In an action for infringement of a patent which will expire on December 10, 1968, the Court of Appeal, reversing the judgment at trial which had declared the patent invalid, granted an injunction restraining the applicant from manufacturing, importing, producing, buying, delivering, selling or offering for sale a substance called chloramphenicol for the duration of the patent. The applicant inscribed an appeal to this Court from that judgment and, after having unsuccessfully applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of the injunction, applied to this Court for an order staying the execution of and suspending the injunction until after judgment has been given by this Court on the merits of the appeal.
Held (Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ. dissenting): The application for a stay of the injunction should be dismissed.
Per Cartwright CJ. and Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ.: The material filed was not adequate to support an application of this kind for what is an unusual form of relief. This Court is being asked to suspend the operation of a judgment of the Court of Appeal, delivered after full consideration of the merits. It is not sufficient to justify such an order being made to urge that the impact of the injunction upon the applicant would be greater than the impact of its suspension upon the respondent. The applicant elected to carry on a business on the assumption that the patent was invalid. The Court of Appeal held that this assumption was wrong. The applicant, in such circumstances, is not in a position to complain if it has to comply with that judgment until it has been reversed on appeal.
Per Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ., dissenting: Equity calls for the suspension of the injunction. If the injunction remains in operation and the appeal succeeds, the applicant will, in the interval, suffer an important prejudice for which it shall never be indemnified. On the contrary, if the injunction is suspended and the appeal fails, the respondent wil be entitled to an indemnity. The loss of the monopoly is not in question because other manufacturers can obtain the right to use the patent. In view of the judgment of the trial Court in its favour, the applicant was not required to establish that, prima facie, the appeal was wellfounded.
Injonction-Suspension durant I'appel-Doit-elle 6tre accordie-De quel c6t6 est le plus grand prdjudice-Cour supreme du Canada-Question de juridiction soulevie mais non decidde.
Cartwright CJ. and Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ.
S.C.R.
[1.968] Dans une action concernant la violation d'un brevet devant expirer le O dicembre 1968, la Cour d'appel a infirm6 le jugement de premiere instance qui avait d6clard que le brevet 6tait invalide et elle a accord6 une injonction d6fendant h la requirante de fabriquer, importer, produire, acheter, livrer, vendre ou offrir en vente une substance dite chloramphenicol pendant la dur6e de ce brevet. La requirante a inscrit un & Co.
appel devant cette Cour de ce jugement et, la suspension de 1'injonetion lui ayant t6 refus6e par la Cour d'appel, a prdsent6 i la Cour suprime une requite pour faire suspendre 'injonction jusqu'au prononc6 du jugement sur son pourvoi devant cette Cour.
Arrat: La requite demandant la suspension de l'injonction doit 6tre rejetie, les Juges Hall, Spence et Pigeon 6tant dissidents.
Le Juge en Chef Cartwright et les Juges Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson et Ritchie: Les documents produits ne sont pas suffisants pour justifier cette requite exceptionnelle. On demande h cette Cour de suspendre l'effet d'un jugement de la Cour d'appel qui a 6t6 rendu apris un examen complet du litige. Pour justifier une telle ordonnance, il n'est pas suffisant d'all6guer que l'effet de l'injonction h 1'gard de la requ6rante serait plus consid~rable que 1'effet de la suspension h 1'6gard de 1'intim6e. La requ6rante a choisi d'exercer son entreprise en prenant pour acquis, ce que la Cour d'appel a d~clar6 6tre erron6, que le brevet 6tait invalide. La requirante, dans de telles circonstances, ne peut pas se plaindre d'6tre oblig~e de se conformer au jugement rendu jusqu'au moment oii il pourra 6tre infirm6 en appel.
Les Juges Hall, Spence et Pigeon, dissidents: L'6quit6 parait r6clamer la suspension de l'injonction. Si elle reste en vigueur, la requirante au cas son appel serait jug6 bien fond6 subira dans l'intervalle un important pr6judice dont elle n'aura jamais droit d'6tre indemnis6e. Au contraire, si l'injonction est suspendue, l'intimbe, advenant le rejet de 1'appel, aura droit h une indemnit6. La question de la privation du monopole n'entre pas en jeu parce qu'il s'agit d'un brevet que d'autres manufacturiers peuvent obtenir le droit d'utiliser. Vu le jugement de premibre instance en sa faveur, la requdrante n'avait pas h d6montrer que, prima facie, I'appel 6tait bien fond6.
REQUETE pour suspendre une injonction durant l'appel'. Requite rejetie, les Juges Hall, Spence et Pigeon 6tant dissidents.
APPLICATION for a stay of an injunction pending the appeal'. Application dismissed, Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ. dissenting.
L. Y. For tier, for the applicant.
Christopher Robinson, Q.C., for the respondent.
1 [19671 Que. Q.B. 975.
R.C.S.
11968] J.:-This is an application by the appellant for an order staying the execution of and suspending an injunction granted by the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side) of the Province of Quebec', dated September 25, 1967. It was heard on November 27, 1967, and was dismissed on December 18, 1967, it being then stated that & reasons for judgment would be delivered later.
This litigation involves a patent no. 479,333 granted to the respondent, bearing date December 11, 1951, relating to "a new chemical compound. . . called Chloramphenicol." The respondent sued the appellant for infringement of this patent, claiming a permanent injunction and damages. The defence was that the patent was invalid, and consequently could not be infringed.
At trial, the action was dismissed, the learned trial judge holding that the patent was invalid. This judgment was reversed, on appeal. A permanent injunction order was granted on September 25, 1967, restraining the appellant from manufacturing, importing, producing, buying, delivering, selling or offering for sale Chloramphenicol for the duration of the respondent's patent. The respondent's right to claim damages up to the amount of $10,000, with interest, was reserved.
From this judgment an appeal has been launched to this Court.
On October 27, 1967, the Court of Appeal rejected an application by the appellant to suspend the injunction until after judgment has been given by this Court on the appeal, holding that it was without jurisdiction in the proceedings after its final judgment had been rendered. This decision has not been appealed to this Court.
The question of the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a motion made to it directly to suspend the operation of the injunction was argued before us, but, as I have reached the conclusion that, if jurisdiction does exist, the appellant's application should be dismissed, I do not find it necessary to state any opinion on the jurisdictional issue. On the merits, the appellant's application was supported by an affidavit of the appellant's attorney, on information and belief, the relevant part of which reads:
In addition to this there was filed, as a part of the & material before us, the petition made to the Court of Appeal for the suspension of the injunction, supported by the affidavit of Gerard Dufault, president of the appellant, stating that the facts alleged in the petition were true. One of the allegations in the petition was that the appellant is a relatively small pharmaceutical company for which Chloramphenicol represented in excess of 50 per cent of its annual volume of sales of pharmaceutical products. It also alleged that the appellant had an inventory of the product Chloramphenicol of about $20,000 which the injunction precluded it from selling, which was of a perishable nature, and the bulk of which could not be returned to the vendor thereof without considerable loss.
I do not think that this material is adequate to support an application of this kind for what is an unusual form of relief. The burden upon the appellant is much greater than it would be if the injunction were interlocutory. In such a case the Court must consider the balance of convenience as between the parties, because the matter has not yet come to trial. In the present case we are being asked to suspend the operation of a judgment of the Court of Appeal, delivered after full consideration of the merits. It is not sufficient to justify such an order being made to urge that the impact of the injunction upon the appellant would be greater than the impact of its suspension upon the respondent.
Even on the matter of balance of convenience I note that Puddicombe J., when dealing with an application by the respondent for an interlocutory injunction, had this to say:
With this view I agree. The appellant elected to carry on a business on the assumption that the patent duly issued to the respondent was invalid. The Court of Appeal has held that this assumption was wrong. The appellant, in such circumstances, is not in a position to complain if it has to comply with that judgment until it has been re- PE versed on appeal.
The patent which is in issue will expire on December 10,
1968. All that the respondent succeeded in obtaining, by virtue of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in its favour, was an injunction restraining the use of its patented product from September 25, 1967, to December 10,
1968. A suspension of that injunction until a decision of this Court on the appeal would further reduce that limited period.
The appellant will not be affected in its operations by the respondent's patent after December 10, 1968. In the meantime, it was properly conceded by the respondent's counsel that the appellant is not precluded by the injunction from dealing in Chloramphenicol purchased from any person or corporation holding from the respondent a licence to manufacture or sell the same. The appellant's petition to the Court of Appeal stated that approximately one-third of its sales of Chloramphenicol were represented by purchases from a company which obtained its supplies from a manufacturer, manufacturing under a compulsory licence under the respondent's patent granted by the Commissioner of Patents.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that this application should be dismissed.
(dissident):-A la demande de 1'intim6e, la Cour du banc de la reine de la Province de Qu6bec si6geant en appel a d6cern4 contre la requirante, le 25 septembre 1967, par jugement sur le fond infirmant celui de la Cour sup~rieure, une injonction d6fendant A la requ6rante de fabriquer, importer, produire, acheter, livrer, vendre ou offrir en vente la substance dite chloramph6nicol vis6e par le brevet canadien numdro 479,333 pendant la dur6e de ce brevet.
La requirante, qui avait contest6 avec succhs devant la
Cour sup6rieure la validit6 du brevet, a interjet6 appel h cette Cour. Elle a ensuite demand6 A la 'Cour d'appel par requ6te la suspension de 1'injonction jusqu'au prononc6 du jugement sur son pourvoi dans cette Cour. Le 27 octobre, cette demande a t6 rejet6e par le motif suivant.'
Le Juge en chef Tremblay:
& Co.
Quand notre Cour a rendu son jugement final dans un appel, il me Le Juge parait clair qu'elle en est dessaisie et qu'elle ne peut s'en ressaisir que dans Pigeon les cas pr6vus b la loi. Cela est encore plus 6vident quand le litige est pendant devant la Cour supreme du Canada.
Or, Iarticle 760 C.p., plac6 dans son contexte, rifbre manifestement A un jugement final de la Cour sup6rieure port6 en appel devant notre Cour et non pas h un jugement final de notre Cour port6 en appel devant la Cour supreme du Canada. Autrement, la L6gislature provinciale aurait pr6tendu d6terminer la proc6dure h suivre devant un tribunal qui relIve de la comp6tence lgislative du Parlement du Canada comme le reconnait 'article 24 C.p.:
<Les tribunaux qui relivent du Parlement du Canada et ont juridiction en matiare civile dans la province sont la Cour supr8me du Canada et la Cour d'6chiquier du Canada.
La comp6tence de ces tribunaux et la procedure qui doit y tre suivie sont d6termin6es par les lois du Parlement du Canada., Ce jugement n'6tant pas frapp6 d'appel, je m'abstiens d'examiner le bien-fond6 de ce motif pour consid6rer d'abord le fond de la requite.
L'6quit6 me parait r6clamer la suspension de 1'injonction. En effet, si elle reste en vigueur, la requirante au cas oii son appel serait jug6 bien fond6 subira dans l'intervalle un important pr6judice dont elle n'aura jamais droit d'6tre indemnis6e. Au contraire, si l'injonction est suspendue, 'intimbe, advenant le rejet de l'appel, aura droit . une indemnit6.
L'intim6e fait valoir que cette indemnit6 ne la compensera pas int6gralement parce qu'elle aura 6t6 priv6e du monopole que le brevet est destin6 h lui assurer. Dans la pr6sente cause, cet argument ne saurait 6tre retenu parce qu'il s'agit d'un brevet que d'autres manufacturiers peuvent obtenir le droit d'utiliser A des conditions fix6es par le Commissaire des brevets. De fait, il appert qu'un permis a 6t6 ainsi obtenu par un autre manufacturier de telle sorte que l'injonction, dans les termes ofi elle a ti d6cern6e, interdit h la requirante ce que I'intim6e est oblig6e d'admettre qu'elle a le droit de faire, savoir: acheter et revendre le produit fabriqu6 par cet autre inanufacturier.
4 [19681 B.R. 239.
R.C.S.
Devant nous, I'intim6e a pritendu que 1'ordonnance d'injonction devait s'interpr6ter de fagon h, ne pas la rendre applicable en pareil cas. Tout en prenant acte de cette attitude pour l'avenir, il me faut dire que cette pr6tention parait contestable. N'est-elle pas contraire au principe d'apris lequel une injonction doit 6tre appliquie comme elle est 6crite puisque 'on ne saurait se d6fendre d'y avoir contrevenu en plaidant qu'elle est mal fond6e?
Il me faut ajouter que le droit reconnu h l'appelante, lors de 1'audition de la requbte, d'acheter et revendre le produit fabriqu6 par un tiers, ne fait pas disparaitre la difficult6 car ce tiers ne fournit le produit que sous 1'une de ses trois formes de telle sorte que 1'injonction continue d'avoir des cons6quences graves pour l'appelante dont elle paralyse une forte partie des op6rations.
L'intim6e a ensuite soutenu que, pour obtenir la suspension de l'ordonnance, la requ6rante devait d6montrer que prima facie 1'appel 6tait bien fonda. Il est possible que dans certains cas l'on soit oblig6 d'examiner le fond du litige A cette fin. Dans le cas pr6sent, cela ne parait aucunement n6cessaire. Il suffit de constater que non seulement le brevet a 6t6 jug4 invalide par la Cour sup6rieure, mais que pr6alablement la Cour d'appel 'avait confirm6 le refus d'injonction interlocutoire qui avait suivi la rescision de l'int6rimaire.
Enfin, l'intim6e a ni6 que cette Cour ait le pouvoir d'accorder la suspension sollicit6e. I est sf^r que nous pourrions, en vertu de 1'art. 41 de la Loi sur la Cour supreme, accorder l'autorisation d'interjeter appel du jugement qui 'a refus6e et 1'accorder ensuite sur un appel ainsi autoris6, si nous en venions h la conclusion que la Cour d'appel a le pouvoir de le faire comme un juge de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario semble l'avoir dicid6 dans des causes qui ont fait l'objet d'une d6cision de cette Cour sur le fond. K.V.P. Co. c. McKie et all. Mais faut-il dire que notre juridiction ne peut 6tre exerc6e que de cette fagon? Ce n'est pas ainsi que le Conseil priv6 a statu6 sur une requite pour sursis d'execution dans une affaire venant de la Haute Cour du Bengal oii il avait accord6 une permission sp6ciale d'appeler. Srimati Nityamoni Dasi c. Madhu Sudan Sen . D'un autre