling-Unusual danger-Failure to use reasonable care-Defence of volenti non fit injuria.
Motor vehicles-Collision-Identification of vehicle-Apportionment of fault- Damages.
3. Damage resulting from fire commencing in defendant's garage and spreading to plaintiff's premises-Defendant's failure to act with the care required in carrying out a dangerous operation-Liability-Non-applicability of The Accidental Fires Act, R.S.O.
et al. v. et al., 448. 4. See also-Voir aussi: Crown.
See also-Voir aussi: Motor vehicle. PARTNERSHIP
1. Husband and wife-Whether partners a bakery business-The Partnership Act, R.S.A. 230.
v. MARx,
See also-Voir aussi: Practice and procedure.
PATENTS
Patented chemical substance diluted by carrier-Composition claims rejected- Patent Act, R.S.C. 203, 41(1). Lucius & 1. Pleadings-Partnership-Jurisdiction- Notice of appeal by one of two partners.
V. 69.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Actions.
3. See also-Voir aussi: Appeals.
4. See also-Voir aussi: Costs.
PROHIBITION (WRIT OF)
1. See-Voir: Jurisdiction.
2. See also-Voir aussi: Labour.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Telephone company-Order by Transport
Board to provide service-Area not served by Bell Telephone Company-Absence of jurisdiction-An act respecting the Bell
Telephone
Company
Canada,
(Can.),-c. 41, s. 2-The Railway Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 234, s. 33.
v. McKENet al., 202.
REAL PROPERTY
1. Sale of house-Fraudulent misrepresentation-Claim for damages-Presumption as to worth not rebutted-Evidence of reduced value due to the misrepresentation.
et al. v. et al.,
2. Lease-Rescission and damages-Moving picture theatre-Lessor's obligation to provide facilities required by by-laws- Failure to do so-Code Civil, arts. 1612, et al. v. PULAFITO
Co. et al.,
Homestead mortgage executed in owner's name by brother-False declaration as to consent of wife-Estoppel not established- Mortgage invalid-Dower Act, R.S.A. 1955,
Co. v. Kos
SCHOOL
See-Voir: Taxation.
SHIPPING
1. Charterparty-Arbitration clause in case of dispute-Motion to dismiss action on charterparty or stay proceedings-Jurisdiction of Exchequer Court to entertain action -Matter of substance or procedure- Whether arbitration clause void as against public policy-Whether arbitration proceedings in foreign country a bar to action in Canada-Admiralty Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 1 -Code of Civil Procedure, art. 94(3). 2. Collision between two tankers in appraoch to Halifax harbour-Negligence of parties-Dense fog-Alteration of course- Excessive speed-Improper radar look-out -Narrow channel rule.
STATUTES
1.-Accidental Fires Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 3......................
2.- Act Respecting Freedom of Worship and the Maintenance of Good Order, 1953-54 (Que.), 15......... 3.-Act respecting Municipal and School Corporations and their Employees, 1949, Geo. VI (Que.), 26, s. 12...............
.......... 4.-Act respecting the Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, 1902 (Can.), c. 41,s.2...........................
See-Voir: PUBuc 5.-Admiralty Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 1.............................
6.-Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 23, 4, as amended, 1960-61 (Ont.), 4, s. 1961-62 (Ont.), 6, 1 .... See-Voir: 5. 7.-Bank Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. substituted 1953-54, 48............ 8.- Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 14, s. 98......................... STATUTES-Continued-Suite
9.-Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
14...........................
10.- B.N.A. Act, a. 96.............
11.-Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960
(Can.), c. 44.....................
12.-Charter of the City of Montreal, art. 300, para. 44(a), enacted in 1954- 55, 3-4 Eliz. II, c. 52, art. 4(c) ......
13.-Charter the City Montreal, art. 524, para. 2, enacted in 1959-60,
8-9 Eliz. II, c. 102..................
14.---City Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 42, es. 303, 309, as amended by 1960
(Alta.), c. 15, as. 13..............
See-Voir: 2.
15.-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 296......................
16.-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c' 51, arts. 21(2), 202(a)(i), 202A(2)(b)
(i), 592(1)(b)(iii), 598(1)(a) ...........
See-Voir: DnoIT 2.
17.-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 2, 424, 680...............
See-Voir: 2.
18.-Code Criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), arts. 202, 202A..................
19.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 79(1)(a), 597(1)(a).........
See-Voir: 2.
20.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 296.....................
See-Voir: CRIMINAL 4.
21.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 103, 408(2)..............
See-Voir: 5.
22.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 592, 597...................
See-Voir: 6.
23.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, a. 150(8) (as enacted by 1959, c.
41, a. 11), and a. 150A(4) (as enacted by
1959, c. 41, a. 12)...................
See-Voir: 7.
STATUTES-Continued-Suite 24.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 374(1)(a)................... See-Voir: 8. 25.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 21(2), 202(a)(i), 202A(2)(b)(i), 592(1)(b)(iii), 598(1)(a).............. 26.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 2, 424, 680.................. See-Voir: 2. 27.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 201, 202A(2)(a), 203........ 471 28.- Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 202A(2)(a), 589(1)(b) ....... See-Voir: 12. 29.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, 202, 202A.................. See-Voir: 13. 30.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, a. 524(la) [enacted 1960-61, c. 43, a.221.........................
31.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, as. 269(1), 598(l)(b)........... See-Voir: 16. 32.-Crown Liability Act, 1952-53 (Can.), c. 30.....................
33.- Dower Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 90. . 167 34.-Estate Tax Act, 1958 (Can.), c. 29,s.24(3)......................... See-Voir: 2. 35.-Estate Tax Act, 1958 (Can.), c. 29, as. 2(1), 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a), 58(1)(i) 647 See-Voir: 6. 36.- Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, a. 82.................... 37.-Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 34......................
38.-Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 100, as. 57, 58.................... 39.-Game and Fisheries Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 94, as. 31(1), 72(1) .......... STATUTES-Continued-Suite
Immigration Act, R.S.C.
325...........................
Imp6t sur le revenu, Loi de 1',
S.R.C. arts. 4, 46(6),
139(1)(e)........................
42.-Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952,
43.-Income Tax Act, R.S.C.
6(1)(c), 15(1), (2).........
44.-Income Tax Act, R.S.C.
ss. 4, 46(6), 139(1)(e).......
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952,
4, 139(1)(e).............
See-Voir: 7.
139(1)(w)......................
See-Voir: 8.
47.-Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q.
17..................
48.-Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q.
c. 4, 41a. .
49.-Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.
202, 1(3)(b), 50, 65, 80. .
50.-Land Titles Act, R.S.O.
c.204............................
51.-Libert6 des cultes et le bon ordre, Loi de la, 1953-54 (Qub.),
52.-Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 1952,
6(1)......................
See-Voir: 9.
53.-Manitoba Natural Resources
Act, R.S.M. 1954, ........
54.-Mental Hospitals Act, R.S.O.
236.......................
STATUTES-Concluded-Fin 55.-Migratory Birds
Convention Act, R.S.C. 1952, 12(1)...... 56.- Motor Vehicles Act, R.S.Q. 53................... 57.-Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1950, 243,s.497......................... 58.--Municipal Act, R.S.M. 1954, 947(2) to (5)............... 59.- Ontario Provincial Police Act, R.S.C. 1960, 298.................. 60.---Ottawa (City Act, 1960-61 (Ont.), 4................... See-Voir: 4. 61.-Partnership Act, R.S.A. c.230 .............................
Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 288, 4........................
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, 203, 41(1)...........................
64.-Planning Act, 1955 (Ont.), as amended by 1960 (Ont.), s.5..............................
Railway Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, 33..........................
66.-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, 259,s.42........................ 67.---Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, 259, 67................... 68.-Trade
Marks
Act, 1952-53 (Can.), 49......................
Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act, R.S.A. 1955, 356, 42, 46.... 70.-Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act, R.S.A. 356, 130....... See-Voir: Taxation.
SURETYSHIP
Co-sureties-Agreement as to payment
-of company's indebtedness-Payment by one surety-Claim for contribution dismissed.
et al. v. 206.
TAXATION
1. Income - Partnership - Advances to
-stock-broker for share of profits-Termination of agreement-Profit in respect of
-current fiscal year, not yet ended, set at negotiated amount-Whether negotiated amount income or capital receipt-Income
'Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, ss. 6(l)(c),
15(1), (2).
Imp6t sur le revenu-Notaire en association avec contracteurs-Achat et vente de terrains-Placement de capital on A titre
:sp6culatif-Loi de l'imp6t sur le revenu,
S.R.C. 1952,
148, arts. 3, 4, 46(6),
139(1)(e).
Income-Notary in partnership with
Tbuilders-Purchase and resale land- Whether capital gain or income-Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, ss. 4, 46(6),
139(1)(e).
-4. City by-law imposing special charge upon owners high-rise or other buildings
-Validity of by-law-The City Ottawa
Act, 1960-61 (Ont.), 4.
OrAWA
-et al., 526.
Lands and building owned by school board ceasing to be used as a school- School remaining closed and property not used for any purpose-Whether liable to
-taxation-The Assessment
Act, R.S.O.
1960, c. 23, s. 4, as amended, 1960-61
VIL- -569.
90139-3
TAXATION-Concluded-Fin 6. Succession duty-Will-Substitution- Lapse of substitution-Residuary interest estate of mother deceased left by mother to children of deceased, if any, or if none, to testamentary Death of deceased childless-Whether deceased "competent to dispose" of residue of mother's estate-Whether deceased exercised "general power" in respect of same- Estate Tax Act, 1958 (Can.), ss. 2(1), 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a), 58(1)(i)-Civil Code, arts. 597, 873, 962.
Co. et al. 7. Income tax-Purchase of land for shopping center and apartment house project- Transfer of land to private companies for shares-Sale shares-Whether realized capital gain or income from business Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, 148, 4, 139(1)(e).
TRADE MARKS
Infringement-Use of coloured bands pharmaceutical capsules-Injunction-Relevancy patent held in the United States-Trade Marks Act, 1952-53 (Can.), c. 49.
TRIALS
Evidence-Plaintiff's diametrically opposed to that of defendant-Trial judge's findings of fact not followed by Court-Duty Court to trial fact plainly wrong.
Creation of bay in shore lot result of sand-removing operations-Obstructions to navigation placed in bay by lot owner- Injunction-Whether navigable waters- Right to navigation of third parties.
WILLS
1. Interpretation-Provision for annuity from residue-Surplus in the residue-Whether intestacy as to surplus V. et al., 312. 2. See also-Voir aussi: Conflict of laws. 3. See also-Voir aussi: Executors and administrators.
4. See also-Voir aussi: Taxation. (Exchiequer Court of Canaba Cour be I'tdjiquier bu Canaba PAUL
A. RAYMOND, C.R. WILLIAM
C. McBRIDE, B.A. Sc. Official Law Editors
Arretistes
Published under authority by Gabriel Belleau, Q.C. Registrar of the Court
Publig par Gabriel Belleau, C.R. Registraire de la Cour
90139-31
Printer
During the period of these Reports:
THE HONOURABLE JOSEPH T. THORSON
(Appointed October 6, 1942)
THE HONOURABLE WILBUR ROY JACKETT
(Appointed May 4, 1964)
PUISNE
THE HONOURABLE J. C.
(Appointed September 4, 1946)
THE HONOURABLE JOHN DOHERTY KEARNEY (Appointed November 1, 1951)
THE HONOURABLE JACQUES DUMOULIN
(Appointed December 1, 1955)
THE HONOURABLE ARTHUR LOUIS THURLOW
(Appointed August 29, 1956)
THE HONOURABLE CAMILIEN NORL
(Appointed March 12, 1962)
THE HONOURABLE ANGUS ALEXANDER CATTANACH (Appointed March 27, 1962)
THE HONOURABLE HUGH FRANCIS GIBSON
(Appointed May 4, 1964)
THE HONOURABLE ALLISON ARTHUR MARIOTTI WALSH (Appointed July 1, 1964)
DISTRICT JUDGES IN ADMIRALTY OF THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
The Honourable W. ARTHUR I. New Brunswick Admiralty District-appointed June 9, 1945.
His Honour Nova Scotia Admiralty District-appointed February 8, 1950.
The Honourable IvEs Quebec Admiralty District-appointed June 16, 1950. The Honourable
Newfoundland Admiralty Distirctappointed October 8, 1959.
The Honourable Ontario Admiralty District-appointed January 28, 1960.
The Honourable NORRIS, British Columbia Admiralty Districtappointed September 28, 1961.
The Honourable Manitoba Admiralty District-appointed October 19, 1962.
R. Q.C., Prince Edward Island Admiralty District-appointed May 24, The Honourable
Newfoundland Admiralty Districtappointed June 4, 1963.
The Honourable Newfoundland Admiralty District-appointed May 28, 1964.
The Right Honourable L. Nova Scotia Admiralty District-appointed November 3, 1958.
The Honourable British Columbia Admiralty District-appointed January 31, 1963.
Q.C., Quebec Admiralty District-appointed May 7, 1964.
Q.C., Ontario Admiralty District-appointed February 21, 1957. The Honourable LIONEL CHEVRIER
The Honourable Guy FAVREAU
The Honourable J. WATSON MACNAUGHT en fonction au cours de la piriode de publication de ces rapports: L'HONORABLE JOSEPH T. THORSON
(nommg le 6 octobre 1942)
L'HONORABLE WILBUR ROY JACKETT
(nomm, le 4 mai 1964)
L'HONORABLE J. C.
(nommb le 4 septembre 1946)
L'HONORABLE JOHN DOHERTY KEARNEY
(nomm4 le 1er novembre 1951)
L'HONORABLE JACQUES DUMOULIN
(nommg le 1.r dicembre 1955)
L'HONORABLE ARTHUR LOUIS THURLOW
(nommb le 29 aort 1956)
L'HONORABLE CAMILIEN NOEiL
(nomm6 le 12 mars 1962)
L'HONORABLE ANGUS ALEXANDER CATTANACH (nomm6 le 27 mars 1962)
L'HONORABLE HUGH FRANCIS GIBSON
(nommd le 4 mai 1964)
L'HONORABLE ALLISON ARTHUR MARIOTTI WALSH (nommb le 1 juillet 1964)
JUGES DE DISTRICT EN AMIRAUTP DE LA COUR DE
L'ECHIQUIER DU CANADA
L'Honorable W. ARTHUR I. district d'amiraut6 du Nouveau-Brunswick-nomm6 le 9 juin 1945.
Son Honneur district d'amiraut6 de la Nouvelle-&cosse--nomm6 le 8 f6vrier 1950.
L'Honorable ARRn district d'amiraut6 de Qu6bec-nomm6 le 16 juin 1950. L'Honorable district d'amiraut6 de Terre-Neuve-nomm6 8 octobre 1959.
L'Honorable district d'amiraut6 d'Ontario-nomm6 le 28 janvier 1960.
L'Honorable district d'amirautd de la Colombie-Britanniquenomm6 le 28 septembre 1961.
L'Honorable ERC district d'amiraut6 de Manitoba-nomm6 le 19 octobre 1962.
R. C.R., district d'amiraut6 de 1'lle du Prince-tdouard-nomm6 le 24 mai 1963.
L'Honorable district d'amiraut6 de Terre-Neuve-nommb le 4 juin 1963.
L'Honorable district d'amiraut6 de Terre-Neuve-nomm6 28 mai 1964.
Le Trbs Honorable L. district d'amiraut6 de la Nouvelle-Pcosse-nomm6 le 3 novembre 1958.
L'Honorable district d'amiraut6 de la Colombie-Britannique-nomm6 le 31 janvier 1963.
C.R., district d'amiraut6 de Qu6bec-nomm6 le 7 mai 1964.
S. MARRIOTT, C.R., district d'amiraut6 d'Ontario-nomm6 le 21 f6vrier 1957. L'Honorable
L'Honorable Guy FAVREAU
L'Honorable J. WATSON MACNAUGHT
Memoranda re Appeals.........
...........................
Table of the Names of Cases Reported in this Volume............ Table of the Names of Cases Cited in this Volume................ Report of the cases adjudged ................................
...............................................
Memoranda concernant les appels.............................. Table des arr~ts rapportds dans ce volume....................... Table des autorit6s cit6es dans les arr~ts susdits.................. Causes adjug6es......................................
........ Table analytique et alphab6tique.. ..........................
The Honourable Joseph T. Thorson, President of the Court, retired during the current year.
The Honourable J. C. A. Cameron, Puisne Judge of the Court resigned during the current year.
L'Honorable Joseph T. Thorson, pr6sident de la cour, a cess6 d'occuper sa charge au cours de l'ann6e courante.
L'Honorable J. C.
At page 19 the footnote should read (1931) 40 O.W.N. 580. At page 29 in the headnote the caption Customs Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 58, s. 45 and s. 44 as enacted by S. of C. 1958, c. 56, s. 2 should read Customs Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 58, s. 35(1), (2) and (3) as re-enacted by S. of C. 1955, c. 32, s. 2(2), s. 48(4) and (5) as enacted by S. of C. 1955, c. 32, s. 3. s. 44 and s. 45 as re-enacted by S. of C. 1958, c. 26, s. 2(1).
At page 29 in the headnote the caption Customs Tariff Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 60, s. 85(2)(3) should read Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 1952, c. 60, s. 3.
At page 145 the first word in the captions Admiralty should read Shipping.
At page 298 in the 7th line of the last paragraph the word imported should read imparted.
At page 479 in the fourth line the words it was held should be deleted.
1. Algoma Central & Hudson Bay Ry. Co. et al v. Manitoba Pool Elevators Ltd. et al [19641 Ex.C.R. 505. Appeals pending.
2. Belle-Isle, Claude v. Ministre du Revenu National [1964] R.C. de l'E. 894. Appel interjet6.
3. Caisse Populaire de St-Calixte de Kilkenny v. La Reine [1964] R.C. de l'E. 882. Appel interjet6.
4. Cardwell, Raymond Philip v. Philippe Leduc et al [1963] Ex. C.R. 207. Appeal dismissed.
5. Consolidated Denison Mines Ltd. et al v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise [1964] Ex. C.R. 100. Appeal pending. 6. Crown Trust Co. (McArdle Estate) v. Minister of National Revenue [1964] Ex.C.R. 941. Appeal pending.
7. DeFrees, Barbara B. et al v. Dominion Auto Accessories Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 331. Appeal pending.
8. Ernest Scragg & Sons Ltd. v. Leesona Corpn. [1964] Ex.C.R. 649. Apeal pending.
9. Fabi, Estate of Dame Adolorata v. Minister of National Revenue [1964] Ex.C.R. 308. Appeal pending.
10. Fabi, Samuel v. Minister of National Revenue [1964] Ex.C.R. 299. Appeal pending.
11. Fraser, Ronald K. v. Minister of National Revenue [1963] Ex.C.R. 334. [1964] S.C.R. 657. Appeal dismissed.
12. Irwin, Joseph S. v. Minister of National Revenue [1963] Ex. C.R. 51; [1964] S.C.R. 662. Appeal allowed.
13. J. K. Smit & Sons International Ltd. v. Packsack Diamond Drills Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 226. Appeal dismissed.
14. Jamb Sets Ltd. v. William H. Carlton [1964] Ex.C.R. 377. Appeal pending.
15. La Presse Ltde., Cie de Publication v. Le Procureur Gindral du Canada [1964] R.C. de l'E. 627. Appel interjet6.
16. Lloyd, Clara M. v. Minister of National Revenue [1964] Ex.C.R. 506. Appeal pending.
17. Minister of National Revenue v. Arthur Minden [1964] Ex.C.R. 179. Appeal discontinued.
18. Montreal Trust Co. et al (Hickson Estate) v. Minister of National Revenue [1964] Ex.C.R. 293. [1964] S.C.R. 647. Appeal allowed.
19. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Empire Laboratories Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 399; [1964] S.C.R. 351. Appeal dismissed.
20. Peck, Neta L. v. The Queen [1964] Ex.C.R. 966. Appeal pending. 21. Queen, The v. Skuttle Mfg. Co. of Canada Ltd. et al [1964] Ex.C.R. 311. Appeal allowed.
22. Rhone-Poulenc, S. A. v. Micro Chemicals Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 834. Appeal dismissed.
23. Rhone-Poulenc, S. A. v. Micro Chemicals Ltd. et al [1964] Ex.C.R. 819. Appeal dismissed.
24. Rivershore Investments Co. v. Minister of National Revenue [1964J Ex.C.R. 481. Appeal pending.
25. Robertson, Alexander Bruce v. Minister of National Revenue [1964]! Ex.C.R. 444. Appeal dismissed.
26. Rouet, Ltde, Le v. Le Roi Hosiery Co. Inc. et al [1964] Ex.C.R. 285. Appeal pending.
27. Seven-Up Co. v. James D. Heavey et al [1964] Ex.C.R. 922. Appeal pending.
28. Shepherd, Robert A. Jr. v. The Queen [1964] Ex.C.R. 274. Appeal dismissed.
29. Whitehall Laboratories Ltd. v. Ultravite Laboratories Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 913. Appeal pending.
30. Willowbranch, M/S v. Imperial Oil Ltd. [1964] Ex.C.R. 255; [19641 S.C.R. 402. Appeal allowed.
ARRfETS RAPPORTS DANS CE VOLUME
A
A-1 Steel and Iron Foundry Ltd.,
Alloy Steel and Metals Co. v........ 593
Aktiebolaget Astra, Apotekarnes Kemiska Fabriker v. Novocol Chemical
Mfg. Co. of Canada Ltd............
Algoma Central, The and Hudson Bay
Rly. Co. et al. v. Manitoba Pool
Elevators Ltd. et al.................
Allov Steel and Metals Co. v. A-1
Steel and Iron Foundry Ltd........
B
-Beaudin, Dr. Jean, Ministre du Revenu
National v....................
]3elle-Isle, Claude v. Ministre du Revenu National.....................
Biltmore Hats Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific
Rly. Co. et al......................
.Blustein, Irving v. Minister of National
..........
l3lustein, Jack v. Minister National
Blustein, Murray v. Minister of National Revenue...............
..
]Brookview Investments Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue..........
*Caisse Populaire de St-Calixte de Kilkenny, La v. La Reine.............
-Canada Trust Co. (Estate of Mary
Viola Maine), Minister of National
Revenue v........................
-Canadian Pacific Rly. Co.
Biltmore Hats Ltd. v...............
*Carlton, William H., Janib Sets Ltd.
v...........................
'Christie, Roger Elkin, Minister of
Consolidated Denison Mines Ltd. et al.
v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise.........
Cosmos Inc., Minister of National
Revenue v........................
'Crown Trust Co. (McArdle Estate),
Minister of National Revenue v... .
:Davidson, Alexander B. v. Minister of
1Davis, Helen D. v. Minister of National
D-Concluded-Fin DeFrees, Barbara B. et al. v. Dominion Auto Accessories Ltd.............. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise, Consolidated Denison Mines Ltd. et al. v......... Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise, Elliott, W. B. v...........................
Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise and National Council of the Baking Industry, M oirs Ltd. v...................... Derby Development Corp. v. Minister Dominion
Auto
Accessories Barbara B. DeFrees et al. v......... Dorval, City of, et al., The Queen v. . . 146 Dorwin Shopping Center Ltd. v. Min- 4ister of National Revenue.......... E
Elgie, Goldwin Corlett v. Minister of Ellendale Investments Ltd. v. Minister Elliott, W. B. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs & Excise.........
..... Empire
Laboratories
Parke, Davis & Co. Ltd. v................ Equitable Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue....... Ernest Scragg & Sons Ltd. v. Leesona Corp.......................
F
Fabi, Estate of Dame Adolorata v. Minister of National Revenue ...... Fabi, Samuel v. Minister of National Finkler, Bruce v. Minister of National Fortin, Jean Julien v. Ministre du Revenu National............... Fraser, Ronald K. v. Minister of Frontenac Shoe Lt6e v. Ministre du Revenu National.................. Fyke, Russel W. v. Minister of National Revenue ................... G
Gingras, Henri v. Ministre du Revenu
National.....................
Gordon A. MacEachern Ltd. v. National Rubber Co. Ltd............
Grant, Ronald D. v. Minister of National Revenue...................
H
Heavey, James D. et at., Seven-Up
Co., The v......
............
Herb Payne Transport Ltd. v. Minister
Hortick, Harry v. Minister of National
Imperial Oil Ltd., M/S Willowbranch v. 255
J
J. K. Smit & Sons International Ltd. v.
Packsack Diamond Drills Ltd....... 226
Jamb Sets Ltd. v. William H. Carlton. 377
La Presse, Limit6e, La Compagnie de
Publication v. Le Procureur G6ndral du Canada...................
Lamoureux, Luc v. Le Procureur G& n6ral du Canada..................
Lane, Clifton H., Minister of National
Revenue v........................
Leesona Corp., Ernest Scragg & Sons
Ltd. v.......................
Lloyd, Clara M. v. Minister of National Revenue ................
Lorenzen, C. B. Jean v. Minister of
Mac
MacEachern Ltd., Gordon A. v. National Rubber Co. Ltd.............
Manitoba Pool Elevators Ltd. et al.,
The Algoma Central and H. B.
Rly. Co. et al. v...................
Marrus, Elliot L. v. Minister of National Revenue ...................
Micro
Chemicals Ltd. v. Rhone- Poulenc S.A......
............
Micro Chemicals Ltd. et al., Rhone- Poulenc S. A......................
Minden, Arthur, Minister of National
Revenue v....................
Minister of National Revenue, Blustein,
Irving v.....................
Minister of National Revenue, Blustein,
Jack v...........................
Minister of National Revenue, Blustein,
Murray v.
...................
M-Continued-Suite Minister of National Revenue, Brookview Investments Ltd. v......... Minister of National
Canada Trust Co. (Estate of Mary Viola Maine) ..................
Minister
Christie, Roger Elkin.............. Minister
Cosm os Inc....................... Minister
Crown Trust Company (McArdle E state).......................... Minister of National Revenue, Davidson, Alexander B. v................ Minister
Davis, Helen D................... Minister of National Revenue, Derby Development Corp. v............. Minister of National Revenue, Dorwin Shopping Center Ltd. v............ Minister of National Revenue, Elgie, Goldwin Corlett v.............. Minister of National Revenue, Ellendale Investments Ltd. v............ Minister of National Revenue, Equitable Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, Fabi, Estate of Dame Adolorata v........ Minister of National Revenue, Fabi, Sam uel v......................... Minister of National Revenue, Finkler, Bruce v.....................
Minister of National Revenue, Fraser, Ronald K. v.......
........... Minister of National Revenue, Fyke, Russel W . v...................... Minister of National Revenue, Grant, Ronald D . v...................... Minister of National Revenue, Herb Payne Transport Ltd. v............ Minister of National Revenue, Hortick, H arry v.......................... Minister
Lane, Clifton H................... Minister of National Revenue, Lloyd, Clara M . v....................... Minister of National Revenue, Lorenzen, C.
M inden, Arthur................... Minister of National Revenue, Montreal Trust Co. et al. (Hickson Estate) v ................................ Minister of National Revenue, Payne Transport Ltd., Herb v............ Minister
Peninsular Investments Ltd........ Minister of National Revenue, Pichosky, Albert v...................... Minister of National Revenue, Rivershore Investments Ltd. v........... Minister of National Revenue, Robertson, Alexander Bruce v............. Minister of National Revenue, Russell, R .
Minister National Revenue, Shafter,
Charles v.........................
Minister of National Revenue, Shafter,
Harry v.......................
Minister National Revenue, Shuchat,
M eyer v..........................
Minister National Revenue, Smith,
Percy Vernon v..................
Minister National Revenue, Sorbara,
Samv..........................
Minister
National
Steen Realty Limited..............
Minister National Revenue, Stewart,
John v.........................
Minister National Revenue, Tanner,
Clifford W . v.....................
Minister
National
Tomkins, Robert Vernon...........
Mirnister National Revenue, Tuke,
Othelia v.......................
Minister
Valclair Investment Co. Ltd....... 1 466
Minister National Revenue, Warnford Court (Canada) Ltd. v.
Minister National Revenue, Weinberger, Jan V. v...................
Minister of National Revenue, Wilson,
Frank v..........................
Minister of National Revenue, Wilson,
Morris v......................
Minister of National Revenue, Wilson,
Sydney v.........................
Minister National Revenue, Wurtele,
Richard K. et al. v................
Ministre du
Revenu
National
Beaudin, Dr. Jean.................
Ministre du Revenu National, Belle- Isle, Claude v.....................
Ministre du Revenu National, Fortin,
Jean Julien v......................
Ministre du Revenu National, Frontenac Shoe Lt6e v...................
Ministre du Revenu National, Gingras,
Henriv..........................
Moirs Ltd. v. Deputy Minister of
National Revenue for Customs &
Excise and National Council the
Baking Industry..................
Montreal Trust Co. al. (Hickson
Estate) v.
Minister of National
N
National Council of the Baking Industry and Deputy Minister of National
Revenue for Customs & Excise,
M oirs Ltd. v......................
National Rubber Co. Ltd., Gordon
MacEachern Ltd. v................
Novocol Chemical Mfg. Co. of Canada
Ltd., Aktiebolaget Astra, Apotkarnes Kemiska Fabrikes v............
P
Packsack Diamond Drills Ltd., J. K.
Smit Sons Int'l. Ltd. v............
P-Concluded-Fin Parke, Davis & Co. Ltd. v. Empire Laboratories Ltd.................. Payne Transport Ltd., Herb v. Minister National Revenue.......... Peck, Neta L. v. The Queen.......... Peninsular Investments Ltd., Minister Pichosky, Albert v. Minister Nation- Procureur G6n6ral du Canada, Le; La Presse,
Ltee, La Compagnie de Publication v.....................
Procureur G6ndral du Canada, Lamoureux, Luc v..................
Q
Queen, The v. Dorval, City of et al...... Queen, The, Peck, Neta L. v........... Queen, The, Shepherd, Robert A. Jr. v.. Queen, The v. Skuttle Mfg. Co. Canada Ltd. al.................. R
Reine, La, La Caisse Populaire de St-Calixte de Kilkenny v........... Rhone-Poulenc, v. Micro Chemicals Ltd.........................
Rhone-Poulenc, v. Micro Chemicals Ltd. et al..................... Rivershore Investments Ltd. v. Minister National Revenue.......... Robert Norton, The Ship al., Toronto Harbour Commissioners v.. 145 Robert Norton, The Ship al., Toronto Harbour Commissioners v.. 498 Robertson, Alexander Bruce v. Minister Roi Hosiery Co. Inc. Le, et al., Le Rouet Lt6e v..................... Rouet Lt6e, Le v. Le Roi Hosiery Co. Inc. al.........................
Russell, R. J. R. v. Minister of National S
Scragg, Ernest & Sons Ltd. v. Leesona C orp............................. Sept Iles Express Inc. v. Clement Trem blay........................ Seven-Up Co., The v. James D. Heavey Shafter, Charles v. Minister of Nation- Shafter, Harry v. Minister of National Shepherd, Robert Jr. v. The Queen. 274 Shuchat, Meyer v. Minister National Skuttle Mfg. Co. Canada Ltd. al. The Queen v......................
Smit & Sons International Ltd., J. K. v. Packsack Diamond Drills Ltd....... 226 Smith, Percy Vernon v. Minister of CASES REPORTED-ARRtTS RAPPORTeS
S-Concluded-Fin
Sorbara, Sam v. Minister of National
Steen Realty Limited, Minister of
Stewait, John S. v. Minister of Nation- T
Tanner, Clifford W. v. Minister of
Tomkins, Robert Vernon, Minister of
Toronto Harbour Commissioners v. The
Ship Robert C. Norton et al..........
Toronto Harbour Commissioners v.
The Ship Robert C. Norton et al.......
Tremblay, Clement, Sept Iles Express
Inc. v........
...............
Tuke, Othelia v. Minister of National
U
Ultravite Laboratories Ltd., Whitehall Laboratories Ltd. v................ Valclair Investment Co. Ltd., Minister of National Revenue v............. W
Warnford Court (Canada) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue...... Weinberger, Jan V. v. Minister of Whitehall Laboratories Ltd. v. Ultravite Laboratories Ltd.............. Willowbranch M/S v. Imperial Oil Ltd.. 255 Wilson, Frank v. Minister of National Wilson, Morris v. Minister of National Wilson, Sydney v. Minister of National Wurtele, Richard K. et al. v. Minister AUTORITkS CITPES
A
RENVOI
Allmanna Svenska Elektriska A/B v. Burntisland Shipbuilding Coy. Ld...............
[1952] 69 R.P.C. 63................ Anglo-Persian Oil v. Dale (H. M. Inspector of
Taxes).........
........
............
16 T.C. 253....................... Anna Salem, The.........................
1 Lloyds Rep. 474 at 478...... Anticosti Shipping Co. v. St. Amand.........
[1959] S.C.R. 372...............216,225 Aristoc Ld. v. Rysta Ld..................
(1945) 62 R.P.C. 65 at 72...........915 Atlantic Sugar Refineries Ltd. v. Minister of
[1949 S.C.R. 706 at 707............ Attorney General v. Carlton Bank ...........
[1899] 2 Q. B. 164 .................. Aubertin v. La Cit6 de Montreal.............
(1925) 31 R.L., N.S. 163............ Auer Incandescent Light v. O'Brien.......... (1897) 5 Can. Ex. C.R. 243 at 292... 830 B
Baldwin International Radio Co. of Canada
Ltd. v. Western Electric Co. Inc. et al.......[1934 S.C.R. 94 .............
703,706 Bannerman v. Minister of National Revenue... S.C.R. 562................612 Battle Pharmaceuticals v. British Drug Houses
.....................
[1946] S.C.R. 50 at 53............915 Bay Ridge Estates v. Minister of National
...................
[1959] Ex. C.R. 248..........932, 933 Beare v. Carter........................23
T.C. 353....................622 Beaudin v. Minister of National Revenue.
(1963) 31 Tax A.B.C. 102, 105-106 Bennett & White Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Minister of National Revenue...........[1949] S.C.R. 287..................45 Blustein, Irving v. Minister of National Revenue.........
.....................
(1961) Tax A.B.C. Blustein, Jack v. Minister of National Revenue. (1961) 26 Tax A.B.C. 238, 240.. Blustein, Murray v. Minister of National
Revenue.............................(1961)
26 Tax A.B.C. 238, 240. Board of Education v. Rice...............[1911]
A.C. 179.................996 Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Berry......[1937] Ex. C.R. 114 at 116 ......... Bourboin v. Savard.....................40
R. J.Q. (B.R.) 68, 71...........84 Boyce v. Morris Motors Ld...............(1927) 44 R.P.C. 105 at 135........600 British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Minister of National Revenue..............[1958]
S.C.R. 133 ...............
British Hartford-Fairmont Syndicate Ld. v.
Jackson Bros. (Knottingley), Ld.........(1932) 49 R.P.C. 495.............704 British Insulated and Helsby Cables, Ld. v.
Atherton ...........
[1926 A.C 205.................612 British Ore Concentration Syndicate Ltd. v.
Minerals Separation Ld................(1909) 26 R.P.C. 124.............731 British Thomson-Houston Company Ld. v.
Charlesworth, Peebles & Co.............(1925) 42 R.P.C. 180 at 204.701, 701, 705 British Thomson-Houston Co. Ld. v. Corona
Lamp Works Ld...
.................
(1922) 39 R.P.C. 49..........706,764 British Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
v. BraulikE..x.CR4........................(1910)27
R.P.C. 209 at 230..742, 000, 000 90139-4
Californian Copper Syndicate v. Harris.
Canadian General Electric Co. Ld. v. Fada
Radio Ld..............................[1927]
Ex.
C.R.
Canadian Lift Truck Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and
Excise................................(1956)
1 D.L.R. (2d) 497 107f347,958 Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. City Winni- ......... . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .
Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co.
al................................
Central Electricity Generating Board v. Halifax orp ............. ............
. .... ......
Chechik v. Bronfman.......................
Christiani & Nielsen v. Rice...............
Christie v. Minister of National Revenue .....
Ciba Ltd. v. Commissioner Patents .......
Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co. al. v. Glacier
Metal Co. Ld.........................
36 D.L.R. .............. O.R. & (C.A.); D.L.R. (P.C.).............. E.R. 915............... (1923-4) Sask. L.R. 512 .......... S.C.R. 444; A.C. 770; 48 R.P.C. 511.......... 675, Tax A.B.C. 1................... S.C.R. 378...............361, 66 R.P.C. at 160......... 67 R.P.C. 149 ......
Cohen v. Minister of National Revenue..
Ex. C.R. ............
Commissioner Patents v. Winthrop Chemical Co. Inc............................[1948
S.C.R. 46.................
Commissioners Inland Revenue v. Muller
Limited...............................[1901]
A.C. 217.................. Commissioners Inland Revenue v. Reinhold.. T.C. 389.....................
Consolidated Denison Mines Ltd. al. v.
Deputy Minister of National Revenue for
Customs and Excise.....................[1963]
C.T.C. 290................ Cosmos Inc. v. Minister National Revenue... Tax A.B.C. 193............. Cour de Recorder et Cit6 de Montr6al v. Soci6t4
Radio-Canada..........................(1941)
70 B.R. Credit Protectors (Alberta) Ltd. v. Minister
National Revenue.......................[1947]
Ex. C.R. 44 at 47.......... Crosley Radio Corp. v. Canadian General
Electric Co. Ltd........................[1936
S.C.R. at 556.......... Curley v. Latreille[........................1919]60
S.C.R. 131.............. Currie v. McKnight.......................[1897]
at 101............. .501 Dagmar Salen, The v. The Chinook ...........
S.C.R. 608 at 612............267 Davies v. Els by Brothers Ltd..............[1961]
1 W.L.R. ................ D'Avigor-Goldsmid v. Inland Revenue Commissioners.............................[1951]
L.R. Ch.D. at 1039,1052 Day v. Minister National Revenue........[1958] Ex. C.R. ................. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for
Customs and Excise v. Parke, Davis and
Company, Ltd..........................[1954]
Ex. C.R. 1..................33 Derby Development Corp. v. Minister of National Revenue.........................28
Tax ...
............. Desoutter Bros. Ltd. v. J. E. Hanger & Co. Ltd. 1 All E.R. 535............. Dufort v. Dufresne........................[1923]
Ex CR 131.............. Durkee-Atwood Co. v. Richardson........... 23 Fox P.d. 30 at 44......... E
East Angus, Ville de v. Westgate..............
66 R.J.Q. (C.S.) 531......... Edge & Son Ltd. v. William Niccolls & Son
1 Ch. 5; 693; 28R.P.C.53.................... E-Concluded-Fin
Edison Bell Phonograph Corp. Ltd. v. Smith and Young..............................
(1894) R .P.C. 389............... Edwards v. Bairstow.......................
[ E.R. 48 ............
Electric and Musical Industries Ltd. et al. v.
Lissen Ltd.............................(1939)
R.P.C. 23... 396, 701, 757 Electrolier Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Dominion Manufacturers Ltd...........................[19341
S.C.R. 436..............704,741 English Crown Apelter Co. Ltd. v. Baker....
T.C. 327.......................617
Equitable Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Minister
National Revenue......................(1960)
Tax A.B.C. 225...........860 European Investment Trust
Co. Ltd. v.
(1932) 18T.C. 47 F
Farbwerke Hoechst v. The Commissioner of
22 Fox Pat. C. 141; 39 C.P.R. at ......... .361, Farmer v. Scottish North American Trust Ltd.. 118.................. Flour Oxidizing Co. Ld. v. Carr & Co. Ld..... (1908) 25 R.P.C. 428 at ......... French's Complex Ore Reduction Co. v. Electrolytic Zinc Process Co...................
S.C.R. 462 at 470 ............ Frontenac Shoe Lte v. Minister National
.........................
28 Tax A.B.C. 1...................
G
Gauthier v. The King.....................
(1918) 56 Can. S.C.R. at 180..... 647 Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Anglo-American
Trading Co. Ld........................
R. P.C. 465 at 480......... Gingras v. Minister National Revenue .....
28 Tax A.B.C. 21.................. Governor, The and Co. Gentlemen Adventurers of England v. Baillancourt....... S.C.R. 414................. Grant v. Minister National Revenue.......
29 Tax A.B.C. 65 ..................
H
Haig, John, Co. Ltd. v. Forth Blending Co. Ltd. (1953) R.P.C. 259..............418 Hanson's Trade Mark, Re..................(1888)
R.P.C. 130...............413 Hawkins, W.T. Ltd. v. The Deputy Minister
National Revenue for Customs and Excise. .
Ex. C.R. at Hayword v. Hamilton.....................(1884-1886)
Griffin's Patent Cases .....................
Hill v. Evans............................(1862)4
De G.F.
J. 288..........727 Hinks & Son v. Safety Lighting Co..........(1876) at .......... Hobbs v. Husse.........................24
T.C. ......................
Hoff(man-Laroche & Ltd. v. Commissioner
Patents(.............................1955]
Hookham v. Johnson ......................
(1897) R.P.C. 563............... Hortick Minister National Revenue.
(1962-63) Tax A.B.C. 8.......... Houslen v. Marshall.......................(1958)
T.R. 337................
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. v. The
Registrar of Trade Marks................[1939]
Ex. C.R. 141................ Ingersoll Sergeant Drill v. Consolidated
Pneumatic Tool Ld.....................
(1908) R.P.C. at ........... Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. Minister Nation- S.C.R. 346.........461,476, 90139-41
CASES CITED xvui J faroslaw Dabrowski, The....................
(1952) Lloyds Rep. 20 at 26....... Javex Co. Ltd. et al. v. The Deputy Minister of
National Revenue for Customs and Excise.. Ex. C.R. 439 ................
Jensen v. Matsen Navigation Co. et al..........
70 F. Supp. 1020................... Johnston v. Minister of National Revenue ...
S.C.R. 486 ..................
Jones v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue.... (1920) 1 K.B. 714.................. Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford.............
(1880) A.C. 214.................. K
King, Brown and Co. v. Anglo-American Brush
Corp..................................(1892)
R.P.C. 319...............700 King, The v. American Optical Co..........[1950] Ex. C.R. 344 at 366, 367....360, 744 King, The v. Armstrong.................(1908)
40 Can. S.C.R. 229 ......... King, The v. Carling Export Brewery and
Malting Co. Ltd.....................[1931]
A.C. 435; Ex. C.R. 130; [1930] S.C.R. 361............... King, The v. Irving Air Chute Inc..........[1949] S.C.R. 613................963 King, The v. Uhlemann Optical Co..........[1950]
Ex. C.R. 597, 725, Kruse v. Johnson.........................[1898]
91...................
Laberge v. Cit6 de Montr6al ................
(1918) R.J.Q. (B.R.) 1 ........... Lacarte v. Board Education Toronto.
S.C.R. 465 at 476 ............ Lacroix v. The Queen......................[1954]
Ex. C.R. 692................. Land Registering Act v. Shaw...............(1915)
24 D.L.R. 429 ..............
Lane v. Minister National Revenue ........
26 Tax A.B.C. .................
Lattimor v. Heaps...(1931)
O.W.N. 580.............. .19 La Tuque, La Ville de v.b
Desbiens..........(1921) R.J.Q. (B.R.) 20.......... Leeming v. Jones .........................
A.C. 415, 420, ........... Lendoiro La Reine......................[19621
Ex. C.R. at 65-66......... 888 Lester v. Norton Bros. & Co................
(1886) R.P.C. at .......... Lindsay a.
v. Commssioners Inland
_(1932) 18 T.C. 43................ Lovell Co.
v. Beatty Bros. Limited Fox Pat. at ....................................
507, Lussier v Tremblay .....................
1 S.C.R. 389 at 404, 406 ...... McIntosh v. Minister National Revenue... Ex.C.R. S.C.R. McLaughlin v.
Revenue Ex. C.R. 391.........848 MePhar v. Instruments.........(1960) Fox C. Martin and Biro Swan Ld. v. H. Milwood Ld.. R.P.C. (1954) R.P.C. ................. v. Reveenue..................................(1958)
20Tax A.B.C. 29............181 Minerals Separation North American Corp. v.
Noranda Mines Ld................... R.P.C. Ex. C.R. .........
Mvinister of National Revenue v. Eastern
Textiles Limited........................[1957]
C.T.C. 48 ...................
Revenue v. Haden
............................... [19621 109................. Minister of National Revenue v. Co.
et v. The Deputy Nation- Revenue Customs and Excise.......
M-Concluded-Fin
NoM
Minister of National Revenue v. MacInnes....
[1962] Ex. C.R. 385; [1963] S.C.R. 229; Minister of National Revenue v. Minden,
Beatrice...........................[1962]
C.T.C. 79................197
Minister of National Revenue v. Simpson's
Ltd...............................[19531
Ex. C.R. 93...............69
Minister of National Revenue v. Spencer.
[1961] C.T.C. 109 ........
168,182,209 Minister of National Revenue v. Wrights'
Canadian Ropes.....................[1947]
A.C. 109 at 122-3..........958 Montr6al, Cit6 de v. Decarie..............[1918]24
R.L., N.S. 241...........159 Montreal Trust Co. v. Minister of National
Revenue...........................[19561
S.C.R. 702...............
Moreau v. Labelle......................119331
S.C.R. 201 at 217............ Mulvey v. The Barge Neosho..............(1199)
19 Can. Ex. C.R. 1 ......... N
National Phonograph v. Menck............(1911) 28 R.P.C. 229 at 248......... Natural Colour Kinematograph Co. Ld. (in liquidation) v. Bioschemes Ld. (in the matter of G.
(1915) 32 R.P.C. 256............ Needham e a. v. Johnson & Co...........
(1884) 1 R.P.C. 49..............7.0. 5 New Process Screw Corp. v. Robertson Mfg.
...............................
(1962) 22 Fox Pat C. 71 at83.
Noakv . Minister of National Revenue.......[1953] 2.C.R. 136........178, 196, 211 "Nodoz" Trade Mark....................
[1962] R.P.C. 1..................
No-Fume Ld. v. Frank Pitchford & Co. Ld
.
(1935) 52 R.P.C. 231.............747 Non-Drip Measure Coy. Ld. v. Stranger's Ld.
et al...............................(1943)
60 R.P.C. 135 363, 508, 740, 742 Noralta Hotel Limited v. Minister of National
54 D.T.C., 1080 ...................
Noranda Mines Ltd. v. Minerals Separation
North American Corp .............
....
[1947] Ex. C.R. 306 at 316; [1950] S.C.R. 34 at 56 ................
O'Cedar of Canada Ltd. v. Mallory Hardware
Products Ltd........................[1956]
Ex. C.R. 29 ........ 63, 393, 723 (Euvre de Patronage de St-Hyacinthe v. Cit6 de St-Hyacinthe.....................(1918)
R.J.Q. (B.R.) 496......... 159 Orlando v. Minister of National Revenue.
S.C.R. 261............... Osramn Lamp Works Ld. v. Pope's Electric
Lamp Co. Ld........................(1917)
34 R.P.C. 369 at 391........ Overend v. Burrow, Stewart & Milne Co.
O.L.R. 642.................. p
Palmer's Trade Mark, re.................(1883)
24 Ch. D. 504, 521......... Parke, Davis & Co. v. Pine Chemicals of
Canada, Ltd.....Aec ...................
[1959] S.C.R. 219 at 228; 18 Fox P.C. 125 at 132 5.................. 826,958 Parkes, Samuel & Co. Ld. v. Cocker Bros., Ltd. (1929) 46 R.P.C. 241 at 248..367, 740 Patent Exploitation, Ld. v. Siemens Bros. &
Co. Ld t.........................
( 1904) 21 R.P.C. 541............. Pendle and Rivet, Ltd. v. llerman ines Ltd (1927) 33 Comm. Cas. 70 at 78 ...... Peninsular Investments Ltd. v. Minister of
28 Tax. A.B.C. 161 ................
Permutit Co. v. Borrowman.................
(1926) 43 R.P.C. 356 .............
Pinsky v. Poitras et a ..................
.44 R. de J. 63 at 74 .............. .8 Pioneer Laundry and Dry Cleaners Ld. v.
Minister of National Revenue...........[1940] A.C. 127 at 136............958 Pore Appliance Corp. v. Spanish River Pulp
Paer Mills Ltd.....................[1929]
A.C. 269; (1929) 46 R.P.C. 23 at 52 and 56.....351, 390, 726, 728, 741 AUTORITES CITeES
R
Randall, H. E. Ltd. v.
R.P.C. 657 at 663........423 Regal Heights Ltd. v. Minister of National
.....................
119601 S.C.R. 902.. 66, 460, 497, 875, 932, 933, 945 Reliable Plastics v. Louis Marx............(1958) 17 Fox Pat. C. 184; 29 C.P.R. 113 at 127.................... Rheostatic Co. Ltd. v. McLaren, Robert & Co.
Riddell v. Patrick Harrison & Co. Pat. C. Robertson v. Minister of National Revenue...
[1944] Ex. C.R. 170, 184..........134 Rogers Majestic Corp. Ltd. v. Corp. of the City of Toronto.........................[1943]
S.C.R. 440 at 446..........443 Rosedale Associated Mfrs. Ld. v. Carlton Tyre
Saving Corp. Ld.....................[19601
R.P.C. 59.............704,764 Ross v. Minister of National Revenue.......[1950] C.T.C. 170 ...............
Royal Trust Co. v. Minister of National Revenue..............................[1957
C.T.C. 32................940
Russell v. Minister of National Revenue.
29 Tax A.B.C. 246, 254 ............ Rutledge v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1929) 14 T.C. 419, 490 .......
193, 476 St
St. Lawrence Transportation Co. Ltd; v. The
Schooner Amedee T...................[19241
Ex. C.R. 204.............. S
Scott v. Minister National Revenue........[1963]
C.T.C. 176.............9.. Sedgepool, The........[1956]
2 Lloyds Rep. 608 Shannon v. Lower Miainl*anrdDiyPout
Board.................................[1938]
A.C. 708-721................ C................(1879) v. Tramways.........(1886) Stewart, J. S. v. Tax A.B.C. Strong & Co. Ltd. v. Woodifield ...........
19061 A.C. 448 at 453 ............
Studebaker
Distributors
Charlton
Stean Shipping Co. Ltd................
[1938] 1 K.B. 459............... Sura v. Minister of National Revenue.......[1962
S.C.R. 65 at 68............134 Surprenant v. Brault......................(1922)
32 R.J.Q. (B.R.)...........153 T
Tanner v. Minister of National Revenue.
Tax A.B.C. 246, 254............90 Timkan v. Perry..........................(1951)
1 T.L.R. 91...............119 Tomkins, v. Minister of National Revenue. 28 Tax A.B.C. 276...............68 Tremblay v. The King.
..................
[1944 Ex. C.R. 1 at 8............646 U
Unipak Cartons Ltd. v. Crown Zellerbach
Canada Ltd .......... L.................(1960) 33 C.P.R. 20 Fox
Pat.
349, 389, 723 20 Fox Pat. C. 1 at 33............... Utah Company of the Americas v. Minister of
National Revenue....................[1960]
Ex. C.R. 128............... Valclair Investment Co. Ltd. v. Minister of
28 Tax A.B.C. 193............. Van der Lely (C.) N.1. v. Ba8fords Ltd.
R.P.C.296 at 305; [19631 R.P.C. 61at71 ...........
701, 741 Vickers, Sons and Co. Ltd. v. Siddell........(1890) 7 R.P.C. 292............. Vidal Dyes Syndicate Ld. v. Levinstein Ld
(1912) 29 R.P.C. 245 at 279......... Von Heyden v. Neustadt................
(1880) 14 C.D. 230.............. zz
W
NAE
S.C.R. 377.................
Wampole, Henry K. & Co. Ltd. v. Hervay
Chemical Co. Canada Ltd..............
Ex. C.R. 78................
Western Electric Co. v. Baldwin International
Radio Canada.......................
S.C.R. 570 at 574........703,706 Williams, J. B. Co. v. Brownley & Co.........
R.P.C. 765 at 771......... Williams v. Leonard al..................
Ont. P.R. 544; (1896) Can. S.C.R. 406................. Wilson v. Village of Long Branch............[1957] O.R. 346...................858 Withers v. Nethersole.....................[1948]
1 ER. 400..............622 Wood v. Butler...........................(1886)
R.P.C. 81................423 Woon v. Minister of National Revenue..
Ex. C.R. .................
Wrights Ropes Ltd. v. Broderick & Bascom
Rope Co
..
Ex. C.R. 143................ Wylie v. The City of Montreal .............
Can. S.C.R. 384 at 386..... z
Zamulinski v. The Queen ...................
D.IL.R.2d. and ........ The General Rules and Orders of the Exchequer Court of Canada as made on April 21, 1931 and as amended from time to time (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") are hereby amended, effective January 1, 1965, as follows:
1. (1) The words "or a Judge" where they appear in the Rules at the places described in Schedule "A" hereto are deleted. (2) The words "or Judge" where they appear in the Rules at the places described in Schedule "B" hereto are deleted.
(3) The word "Judge" or "a Judge" where that word or words appear in the Rules at the places described in Schedule "C" hereto, is hereby deleted and the word "Court" or "the Court" is substituted therefor.
(4) The words "a Judge in Chambers", where those words appear in the Rules at the places described in Schedule "D" hereto, are hereby deleted and the words "the Court" are substituted therefor.
(5) The words "or to a Judge" in line 1 of Rule 67 are deleted. (6) The words "to him" in the second line of Rule 73 are deleted. (7) The words "or a Judge in Court" in the first and second lines of Rule 174, are deleted.
(8) The words "the Judge" in the sixth line and in the ninth line of Rule 178 and in the third line of Rule 181 are deleted and, in each case, the words "a Judge" are substituted therefor. (9) The words "or his" in the first line of Rule 219 are deleted. (10) The words "or he" in the third and fourth lines of Rule 233 are deleted.
The words "Judge who tries the action" in the third line of Rule 237 are deleted and the word "Court" is substituted therefor.
(12) The words "to a Judge in Chambers or" in the first line of Rule 258 are deleted.
(13) Paragraph (e) of Rule 277A is amended by deleting the comma and the words "a Judge" in the first line and the third line thereof.
2. (1) Paragraph (c) of Rule 1 is repealed and the following is sub- (c) The words "Exchequer Court" or "Court" when used in these Rules shall mean the Exchequer Court of Canada, any part of the business which may be transacted, by virtue of section of the Exchequer Court Act, by any Judge of that Court.
(2) Paragraph (d) of Rule 1 is repealed.
(3) Paragraph (e) of Rule 1 is repealed and the following is substituted therefor:
(e) "Registrar" includes a Deputy Registrar when acting as Registrar in the absence of the Registrar or when performing a function of the Registrar in accordance with an arrangement made by the Registrar or Acting Registrar or a direction given by the Registrar or Acting Registrar.
3. Rule 6 is amended by adding the following paragraph thereto: 4. A petition of right or a statement of claim shall show the place of residence of the suppliant or plaintiff at the time of the commencement of the action and, if the suppliant or plaintiff is not a natural person, the petition of right or statement of claim, as the case may be, shall show its legal character.
4. The words "Minister of Agriculture" where they appear in the fourth line of the second paragraph of Rule 36, in the fourth line of Rule 37 and in the third line of Rule 41 are deleted and the words "Attorney General of Canada" are substituted therefor. 5. Rules 60 and 68 are repealed.
6. The following is added to the Rules immediately following Rule 96: RULE 96A
Particulars
Subject to paragraph (2), every pleading shall contain the necessary particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing words,
(a) particulars of any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party pleading relies; and
(b) where a party pleading alleges any condition of the mind of any person, whether any disorder or disability of mind or any malice, fraudulent intention or other condition of mind except knowledge, particulars of the facts on which the party relies. (2) Where it is necessary to give particulars of debt, expenses or damages and those particulars exceed 3 folios, they must be set out in a separate document referred to in the pleading and the pleading must state whether the document has already been served, and if so, when, or is to be served with the pleading.
(3) The Court may order a party to serve on any other party further and better particulars of any claim, defence or other matter stated in his pleading, or a further and better statement of the nature of the case on which he relies, and the order may be made on such terms as the Court thinks just.
(4) Where a party alleges as a fact that a person had knowledge or notice of some fact, matter or thing, then, without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (3), the Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, order that party to serve on any other party
(a) where he alleges knowledge, particulars of the facts on which he relies; and
(b) where he alleges notice, particulars of the notice. (5) An order under this rule shall not be made before service of the defence and such discovery of documents or examination for discovery as the party applying intends to have, unless, in the opinion of the Court, the order is necessary or desirable to enable the defendant to plead or for some other special reason.
(6) Where the applicant for an order under this rule did not apply in writing to the party against whom the order is sought for the particulars that he requires, the Court may in its discretion refuse to make the order unless of opinion that there were sufficient reasons for such an application in writing not having been made.
7. Rule 107 is amended by adding the following paragraph immediately after the first paragraph thereof:
The Attorney General, or a petitioner or plaintiff other than one petitioning or suing on behalf of a class may, at any time, without leave, by notice in writing, after having filed a consent from all other parties, wholly discontinue his action or withdraw any part or parts of his alleged cause of complaint, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be contained in such consent.
8. The second paragraph of Rule 113 is repealed and the following is substituted therefor:
But where in an action it appears to the Court that the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues of fact in dispute between the parties, it may, either upon application of one of the parties or of its own motion, direct the parties to prepare issues, and such issues shall, if the parties differ, be settled by the Court. '
9. Rule 138 is repealed and the following is substituted therefor: RULE
Using at trial examination for Discovery
Any party may, at the trial of an action or issue, use in evidence any part of the examination for the purposes of discovery of the opposite party; but the Court may look at the whole of the examination. and if of opinion that any other part is so connected with the part to be used that the last-mentioned part ought not to be used without such other part, may require such other part to be put in evidence by the party seeking to use such examination.
10.
In any action for damages arising out of any injury to the person, the Court may order that the person in respect of whose injury damages are claimed shall submit himself to examination at such place and by such duly qualified medical practitioner or practitioners or such medical officer or officers of the Department of Veterans' Affairs as may be deemed proper.
(2) The third and fourth paragraphs of Rule 144A are repealed and the following substituted therefor:
3. If the person ordered under this Rule to submit himself for examination fails, without good cause, to comply with such order, he shall, if he is the suppliant or plaintiff, be liable to have his action dismissed.
4. The Court may order that the Crown or other party seeking an order under the first or second paragraph of this Rule pay to the person to be examined or his parent or guardian all necessary travelling and maintenance expenses incurred or to be incurred in attending for such examination.
(3) Rule 144A is further amended by adding the following paragraph thereto:
6. Any person required to undergo examination pursuant to this Rule is entitled to have his solicitor and medical advisor or either of them at such examination and is entitled to a copy of any written record or report of the examination that the examiner may make. 11. Rule 147 is repealed and the following is substituted therefor: RULE 147
Notice to Admit Facts
Any party may call upon any adverse party not less than days before the commencement of trial, to admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice.
In case of refusal or neglect to admit, after a notice under this Rule, the cost of proving the fact not admitted shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the action may be, unless at the hearing or trial the Court certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable.
A notice to admit facts may be in the terms of Form 26A in the Appendix to these Rules.
12. Rule 156 is repealed and the following substituted therefor: RULE 156
Time and place for trial
When any action or other matter is ready for trial or hearing, the Court may, upon application of any party and after notice thereof served on all other parties, fix the time and place of trial or hearing and may direct when and in what manner and upon whom notice of trial or hearing is to be served. The order will, unless otherwise directed, be in the terms of Form 27 in the Appendix to these Rules.
General sittings of the Exchequer Court of Canada may be held at any place outside Ottawa at any time appointed by the Court, of which notice shall be published in the Canada Gazette; and any action or matter ready for trial or hearing may, without a direction under the first paragraph of this Rule having been obtained, be set down for trial or hearing at any such General Sittings by either party thereto, upon giving the opposite party ten days' notice of trial, or by consent of the parties.
Before making an application for an order fixing a date and place for trial or setting a case down for trial at a General Sittings, a party shall,
(a) unless the pleadings sufficiently define the issues of fact in dispute between the parties,
(i) file an agreement of all parties stating such issues, or (ii) apply under Rule 113 for an order settling the issues of fact, and (b) unless there are special reasons for fixing the date for trial a substantial time in advance of trial,
(i) have had examination for discovery or waive such examination, (ii) have had production of documents or waive such production, (iii) have served such notices to admit under Rule 146 and Rule as may be appropriate.
A party making an application for a date fixing a date and place for trial or setting a case down for trial at a General Sittings shall, before making the application, have filed a note signed by the solicitor or counsel stating
(a) the number of witnesses that the party proposes to call, (b) the party's estimate of the length of the hearing in days or hours, (c) an indication of the quantity of documents in the case;
and every other party shall file such a note
(d) upon being served with a notice of application to fix the place and date of the trial, or
(e) upon being served with a notice of trial after a case has been set down for hearing at a General Sittings.
The Court may direct that an action or other matter that has been set down for hearing at a General Sittings be removed from the list for that sittings if. having regard to the probable length of the case, it is impractical to have it heard at that sittings.
Any such General Sittings shall be continued from day to day until the business coming before the Court be disoosed of.
On the first day of each such General Sittings, the Court will deal with interlocutory and other matters that can be more conveniently dealt with at that sittings than in Ottawa.
13. Paragraph (1) of Rule 157 is repealed and the following is sub- The party by whom any proceedings are set down for hearing or who gives notice of motion for an order fixing the date for hearing of any proceedings shall, at the time the proceedings are set down or the notice of motion is filed, as the case may be, have had prepared, and had certified by the Registrar, a copy of the record (being the pleadings and all such orders or other material on the Court's file as may be material to the disposition of the matter at or after trial) and shall supply an additional copy thereof for the use of the trial Judge. Such copy of the record shall be on such paper and in such state as is satisfactory to the Registrar.
The Judge's fiat or pronouncement disposing of the matter shall be endorsed or added to the certified copy of the record and signed or initialled by him.
14. The following rule is added immediately after Rule 157:
RULE 157A
Opening statements by counsel
Whenever, on the trial of any proceedings, any party proposes to adduce evidence, a counsel for the party shall, unless the presiding Judge otherwise directs, immediately before introducing any evidence, make a short statement giving a concise outline of the facts that the party proposes to prove and of the applicable law.
15. Rules 160 and 161 are repealed and the following are substituted therefor:
RULE 160
Postponement of trial
The Court may, if it is expedient in the interest of justice, postpone or adjourn the trial for such time, and upon such terms, if any, as seem fit.
Sitting or trial adjourned when Judge unable to attend
In case no Judge is able to attend on a day fixed for the hearing of any proceedings, such hearing shall stand adjourned from day to day until a Judge is able to attend.
16. Paragraph 2 of Rule 172 is repealed and the following paragraphs are substituted therefor:
2. When no party has, two weeks from the day the order was made, applied to the Registrar for an appointment to settle the minutes of the order, the Registrar may, ten days after sending to the parties, by ordinary mail, a draft of the order and after considering any representations received from the parties within that time, settle the minutes of the order.
3. When the Registrar has settled the minutes of an order under paragraph 2 hereof, the party upon whose application the order was granted shall forthwith pay to the Registrar a fee of $20 and shall not be permitted to take any further step in the matter until the fee has been paid.
17. Rule 206 is repealed and the following is substituted therefor: RULE 206
Enforcing order of Court
Every order of the Court, whether in an action, cause or matter, may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment to the same effect. 18. The following is added immediately after Rule 222:
RULE 222A
Execution of judgment on condition
Where a judgment or order is to the effect that any party is entitled to any relief subject to or upon fulfilment of any condition or contingency, the party so entitled may, upon the fulfilment of the condition or contingency, and demand made upon the party against whom he is entitled to relief, apply to the Court for leave to issue execution against such party; and the Court may, if satisfied that the right to relief has arisen according to the terms of the judgment or order, order that execution issue accordingly, or may direct that any issue or question necessary for the determination of the rights of the parties be tried in any of the ways in which issues or questions arising in an action may be tried.
19. Rule 242 is amended by adding the following paragraph thereto: Every interlocutory order granting an injunction is, whether or not the order expressly so provides, subject to rescission, suspension or amendment by order of the Court at any time after the order granting the injunction was made.
20. Rules 247, 248 and 249 are repealed and the following are sub- RULE 247
Hearing of motions
A Judge will sit in open Court at Ottawa every Tuesday and Thursday, or on the next juridical day, in the event of any Tuesday or Thursday being a holiday, for the purpose of hearing all motions and applications that can conveniently be heard at such sittings.
Counsel need not be robed for such sittings.
RULE 248
Setting down of motions
Motions and applications are to be set down to be heard at least two days before hearing under Rule 247 unless the Court shall otherwise order. This rule does not apply to ex parte motions.
RULE 249
Application to be made by motion
Where by these Rules any application is authorized to be made to the Court, it shall be made by motion.
21. Rule 256 is repealed.
22. Rule 259 is repealed and the following substituted therefor: RULE 259
Rescission of ex parte orders
The Court may rescind any order that was made ex parte but no such rescission will affect the validity or character of anything done or not done before the rescinding order was made.
23. (1) All that part of Rule 287 preceding paragraph (2) thereof is repealed and the following is substituted therefor:
(1) The Registrar shall have power
(a) to do anything that he is by the Rules of Court authorized to do,
(b) if he is satisfied that all parties affected have consented thereto, make any order that the Court may make other than an order that is inconsistent with any order previously made by a judge,
(c) if he is satisfied that all narties affected have consented to a judgment that is limited to the payment of a fixed amount of money enter judgment accordingly, and (d) give any judgment that the Court might give under paragraph (b)
of Rule 124 in any action claiming only a liquidated amount of money.
In case any matter shall appear to the Registrar to be proper for consideration by the Court, he may refer the same to the Court and the Court may either dispose of the matter or refer it back to the Registrar, with such direction as it deems appropriate.
(2) Paragraph (2) of Rule 287 is amended by deleting the words "a Judge sitting in Chambers" and substituting the words "the Court" therefor.
(3) Paragraph (4) of Rule 287 is amended by deleting the words "Judge in Chambers" in the second line and substituting the word "Court" therefor and by deleting the word "Judge" in the last line and substituting the word "Court" therefor. (4) Paragraph (5) of Rule 287 is amended by deleting the words "Monday" and "Friday" wherever they appear therein and substituting the words "Tuesday" and "Thursday" respectively therefor, and by deleting the word "Judge" in the fifth line and substituting the word "Court" therefor.
24. Rule 289 is amended by deleting all the words in the said rule commencing with the word "Provided" in the fifth line.
25. Delete the words "The Judge" where they appear in the first line of Rule 290 and in the sixth line of Rule 291 and substitute the words "A Judge" therefor.
26. The following paragraph is added to Rule 298:
Before a matter has been set down for trial at a General Sittings or an order has been made fixing the time and place of trial, where any party desires to have the time appointed by these Rules or fixed by any order for his doing any act or taking any proceeding enlarged or abridged and the party or parties adverse in interest consent to such enlargement or abridgment, it is not necessary to obtain an order from the Court to enlarge or abridge the time and, in the absence of special circumstances, an application for an order enlarging or abridging the time shall not be made without having first sought such consent. 27. Rule 300 is repealed and the following substituted therefor: RULE 300
Non-compliance
The Court may under special circumstances, depart from any limitation in these Rules upon the inherent right or power of the Court. Non-compliance with any of these Rules or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court shall so direct but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court shall think fit. No application to set aside any proceeding for irregularity shall be allowed unless made within a reasonable time, nor if the party applying has taken any fresh step after knowledge of the irregularity. Where an application is made to set aside a proceedings for irregularity, the several objections intended to be insisted upon shall be stated in the notice of motion.
28. The appendix is amended by adding the following immediately after Form 26:
FORM 26A
Notice to Admit Facts
(Rule 147) IN THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
Between
A.B.,
C.D.
TAKE NOTICE that the plaintiff (or defendant) requires the defendant (or plaintiff), within six days from service of this notice, to admit, for the purposes of this cause only, the several facts respectively hereunder specified, saving all just exceptions to the admissibility of such facts as evidence in this cause.
Dated, etc.
Solicitor for the plaintiff (or defendant) To the Solicitor for the defendant (or plaintiff)
The facts, the admission of which is required, are
1. That the automobile referred to in paragraph............of the statement of claim and in paragraph............of the statement of defence belonged at all relevant times to the plaintiff.
2. That J.D., referred to in the same paragraphs was, at all relevant times, a servant of the defendant, acting in the course of his employment.
3. That the cost of repairing the damages sustained by the aforesaid automobile in the collision referred to in paragraph............of the statement of claim and paragraph............of the statement of defence was............and that the expense was reasonably incurred.
29. Tariff A is amended by adding the following item immediately after Item 36:
36A. Counsel fees on negotiations with the opposing party with a view to agreeing on facts for purposes of trial or with a view, otherwise, to agreeing an arrangements to shorten or facilitate the trial of the matter, to be allowed on the same basis as counsel fees at trial. 30. A reference in this Order to a line of a rule is a reference to that line of the Rules as printed by the Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery in 1962.
31. The Rules as amended hereby apply to proceedings pending in the Court at the time these amendments become effective as well as to proceedings commenced thereafter.
DATED at Ottawa, this 4th day of November, 1964.
Camil NoRl
SCHEDULE "A"
Delete "or a Judge"
(1) R. 23, 2nd 1.
R. 69, 8th 1.
R. 24, 2nd 1.
R. 6th 1.
(3) R. 25, 2nd 1.
(9) R. 76, 5th 1.
(4) R. 26, 1st 1.
R. 76, 9th 1.
R. 27, 1st & 2nd 11
R. 76, 14th 1.
R. 56, 9th 1.
R. 77, 1st 1.
(7) R. 69, 7th 1.
R. 77, 5th 1.
90139-9
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R. 77, 10th & 11th 11.
R. 77, 13th 1.
R. 78, 2nd 1.
R. 78, 7th 1.
R. 79, 7th 1.
R. 103, 9th 1.
R. 104, 7th 1.
R. 107, 2nd para. 3rd 1.
R. 107, 2nd para. 4th 1.
R. 4th para. 1st 1.
R. 109, 4th 1.
R. 110, 2nd 1.
R. 4th 1.
R. 114, 1st 1.
R. 115, 1st 1.
R. 117, 4th 1.
R. 118, 2nd 1.
R. 119, 3rd 1.
R. 124(a), 10th 1.
R. 124(a), 14th & 15th 11.
R. 124(b), 9th 1.
R. 124(c), 2nd 1.
R. 127, 2nd 1.
R. 128, 2nd & 3rd 11.
R. 128, 7th 1.
R. 129(c), 3rd 1.
R. 129(d).
R. 130(b).
R. 9th 1.
R. 135, 4th 1.
R. 137, 2nd 1.
R. 140, 1st 1.
R. 3rd 1.
R. 143, 2nd & 3rd 11.
R. 148, 1st 1.
R. 149, 4th 1.
R. 149, 5th 1.
SCHEDULE "B"
Delete "or Judge"
26, 4th 1.
27, 5th 1.
5th 1.
7th 1.
75, 5th 1.
110, 3rd 1.
117, 5th 1.
120, 8th 1.
127, 3rd 1.
5th 1.
128, 9th 1.
144A(2), lst 1.
144A(5), 4th 1.
5th 1.
8th 1.
164, 6th 1.
164, 10th 1.
205, 5th 1
4th I
R. 2nd 1. 9th 1. R. 1st 1. R. 5th 1. R. 10th 1. 12th 1. R. 15th 1. R. 3rd 1. I. 7th 1. R. 3rd 1. H. 6th 1. R. 1st 1. R. 2nd 1. R. 4th 1. R. 6th & 7th 11. R. 2nd & 3rd 11. R. 2nd 1. Heading of Rule R. 1st 1. R. 153, 3rd 1. R. 155, 14th 1. R. 2nd 1. R. 164, 2nd 1. R. 169, 1st 1. 9th 1. R. 205, 4th 1. R. 208, 2nd 1. R. 211, 4th 1. R. 216, 2nd 1. H. 219, 1st 1. R. 226, 3rd 1. I. 228, 12th 1. H. 230, 5th 1. R. 231, 4th 1. R. 232, 3rd 1. R. 233, 1st 1. R. 235, 13th 1. R. 236, 5th 1. R. 236, 8th 1. R. 237, 9th & 10th 11. R. 238, 3rd 1. R. 239, 1st 1. R. 242, 2nd 1. R. 243, 1st 1. I. 244, 1st 1. R. 244, 5th & 6th 11. R. 245, 2nd 1. R. 250, 2nd 1. R. 255, 2nd 1. R. 261, 2nd 1. R. 261, 3rd & 4th 11. R. 266, 4th 1. R. 268, 2nd 1. R. 269, 11th 1. R. 297, 4th 1. I. 298, 1st 1. R.
R.
R.
R.
R. 2nd 1.
R. 6th 1.
R. 18(2), 8th 1.
(8) R. 7th 1.
(2) R. 9th 1.
R. 3rd 1.
(3) R. 7th 1.
R. 6th 1.
(4) R. 7th 1.
SCHEDULE "D"
Substitute "the Court" for Judge in Chambers"
(1) R. 2nd & 3rd 11.
(3) R. 6th 1.
R. 3rd para. 4th 1.
(4) R. 264(3), 2nd 1. AMENDMENT TO RULES
EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
Form 26A in the Appendix to the General Rules and Orders of the Exchequer Court of Canada as added thereto by paragraph 8 of the Order amending the Rules and Orders dated November 4, 1964, is hereby amended, effective January 1, 1965, by inserting immediately after the words "within six days from service of this" the words "notice, to admit, for the purposes of this".
Dated at Ottawa, this 3rd day of December, A.D. 1964.
Camil Nol
AMENDMENTS TO RULES
EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
1. Rule 156 of the General Rules and Orders of the Exchequer Court of Canada, as amended by the Order dated November 4, 1964, is amended by deleting the words "a date" at the end of the first line of the fourth paragraph thereof and substituting the words "an order" therefor.
2.
but no declaratory or other relief other than that specifically pronounced by the Court shall be included, whether by consent or otherwise, in such minutes.
(2) The said Rule 172 is further amended by adding the following paragraphs thereto:
4. A party who is dissatisfied with the minutes of a judgment or order as settled by the Registrar may apply to the Court to vary the minutes as settled, upon serving the opposite party with two clear days' notice of the application; but no such application shall stay the entry of the judgment or order if the Registrar is of opinion that the application is frivolous or would unreasonably prejudice the successful party.
5. An application under paragraph 4 shall be based only on the ground that the minutes as settled do not in some one or more respects specified in the notice of application accord with the judgment pronounced by the Court or that some matter which should have been dealt with has been overlooked or accidentally omitted from the judgment as pronounced.
Dated at Ottawa, this 11th day of January, A.D. 1965.
Camil Noll
PRACTICE NOTE No. 1
September 1, 1964
Having regard to the large number of cases that are expected to come on for trial during the coming year and the heavy demands on the time of the Judges of the Court, the co-operation of counsel appearing for parties in cases that are in course of preparation for trial is sought with a view to ensuring that trials are completed without undue delay.
In this connection, the following matters are specifically drawn to the attention of counsel so engaged:
1. COSTS
The taxing officer will allow appropriate fees for time spent by solicitors or counsel in preparation for trial by way of making arrangements between the parties designed to shorten the trial of an action. 2. DEFINITION OF ISSUES OF FACT
Rule 113 of the Exchequer Court Rules reads, in part:
But where in an action it appears to a Judge that the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues of fact in dispute between the parties, he may direct the parties to prepare issues, and such issues shall, if the parties differ, be settled by the Judge.
Counsel are requested to review pleadings well in advance of trial with a view to making any necessary application to ensure that the "issues of fact" to be determined at trial are clearly and exhaustively "defined". 3. ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS
Counsel are expected to establish before trial which documents can be admitted by consent without proof and which documents must be proved. Counsel will for this purpose be expected to make full use of Rule 146, which reads as follows:
Either party may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all just exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the action may be, unless at the hearing or trial the Court certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice be given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense.
A notice to admit documents may be in the terms of Form 26 in the Appendix to these Rules.
Counsel are requested to have available for the use of the Court and for the use of counsel for the adverse party, copies (preferably photostat) of the documentary exhibits it is proposed to put in evidence, bound together, where practicable, in chronological order. Each document should bear a notation, preferably signed by opposing counsel, as to whether it is "admitted" or its "admission is refused" pursuant to Rule 146. It would be an added convenience if the opposing parties could co-operate on an amalgamation of the Judge's copies of documents so that there would be one set in chronological order with a suitable notation on each document as to the party who proffers it. 4. ADMISSIONS OF FACTS
Counsel are requested to review the pleadings in planning their evidence at trial with a view to taking full advantage of admissions on the pleadings. Rule 92 reads as follows:
Every allegation of fact in any pleadings in an action, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleadings of the opposite party, shall be taken to be admitted, except as against an infant, lunatic, person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, or other person judicially incapacitated.
Further proof of any allegation of fact in a pleading is therefore unnecessary unless it is
(a) denied specifically or by necessary implication, or
(b) stated to be "not admitted", or unless the opposing party is a person judicially incapacitated. Attention is also drawn to Rule 145, which reads as follows: Any party to a cause or matter may give notice, by his pleading or otherwise, that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party. It would be appreciated if counsel would consider before trial, the possibilities of proceedings under this Rule to shorten the duration of trials.
Attention is further drawn to Rule 4 of Order 32 of the English Rules (which would appear to be applicable in cases arising outside the Province of Quebec). That Rule reads as follows:
4. party may, writing, at any time not later than nine the notice trial has been notice trial required, not later than days after the action set for trial, other party to admit, the purposes the matter any fact mentioned notice. Provided that pursuance notice to deemed to only the the particular matter, and not to against the party any other favour any other than the party the notice: provided that the Court Judge may at any time any party to amend withdraw any admission made terms may just.
Counsel should consider taking advantage of this Rule with reference to specific facts. The party upon whom a notice to admit facts has been served may, of course, refuse to admit or fail to answer, but he would do so at his peril as to costs.
There is, of course, no intention to abridge the right of parties to a full and ample hearing of the issues between them giving rise to the necessity of having their disputes adjudicated. However, complete justice cannot be done to all parties having disputes to be adjudicated by the Court unless early dates for trial can be granted and time can be allowed to Judges for preparation of judgments without undue delay after completion of trials. Counsel are therefore expected to take all steps, consistent with protecting their clients' proper interests, that will aid the Judges in expediting the business of the Court.
PRACTICE NOTE No. 2
December 29, 1964
Much time is presently occupied during the course of argument while the judge makes a note of the names and citations of authorities and statutes referred to by counsel. To eliminate any unnecessary prolongation of the argument on that account, the following request is made:
Before a counsel commences argument or summing up, he is requested to supply, for the use of the Court, a list of the authorities and statutes upon which he intends to rely, including citations, and to supply a copy of the list to counsel for the other parties.
It is understood, of course, that counsel are not precluded from referring, during argument, to authorities or statutes not on the lists. Les Rgles et Ordonnances g~n6rales de la Cour de lIPchiquier du Canada, 6tablies le 21 avril 1931 et modifides de temps h autre par la suite (ci-apris appel6es (les RiglesD), sont par les prdsentes modifi6es, A compter du lor janvier 1965, comme il suit:
1. (1) Les mots un jugeD, d'un jugeD, A un juge> ou dernier ou>, selon le cas, qui apparaissent dans les R~gles aux endroits indiquis A l'annexe -A- ci-jointe, sont retranch6s. (2) Les mots le juge>, eou du jugeD, un juge>, d'un juge>, A un jugeD, lui ou>, au jugeD ou ce jugeD, selon le cas, qui apparaissent dans les Rigles aux endroits indiquis A l'annexe ci-jointe, sont retranchis. (3) Les mots jugeD, -du juge> ou ail-, selon le cas, qui apparaissent dans les R~gles aux endroits indiqus h l'annexe -C- ci-jointe, sont par les pr6sentes retranch6s et remplac6s par les mots Cour>, la Cour ou celleD, selon le cas.
(4) Les mots juge en chambreD, qui apparaissent dans les Rigles aux endroits indiquds h l'annexe ci-jointe, sont par les pr6sentes retranch6s et remplacs par les mots CourD. (5) Les mots A un jugeD, h la premibre ligne de la Rbgle 67, sont retranch~s.
(6) Le mot h la deuxibme ligne de la Rigle 73 est retranch6.
(7) Les mots un juge sidgeant en courD, premibre et deuxibme lignes de la R~gle 174, sont retranch6s.
(8) Les mots die juge> qui apparaissent h la sixibme et h la dixibme lignes de la R~gle 178 et h la troisibme ligne de la Rigle 181, sont retranch6s et, dans chaque cas, ces mots sont remplac~s par les mots juge>.
(9) La pr~sente modification ne s'applique pas A la version frangaise (Rgle 219).
(10) La pr~sente modification ne s'applique pas h la version frangaise (Rigle 233).
(11) Les mots cIe juge qui instruit l'actiono, h la troisibme ligne de la Rbgle 237, sont retranch6s et remplac6s par les mots CourD.
(12) Les mots un juge en chambre ouD, A la premibre ligne de la Rbgle 258, sont retranch6s.
(13) L'alin6a e) de la Rhgle 277A est modifi6 par la suppression de la virgule et des mots cun juge
A la premibre et h la troisibme lignes.
2. (1) L'alin6a c) de la Rhgle 1 est abrog4 et remplac6 par ce qui c) Les expressions <Cour de 1ichiquiers ou aCourp, partout oi elles se rencontrent dans les pr~sentes R~gles, signifient la Cour l'Echiquier du Canada, dont toute partie des affaires peut, sous le r6gime de Particle de la Loi sur la Cour de l'Achiquier, 6tre exp~dide par n'importe quel juge de cette Cour,
(2) L'alin6a d) de la R~gle 1 est abrog6.
(3) L'alinia e) de la Rigle 1 est abrog6 et remplac6 par ce qui e) L'expression <registraireD comprend un sous-registraire qui agit en qualit6 de registraire en I'absence du registraire ou qui remplit une fonction du registraire en conformit6 d'une disposition prise par le registraire ou sous-registraire ou d'une directive donn6e par le registraire ou sous-registraire.
3. La Rhgle 6 est modifi6e par l'adjonction du paragraphe suivant: 4. Une p6tition de droit ou un expos6 de demande doivent indiquer le lieu de r6sidence du requ6rant ou demandeur au moment du d~but de laction et, si le requ~rant ou demandeur n'est pas une personne physique, la p6tition de droit ou 1'expos6 de demande, selon le cas, doit indiquer le caractbre juridique du requ~rant ou demandeur. 4. Les mots de l'Agriculturep, qui apparaissent aux quatribme et cinquibme lignes du deuxibme paragraphe de la Rigle 36, h la quatribme ligne de la Rigle 37 et h la troisibme ligne de la Rigle 41, sont retranchds et remplac6s par les mots <procureur g6ndral du Canada-.
5. Les Rhgles 60 et 68 sont abrog6es.
6. Les Rigles sont modifi6es par l'insertion, imm~diatement apris la Rigle 96, de ce qui suit:
REGLE 96A
D6tails
Sous riserve du paragraphe (2), toute plaidoirie doit fournir les ditails nicessaires au sujet de toute r~clamation, de toute d6fense ou de toute autre matibre plaid6e, y compris, sans pr6judice de la g6n6ralit6 de ce qui pr~cide, a) Des d6tails au sujet de toute d~claration fausse, toute fraude, tout abus de confiance, tout manquement d6lib6rd ou toute influence indue sur lesquels s'appuie la partie qui plaide, et b) Lorsqu'une partie qui plaide alligue quelque 4tat d'esprit chez quelque personne, qu'il s'agisse de d6rangement ou de faiblesse d'esprit, ou de malice, d'intention de frauder ou de quelque autre 6tat d'esprit, sauf la connaissance des d6tails au sujet des faits sur lesquels la partie s'appuie.
(2) Lorsqu'il est n6cessaire de donner des d6tails au sujet de dettes, de d6penses ou de dommages-intirits, et que ces renseignements exc6dent trois folios, il faut en faire l'expos6 dans un document s~pard dont il est fait mention dans la plaidoirie qui doit indiquer 6galement si le document a d6jh t6 signifi6 et, le cas 6chiant, quand il 'a 6t, ou s'il doit l'8tre en mime temps que la plaidoirie.
(3) La Cour peut ordonner h une partie de fournir A toute autre partie des d6tails plus amples et plus pr6cis au sujet de toute r6clamation, defense ou autre question mentionn6e dans sa plaidoirie, ou un expos4 plus ample et plus pr6cis de la nature de la cause sur laquelle elle s'appuie, et I'ordonnance peut 6tre rendue aux conditions que la Cour juge 6quitables.
(4) Lorsqu'une partie alligue comme un fait qu'une personne a eu connaissance ou requ avis de quelque fait, matibre ou chose, alors, sans pr6judice de la g6ndralit6 du paragraphe (3), la Cour peut, aux conditions qu'elle juge 4quitables, ordonner A cette partie de fournir A toute autre partie a) Lorsqu'elle allbgue la connaissance, les d6tails au sujet des faits sur lesquels elle s'appuie; et b) Lorsqu'elle all~gue l'avis, les d6tails au sujet de l'avis. (5) Une ordonnance en vertu de la pr~sente R6gle ne doit pas 6tre rendue avant la signification de la d6fense et la communication de documents ou 1'examen pr6alable que la partie qui pr~sente la demande a l'intention de faire, A moins que, de l'avis de la Cour, l'ordonnance soit nicessaire ou souhaitable pour permettre au d6fendeur de plaider ou pour quelque autre raison sp6ciale.
(6) Lorsque la partie qui demande une ordonnance en vertu de la pr~sente R6gle n'a pas demand6 par 6crit A la partie contre laquelle elle demande Fordonnance les d6tails dont elle a besoin, la Cour peut A sa discrition refuser de rendre I'ordonnance, A moins qu'elle ne soit d'avis que des raisons suffisantes justifiaient 1'omission d'une telle demande 6crite.
7. La Rbgle 107 est modifi6e par 1insertion imm6diatement apris le premier paragraphe, du paragraphe suivant:
Le procureur g~ndral ou un pititionnaire ou demandeur autre que celui qui pititionne ou poursuit au nom d'une cat~gorie peut, en tout temps, sans autorisation, par avis 6crit, apr&s avoir d~pos6 un consentement de toutes les autres parties, se d6sister entibrement de son action ou retirer une ou des parties des moyens invoqu6s A L'appui de sa r~clamation, A telles conditions concernant les frais ou de telle autre manibre que ce consentement indique.
8. Le second paragraphe de la Rhgle 113 est abrog4 et remplac6 par ce qui suit:
Toutefois, dans une action, s'il apparait A la Cour que les plaidoiries ne d6finissent pas suffisamment les questions de fait en contestation entre les parties, la Cour peut, soit A la demande de l'une des parties, soit de sa propre initiative, ordonner aux narties d'6tablir les points litigieux, et, si les parties diffbrent d'avis; la Cour doit r6gler ces points. 9. La R&gle 138 est abrog~e et remplac6e par ce qui suit:
REGLE
Recours A 1'examen prialable pendant le proces
Toute partie, lors de 1'instruction d'une action ou contestation, peut se servir, A titre de preuve, d'une portion quelconque de l'examen prialable de la partie adverse; mais la Cour peut lire 1'examen en entier, et, si elle est d'avis que toute autre portion est tellement li6e A ce qui doit tre utilis6 que la portion en dernier lieu mentionnie ne devrait servir sans cette autre portion, elle peut exiger que cette dernibre soit consign6e comme preuve par la partie qui cherche A se servir de 1'examen pr6alable.
10.
Dans toute action en dommages-inthrats pour quelque blessure A la personne, la Cour peut ordonner que la personne dont les blessures font 'objet d'une r6clamation en dommages-intir8ts se pr6sente A un examen A L'endroit et devant le m6decin ou les m~decins comp6tents ou le m6decin fonctionnaire ou les m~decins fonctionnaires du ministbre des Affaires des anciens combattants qui peuvent 6tre jug~s convenables.
3. Si la personne qui, sous L'empire de la pr6sente R&gle, a requ 1'ordre de se pr6senter A un tel examen n6glige, sans raison valable, de se 90139-10 conformer A une telle ordonnance, l'action de cette personne, ei celle-ci est le demandeur ou le requ6rant, est susceptible d'6tre renvoy6e.
4. La Cour peut ordonner que la Couronne ou toute autre partie demandant une ordonnance sous l'empire du premier ou du deuxibme paragraphe de la pr~sente Rgle verse A, la personne qui doit Stre examin6e, ou A son phre ou A sa mhre ou h son tuteur, tous les frais n6cessaires de d6placement et de subsistance occasionn6s ou devant Ztre occasionnis par leur pr&sence audit examen.
(3) La Rigle 144A est aussi modifide par Padjonction du paragraphe suivant:
6. Toute personne qui doit subir un examen sous 1'empire de la pr6sente Rigle a droit de se faire accompagner par son avocat et son m~decin ou par 'un ou l'autre h cet examen, et elle a droit b une copie de tout compte rendu ou rapport 6crit de 1'examen que l'examinateur peut faire.
11. La Rigle 147 est abrog6e et remplace par ce qui suit:
RtGLE 147
Avis d'admettre des faits
Toute partie peut enjoindre A toute partie adverse, au moins 14 jours avant le ddbut de l'instruction, d'admettre, uniquement aux fins de la cause, de 1'affaire ou du litige, tous faits pr6cis mentionn6s dans un tel avis ou lun quelconque de ces faits.
En cas de refus ou negligence d'admettre, apris un avis donn6 sous l'empire de la pr6sente R~gle, les frais occasionn6s par la preuve du fait non admis doivent 6tre acquitt6s par l'auteur de la n6gligence ou du refus, quel que soit le r6sultat de laction, A moins qu'd I'audition ou instruction la Cour n'atteste que le refus d'admettre 6tait raisonnable. Un avis d'admettre des faits peut Stre r6dig6 selon la formule n, 26A de l'annexe aux pr6sentes R~gles.
12. La Rigle 156 est abrog6e et remplacee par ce qui suit:
RtGLE 156
Date et lieu de l'instruction
Lorsqu'une action ou autre affaire est prite pour l'instruction ou l'audition, la Cour peut, sur requate de toute partie et apris qu'avis en a td signifi6 . toutes les autres parties, fixer la date et le lieu de l'instruction ou audition et prescrire quand, comment et b qui doit 6tre signifi6 l'avis de 1'instruction ou audition. A moins d'instructions contraires, I'ordonnance doit Stre ridig6e selon la formule 27 de Pannexe aux pr~sentes R~gles.
La Cour de l'chiquier du Canada peut tenir en tout lieu en dehors d'Ottawa et en tout temps fix6 par la Cour, des s6ances g~ndrales dont avis doit Stre publi6 dans la Gazete du Canada; et toute action ou affaire prite pour l'instruction ou audition peut, sans que des instructions aient 6t6 obtenues en vertu du premier paragraphe de la pr4sente R~gle, 6tre inscrite pour instruction ou audition & une telle s6ance g~ndrale par l'une ou l'autre partie, sous riserve d'un avis d'instruction de 10 jours h la partie adverse, ou moyennant le consentement des parties.
Avant de demander une ordonnance fixant la date et le lieu de l'instruction on d'inscrire une cause pour instruction A une s6ance g6n6rale, une partie doit a) A moins que les plaidoiries ne d6finissent suffisamment les questions de fait en contestation entre les parties,
(i) D~poser un expos6 des points litigieux, sur lequel les parties sont d'accord, ou
(ii) Demander, sous l'empire de la R~gle 113, une ordonnance r~glant les questions de fait, et b) A moins que, pour des raisons sp6ciales, il ne faille fixer la date de 1'instruction longtemps avant celle-ci,
(i) Avoir fait l'examen prialable ou avoir renonc4 . cet examen, (ii) Avoir exig6 la production de documents ou avoir renonc6 b cette production, et
(iii) Avoir signifi6 tels avis d'admettre en vertu de la R~gle 146 et de la R&gIe 147 qui peuvent 6tre jug~s approprids.
Une partie qui demande une ordonnance fixant la date et le lieu de l'instruction ou l'inscription d'une cause pour instruction A une sance g~n6rale doit, avant de faire sa demande, avoir d4pos6 une note sign~e par le procureur ou conseil indiquant a) Le nombre de t6moins que la partie se propose d'appeler, b) La dur6e estimative, selon elle, de l'audition en jours ou en heures, c) Une ide de la quantit6 des documents relatifs A la cause;
Et toute autre partie doit d~poser une telle note d) Sur signification d'un avis de demande de fixation du lieu et de la date d'instruction, ou, e) Sur signification d'un avis d'instruction apris qu'une cause a 6t6 inscrite pour audition A une s6ance g6ndrale.
La Cour peut ordonner qu'une action ou autre affaire, inscrite pour instruction A une sance g~n6rale, soit radide de la liste pour cette s6ance si, compte tenu de la dur6e probable de la cause, il est impossible de I'entendre A cette s~ance.
Ces s6ances g6n6rales doivent se poursuivre de jour en jour jusqu'A ce que les affaires dont la Cour est saisie soient termin6es.
Le premier jour de chacune de ces s~ances g4n6rales, la Cour s'occupera des affaires interlocutoires et autres affaires dont il lui est plus facile de s'occuper A ces s6ances qu'A Ottawa.
13. Le paragraphe 1 de la Rbgle 157 est abrog6 et remplac6 par ce qui La partie qui inscrit les proc6dures pour audition ou qui donne avis de motion pour une ordonnance fixant la date de I'audition de toute procidure doit, au moment de l'inscription des proc6dures ou du d~pbt de l'avis de motion, selon le cas, avoir fait prdparer et avoir fait attester par le registraire une copie du dossier (c'est-A-dire des plaidoiries, de toutes les ordonnances et de tous les autres documents au dossier de la Cour qui pourraient 6tre utiles pour le riglement de l'affaire A 1'instruction ou apris cette instruction) et doit en fournir une copie suppl6mentaire pour l'usage du juge A l'instruction. Une telle copie du dossier doit 6tre sur le papier et dans I'6tat qu'exigera le registraire. L'autorisation ou la d4cision du juge r6glant l'affaire doit 6tre ajout6e A la copie authentique du dossier ou mentionn6e au verso de celle-ci, et sign4e ou initial6e par lui.
14. La Rbgle suivante est ajout6e imm6diatement apris la R&gle 157: RRGLE 157A
Dclarations pr~Iiminaires des conseils
Quand, lors de 1'instruction d'une procidure, une partie se propose de fournir une preuve, un conseil de la partie doit, A moins que le juge 90139-OJ qui pr6side n'en decide autrement, imm~diatement avant de pr~senter quelque preuve, faire une brave d6claration donnant un expos6 concis des faits que la partie se propose de prouver et des lois applicables. 15, Les Rigles 160 et 161 sont abrog&es et remplaces par ce qui suit: REGLE
Remise de l'instruction
La Cour peut, s'il est opportun de le faire dans l'int6rt de la justice, remettre ou ajourner 1'instruction h telle date et selon telles conditions, le cas 6ch6ant, qui semblent approprides.
RtGLE 161
Ajournement I'audience l'instruction quand juge peut assister aucun juge ne peut 6tre pr~sent jour pour l'audition quelque proc6dure, cette audition doit rester ajourn6e de jour en jour jusqu'h qu'un juge puisse y assister.
16. Le paragraphe 2 de la R~gle 172 est abrog6 et remplac6 par les paragraphes suivants:
2. Quand, deux semaines apris le jour oii 1'ordonnance a 6t6 rendue, aucune partie n'a demand6 au registraire une convocation pour la d6termination des minutes de 1'ordonnance, le registraire peut, dix jours apris avoir adress6 aux parties, par courrier ordinaire, un projet d'ordonnance et, apris avoir consid6r6 les observations, s'il en est, faites par les parties dans les limites de ce dblai, d6terminer les minutes de 1'ordonnance.
3. Lorsque le registraire a d~termin6 les minutes d'une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe 2 ci-dessus, la partie h la demande de laquelle l'ordonnance a 6t6 rendue doit imm6diatement verser au registraire des honoraires de et elle ne sera pas autorise poursuivre l'affaire tant que ces honoraires n'auront pas 6t6 payds.
17. La Rgle 206 est abrog~e et remplace par ce qui suit:
REGLE 206
Execution d'une ordonnance Cour
Toute ordonnance de la Cour, dans une action, une cause on une affaire, peut 6tre ex~cut6e de la meme manire qu'un jugement au mime effet.
18. La R~gle suivante est ajoutie imm6diatement apris la R~gle 222: R1GLE
Ex6cution d'un jugement condition
Si un jugement on une ordonnance porte qu'une partie a droit h quelque recours sous r~serve ou apris accomplissement de quelque condition ou 6ventualit6, la partie ayant ce droit peut, apris l'accomplissement de la condition ou 6ventualit6 et apris qu'une demande a 6t6 faite la partie contre laquelle elle a droit un recours, demander 4 la Cour de d6livrer un ex6cutoire contre cette partie; et la Cour peut, si elle est convaincue que le droit au recours existe conform6ment aux conditions du jugement de l'ordonnance, ordonner 1'ex~cution en cons6quence ou ordonner que tout point litigieux toute question n6cessaire la d6termination des droits des parties soient examinds de l'une quelconque des favons dont les points questions qui surgissent au cours d'une action peuvent 6tre instruits. 19. La R~gle 242 est modifide par 1'adjonction du paragraphe suivant: Chaque ordonnance interlocutoire accordant une injonction, que l'ordonnance le mentionne express~ment ou non, est sujette h rescision, suspension ou modification par ordonnance de la Cour en tout temps apris que l'ordonnance accordant I'injonction a t6 rendue.
20. Les Rbgles 247, 248 et 249 sont abrog6es et remplac6es par ce qui RRGLE 247
Audition motions
Un juge sidgera en audience publique A Ottawa chaque mardi chaque jeudi, ou le jour juridique suivant, le mardi ou le jeudi est un jour firi6, afin d'entendre 1'audition de toutes les motions demandes qu'il peut sans inconv~nient entendre A de telles s~ances. I n'est pas n6cessaire que les conseils portent la toge pour seances.
RRGLE
Inscription des motions
Les motions et les demandes doivent 6tre inscrites pour audition au moins deux jours avant l'audition aux termes de la R~gle & moins que la Cour n'en ordonne autrement. La pr6sente R~gle ne s'applique pas aux motions ex parte.
RRGLE
Demande par motion
Lorsque les pr~sentes Rigles autorisent la pr6sentation d'une demande la Cour, cette demande doit tre pr6sent6e par voie de motion.
21. La Rbgle 256 est abrogie.
22. La R&gle 259 est abrog6e et remplace par ce qui suit:
RRGLE 259
Rdvocation d'ordonnances parte- La Cour peut r6voquer toute ordonnance qui a 6t6 rendue ex parte; mais une telle rAvocation ne portera pas atteinte la validit6 ni au caractbre de ce qui a fait ou n'a pas t6 fait avant que f^t rendue l'ordonnance de rivocation.
23. (1) Toute la partie de la R~gle 287 qui pricide le paragraphe (2) de cette Rbgle est abrog~e et remplac6e par ce qui suit: (1) Le registraire a le pouvoir a) D'accomplir toutes les choses que les R~gles de la Cour I'autorisent accomplir,
S'il est convaincu que toutes les parties intiressies y ont consenti, rendre toute ordonnance que la Cour peut rendre, sauf une ordonnance qui est en disaccord avec quelque autre ordonnance rendue ant6rieurement par un juge, c) S'il est convaincu que toutes les parties intkressies ont consenti A un jugement qui est restreint au versement d'un montant fixe, inscrire le jugement en cons&quence, et d) Rendre tout jugement que la Cour peut rendre en vertu du paragraphe b) de la R~gle 124 dans toute action par laquelle est uniquement r6clam6 un montant fixe. S'il apparait au registraire qu'une question est du ressort de la Cour, il peut d6f6rer cette question A la Cour et celle-ci a la facult6 de statuer sur la question ou de la renvoyer au registraire avec les instructions qu'elle estime utiles.
(2) Le paragraphe 2 de la Rbgle 287 est modifi6 par la substitution des mots -la Cours aux mots aun juge si6geant en chambre>. (3) Le paragraphe 4 de la Rhgle 287 est modifi6 par la substition, A la deuxibme ligne, des mots ala Cour> aux mots aun juge en chambrei) et la substitution, h l'avant-dernire et h la dernibre lignes, des mots ela Cour> aux mots jugeb.
(4) Le paragraphe 5 de la rbgle 287 est modifi6 par la substitution des mots <mardib et jeudi> respectivement aux mots clundi, et evendrediD, chaque fois qu'ils s'y trouvent, et par la substitution, h la cinquibme ligne, des mots cla Cour> aux mots jugeD.
24. La Rhgle 289 est modifi6e par la suppression de tous les mots de ladite Rhgle qui suivent le mot Ltoutefois, A la cinquibme ligne. 25. A la premibre ligne de la Rbgle 290 et h la septibme ligne de la Rbgle 291, substituer les mots jugez aux mots ale juge>. 26. Le paragraphe suivant est ajout6 h la Rgle 298:
Lorsque, avant qu'une affaire soit inscrite pour instruction h une siance g~ndrale ou qu'une ordonnance soit rendue fixant la date et le lieu de l'instruction, une partie quelconque d6sire faire augmenter ou abr6ger les d6lais prescrits par les pr~sentes R~gles fix6s par quelque ordonnance pour 1'accomplissement de tout acte ou l'introduction de toute proc6dure et que la partie adverse consent h une telle augmentation ou r6duction, il n'est pas nicessaire d'obtenir une ordonnance de la Cour pour augmenter ou abr6ger le d6lai et, en I'absence de circonstances sp6ciales, une demande d'ordonnance tendant , augmenter ou abriger le d6lai ne doit pas 6tre pr6sent~e sans qu'on nit d'abord obtenu un tel consentement.
27. La Rgle 300 est abrog~e et remplac6e par ce qui suit:
RtGLE 300
Inobservation
En des circonstances particulibres, la Cour peut s'6carter de toute restriction contenue dans les pr6sentes R~gles au droit ou pouvoir inh6rent de la Cour.
L'inobservation de 1'une quelconque des prsentes Rhgles ou de toute r~gle de pratique pr6sentement en vigueur n'invalidera pas une proc6dure, h moins que la Cour n'ordonne qu'il en soit ainsi; mais une telle proc6dure peut tre d6clar6e irr6gulibre, en tout ou en partie, ou Atre modifide ou autrement rigl6e de la fagon et selon les conditions que Ia Cour jugera appropri6es.
Aucune demande du rejet de quelque proc6dure pour cause d'irr6gularit6 ne sera revue, h moins qu'elle ne soit pr~sent6e dans un ddlai raisonnable, ni si la partie qui pr6sente la demande a pris de nouvelles mesures bien qu'elle connit I'irrigularit6.
Si une demande de rejet d'une proc6dure pour cause d'irrigularit est pr~sent6e, les diverses objections qu'on a l'intention de soulever doivent 6tre 6nonc6es dans 1'avis de motion.
28. L'annexe est modifi6e par l'insertion, immidiatement apris la formule 26, de ce qui suit:
FORMULE 26A
Avis pour admission de faits
(Rigle 147) COUR DE L'PCHIQUIER DU CANADA
Entre
A.B.,
C.D.
SACHEZ que le demandeur (ou d~fendeur) exige du d~fendeur (ou demandeur), dans les six jours qui suivent la signification du present avis, aux fins de la pr6sente cause seulement, I'admission des divers faits respectivement 6nonc6s ci-apris, sauf toutes exceptions pertinentes A I'admissibilit6 de ces faits comme preuve en la pr~sente cause.
Dat6, etc.
Procureur du demandeur (ou d6fendeur) Au procureur du d~fendeur
(ou demandeur)
Les faits dont on demande l'admission sont
1. Que l'automobile dont il est fait mention A l'alinia............de 1'expos6 de la demande et h l'alinda............de 1'expos6 de la d6fense appartenait, A tous les moments pertinents, au demandeur. 2. Que J.D., dont il est fait mention dans les mames alindas, 6tait, A tous les moments pertinents, un employ6 du d~fendeur et agissait dans l'exercice de son emploi.
3. Que les frais de rdparation des dommages occasionn6s A l'automobile susmentionn6e au cours de la collision dont il est fait mention A l'alinia...........de I'expos6 de la demande et A l'alinia........... de 1'expos6 de la d6fense s'6tablissaient A...........et que ces frais 6taient raisonnables.
29. Le tarif A est modifi6 par l'insertion, imm6diatement apris Particle 36, de ce qui suit:
36A. Les honoraires d'un conseil pour des n~gociations avec la partie adverse en vue d'une entente sur les faits aux fins de l'instruction ou en vue, autrement, d'une entente sur des dispositions tendant A abriger ou faciliter l'instruction de I'affaire, seront allou6s aux m~mes taux que les honoraires d'un conseil pour I'instruction.
30. Toute mention dans la pr6sente ordonnance d'une ligne d'une R~gle se rapporte h l'6dition publide en 1962, par l'imprimeur de la Reine, contr8leur de la papeterie.
31. Les Rhgles modifides par les pr&sentes s'appliquent aux procidures pendantes devant la Cour au moment de l'entr6e en vigueur de ces modifications aussi bicn qu'aux procedures institudes par la suite. FAIT h Ottawa, ce jour de novembre 1964.
Pr6sident,
Cour de lIchiquier du Canada. Camil Nol
Juges puinds,
Cour de l'Echiquier du Canada. ANNEXE
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R. 5* ligne
R. et lignes La formule 26A, qui apparait en annexe aux R~gles et Ordonnances g6n6rales de la Cour de 1' chiquier du Canada et h laquelle le paragraphe 8 de l'ordonnance modifiant les Rhgles et Ordonnances du 4 novembre 1964 a ajout6 du texte, est par les pr6sentes modifi~e, A compter du ler janvier 1965, par l'insertion immidiatement apris les mots: adans les six jours qui suivent la signification du pr6sent avis*, des mots el'admission, aux fins de la pr6sente cause seulements.
Dat6 A Ottawa, le 3 d6cembre 1964.
pr6sident de la Cour de I'ichiquier du Canada Camil Noil
Juges puln6s de la Cour de I'Echiquier du Canada MODIFICATIONS APPORTRES AUX RIGLES DE LA COUR DE L'ICHIQUIER DU CANADA
1. La R~gle 156 des R&gles et Ordonnances g6ndrales de la Cour de lIchiquier du Canada, telle que
'a modifi6e I'ordonnance du 4 novembre 1964, est modifi6e par le retranchement des mots ca date, A la fin de la premibre ligne du quatribme paragraphe (de la version anglaise desdites Rigles) et leur remplacement par les mots can orders. (Cette modification ne vise que la version anglaise.)
2.
mais aucun redressement d6claratoire ou autre, sauf celui qu'a sp6cifiquement rendu la Cour, doit Stre inclus dans ces minutes, soit par consentement soit d'autre fagon.
(2) Ladite Rbgle 172 est de plus modifide par l'adjonction des paragraphes suivants:
4. Toute partie non satisfaite des minutes d'un jugement ou ordonnance qu'a d6termindes le registraire peut demander A la Cour de modifier les minutes ainsi d6termindes d6s qu'elle a signifi6 h la partie adverse un avis de deux jours francs d'une telle demande; toutefois, aucune semblable demande ne suspend l'inscription du jugement ou de l'ordonnance si le registraire estime que la demande est frivole ou causerait un pr6judice d6raisonnable A la partie qui a gain de cause.
5. Une demande pr6vue par le paragraphe 4 doit 6tre fond~e sur un des deux motifs suivants: les minutes telles qu'elles ont 6t0 d6ter- Dat6 A Ottawa, le janvier 1965.
pr6sident de la
Cour de I' chiquier du Canada L. Thurlow Camil Noil
Juges puin6s de la Cour de I'ichiquier du Canada NOTE CONCERNANT LES RkGLES DE PRATIQUE Le ler septembre 1964
Comme le nombre de causes A entendre au cours de la prochaine ann6e sera vraisemblablement tris 6lev6 et que le temps dont disposent les juges de la Cour est partag6 entre des tAches multiples, les procureurs qui comparaissent pour les parties dans des causes en voie de pr6paration sont invitis h collaborer afin d'assurer que les procks puissent se d~rouler sans retard excessif.
A cet 6gard, les avocats int6ress6s sont prids de noter particulibrement ce qui suit:
1. FRAIS
Le fonctionnaire taxateur allouera des frais appropries pour le temps que les solliciteurs ou les procureurs consacrent, lors de la pr¶tion d'un procks, h amener les parties A conclure des accords propres A abriger un prochs.
2. DIEFINITION DES QUESTIONS DE FAIT
La rbgle 113 des Rgles de la Cour de lIchiquier se lit, en partie, ainsi qu'il suit:
A Les procureurs sont pri6s de revoir les plaidoiries, bien avant le proces, afin de faire le nicessaire pour que les equestions de fait, h 6tre d~cid6es lors du procks soient clairement et complitement 3. ADMISSION DE DOCUMENTS
On demande aux procureurs d'4tablir avant le procks la liste des documents qu'on consent A admettre sans 6tablissement de preuve et la liste de ceux qui exigent une preuve. A cet 6gard, les procureurs devraient s'efforcer de mettre h profit, aussi pleinement que possible, les dispositions que renferme la rigle 146, dont voici le texte: L'une ou l'autre partie peut enjoindre h la partie adverse d'admettre un document, sous r~serve des exceptions 16gitimes; en cas de refus ou de n6gligence d'admettre, apris cet avis, les frais occasionnis par la preuve de tout semblable document doivent 6tre acquittis par I'auteur de la n6gligence ou du refus, quel que soit le r~sultat de l'action, A moins qu'h a'audition ou instruction de la Cour n'atteste que le refus d'admettre 6tait raisonnable. De plus, il ne sera pas accord6 de frais de preuve A '6gard d'un document A moins qu'un tel avis ne soit donn6, sauf si 1'omission de donner I'avis constitue une 6conomie, suivant l'opinion du fonctionnaire taxateur.
Un avis d'admettre des documents peut 6tre ridig6 selon la formule No 26 de l'Annexe des pr6sentes.
Chaque procureur est pri6 de placer h la disposition du tribunal et du procureur de la partie adverse des exemplaires (de pr~f6rence des photostats) des pices documentaires qu'il se propose de d~poser en preuve, reli6s ensemble-si possible-selon l'ordre chronologique. Chaque document devrait porter une note, pr6f6rablement sign6e par le procureur de la partie adverse, indiquant si le document est cadmis. ou si son -admission est refuse> comme le privoit la rigle 146. Il serait en outre extr~mement utile que les parties adverses r6unissent des copies des documents h l'usage du juge et en prdparent un jeu complet, 6tabli selon l'ordre chronologique, chaque document portant une indication du nom de la partie qui le produit.
4. ADMISSION DE FAITS
En pr6parant la preuve qu'ils entendent soumettre au procks, les procureurs sont prids de revoir les plaidoiries afin de tirer tout le parti qu'offrent les admissions que celles-ci renferment. La rigle 92 porte ce qui suit:
Toute all6gation de fait que renferme une plaidoirie dans une action, lorsqu'elle n'est pas ni6e sp~cifiquement ou par implication n6cessaire, ou d6clar~e non admise dans la plaidoirie de la partie adverse, est cens6e admise, sauf contre un mineur, un ali6n6, une personne faible d'esprit qui n'a pas 6t6 ainsi jug6e par enquite, ou tout autre personne frappie d'incapacit6 judiciaire.
Une nouvelle preuve d'une alligation de fait que renferme une plaidoirie est done superflue, sauf
(a) si elle est nide sp6cifiquement ou par implication nicessaire, ou (b) si elle est d~clar6e -non admise>, ou sauf si la partie adverse est une personne frapp6e d'incapacit6 judiciaire.
11 convient de noter 6galement ce qu'6nonce la rigle 145, dont le texte est le suivant:
Toute partie dans une cause ou affaire peut donner avis, par sa plaidoirie ou autrement, qu'elle admet la viracit6 de la totalit6 ou de l'un quelconque des alligu6s d'une autre partie.
Afin d'abriger la dure des procks, les procureurs auraient avantage h consid6rer, avant le procks, les possibilit6s d'applications de cette rkgle.
Signalons en outre la rigle 4 de l'ordonnance 32 des R6gles anglaises (qui, semble-t-il, sont applicables aux causes ayant pris naissance hors de la province de Quebec). Cette rbgle se lit comme il suit:
jours Les procureurs pourraient tirer parti de cette rigle en ce qui concerne des faits particuliers. La partie A qui un avis d'admission de faits a t6 signifi6 peut, cela va de soi, refuser d'admettre ou omettre de r6pondre, mais elle le fait h ses propres risques pour ce qui est des frais. II ne s'agit nullement-on le comprendra sans doute-de restreindre le droit des parties h une audition complkte des contestations qui les divisent et ndcessitent 1'arbitrage de leurs diffdrends. Toutefois, pleine justice ne peut Stre rendue h toutes les parties h des conflits que doit trancher le tribunal que si des dates asses rapprochies peuvent 6tre fix6es pour les procks et si les juges peuvent disposer du temps ndcessaire pour la preparation de leurs jugements, sans retard inutile, une fois le procks termin6. C'est pourquoi les procureurs feront, nous n'en doutons pas, leur possible pour aider les juges h acc6l6rer les thches du tribunal, tout en prot~geant les intir~ts l6gitimes de leurs clients.
Le president,
NOTE 2 CONCERNANT LA PRATIQUE DE LA COUR Le 29 d6cembre 1964
Le temps prsentement consacr6 au cours des plaidoiries orales par le juge b noter la jurisprudence, les autorit6s et statuts citds, de part et d'autre, par les procureurs, pourrait tre 6limind, en grande partie, et comme r6sultante, rdduire d'autant la durie de la plaidoirie en se conformant h la directive suivante:
Au commencement de sa plaidoirie chaque procureur produira, pour l'usage du tribunal et celui du procureur de la partie adverse, une liste de la jurisprudence, les autoritis et statuts qu'il entend soumettre h l'appui de ses pritentions.
Il est bien entendu que cette directive ne restreint en rien les procureurs de se rif6rer, au cours des plaidoiries, des autorit6s ou statuts qui n'auraient pas 6t6 inclus dans la liste en question. Le president,
Cases cited
- Kelsey v. The Queen scr-1953-1-220
- 23 C.C.C. 414 23 C.C.C. 414
- Fraser v. Minister of National Revenue scr-1964-657
- Minister of National Revenue v. Irwin scr-1964-662
- Montreal Trust Co. et al. v. Minister of National Revenue scr-1964-647
- Parke, Davis & Co. v. Empire Laboratories Ltd. scr-1964-351
- Anticosti Shipping Co. v. St. Amand scr-1959-372
- Battle Pharmaceuticals v. The British Drug Houses Ltd. scr-1946-50 53
- Bennett and White Construction Co. v. Minister of National Revenue scr-1949-287
- 1926 A.C. 205 1926 A.C. 205
- A.C. 214 A.C. 214
- The King v. Carling Export Brewing & Malting Co. Ltd. scr-1930-361
- The King v. Irving Air Chute scr-1949-613
- Heller v. Registrar, Vancouver Land Registration District scr-1963-229
- S.C.R. 34 S.C.R. 34 56
- Parke, Davis & Co. v. Fine Chemicals of Canada Ltd. scr-1959-219 228
- A.C. 127 A.C. 127 136
- O.R. 346 O.R. 346
Statutes and regulations cited
-
- s. 269(1)
- s. 347
- s. 269
- s. 598(1)
- s. 1014
- section 340
- section 497
- section 500
- s. 42
- ss. 57
- 58
- s. 296
- ss. 408(2)
- ss. 592
- 597
- ss. 21(2)
- 202(a)(i)
- ss. 201
- ss. 202
- arts. 21(2)
- ss. 42
- ss. 79(1)(a)
- s. 374(1)(a)
-
Bank Act
- s. 592(1)
- s. 88 of Bank Act
- Article 94(3)
- s. 96
- art. 94(3)
- 597(1)(a)
- 3(1)(a)
-
- s. 524
- s. 221
- s. 17
- s. 12
- ss. 2
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- s. 53
- 46
- s. 2
- ss. 4
- s. 4
-
- para. 44(a)
- art. 4(c)
-
- 139(1)(e)
-
Unresolved citations
- s. 598(1)(b)
- s. 31(1) of The Game and Fisheries Act
- s. 65 of Labour Relations Act
- Paragraph (e)
- Paragraph (c)
- Paragraph (d)
- paragraph (b)