Majority
was imposed in lieu of the sentence imposed for the substantive offence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding that the respondent was an habitual criminal, but set aside the sentence of preventive detention and restored the sentence of one year imposed upon him by the Magistrate. The Crown was granted leave to appeal to this Court. The only question raised was whether a sentence of preventive detention should be imposed. At the hearing of the appeal the question of the jurisdiction of this Court was raised for the first time from the Bench. The contention of the Crown was that there was an appeal to this Court under the provisions of s. 41 of the Supreme Court Act. Held (Taschereau CJ. and Martland J. dissenting): The appeal should be quashed.
Per Cartwright J.: Since the decisions of this Court in Brusch v. The Queen, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 373 and Parkes v. The Queen [19561 S.C.R. 134, it could not be said that any right of appeal to this Court was conferred by the Criminal Code. An order made under Part XXI of the Code is neither a conviction nor an acquittal of an indictable offence. If the Crown has a right of appeal it must be found in s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act. However, the power to grant the right of appeal sought by the Crown in this case is not conferred by the general words of s. 41(1) although on their literal meaning they would appear wide enough to comprehend it. The construction of s. 41(1), for which the Crown contends in this case would result in an incongruity. The case of The King v. Robinson (or Robertson), [19511 S.C.R. 522, could not now be regarded as an authority for the existence of jurisdiction in this Court to entertain an appeal by the Crown from a judgment of a Court of Appeal setting aside a sentence of preventive detention.
Per Abbott, Judson, Ritchie and Hall JJ.: This Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Neither the Crown nor the accused is given any right under the Criminal Code to appeal to this Court from the disposition made of an application for preventive detention by the Court of Appeal of a province. The sentence of preventive detention could only have been imposed on a man who had been found to have the status of an habitual criminal, but it was the conviction of an indictable offence which afforded the occasion for its imposition and as this appeal is from the sentence-the finding as to status not being an issue-it is governed by the decision of this Court in Goldhar v. The Queen, [19601 S.C.R. 60, where it was held that this Court has not jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against sentence. Parliament could not have intended the anomaly which would result from the provisions of s. 667(2) of the Criminal Code and a. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act, if there was an appeal to this Court at the instance of the Crown from an order of the Court of Appeal setting aside a sentence of preventive detention.
Per Taschereau CJ. and Martland J., dissenting: It is clear that no appeal lies to this Court from a sentence imposed under a. 660 of the Criminal Code by virtue of the provisions of the Criminal Code governing appeals in respect of indictable offences, for such appeals are limited to judgments respecting convictions or acquittal of an indictable offence. However, all the necessary elements of s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act are met in this case. The decisions in Goldhar v. The 359, do not preclude an appeal in the present case. A sentence under s. 660 is not imposed as a punishment for the indictable offence, but is imposed because the accused is an habitual criminal and it is expedient that the public be protected from him. The contention that, E while an appeal to this Court might lie in relation to the finding that the accused is an habitual criminal, it could not lie in respect of the question as to whether it was expedient for the protection of the public that he be sentenced, could not be supported. There is no incongruity in permitting an appeal by the Crown in this case. Section 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act was a means provided by Parliament to enable this Court to deal with a situation such as the one in this case. There is no valid reason for reading into s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act a limitation as to an appeal by the Crown when a right of appeal by the accused is well recognized. Leave having been granted, this Court did have jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal.
As to the merits, the Court of Appeal erred when it ruled that it could not impose a preventive sentence unless there was evidence on which a magistrate could find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was expedient for the protection of the public to so sentence the accused. A standard which is applied in weighing proof of the guilt of the accused has no application to the formulation of an opinion as to what is expedient to protect the public.
Droit criminel-Appels-Juridiction-Diclaration que 'accuse est un repris de justice confirmie par la Cour d'Appel, mais sentence de ditention priventive mise de c6ti-La Cour supr~me du Canada a-t-ele juridiction pour entendre l'appel de la Couronne-Code criminel, 1958- 54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 667-Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 41.
Ayant t6 trouv6 coupable de vol, I'intim6 a Wt subsiquemment reconnu repris de justice et une sentence de d4tention pr6ventive lui fut impos~e au lieu de la sentence qui avait 6t6 impos6e pour l'infraction dont il avait t6 dclar6 coupable. La Cour d'Appel confirma la d6claration que l'intim 6tait un repris de justice, mais mit de c8t6 la sentence de d~tention priventive et r6tablit la sentence d'un an qui avait t6 impos~e par le magistrat. La Couronne a obtenu permission d'en appeler devant cette Cour. La seule question soulev6e 6tait de savoir si une sentence de dtention pr~ventive pouvait 6tre imposde. Lors de 1'audition de l'appel, la question de Ia juridiction de cette Cour a 6t6 soulev6e pour Ia premibre fois par la Cour. La pr6tention de Ia Couronne 6tait qu'il y avait appel devant cette Cour en vertu des dispositions de l'art. 41 de Ia Loi la Cour supreme.
Arrit: L'appel doit 6tre rejet4, le Juge en Chef Taschereau et le Juge Martland 6tant dissidents.
Le Juge Cartwright: Depuis les jugements de cette Cour dans Brusch v. The Queen, [1953] 1 R.C.S. 373 et Parkes v. The Queen, [19561 R.C.S. 134, on ne peut pas dire qu'un droit d'appel devant cette Cour est attribu4 par le Code criminel. Une ordonnance pass~e en vertu de la partie XXI du Code est ni une d~claration de culpabilit6 ni un acquittement d'un acte criminel. Si la Couronne a un droit d'appel, ce droit doit se trouver dans l'art. 41(1) de Ia Loi sur la Cour suprdme. Cependant, le pouvoir d'accorder le droit d'appel recherch6 par la Couronne dans cette cause ne se trouve pas dans les mots g6n6raux de l'art. 41(1) quoique en regard de leur sens littoral ces mots semblent avoir une 6tendue asses grande pour englober ce pouvoir. L'interpr6tation de Part. 41(1) telle que soutenue par la Couronne dans cette cause aurait le r~sultat de cr6er une incongruit6. La cause de The King v. Robinson (or Robertson), [19511 R.C.S. 522, ne peut pas maintenant 6tre considr6e comme une autorit6 pour l'existence de la juridiction de cette Cour d'entendre un appel par la Couronne d'un jugement de la Cour d'Appel mettant de c8t6 une sentence de ditention pr6ventive.
Les Juges Abbott, Judson, Ritchie et Hall: Cette Cour n'avait pas la juridiction d'entendre 1'appel. Le Code criminel ne donne ni A la Couronne ni h l'accus6 le droit d'en appeler devant cette Cour de Ia disposition faite par la Cour d'Appel d'une province de la demande pour d6tention pr6ventive. La sentence de d6tention pr~ventive ne peut 6tre imposie qu'A une personne dont la statut a t d~clar6 6tre celui d'un repris de justice, mais c'est la d6claration de culpabilit6 d'un acte criminel qui donne ouverture A l'imposition de cette sentence, et comme cet appel est de la sentence-la d6claration relativement au statut n'4tant pas en litige-l'appel est gouvern6 par la d6cision de cette Cour dans Goldhar v. The Queen, [19601 R.C.S. 60, il a t6 jug6 que cette Cour n'avait pas juridiction d'entendre un appel de la sentence. Le parlement n'a pas pu avoir eu l'intention de crier 1'anomalie oui r6sulterait des dispositions de l'art. 667(2) du Code criminel et de l'art. 41(1) de la Loi sur la Cour supreme, s'il existait un appel devant cette Cour de la part de la Couronne d'une ordonnance de la Cour d'Appel mettant de c8t6 une sentence de ditention preventive.
Le Juge en Chef Taschereau et le Juge Martland, dissidents: Il n'existe aucun appel devant cette Cour d'une sentence impos6e en vertu de l'art. 660 du Code criminel en vertu des dispositions du Code criminel gouvernant les appels relativement aux actes criminels, de tels appels 6tant limitie aux jugements relativement A une d6claration de culpabilit6 ou un acquittement d'un acte criminel. Cependant, tous les 6liments nicessaires de Fart. 41(1) de la Loi sur la Cour supreme se rencontrent dans cette cause. Les d6cisions de Goldhar v. The Queen, supra, et de The Queen v. Alepin Frares Lt~e, [19651 R.C.S. 359, n'emp6chent pas un appel dans cette cause. Une sentence en vertu de l'art. 660 n'est pas imposee comme punition pour un acte criminel, mais est impos6e parce que l'accus6 est un repris de justice et qu'il est opportun que le public soit prot~g6 contre lui. La pritention A l'effet que, quoiqu'un appel puisse exister relativement A une d~claration que l'accus6 est un repris de justice, un appel ne peut exister relativement A la question de savoir s'il est opportun pour la protection du public qu'une sentence soit impos6e, ne peut pas 6tre support6e. Il n'y a aucune incongruit4 de permettre un appel par la Couronne dans cette cause. L'art. 41(1) de la Loi sur la Cour supreme est un moyen pr6vu par le parlement pour permettre A cette Cour de disposer d'une situation telle que celle qui se pr6sente dans cette cause. Il n'y a en cons6quence aucune raison valide pour voir dans l'art. 41(1) de la Loi sur la Cour supreme une restriction quant A un appel par la Couronne lorsqu'un droit d'appel par I'accus6 est reconnu. Permission d'appeler ayant & accord6e, cette Cour avait juridiction d'entendre 1'appel.
Quant aux m6rites, la Cour d'Appel a err6 quand elle a dcid6 qu'elle ne pouvait imposer une sentence pr6ventive A moins qu'elle ne trouve THE une preuve sur laquelle un magistrat pourrait d6clarer hors de tout doute raisonnable qu'il 4tait opportun pour la protection du public que l'accus6 regoive une telle sentence. On ne peut se servir pour formuler une opinion relativement b l'opportunit4 de protiger le public d'une norme dont on se sert pour 6valuer la preuve relativement h la culpabilit46 de 1'accus6.
APPEL d'un jugement de la Cour d'Appel de la Colombie-Britannique, mettant de c8t6 une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive. Appel rejet6, le Juge en Chef Taschereau et le Juge Martland 6tant dissidents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, setting aside a sentence of preventive detention. Appeal quashed, Taschereau C.J. and Martland J. dissenting.
W. G. Burke-Robertson, Q.C., for the appellant.
Angus Carmichael, Q.C., for the respondent.
MARTLAND J. (dissenting)
:-This is an appeal, brought by the Crown, pursuant to leave granted by this Court, from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, which reversed the decision of a magistrate, who had imposed a sentence of preventive detention on the respondent pursuant to s. 660 of the Criminal Code, which provides:
660. (1) Where an accused has been convicted of an indictable offence the court may, upon application, impose a sentence of preventive detention in lieu of any other sentence that might be imposed for the offence of which he was convicted or that was imposed for such offence, or in addition to any sentence that was imposed for such offence if the sentence has expired, if
(a) the accused is found to be an habitual criminal, and
(b) the court is of the opinion that because the accused is an habitual criminal, it is expedient for the protection of the public to sentence him to preventive detention.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an accused is an habitual criminal if
(a) he has previously, since attaining the age of eighteen years, on at least three separate and independent occasions been convicted of an indictable offence for which he was liable to imprisonment for five years or more and is leading persistently a criminal life, or (b) he has been previously sentenced to preventive detention.
This section deals exclusively with the matter of sentence, as is made clear by the opening words of s. 667(1), which deals with the right of appeal of the accused:
Before a sentence of preventive detention can be imposed the court must reach a decision on two matters, defined in paras. (a) and (b) of subs. (1); i.e.,
(a) That the accused is an habitual criminal; and (b) That because of that fact, it is expedient for the protection of the public that he should be sentenced to preventive detention.
A decision in favour of the accused on each of these matters was the basis of the dissenting judgment of Mac- Quarrie J., in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, in Mulcahy v. The Queen', which was adopted by this Court' when the appeal of the accused was allowed.
These matters are, I think, of importance in considering the first issue raised by the respondent as to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear this appeal.
It is clear that no appeal lies to this Court from a sentence imposed under s. 660 by virtue of the provisions of the Criminal Code governing appeals in respect of indictable offences, for such appeals are limited to judgments respecting conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence.
Appeals to this Court, in respect of a sentence under s. 660, have been brought, with leave pursuant to s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act, which provides:
As my brother Cartwright points out, in the present case, all of the necessary elements of that subsection are here met. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is a final judgment, and it is the judgment of the highest court of final resort in which judgment could be had in this case.
This being so, on what basis can it be contended that this
Court lacks jurisdiction? In my opinion the decisions in Goldhar v. The Queen and in The Queen v. Alepin Frdres Ltie and Climent Alepin do not preclude an appeal in the present case. Each case was concerned solely with the matter of sentence in respect of an offence imposed in consequence of a conviction of such offence. A sentence under s. 660, while it is made following conviction of an indictable offence, is not imposed as a punishment for that offence, but is imposed because the accused is an habitual criminal and it is expedient that the public be protected from him. In Parkes v. The Queen*, Cartwright J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, said, at p. 135:
It is, therefore, established that a sentence under s. 660 is not one which is imposed in relation to a charge of an offence or crime, but is a disposition which may be made by the court, if it is expedient for the protection of the public, with relation to a person in a particular status or condition.
Appeals from a sentence under s. 660 have been determined in this Court on a number of occasions, one of the most recent being the Mulcahy case previously mentioned, in which Chief Justice Taschereau commenced his judgment with the words: "We are all of the opinion that the appeal against sentence of preventive detention should be allowed . . ."
It is contended that, while an appeal to this Court might lie in relation to the finding of the accused to be an habitual criminal, it could not lie in respect of the question as to whether it was expedient for the protection of the public that he be sentenced. If a finding as to the status of the accused, on the first point, is not a judgment acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence, within s. 41(3) of the Supreme Court Act, as was held in the Parkes case, I find it hard to understand how the decision on the second point as to expedience can fall within it. Furthermore, I do not agree that the appeal to this Court respecting matters under s. 660 can be arbitrarily divided in respect of the two items under paras. (a) and (b) of subs. (1). Any appeal in relation to s. 660 is an appeal from sentence, but it is not within s. 41(3) of the Supreme Court Act because, as was said in Parkes, it does not relate to conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence, but to a method of dealing with people of a particular status.
Another ground for contending that no appeal lies in the present case is because this appeal is by the Crown, and the Crown is limited, in respect of its right of appeal to the court of appeal, to matters of law, and consequently the general words of s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act should be narrowed in respect of the nature of this subject-matter. It is said that it would be incongruous to permit an open appeal by the Crown to this Court, when it has only a limited right in the court below.
The Crown's right to appeal to the court of appeal, while limited to a question of law, is absolute, whereas there is no appeal to this Court under s. 41(1) without leave.
The limitation upon the position of the Crown in the court of appeal is only in those cases in which the accused has succeeded in the court of first instance. In a case of that kind, if the Crown's appeal to the court of appeal failed, it is clear that, if it were to obtain leave to appeal to this Court, its appeal, of necessity, could only lie in relation to the question of law which had been determined adversely to it in the court of appeal. Under s. 46 of the Supreme Court Act, this Court could only dismiss the appeal or give the judgment which should have been given in the court below, i.e., on a question of law.
In the case of an appeal to the court of appeal by an accused who has been sentenced under s. 660, it would be open to the Crown to raise any ground for contending that the initial decision should be maintained, and in respect of that kind of an appeal the position of the Crown is unrestricted. That being so, I do not find it incongruous that it should be entitled to seek leave to appeal to this Court on any ground taken by it before the court of appeal.
In the present case, the ground for seeking leave was solely with respect to an important question of law on which it was contended that the Court of Appeal had erred. If the
Crown can appeal on a matter of law to the Court of
Appeal, and if the accused can seek leave to appeal to this
Court upon any ground, I see no basis for limiting the words of s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act so as to preclude any right of appeal by the Crown to this Court, upon a question of law. To deny such a right is to make it possible for differing applications of s. 660 in different provinces, with no power in this Court to determine the matter. Section 41(1)
was a means provided by Parliament to enable this Court to deal with a situation of that kind.
I can, therefore, see no valid reason for reading into s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act a limitation as to an appeal by the Crown when a right of appeal to this Court by the accused is well recognized.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that this Court does have jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal, leave having been granted.
The decision of the Court of Appeal, that, although the respondent was an habitual criminal, yet it was not expedient for the protection of the public to sentence him to preventive detention, was stated to be based on the proposition that a court, under s. 660, cannot impose that sentence unless there is evidence "on which a magistrate could find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was expedient for the protection of the public to sentence him to preventive detention."
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the well-recognized standard applied in the criminal law in respect of the establishing of the guilt of an accused person. In my opinion it has no application to the matter of the imposition of sentence. A court, under s. 660, having determined that an accused person is an habitual criminal, is required to exercise its judgment as to whether it is expedient for the protection of the public to impose a sentence of preventive detention. Section 660(1) (b) states specifically that this is a matter of opinion. That opinion must be as to expediency for public protection. In my view, a standard which is applied in weighing proof of a fact, i.e., guilt of the accused, has no application to the formulation of an opinion as to what is expedient to protect the public.
I would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the magistrate.
J.:-An account of the proceedings in the courts below is given in the reasons of my brother Ritchie. On March 15, 1965, an order was made by this Court the operative part of which reads as follows:
No question as to the jurisdiction of this Court was raised or considered when this order granting leave was made. The question of our jurisdiction was raised for the first time from the bench during the argument of the appeal.
It is well settled that a person who has been sentenced to preventive detention and whose appeal against that sentence has been dismissed by the Court of Appeal may be granted leave to appeal to this Court under s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act. On this point it is sufficient to refer to the unanimous judgment of the Court in Parkes v. The Queen'. As is pointed out by my brother Ritchie, a number of such appeals have been allowed by this Court.
As far as I am aware, subject to something to be said later as to Robinson's case, infra, the question whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to the Attorney General to appeal to this Court against the dismissal of an application for an order that a person be sentenced to preventive detention has not previously been considered by this Court. The answer to this question depends upon the proper construction of the relevant statutory provisions.
Little assistance is to be found in the comparatively short history of the legislation in this country relating to preventive detention. The predecessors of the group of sections which now form Part XXI of the Criminal Code were first enacted by Statutes of Canada, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, c. 55 and were numbered 575A to 575H. Section 575E corresponded to the present s. 667, which is set out in full in the reasons of my brother Ritchie. It was silent as to any right of the Attorney General to appeal. It read as follows:
The first alteration in the provisions as to appeal was made when the present Criminal Code, 2-3 Eliz. II, c. 51, came into force on April 1, 1955, at which time s. 667 read as follows:
Section 667, in its present form ,was enacted by Statutes of
Canada, 1960-61, 9-10 Eliz. II, c. 43, s. 40.
It is clear that the provisions quoted above deal only with the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the tribunal of first instance. It cannot be said that sub-section (3) of s. 667, providing that "the provisions of Part
XVIII with respect to procedure on appeals apply, mutatis mutandis to appeals under this section", has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on this Court. Part XVIII deals only with appeals in regard to convictions or acquittals of indictable offences.
Since the decisions of this Court in Brusch v. The Queen' and Parkes v. The Queen, it cannot be said that any right of appeal to this Court is conferred by the Criminal Code. An order made under Part XXI is neither a conviction nor an acquittal of an indictable offence. If the Attorney General has a right of appeal to this Court it must be found in s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act. It is clear that if on its true construction subs. (1) confers the right of appeal which the Attorney General seeks to assert that right is not taken away by the terms of subs. (3) for we are not here concerned with the judgment of any court acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence or of any offence.
Section 41(1) reads a follows:
Applying these words to the circumstances of the case before us it appears: (i) that the judgment from which the Attorney General appeals is a final judgment, it finally determines that the sentence of preventive detention imposed upon the respondent by the learned Magistrate is set aside; and (ii) that it is a judgment of the highest court of final resort in the Province of British Columbia in which judgment can be had in this particular case. That being so, the application for leave to appeal made by the Attorney General would appear to be warranted by the literal meaning of the words of the sub-section and prima facie this Court would seem to have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal unless it appears by the application of the rules which guide the Court in the interpretation of statutes that Parliament did not intend to confer a right of appeal from a judgment such as that pronounced by the Court of Appeal in this case.
The words of s. 41(1) are general and it is necessary to consider the possible application of the rule expressed in the maxim "Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personae" (Bac. Max. reg. 10) Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th ed. 438. The maxim was applied in Cox v. Hakes'. It was held in that case by the House of Lords that the following words in s. 19 of the Judicature Act, 36 and 37 Vict., c. 66: did not confer a right of appeal from an order of the High 1s Court directing the discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus, although as was said by Lord Herschell at page 428: Lord Bramwell, at page 527, concluded his speech with the following sentence:
The construction of s. 41(1), for which the Attorney General contends in the case at bar would result in an incongruity pointed out in the reasons of my brother Ritchie to which further reference will be made.
I am able to derive little assistance in the solution of the question before us from the judgments of this Court in Goldhar v. The Queen' or in The Queen v. Alepin Freres Lt6e and Cl6ment Alepin . They establish only that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, even on a question of law in the strict sense, against a judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming or quashing a sentence imposed following conviction of an indictable offence or of an offence other than an indictable offence; and it is well settled that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the imposition of a sentence of preventive detention. There is something to be.said for the view that the Court should have a corresponding jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order dismissing an application for the imposition of such a sentence, but in dealing with a similar argument in Cox v. Hakes, supra, Lord Herschell said at pages 535 and 536:
to it only because it was suggested that if there was an appeal in the one TE case, it was scarcely to be conceived that there should not be an appeal in the other. I do not think so. There would be to my mind nothing surprising if it should turn out that an appeal lay by one whose discharge Cartwright j.had been refused, but that there was no appeal against a discharge from custody. It would be in strict analogy to that which has long been the law. The discharge could never be reviewed or interfered with; the refusal to discharge, on the other hand, was always open to review; and although this review was not properly speaking, by way of appeal its practical effect was precisely the same as if it had been.
My brother Ritchie points out that if we should uphold the Attorney General's right of appeal in this case it would have the anomalous result which he describes as follows: It would mean that although the Crown is restricted to "any ground of law" when appealing to the Court of Appeal of a province against the dismissal of an application for preventive detention by a trial judge, it can obtain access to this Court on unrestricted grounds when appealing from a judgment of the Court of Appeal which has the same effect. The unlikelihood of Parliament intending such a result appears to me to be a sufficient reason for applying the maxim quoted above and holding that power to grant the right of appeal sought by the Attorney General in this case is not conferred by the general words of s. 41(1) although on their literal meaning they would appear wide enough to comprehend it.
Before parting with the matter I wish to refer to the case of The King v. Robinson (or Robertson)', which, on its face, appears inconsistent with the conclusion at which I have arrived. The respondent in that case was found to be a habitual criminal and was sentenced by Whittaker J. to preventive detention. On appeal to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia the sentence of preventive detention was set aside. The Attorney General applied to a single judge of this Court under s. 1025 of the Criminal Code then in force for leave to appeal on a question of law. Leave was granted and the full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and referred the matter back to that Court to deal with other grounds which had been raised in the notice of appeal but which the Court had found it unnecessary to consider in view of its decision on the point 1 [19511 S.C.R. 522, 12 C.R. 100 C.C.C. 1.
2 (1950), 2 W.W.R. 1265, C.R. 139, 99 C.C.C.
of law. I was a member of the Court which heard the appeal and took part in the judgment allowing the appeal of the Attorney General. I have confirmed my recollection by examining the record and consulting the Judge who gave leave and it is clear that our jurisdiction was not questioned at any stage of the proceedings in this Court. The Court and all counsel concerned appear to have proceeded on the view that an appeal to this Court lay as if the finding that the respondent was a habitual criminal was tantamount to his conviction of an indictable offence. This view may have been induced by the following expressions found in the sections then in force which no longer appear in Part XXI:
575 E, "a person convicted and sentenced to preventive detention, may appeal against his conviction and sentence, and the provisions of this Act relating to an appeal from a conviction for an indictable offence shall be applicable thereto"; and in s. 575 G(1) "The sentence of preventive detention shall take effect immediately on the conviction of a person on a charge that he is a habitual criminal".
It is, I think, a tenable view that under the wording of the relevant sections then in force the procedure followed in
Robinson's case was correct. The question of a right of appeal to this Court was not discussed in Brusch v. The
Queen, supra, and by the time Parkes v. The Queen, supra, was decided Part XXI had been enacted in substantially its present form. In view of the changes in wording made when the new Code came into force and the decision of this Court in Parkes v. The Queen, supra, it is my opinion that
Robinson's case cannot now be regarded as an authority for the existence of jurisdiction in this Court to entertain an appeal by the Attorney General from a judgment of a Court of Appeal setting aside a sentence of preventive detention.
I would dispose of the appeal as proposed by my brother
Ritchie.
The judgment of Abbott, Judson, Ritchie and Hall JJ.
was delivered by
RITclE J.: -This is an appeal brought at the instance of THE Attorney General of British Columbia and with leave of this Court from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Ritchie J. Columbia. The order for judgment of that court reads, in part, as follows:
that the Appeal of the abovenamed Appellant from the finding that the Appellant is an habitual criminal be and the same is hereby dismissed, the Appeal of the abovenamed Appellant from the sentence of preventive detention imposed on him be and the same is hereby allowed, the sentence of preventive detention imposed on him as aforesaid be and the same is hereby set aside, and pursuant to section 667 of the Criminal Code, a sentence of imprisonment in Oakalla Prison Farm, Burnaby, British Columbia, for a term of one year be and the same is hereby imposed in respect of the said conviction by Magistrate L. H. Jackson entered on the 20th day of May 1964 on the above-described charge, such sentence to run from the 20th day of May, No appeal has been asserted from the finding that the respondent, Robert MacDonald is an habitual criminal and the Crown seeks to confine its appeal to that part of the judgment which allowed the appellant's appeal from the sentence of preventive detention imposed on him by Magistrate Cyril White of Vancouver on December 29, 1964. Robert MacDonald was tried and convicted before Magistrate Jackson on the charge that he "unlawfully did commit theft of one case containing 50 cartons of DuMaurier cigarettes of a value in excess of $50.00 . . ." and for this crime he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year. Having regard to the respondent's past criminal record, an application was made with the consent of the Attorney General of British Columbia for the imposition of a sentence of preventive detention in lieu of the sentence imposed upon him by Magistrate Jackson.
Applications for preventive detention are governed by s. 660 of the Criminal Code which reads as follow:
660. (1) Where an accused has been convicted of an indictable offence the court may, upon application, impose a sentence of preventive detention in lieu of any other sentence that might be imposed for the offence of which he was convicted or that was imposed for such offence, or in addition to any sentence that was imposed for such offence if the sentence has expired, if
(a) The accused is found to be an habitual criminal, and
(b) the court is of the opinion that because the accused is an habitual criminal, it is expedient for the protection of the public to sen- THE tence him to preventive detention.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an accused is an habitual criminal if
Ritchie J. (a) he has previously, since attaining the age of eighteen years, on at least three separate and independent occasions been convicted of an indictable offence for which he was liable to imprisonment for five years or more and is leading persistently a criminal life, or
(b) he has been previously sentenced to preventive detention.
(3) At the hearing of an application under subsection (1), the accused is entitled to be present.
It is to be observed that the finding that an accused is an habitual criminal is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a sentence of preventive detention but that it does not result in the imposition of such a sentence unless the court is of opinion that it is expedient for the protection of the public that it should be imposed. As has been indicated, the only question raised on this appeal is whether a sentence of preventive detention should have been imposed in the present case.
The only provision in the Criminal Code for an appeal from the disposition of an application made under s. 660 is contained in s. 667 and it was pursuant to the provisions of this section that the respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeal of British Columbia. This section reads as follows:
667.(1) A person who is sentenced to preventive detention under this
Part may appeal to the court of appeal against that sentence on any ground of law or fact or mixed law and fact.
(2) The Attorney General may appeal to the court of appeal against the dismissal of an application for an order under this Part on any ground of law.
(2a) On an appeal against a sentence of preventive detention the court of appeal may
(a) quash such sentence and impose any sentence that might have been imposed in respect of the offence for which the appellant was convicted, or
(b) dismiss the appeal.
(2b) On an appeal against the dismissal of an application for an order under this Part the court of appeal may
(a) allow the appeal, set aside any sentence imposed in respect of the offence for which the respondent was convicted and impose a sentence of preventive detention, or
(b) dismiss the appeal.
(2c) A judgment of the court of appeal imposing a sentence pursuant TE -E to this section has the same force and effect as if it were a sentence passed by the trial court.
(3) The provisions of Part XVIII with respect to procedure on Ritchie j.
appeals apply, mutatis mutandis, to appeals under this section.
Under this section the right of the Attorney General to appeal against the dismissal of an applicaiton for preventive detention is strictly limited to "any ground of law" and it is to be observed also that neither the Crown nor the accused is given any right under the Criminal Code to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the disposition made of such an application by the Court of Appeal of a province. It is contended, however, on behalf of the Attorney General of British Columbia that an appeal lies to this Court under the provisions of s. 41 of the Supreme Court Act which reads, in part, a follows:
41(1) Subject to subsection (3), an appeal lies to the Supreme Court with leave of that Court from any final or other judgment of the highest court of final resort in a province, or a judge thereof, in which judgment can be had in the particular case sought to be appealed to the Supreme Court, whether or not leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been refused by any other court.
(3) No appeal to the Supreme Court lies under this section from the judgment of any court acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence or, except in respect of a question of law or jurisdiction, of an offence other than an indictable offence.
Counsel for the appellant concedes that it has been decided in the case of Goldhar v. The Queen' that criminal offences and sentences imposed therefor are excluded from the operation of s. 41(1) by the terms of s. 41(3), but he contends that a sentence of preventive detention is imposed as a result of a finding that the accused has the status of an habitual criminal which this Court has held not to be a criminal offence (see Brusch v. The Queen 2 ). It is therefore argued that the judgment of the Court of Appeal setting aside the sentence of preventive detention is unaffected by S. 41(3) and is a judgment of the highest court of final resort in a province determining the rights of an individual and 1 [19601 S.C.R. 60, 31 C.R. 374, 125 C.C.C. 209.
2 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 373, 16 C.R. 316, 105 C.C.C. 340, 2 D.L.R. 707. accordingly a proper subject for appeal under section 41(1).
There have been a number of cases in this Court in which leave to appeal has been granted pursuant to s. 41(1) from the granting of an application for the imposition of a sentence of preventive detention under s. 660, but each of these cases involved an appeal from the finding that the person seeking leave to appeal was an habitual criminal, and that finding was in each instance set aside with the result that the sentefice of preventive detention for which it was a prerequisite was also set aside. As has been indicated, it is upon the ground that the finding that a man is an habitual criminal is a dbtermination of status and not a conviction of a criminal offence that leave to appeal has been granted in the past and counsel were unable to cite any case except the present one in which the finding of status was not in issue and the entire appeal has been limited to the question of sentence.
Reference was made to the case of Mulcahy v. The Queen' where the judgment of this Court is reported as follows:
It must be noted, however, that in that case MacQuarrie J.
had concluded his reasons for judgment by saying:
The italics are my own.
It is true that the finding of the appellant's status in the present case was not a conviction of a criminal offence, but the sentence of preventive detention imposed by Magistrate
White was "in lieu of the sentence of one year imposed earlier upon the said Robert Cecil MacDonald.. ." upon his conviction for an indictable offence. The sentence of preventive detention could only have been imposed on a man who had been found to have the status of an habitual criminal, but it was the conviction of an indictable offence which THE QuEN afforded the occasion for its imposition and as this appeal is from the sentence and the finding as to status is not an issue, Ritchie j. it is, in my opinion, governed by the decision of this Court in Goldhar v. The Queen, supra.
The effect of the Goldhar case is summarized in the judgment of Taschereau J., as he then was, in Paul v. The Queen', where he says at 457 speaking of s. 41(3):
In matters of indictable offences, it confers no jurisdiction on this Court, and we must find in the Criminal Code the rules that govern such appeals. In summary matters, on the other hand, jurisdiction to appeal to this Court is given in s. 41(3). It was held in Goldhar v. The Queen that if an appeal from a sentence was not given by 41(3), nor the Criminal Code, we could not find any authority in 41(1) to review a sentence imposed by the Courts below. In that case it was stated by Fauteux J. with whom all the members of the Court agreed, Cartwright J. dissenting, that in order to determine if a convicted person could appeal against a sentence in a matter of indictable offence, it was not permissible to look to s. 41(1) for the authority to intervene, but only in the Criminal Code which does not permit an appeal against a sentence.
In the recent case of Her Majesty the Queen v. J. Alepin Frbres Lt66 and Cl6ment Alepin 2 , the Crown sought to appeal the quashing of a sentence by the court below on jurisdictional grounds and Fauteux J., speaking on behalf of the Court, had occasion to comment on the effect of s. 41(1) and 41(3) of the Supreme Court Act, saying:
It is clear from the terms of subsection (3) that, unless the judgment sought to be appealed is a judgment "acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal" of either an indictable offence or an offence other than an indictable offence, there is no jurisdiction in this Court under that subsection to entertain this appeal. The judgment here sought to be appealed does not come within that description. It is not a judgment related to an acquittal or a conviction of an offence and, while an important question of jurisdiction is involved therein, this question does not relate to an acquittal or a conviction within the meaning of subsection (8) but to sentence. Neither can jurisdiction of this Court be found in subsection (1). The general proposition that matters which are not mentioned in s. 41(3) must be held to be comprised in s. 41(1), with the consequence that this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a judgment of a nature similar to the one here considered, is ruled out by what was said by this Court in Goldhar v. The Queen and Paul v. The Queen. It may be a matter of regret that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the important question which gave rise to conflicting ' [19601 S.C.R. 452, 34 C.R. 110, 127 C.C.C. 129.
[19651 S.C.R. 359, 46 C.R. 113, 3 C.C.C. 1, 49 D.L.R. (2d) 220. The italics are my own.
As has been pointed out, the Criminal Code makes express provision under s. 667 for appealing to the court of appeal of a province from the disposition made by a trial judge of an application for preventive detention and by s. 667(2) the Attorney General is limited to "any ground of law" in appealing from the dismissal of such an application. If counsel for the appellant were right in his contention that an appeal can be had to this Court under s. 41(1), at the instance of the Crown, from an order of the court of appeal setting aside a sentence of preventive detention, it would mean that although the Crown is restricted to "any ground of law" when appealing to the Court of Appeal of a province against the dismissal of an application for preventive detention by a trial judge, it can obtain access to this Court on unrestricted grounds when appealing from a judgment of the Court of Appeal which has the same effect. I cannot think that Parliament intended such an anomaly to result from the provisions of s. 667(2) of the Criminal Code and s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act.
The limitation to "any ground of law" of the right of the Attorney General to appeal to the Court of Appeal was first enacted by Chapter 43 of the Statutes of Canada, 1960-61, and s. 667(2) in its present form has not been previously considered by this Court.
In view of the above, I am of opinion that this Court is without jurisdiction in the circumstances and I would accordingly quash this appeal.
Appeal quashed, C.J. and J. dissenting.
Solicitor for the appellant: R. D. Plommer, Vancouver. Solicitor for the respondent: A. Carmichael, Vancouver. 1. Peremption-Action inscribed for proof and hearing-Action placed on roll of ordinary cases-Application for jury trial granted-No further proceedings for two years-Action never struck off roll of ordinary cases-Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 282, 421, 423, 433.
et al., 352.
2. Exception of ls pendens-Action in damages for breach of building contract against builder-Subsequent by builder to preserve privilege and in damages
-Cross-demand in second action by first plaintiff-Whether identity of parties, cause and object in cross-demand-Code of Civil
Procedure, arts. 173, 215.
Co. v.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. Delegation of power by Farm Products
Marketing Board to Tobacco Growers'
Marketing Board make regulations providing for refusal of licences for production of tobacco and for refusal of acreage allotments or other production quotas-Validity of regulations.
TOBAcco
2. Delegation of power by Farm Products
Marketing Board to Tobacco Growers'
Marketing Board to make regulations providing for refusal of licences for production of tobacco and for refusal of acreage allotments or other production quotas-Validity of regulations.
APPEALS
1. Jurisdiction-Taxation-Income tax- Seizure of solicitor's trust accounts books and records-Whether subject to solicitorclient privilege-Motion for leave to appeal
APPEALS-Concluded-Fin -Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, 259, 41-Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, 148, s. 126A.
v. 84.
2. Taxation-Income tax-Leave to appeal appeal from Taxation Board to Exchequer Court a trial de novo-Whether decision by Exchequer Court on procedural matter subject to review by Supreme Court-Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, 91, 99(2).
3. Jurisdiction-Practice and procedure- Appeal to Supreme Court of Canada- Amount in controversy-Closure of street by municipality-Land not made available to adjoining owners-Land sold to nominee of Reeve-Acquired and built upon by Reeve-Motion to quash-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 36.
et al. et al., 624. 4. also-Voir aussi: APPELS
1. Inscription en Cour d'appel non signifide dans les trente jours du jugement-Rejet de l'appel-D6lai de rigueur-Ddch6ance du droit d'appel-Code de Proc6dure civile, arts. 537, 1209-Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, arts. 36, 41.
v. et al., 243.
2. Revenu-Imp6t sur le revenu-Permission d'appeler-Un appel A la Cour de l'Rchiquier d'un jugement de la Commission d'Appel de l'Imp6t sur le Revenu estil un procks de novo-La d6cision de la Cour de l'chiquier sur une matibre de proc6dure est-elle sujette A revision par la Cour supr6me-Loi de l'Imp6t Sur le Revenu, S.R.C. 1952, c. 148, arts. 91, 99(2) APPELS-Concluded-Fin
3. Juridiction-Procdure-Appel Ala Cour supreme du Canada-Montant en litige- Fermeture d'un chemin par une municipalit6-Terrain non mis A la disposition des propri6taires contigus-Terrain vendu
A un pr6te-nom d'un conseiller municipal- Terrain acquis et construit par le conseiller
-Demande pour faire rejeter l'appel-Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 36.
et a]. v. REID et al., 624.
AUTOMOBILES
1. Collision fatale-Responsabilit6-Question de fait-Accord des deux Cours- Quantum des dommages-int6rts-Perte de soutien-Convol de la veuve durant 'instance-Code civil, arts. 1053, 1056.
v. 393.
BANKRUPTCY
1. Assignment of wages to creditor-Subsequent assignment in bankruptcy-Whether assignment of after-acquired wages valid as against trustee in bankruptcy-Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 14.
HOLY RoSARY
BANKS AND BANKING
Purchaser turning over bank draft to third party to effect payment for shares- Proceeds of draft credit to account holding company to cover latter's cheque to payee-Bank not liable for conversion.
v. 696.
BREVETS
1. Licence forc6e, limit6e A Ia vente au
Canada-Contrefagon-Vente par le porteur de licence A une compagnie canadienne apparentde-Vente par l'acheteur A une autre compagnie canadienne apparentde avec revente A un client en dehors du
Canada-Y a-t-il eu violation-Loi sur
BREVETS-Concluded-Fin brevets, S.R.C. 1952, 203, arts. 41(3), MIcRo et al. v. 2. Licence force-Requte du titulaire du brevet pour une audition ou un contredevant missaire-Le refus du Commissaire n'est pas un d6ni de justice-Sdcurit4 du public- Loi sur les Brevets, S.R.C. 203, art.
Contrefaon-Validit6 du brevet-Anticipation-Perfectionnement d'atelier-Loi sur les Brevets, S.R.C. 1952, 203. DE et al., 599.
CERTIORARI
CHEMINS DE FER
1. Construction d'un pont pour remplacer un viaduc-R1partition frais-Loi les Chemins de Per, S.R.C. 1952, 234, arts. 39, 53(2), 260, 262, 267.
et al., 602 Viaduc insuffisant-Requite par ]a municipalit6 pour 6largir-Contre-proposition par compagnie que la voie routibre soit d6tourn6e pour passer sous un pont existant-La Commission des Transports du Canada a-t-elle le pouvoir d'autoriser un octroi de la Caisse des passages A niveau de chemins de fer-Loi sur les Chemins de fer, S.R.C. 1952, c. 234, art. 265(1)(b). CIVIL CODE
Article 283 (Tutorship) ........ 2.- Article 1053 (Quasi-delict) ..... 3.-Articles 1053, 1056 (Quasi-delict) 393 See-Voir: AuroMnOILES CIVIL CODE-Concluded-Fin
4.- Article 1053 (Quasi-delict)...... 527
5.-Articles 1053, 1054 (Quasi-delict) 553
6.- Article 1834 (Partnership)...... 349
See-Voir: Soc&ivs
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Article 173 (Lis pendens)...... 594
2.- Article 215 (Cross demand)..... 594
3.- Articles 269, 270 (Continuance of suits).........................
4.- Article 282 (Peremption) .......
5.-Article 332 (Examination of witnesses)............................
See-Voir: ThiuoIN
6.-Articles 421, 423, 433 (Trial by jury)..............................
See-Voir: ACroNs
7.-Article 537 (Rules as to judgm ent).............................
8.-Article 1209 (Delay for appeal). 243
COMMETTANT ET PRtPOSk
COMPANIES
1. Amalgamation-Order approving amalgamation agreement-Amalgamation certificate issued by Registrar of Companies-- Approval order set aside on appeal-Order on appeal of no effect-The Companies
Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 53, s. 140a (enacted
1959, c. 10).
et al. v. 36.
COMPANIES-Concluded-Fin 2. Purchase of shares-Failure to deliver prospectus-Waiver of any right to have allotment of shares rescinded-The Companies Act, R.S.S. 1940, c. 113, ss. 116(1) and 129.
et al., 670.
3. Company pledging assets to bank as security for loan to third parties-Transadmitted be intra vires- Unanimous consent of all shareholders where given in fact as effective to validate transaction as if given in formal meeting. et a]., CONFLICT OF LAWS Status-Parties whose domicile of origin was Hungary married in that country- Jewish bill of divorcement obtained in Italy-Parties later acquiring domicile of choice in Israel-Divorce not recognized in Italy or Hungary but recognized in Israel-Female party subsequently married in Ontario while continuing to be domiciled in Israel-Whether Ontario marriage valid. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1. Validity of legislation-Provincial legislation compelling person accused of murder to testify at corner's inquest-Whether intra vires-Coroners Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 106, as. 8, 8a, 15, 20, as amended by 1960 (Sask.), c. 14-B.N.A. Act, 1867, as. 91 (27), 92(14).
2. Validity of provincial legislation-Legislation conferring divorce jurisdiction on local judges of Supreme Court-Whether ultra vires-B.N.A. Act, 1867, ss. 91, 92, 96, 101-Supreme Court Act Amendment Act 1964, 1964 (B.C.), c. 56-Constitutional Questions Determination Act, R.S.- B.C. 1960, c. 72-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 37.
BRITISH 3. Magistrate's Court of Quebec-Pecuniary limits raised from $200 to 8500-Constitutionality of the Act concerning the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court,
12 Eliz. II, c. 62-B.N.A. Act, 1867, c. 3,
RE al., 772.
4. Zoning by-law prohibiting signs on private property-Applicability to federal election signs-Canada Elections Act, 8-9
McKAY THE 798.
CONTRACTS
1. Agreement between subcontractors to undertake highway contract-Subsequent agreement of contractor with one of the subcontractors to perform the contract- Whether contractor entitled to enforce provisions of agreement between itself and one of the subcontractors as against the other subcontractor-Counterclaim for arrears of equipment rental-Claim damages flowing from interim injunction preventing subcontractor removing machinery.
Co. v.
RusH &
2. Transfer of petroleum and natural gas interest-Non est factum-Second transfer with full knowledge and by way of compromise-Claim by mistaken party to have transactions set aside-Alternative
Claim for deceit.
v. Co.
et al., 417.
Novation-Agreement to assume third party liability to extent of specific amount- Covenant to continue to do business with third party-Further extension of credit later refused-Whether failure of consideration-Justification in withholding further credit.
LTD.
4. Assignment of royalty interest under petroleum and natural gas lease and grant of minerals lease-Plea of non est factum- CONTRACTS-Concluded-Fin Claim to rescind on ground of innocent misrepresentation.
v. Co. et al., 670.
COURONNE
1. Terre appartenant aux Indiens-Droit de la Bande A la possession-Terre situde sur la r6serve-Droit du possesseur lgal de donner par testament possession A une personne qui n'est pas un Indien-Action prise par la Couronne au nom de la Bande pour possession-Loi sur les Indiens, S.R.C. 1952, arts. 20, 28, 31(1), 50. v. DEVEREUx, 567. also-Voir aussi: CRIMINAL LAW
1. Indictment-Duplicity-Charge of selling as food "dead animals" contrary to s. 25(b) of Food and Drugs Act, 1952-53 38 and regulations-"Dead animals" defined by regulations as either improperly killed or affected with disease- Whether indictment void for duplicity- Whether two different modes of committing single offence-Criminal
Code, 1953-54 (Can.), 703.
Kipp v. Mandamus-County Court judge erroneously quashing indictment for duplicity on preliminary objection-Whether order lies to compel judge to proceed with indictment.
Kipp v. Common betting house and book-making -Trial judge expressing doubt as to modus operandi-Whether necessary for Crown to prove precise manner in which offence committed-Criminal
Code,
177(1)(e), 592(4)(1), 597(2).
4. Fraud-Employee filing false expense accounts as a means increasing salary- Belief by accused of employer's sanction- Whether intention to defraud-Conviction quashed by Court of Appeal-Whether CRIMINAL LAW-Continued-Suite quashing based on grounds of law-Whether quashing should be upheld-Criminal Code
1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 323(1).
5. Capital murder-Conviction affirmed by
Supreme Court of Canada-Minister remitting case to Court of Appeal for further hearing-Whether further appeal to Supreme Court of Canada-Supreme Court
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 55-Criminal
Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 596, 597.
v. 209.
6. Common gaming house-Slot machine
-Conviction quashed by Court of Appeal player has control over operation-Whether dissent in Court of Appeal on question of law-Criminal Code, 1953- 54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 170(2)(b)(i), 176.
THE v. TOUPIN, 275.
7. Habitual criminal-Notice of application to have accused given preventive detention "in addition to" sentence for substantive offence-Whether notice defective to the extent of nullity-Criminal
Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 660(1),
662(1)(a), 667.
V. THE 312.
8. Habitual criminal-Procedure-County
Court Judges' Criminal Court-Application for sentence of preventive detention- Application traversed to next sittings of
Court in
January-Application finally heard in June-No adjournments meanwhile-Whether proceedings had come to an end because of postponements and delay-Whether County Court Judges'
Criminal Court a continuing Court.
V. THE 312.
9. Coroner's inquest-Examination of person charged with murder at inquest into the death in question. Whether compellable witness-Coroners Act, R.S.S. 1953, c.
106, ss. 8, 8a, 15, 20, as amended by 1960
(Sask.),
14-Canada
Evidence Act,
Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.), c. 44, s. 2(d),
(e)-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 448, 488(3).
Non-capital murder - Evidence - Weight-Confessions made to friends- Charge to jury-Whether adequate.
CRIMINAL LAW-Concluded-Fin v. THE
11. Habeas corpus-Whether warrant of committal discloses offence-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 288(d).
v. 657.
12. Notice of appeal to Court of Appeal expressing appellant's wish to be present and argue orally-Appellant not present and not represented-Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal to hear and dismiss appeal- Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 549(1).
v. 658.
13. Capital murder-Misdirection by trial judge-Theory of the defence not put to the jury-Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 12(1)-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 592(1) (b) (iii). Appeals--Jurisdiction-Finding of habitual criminal affirmed in Court of Appeal, but sentence of preventive detention set aside-Whether Supreme Court of Canada has jurisdiction to entertain appeal Crown-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 667-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, 259,
THE 831. CROWN
1. Motor vehicle accident-Personal injuries-Jury's award reduced on appeal- Whether Court of Appeal justified in reducing award.
2. Motor vehicle accident-Injury giving rise to phlebitis-Pre-existing disability- DAMAGES-Concluded-Fin
Both award of jury and that of Court of
Appeal rejected by Supreme Court.
CORRIE 457.
for injuries received during course of arrest-Whether evidence supported jury's finding that excessive force used-Corroboration of evidence required by of The Evidence Act, R.S.O.
et al. v. 538.
4. Negligence-Use fire-arms-Fugitive shot accidentally by police officer-Responsibility.
DIVORCE
2. See also-Voir
DOMMAGES
1. Commettant et pr6pos6--Couronne- Automobile-Soldat bless6 dans un accident d'automobile--R6clamation pour perte de service-Pas de recours sous l'art. du
Code civil de Qu6bec.
2. N6gligence-Usage d'armes
A feu- Fuyard atteint accidentellement par une balle tir6e par un agent de police-Responsabilit6.
v. 638.
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
1. Validit6 de la l6gislation-Statut provincial contraignant une personne accus6e de meurtre de rendre t6moignage A l'enquote du coroner-Statut est-il intra vires
-Coroner's
Act, S.R.S. arts.
8, 8a, 20, tels qu'amend6s par
(Sask.), c. 14-Loi de l'Amdrique britannique du Nord, arts. 91(27), 92(14).
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL Validit6 d'un statut provincial-Statut confirant aux juges locaux Ia Cour supreme juridiction en matibres de divorce -Statut est-il ultra vires-Acte de l'Am6rique du Nord britannique, arts. 92, 96, 101-Supreme Court Act Amendment Act 1964, (B.C.), 56-Constitutional Questions Determination Act, R.S.B.C.
72-Loi sur Ia Cour supreme, S.R.C. 259, 37. Cour de Magistrat de Qu6bec-Limite p6cuniaire port6e de $200 A 8500-Constitutionnalit6 Ia Loi concernant juridiction de Cour de Magistrat, 11-12 Eliz. II, 62-Acte de l'Am6rique du Nord britannique, c. art. 96. RE QUkBEC al., Rbglement zonage d6fendant les enseignes sur propridtis priv6es-Applicabilit6 aux enseignes pour les 6lections f6d6rales-Loi blectorale Eliz. 11 (1960), c. 39, arts 2(4), 49, 71, 100- L'Acte de l'Am6rique du Nord britannique, c. arts. 92.
DROIT CRIMINEL
1. Meurtre qualifi6-Verdict de culpabilit6 affirm6 par la Cour supr6me du Canada- Ministre d6f6rant la cause A la Cour d'Appel pour nouvelle audition-Nouvel appel A la Cour suprime du Canada-Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 55-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts.
2. Maison de jeu-Appareil
A sous- Verdict de culpabilit6 renvers6 par la Cour d'Appel--Question de savoir joueur un l'op6ration-Question savoir la dissidence en Cour d'Appel porte sur une question de droit-Code arts. 170(2)(b)(i), 176.
3. Repris de justice-Avis de demande pour imposer A l'accus6 une sentence de d6ten- DROIT CRIMINEL-Continued--Suite tion pr6ventive plus des la sentence impos6e pour ]'offense originale-L'avis
6tait-il d6fectueux jusqu'au point de nullit6-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c.
arts. 660(1), 662(1)(a), 667.
4. Repris de justice-Proc6dure County
Court Judges' Criminal Court-Demande* pour imposer une sentence de detention pr6ventive-Demande remise A la session suivante de la Cour en janvier-Demande finalement entendue en juin-Aucun ajournement durant cette p6riode-Est-ce que les proc6dures avaient pris fin A cause de retards et ddlais-Est-ce que la County
Court Judges'
Criminal Court est une
Cour continuelle.
V. 312.
Enquite du coroner-Interrogatoire d'une personne accus6e de meurtre A l'enquite relativement au d6chs en question- T6moin est-il contraignable-Coroner's Act,
S.R.S. arts. 8, 8a, 20, tels qu'amend6s par (Sask.), 14-Loi sur
]a preuve au Canada, S.R.C. 1952, 307, arts. 4, 5-Loi sur la dclaration canadienne des droits, (Can.), c. 44, s.
2(d), (e)-Code criminel, 1953-54, (Can.), arts. 448, 488(3).
al., 465.
Meurtre non qualifi&-Preuve-Poids- Aveu fait
A des amies-Suffisance au jury.
V. 555.
Habeas corpus-Le mandat de ddp6t divoile-t-il une offense-Code
1953-54 (Can.), art. 288(d).
v. THE
8. Avis d'appel A la Cour d'Appel exprimant d6sir de l'appelant d'6tre pr6sent et de plaider oralement-L'appelant non prdsent et non repr6sent--Juridiction de
Ia Cour d'Appel d'entendre et de rejeter
I'appel-Code art. 549(1).
v. THE 658.
Meurtre qualifl6-Mauvaise direction par juge au procks-Th6orie de la d6fense non pr6sent6e au jury-Loi sur Preuve au Canada, S.R.C. 307, 12(1)- Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. art.
592 (1) (iii).
91534-92
DROIT CRIMINEL-Concluded-Fin Appels-Juridiction-D6clarationque l'accus6 est un repris de justice confirm~e par Cour d'Appel, mais sentence d6tention pr6ventive mise c6t6-La Cour supreme du Canada a-t-elle juridiction pour entendre Pappel de Couronne- Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), art. 667-Loi sur Cour supreme, S.R.C. c. 259, art.
TrE DROIT MUNICIPAL Chute sur trottoir glac6--Responsabilit6 -Diligence de cit6-Fardeau de preuve-Avis incomplet-Charte la Cit6 de Qu6bec, art. 535-Code civil, art. ELECTIONS
FAILLITE
HABEAS CORPUS
- HUSBAND AND WIFE IMMIGRATION
1. Deportation-Habeas corpus-Deportation order suspended for specified period IMMIGRATION-Concluded-Fin probation-Review without notice- Attempt to implement order long after expiry of probationary period-Whether authority to enforce order-Immigration
19(e), 26, 31(4), 33-Canadian Bill of
Rights, 1959-60 (Can.), c. 44.
VIou et al., 232.
2. Expulsion-Habeas corpus-Ordonnance d'expulsion suspendue pour une p6riode sp~cifique sous surveillance-Revision sans avis-Tentative de dcnner suite A l'ordonnance longtemps aprbs l'expiration de la p6riode sous surveillance-Autorit6 mettre en vigueur l'ordonnance-Loi sur
I'immigration, S.R.C. 1952, c. 325, arts.
8, 15(1), 17, 19(e), 26, 31(4), 33-Loi sur la ddclaration canadienne des droits, 1960
(Can.), c. 44.
et al., 232.
INDIANS
INDIENS
INSURANCE
Accident insurance-Insured suffering fatal heart attack while rocking car caught in snowdrift-Whether loss caused by accident as required by policy.
v. INSUR- Co., 434.
JURIDICTION
1. See-Voir:
JURISDICTION
1. See-Voir:
3. See also-Voir aussi: LABouR.
4. See also-Voir aussi: WILL.
JURY TRIAL
LABOUR
1. Arbitration-Appointment of arbitrator by Labour Relations Board-Application for writ of certiorari to quash appointment -Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, s. 22(3)(a) [enacted 1961 (B.C.), c. 31, s. 17(b)].
et al., 222.
2. Criminal law-Wrongful dismissal from employment-Whether evidence to support conviction-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 367(a),
19-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 41(3). J. et al., 355.
3. Criminal law-Wrongful dismissal from employment-Appeal by way of trial de novo before sentence imposed-Whether judge hearing trial de novo has jurisdiction to impose sentence-Whether evidence to support conviction-Criminal Code, 1953- 54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 367(a), 367(b), 719- Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 41(1), (3).
J. LT9E et al., 359.
LIBEL
Credit reports on plaintiff requested by clients of defendant company-Reports prepared and sent out to clients-No evidence of letters having been mailed or received-Whether burden of proving publication discharged-Question for jury's determination.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Defendant laying information and withdrawing same at later date-Nothing done during interval by magistrate before whom information sworn-Whether a prosecution commenced so as to entitle plaintiff to claim against defendant for malicious prosecution.
LTD. et al., 607.
1. See-Voir:
MARQUES DE COMMERCE
Enregistrement-aResdans eDandressD-Ces deux mots cr6ent-ils de la confusion-Sont-ils distinctifs-Loi sur les
Marques de Commerce, 1952-53 (Can.),
49, arts. 6(2), (5), 12(1)(d), 37(2)(d).
LDr., 734.
MASTER AND SERVANT
MINES AND MINERALS
1. Petroleum and natural gas lease-Ten year term and as long thereafter as oil or gas produced from leased land-Where gas from well not sold or used royalty payment to extend if gas being produced- Subsequent amendment of lease providing
Well drilled on pooled lands capped because of lack of market-Royalty paid after expiry of ten year term-Whether lease continued beyond expiration of primary term.
MORTGAGES
Guarantee-Mortgage on land and buildings-Collateral mortgage on chattels- 34(17) of The Judicature Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 164-Liability guarantor-The Guarantees Acknowledgment Act, R.S.A. 1955, et 441.
MOTOR VEHICLES
1. Negligence-Car owned by insurance company in collision with train-Passenger
EX
MOTOR VEHICLES-Concluded-Fin and driver fellow servants of company and acting in course of their employment as such servants-Driver negligent-Liability of company for injuries to passenger- Driver immune from liability-The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 167, s. 50(2) [now R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105(2)- The Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 437, ss. 123-125.
Co-OPERATORS v. 106.
2. Negligence-Truck involved in collision between two automobiles-Owner and driver of truck found jointly and severally liable with driver of one of the automobiles -Driver of automobile alone held liable on appeal-New trial ordered by Supreme Court on certain questions.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1. Drainage ditch constructed by municipality-Silt carried by ditch causing damage to plaintiff's property-Action for damages and an injunction-Statutory defence-Municipal Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, 255, 527 and 529.
MCKENZIE 2. Supplementary estimate certified Metropolitan Council by Executive Committee-Estimates for the year already adopted-Whether by-law levying additional sum upon area municipalities, validly enacted-The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 249, s. 206(1)(a) and (2)-The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 260, ss. 229(1), 230(1), (2) and (10).
3. Application for building permit refused -Prima facie right to have permit granted -Municipality seeking to defeat prima facie right by enactment of rezoning bylaw-Application for mandamus-Municipality failing to manifest that it was proceeding on a pre-existing clear intention to restrict lands in question and was acting in good faith in so doing.
4. Zoning by-law-Failure to comply with
Council's procedural resolution-Action declaration of invalidity of by-law- Whether action barred by limitation period
Metropolitan Winnipeg Act,
(Man.), 40, 206(4) [am. 1962,
29(a)] 97, 29(b)J.
5. County responsible for care of indigent person prior to annexation of certain area by city-Indigent's case inadvertently omitted from list welfare cases for which city assumed responsibility-Claim county for moneys expended for indigent's care subsequent to annexation-Restitution-The Homes for the Aged Act,
(Ont.), 46.
OrAWA,
Bakery having place business outside city limits-Products sold at wholesale to merchants and distributed by trucks inside city limits-Whether exemption from having to pay for permits and licences- Action to recover moneys so paid-Municipal Tax Exemption Act, R.S.Q.
NEGLIGENCE
1. Explosion-Gasoline livrde h un garage
-Surplus de gasoline d6vers6 dans neige et p6nitrant dans le garage-D6faut de fermer les valves-Responsabilit6 du livreur-Code civil, arts. 1054.
Patrons et employds-Radiologiste employd par un h6pital-Appareil de Rayon- X-Blessures causbes par la radiation- Responsabilit6-Code civil, arts.
3. See also-Voir
NEGLIGENCE-Concluded-Fin 4. See also-Voir aussi: 5. See also-Voir aussi: 6. See also-Voir aussi: NOVATION
PATENTS
1. Compulsory licence-Restricted to sale "to be used in Canada"-Infringement- Sale by licensee to related Canadian company-Sale by purchaser to third related Canadian company with resale to customer outside Canada-Whether infringement- Patent Act, R.S.C. ss. 41(3), Compulsory licence-Patentee requesting oral hearing or cross-examination upon affidavits before Commissioner-Whether refusal by Commissioner a denial of justice -Public safety-Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, 203, 41(3).
3. Infringement-Whether patent valid- Anticipation-Workshop
Patent Act, R.S.C. 203.
et 599.
PATRONS ET EMPLOYES PEREMPTION
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS action-Piece in patient's body-Whether left there during operation performed by second defendant in or during one performed by first defendant in
1. Conflict between applicants for patent- Application by third party to be added as a defendant-Whether Exchequer Court had jurisdiction to add party-Patent Act,
R.S.C. 1952, c. 203, s. 45(8)-Exchequer
Court Rules, r. 42-R.S.C. (Eng.), Ord.
16, r.
V. et al.,
RAILWAYS
1. Level crossing-Order of Board of
Transport Commissioners requiring installation of signals within days after completion of street widening-Accident occuring before expiration of period-Statutory speed limit of 10 m.p.h. where order not complied with-Train travelling in excess of permitted rate-Negligence-Railway
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, s. 312(1)(c).
C.P.R. Co. et al., 448.
2. Construction of overhead bridge as replacement for existing subway-Apportionment of cost-Railway Act, R.S.C.
1952, 234, 39, 53(2), 260, 262, 267.
et al., 602.
3. Inadequate railway subway-Application by municipality to enlarge-Proposal by company that highway be diverted to pass under existing bridge-Whether Board of Transport has power to authorize grant from Railway
Grade Crossing
Fund- Railway
Act, R.S.C.
234,
265(1)(b).
Co., 729.
REVENU
1. Taxe de vente Exemptions-Humidificateurs employds dans la fabrication de fournaises non sujettes A la taxe-Certificats d'exemption-Exempts comme mat6riaux de construction ou marchandise partiellement fabriqude-Fin de non-recevoir contre la Couronne-Loi sur la taxe d'accise,
S.R.C. 1952, arts. 29(1)(d), 30(1)(a),
30(2), 32(1), 44(4), et Rglements.
THE 217.
REVENU-Concluded-Fin Imp6t sur le revenu-Compagnie de p6trole-D~ductions-D6penses de forage et d'exploration sont-elles d6ductibles par la (corporation remplacdes pour la m8me ann6e d'imposition durant laquelle elle a vendu ses biens A une (corporation remplagantes-Loi de l'imp6t sur revenu, S.R.C. c. 148, s. 83A(3), (8a). OF Douanes et accise-Importation d'une machine A grande vitesse pour fabriquer papier journal-Est-elle d'une classe espbee fabriqu6e au Canada-Loi sur douanes, S.R.C. 1952, 58-Tarif des douanes, S.R.C. 1952, item 427, 427a. EXCISE V. & et al., 366. 4. Imp6t sur revenu-Remboursement de contributions faites A un fonds de retraite lors de la mort d'un employ6-Ce montant est-il taxable comme imp6t de succession ou comme imp6t du d6funt-Loi de l'Imp6t sur le Revenu, S.R.C. 1952, 148, arts. 6(1), (a)(iv), 63(1), (4), 64(2), 139(1)(ar).
OF SLANDER
Qualified privilege-Whether sufficient evidence of malice to warrant the question malice or the absence of malice being put before the jury.
SOCITIES
Requ~te en annulation de l'enregistrement d'une raison sociale-Qui a droit au recours de l'art. la Loi des d6clarations des compagnies et des soci6t6s, S.R.Q. 277-Code Civil, art. 1834. STATUTES
1.-Acte de l'Am6rique du Nord britannique, arts. 91(27), 92(14). 465 2.-Acte de l'Amdrique du Nord britannique, 1867, arts. 91, 92, 96, 101... 491
3.-Acte de I'Am6rique du Nord britannique, art. 96..........
4.-Acte de l'Am6rique du Nord britannique, arts. 92... 798
5.-Bankruptcy
14................................
6.-B.N.A. Act, 92, 96,
101.........
..................
7.-B.N.A. Act, 1867, ss. (27),
92(14) .............................
8.-B.N.A. Act, 96.... 772
B.N.A.
Act, 1867, ss.
92........................
10.-Canada Elections Act, 8-9 Eliz.
II 39, 2(4), 49, 100...
11.-Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.
12.-Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 307, s. 12(1)................
13.-Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960
(Can.), c. 44, s. 2(e).................
14.-Canadian Bill of Rights, 1959- 60 (Can.), c. 44..................
15.-Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.), c. 44, s. 2(d), (e)............. 16.-Charte de la Cit6 de Qu6bec, art. 535.......................
17.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 596, 597................. 18.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), arts. 170(2)(b)(i), 176.......... See-Voir: DRoIT Code criminel, 1953-54 c. arts. 660(1), 662(1)(a), 667..... 20.- Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 367(a), 719............... 21.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. arts. 367(a), 367(b), 719........ 22.-Code criminel, 1953-54, (Can.), arts. 448, 488(3)............... 23.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 288(d).................... 24.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 549(1).................... 25.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), art. 592(1)(b)(iii).............. 26.-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 667...................
27.-Companies Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 53, s. 140a (enacted 1959, c. 10) ...... 28.-Companies Act, R.S.S. 1940, c.
113, s. 116(1), 129 ................
29.-Constitutional Questions Determination Act, R.S.B.C. 72.... 490
30.-Constitutional Questions Determination Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 72.... 490
See-Voir: Dnorr
31.-Coroner's Act, S.R.S. 1953, c.
106, arts. 8, 8a, 15, 20, tels qu'amend6s par 1960 (Sask.), c. 14...............
32.- Coroner's Act, S.R.S. 1953, c.
106, arts. 8, 8a, 15, 20, tels qu'amend6s par 1960 (Sask.), c. 14...............
See-Voir: Dnorr
33.-Coroner's Act, R.S.S. 1953, c.
106, ss. 8, 8a, 15, 20, as amended by
1960 (Sask.), c. 14..................
34.- Coroner's Act, R.S.S. 1953, c.
106, ss. 8, 8a, 15, 20, as amended by
1960 (Sask.), c. 14..................
35.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 703...
...................
592(4)(1), 597(2)....................
37.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 323(1)......................
38.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.),
596, 597. ...............
39.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 170(2)(b)(i), 176............
275 1
40.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), 660(1), 662(1)(a), 667 ....... 41.- Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 367(a), 719................ 42.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 367(a), 367(b), 719.......... 43.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), 448, 488(3).............. 44.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 288(d).................. 45.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 549(1)...................... 46.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 592(1)(b)(iii)....... ....... 47.-Criminal Code, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, s. 667....................
48.-Customs Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 58...........................
51.-Guarantees
Acknowledgment Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 136............. 52.-Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O.
.....
53.- Homes for the Aged Act, 194
(Ont.), c. 46....................
33...........................
56.- Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 126A.................
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952,
83A(3), 8a)...............
139(1)(ar)......................
61.- Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
62.-Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C.
1960, c. 205, s. 22(3)(a) [enacted 1961
(B.C.), c. 31, s. 17(b)]...............
63.-Loi sur les Brevets, S.R.C.
1952, c. 203, arts. 41(3), 46...........
See-Voir: BREVETS
64.-Loi sur les Brevets, S.R.C. 1952, c. 203, art. 41(3)................. 65.-Loi sur les Brevets, S.R.C. 1952, c.203.........................
66.-Loi sur les Chemins de fer, S.R.C. 1952, c. 234, arts. 39, 53(2), 260, 262, 267...................
67.- Loi sur les Chemins de fer, S.R.C. 1952, c. 234, art. 265(1)(b).... S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 55........... 69.-Loi sur la Cour supr~me, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, arts. 36, 41 ....... 70.-Loi sur la Cour supr~me, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 41(3)............... 71.-Loi sur la Cour supr~me, S.R.C. 1952, 259, art. 41(1), (3)........... 1952, c. 259, art. 37................. 73.- Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 36................. 74.-Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, art. 41................. Loi sur la D6claration canadienne des droits, (Can.), 44... 232 76.-Loi sur la D6claration canadienne des droits, 1960 (Can.), c. 44, art. 2(d), (e)....................
See-Voir: Daorr 77.-Loi des Dtclarations des compagnies et des soci6tis, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 277, art. 13........................
78.-Loi sur les Douanes, S.R.C.
1952, c. 58 ........................
See-Voir: REVENU
79.- Loi 6lectorale du Canada, 8-9
R liz. II (1960), c. 39, arts. 2(4), 49, 71,
100...........................
80.-Loi sur l'Immigration, S.R.C.
1952, c. 325, arts. 8, 15(1), 17, 19(e),
26, 31(4), 33....................
81.- Loi de 1'Imp6t sur le revenu,
S.R.C. 1952, c. 148, art. 83A(3), (8a)..
82.-Loi de 1'Imp6t sur le revenu'
S.R.C. 1952, c. 148, arts. 91, 99(2)....
83.- Loi de l'Imp6t sur le revenu,
S.R.C. 1952, c. 148, arts. 6(1), (a)(iv),
63(1), (4), 64(2), 139(1)(ar)..........
84.-Loi sur les Indiens, S.R.C.
c. arts. 20, 28, 31(1), 50 .........
de Magistrat, 11-12 Pliz. II, .
86.-Loi sur les Marques de Commerce, 1952-53 (Can.), c. 49, arts. 6(2),
(5), 12(1)(d), 37(2)(d).............
87.-Loi sur la Preuve au Canada,
S.R.C. 1952, c. 307, arts. 2, 4, 5 ......
Loi sur la Preuve au Canada,
S.R.C. 1952, c. 307, art. 12(1)........
Winnipeg Act, 1960 (Man.), c. 40, s. 206(4) [am. 1962, c. 97, s. 29(a)] (5) [en. 1962, c. 97, s. 29(b)]......
................... 91.-Municipal Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 255, ss. 527, 529.................. 92.-Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 249, s. 206(1)(a), (2).............. 93.- Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 221, s. 6......... 94.-Municipality Toronto Act, R.S.O. 1960, 260, ss. 229(1), 230(1), (2), (10).............. 95.-Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203, s. 45(8) .......................... 96.-Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203, as. 41(3), 46....... ................ 97.-Patent Act, R S.C. 1952, c. 98.--Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203 599 99.-Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 323, s. 5
.................... 100.-Railway Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, s. 312(1)(c).................... 101.-Railway Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, ss. 39, 53(2), 260, 262, 267....... STATUTES-Concluded-Fin
102.- Railway Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
234, s. 265(1)(b).................
103.-Security Frauds Prevention
Act, 1930 (B.C.), c. 64, ss. 10, 29.....
104.upreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 41...................
105.--Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 55...................
106.-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 41(3)................
107.-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 41(1)(3)..............
108.-Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, 259, 37................
109.--Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 36...................
110.--Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 259, s. 41...................
111.-Supreme Court Act Amendment Act 1964, 1964 (B.C.), c. 56..... 490
112.--Supreme Court Act Amendment Act 1964, 1964 (B.C.), c. 56.... 490
113.- Tarif des douanes,
S.R.C.
1952, c. 60, item 427, 427a...........
114.-Trade Marks Act, 1952-53
37(2)(d).......................
115.- Workmen's Compensation Act,
R.S.O. 1960, c. 437, ss. 123-125 ......
See-Voir: MoToR
TAXATION
1. Income tax-Investigation-Inquiry by person authorized by Minister into the affairs of taxpayer-Whether taxpayer entitled to be present and represented by counsel at hearings-Injunction-Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 126(4), (8)-Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 154, as. 4, 5-Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.), c. 44, s. 2(e)-Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 323, s. 5--Security Fraud Prevention Act, 1930 (B.C.), c. 64, ss. 10, 29.
2. Sales tax-Exemptions-Humidifiers- Used in manufacture of tax-exempt furnaces-Certificates of exemption-Whether exempt as "building material" whether "partly manufactured goods"-Estoppel of the Crown-Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 100, ss. 29(1)(d), 30(1)(a), 30(2), 32(1), 44(4), and Regulations.
SKUTTLE THE 217.
Income tax-Oil company-Deductions -Drilling and exploration expenses- Whether deductible by the "predecessor corporation" for same taxation year in which it sold its assets to a "successor corporation"-Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, 148, s. 83A(3), (8a).
4. Customs and Excise-Importation high-speed newsprint machine-Whether of a class or kind made in Canada-Customs Act, R S.C. 1952, 58-Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 60, tariff items 427, 427a. & et al., 366. Income tax-Refund of pension fund contributions upon death of employee- Whether taxable as income of estate or as income of deceased-Income
TfMOIN
1. Interrogatoire-Faillite-Privilbge de la Couronne-Int6r~t public-Attestation du TtMOIS-Concluded-Fin procureur g6n6ral-Formule trop g4ndrale- La Cour peut-elle aller au-deld de cette attestation-Code de proc6dure civile, art.
MonaliRES et al.,
TRADE MARKS
Registration-"Resdan" and "Dandress"
confusing-Whether distinctive
-Trade
Marks Act, 1952-53 (Can.), c.
TRAVAIL
1. Droit criminel-Cong6diement ill6gal- Preuve ne supportant pas le verdict de culpabilit6-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, arts. 367(a), 719-Loi sur la Cour supr6me, S.R.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 41(3).
v. J.
et al., 355.
2. Droit criminel-Cong6diement ill4gal- Appel par voie de procks de novo avant le prononc6 de la sentence-Juridiction du juge entendant le procks de novo d'imposer une sentence-Preuve supportant le verdict de culpabilit6-Code
(Can.), arts. 367(a), 367(b), 719- Loi sur la Cour supreme, S.R.C. 1952,
J.
et al., 359.
TUTELLE
Mbre nommbe tutrice A ses enfants- Action intent6e A la suite du dcs de son mari-Convol de la tutrice durant I'instance en Cour supdrieure-Convention des procureurs que le dossier serait r~gularis6 plus tard-Reprise d'instance par I'6pouse mais omission de pourvoir A la tutelle- Epouse finalement nomm6e tutrice conjointement avec son mari durant l'instance en appel-Requ~te A la Cour d'Appel pour
TUTELLE-Concluded-Fin r~gulariser dossier-G6rant d'affaires- Contrat judiciaire-Code civil, art. 283- Code de proc6dure civile, arts. 269, 270 v. 393.
WILLS
1. Construction-Gift to testatrix's husband if he survives-Provision for alternative disposition and will to take effect as if husband had predeceased testatrix in event of their deaths being simultaneous- Whether expression of intention that in either of the two situations, contemporaneous death or death of testatrix following that of husband, disposition of property to be the same.
et al. et Husband and wife domiciled in Latvia- Joint will-Bank accounts in Switzerland and England-Whether separate property of wife and thus available for distribution amongst her heirs or whether joint property of herself and her husband so as to entitle his heirs to a one-half interest therein. Trustees given implied power to lease- Stated income to widow-Balance income and residue of estate to daughter- Whether widow put to election between gifts to her under will and her dower right. ABsor v. et al., 628.
4. Validity-Allegation that testatrix lacked testamentary capacity-Alternative allegation of undue influence-Whether suspicion raised by circumstances surrounding execution of will dispelled-Onus of proof.
MAc v. 757
5. Charities-Testator domiciled in British Columbia-Residuary estate to Jewish National Fund in New York as a trust for purchase of lands in designated countries and establishment thereon Jewish colonies a valid charitable bequest-Law of which jurisdiction applicable.
ROYAL Co. RICHTER et al., 784 6. Construction-Bequest testator's daughter for life with direction for distribution upon her decease to those persons WILLS-Concluded-Fin entitled as if testator had died intestate- Whether next-of-kin to be determined at date of testator's death or at date of death of life tenant.
Co. LTD. v.
WITNESS
1. Examination-Bankruptcy-Crown privilege-Public policy-Attorney General's
WITNESS-Concluded-Fin certificate-No reference to specific facts- Whether invalid for vagueness-Whether Court can go lehind certificate-Code of Civil Procedure, art. 332.
et al., 73.
Cases cited
- Brusch v. The Queen scr-1953-1-373
- de Goldhar v. The Queen de Goldhar v. The Queen, supra
- Robinson's Robinson's case, infra
- Cox v. Hakes Cox v. Hakes, supra
- 2 W.W.R. 1265 2 W.W.R. 1265
- Parkes v. The Queen Parkes v. The Queen, supra
- Goldhar v. The Queen Goldhar v. The Queen, supra
Statutes and regulations cited
-
- s. 41 of the Supreme Court Act
- s. 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act
- Section 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act
- s. 41(3) of the Supreme Court Act
- s. 46 of the Supreme Court Act
- Section 660(1)
- s. 41(1)
- 41(3) of the Supreme Court Act
- s. 36
- 99(2)
- 53(2)
- ss. 116(1)
- 129
- ss. 91
- 92
- 96
- 101
- s. 37
- ss. 2(4)
- 49
- 71
- 100
- 31(1)
- ss. 660(1)
- arts. 660(1)
- s. 116(1)
- arts. 2(4)
- s. 41
-
- s. 667(2)
- s. 660
- art. 41(1)
- art. 667(2)
- s. 667(1)
- s. 667
- Section 667
- s. 40
- s. 1025
- s. 575
- section 667
- s. 41(1)
- art. 265(1)(b)
- s. 323(1)
- 597
- ss. 170(2)(b)(i)
- ss. 8
- ss. 2
- 4
- 5
- s. 2(d)
- ss. 448
- 488(3)
- s. 288(d)
- s. 549(1)
- s. 12(1)
- s. 592(1)
- ss. 20
- 82
- 50
- arts. 91(27)
- 92(14)
- arts. 170(2)(b)(i)
- 662(1)(a)
- art. 288(d)
- art. 549(1)
- s. 22(3)(a)
- s. 17(b)
- s. 367(a)
- ss. 367(a)
- 367(b)
- arts. 6(2)
- 12(1)(d)
- 37(2)(d)
- s. 50(2)
- s. 105(2)
- ss. 123
- s. 206(1)(a)
- (2)
- ss. 229(1)
- (10)
- arts. 660(1)
- arts. 367(a)
- art. 592(1)(b)(iii)
- s. 703
- ss. 21
- 168
- 169
- 176(1)
- 177(1)(e)
- s. 170(2)(b)(i)
- s. 592(1)(b)(iii)
- 30(2)
- 32(1)
- 17
- 19(e)
- ss. 4
- art. 2(d)
- art. 12(1)
- s. 206(4)
- ss. 527
- 529
- s. 5
- s. 265(1)(b)
- ss. 6(2)
-
- s. 55
- ss. 596
-
- s. 45(8)
- s. 312(1)(c)
- arts. 29(1)(d)
- 30(1)(a)
- arts. 6(1)
- (a)
- s. 2(e)
- (e)
- s. 29(1)(d)
- 31(4)
- ss. 29(1)(d)
-
Unresolved citations
- subsection (1)
- paras. (a)
- (b)
- subs. (1)
- section (3)
- subs. (3)
- s. 19 of the Judicature Act
- subsection (3)
- subsection (8)
- s. 25(b)
- ss. (27)