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Mayzel v. Runnymede Investment Corp. Ltd. et al.

[1968] SCR 543 Court SCC Decision date 1968-04-29 English

Decision Majority · Judgment of the Court

Contents

Majority

enact a provision having no relation with the stated purpose of the agreement and also to create a lack of uniformity by establishing in favour of the Indians in one province an exception that does not exist in favour of the Indians in other provinces.
In Danby v. Coutts & Co.", it was held that a power of attorney granted in general terms for the purpose stated in the recitals, to act for the grantor during his absence from England, must be construed as limited to the duration of such absence. Concerning statutes, Maxwell says (The Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed., p. 79): "General words and phrases, therefore, however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must, usually, be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act." and he adds quoting Lord Halsbury in Leach v. Rex", "It would be 'perfectly monstrous' to construe the general words of the Act so as to alter the previous policy of the law."

Judgment of the Court

JUDSON J.:-We are concerned in this appeal with the counterclaim of Louis Mayzel against Runnymede Investment Corporation Limited and Rexdale Investments Limited. In this counterclaim Mayzel asked for a declaration that the exercise of the power of sale in a certain mortgage given by him to Runnymede Investment Corporation Limited was a nullity. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal have upheld the exercise of the power.
Mayzel says that the exercise of the power is a nullity because it offends s. 29 of The Mortgages Act, which was J. enacted by 1964 Statutes of Ontario, c. 64, s. 5. This legislation came into force on September 1, 1964. The new s. 29(1) provides:
There is a transitional provision in the 1964 legislation contained in s. 8, which reads as follows:
Mayzel's argument is that the proceedings under the power of sale were commenced on or after September 1,
1964. Runnymede and Rexdale submit that the proceedings were commenced by a notice given on May 20, 1964, and that they are consequently outside the new legislation.
This is the only issue involved in this appeal.
Mayzel was the owner in fee of two parcels of land on
University Avenue. These were subject to mortgages which were vested in Runnymede as mortgagee. There were encumbrances prior to these mortgages. Mayzel was also interested in land known as 137 Richmond Street West, which adjoined the two freehold parcels. His interest in
137 Richmond Street West was a right to acquire a leasehold interest from Principal Investments Limited. This leasehold enjoyed a right of perpetual renewal every twenty-one years at an agreed or arbitrated amount as ground rental. To secure an extension of time on the mortgages on the freehold lands on University Avenue, Mayzel gave a mortgage to Runnymede on his right to acquire the leasehold interest in 137 Richmond Street West. All three mortgages were in default on May 20, 1964, when Runnymede Investment Corporation Limited gave the following notice of sale. It applied both to the freehold lands and the leasehold interest. It is in the following form:
May 20, 1964. et al.
Mr. Norton Penturn,
Judson J.
John Penturn & Son Limited,
25 Adelaide Street West,
Toronto 1,
Ontario.
Mortgagee's sale of freehold and leasehold land
We wish to inform you that written Offers to Purchase will be considered by us at the offices of Messrs. McDonald, Davies & Ward, 4 King Street West, Toronto 1, on Friday May 29, 1964 at 12:00 o'clock noon in respect of the lands described in the enclosed sketch. The lands are vacant except for a service station building located at the northeast corner of the property.
The portion of the property outlined in red is leasehold land subject to a perpetually renewable lease which provides for a current rental of $7,200 per annum. Such rental to be re-negotiated and if necessary settled by arbitration in 1970 for the ensuing twentyone year term and so on from term to term. The balance of the property is freehold land which will be sold subject only to an existing first mortgage for $800,000 due as to the principal amount on October 1, 1971 with interest only payable during the term at the rate of $4,600.03 per month.
The area of the property is approximately 60,000 square feet; the 1963 real estate taxes were approximately $74,000 and we understand (without warranty thereof) that the net rental income derived from the property is approximately $55,000 per annum. A deposit equal to 10% of the purchase price, in cash or by certified cheque, will be required upon the submission of any Offer to Purchase. The balance of the purchase price shall be payable in cash or by certified cheque on June 1964. The freehold portion of this property is being sold by us as third mortgage under and by virtue of the power of sale without notice contained in a first mortgage upon the said leasehold interest.
In connection with this sale we refer you to our letter of October 24, 1963, which was mailed to you. The sale contemplated by that letter was abandoned because of the furnishing by the mortgagor of the adjoining leasehold property as additional security for us. As this additional mortgage is now in default and the original mortgage has continued in default we are now entitled to sell the two properties together.
Yours very truly,
RUNNYMEDE INVESTMENT CORP. LTD.
Louis Charles
LC/ej
Enc.
R.C.S.
This notice was sent to forty of the leading real estate agents in Toronto and a copy was also sent to Mr. Mayzel and his solicitor.
. Mayzel's right to acquire an assignment of the leasehold interest from Principal Investments was in serious jeopardy. The purchase price was $250,000 with a $10,000 JudsonJ. deposit. The purchase should have been completed on December 17, 1962, but because of litigation concerning the validity of the right of perpetual renewal, there were extensions from time to time. The closing date was finally extended to October 6, 1964. On that date Mayzel required almost $250,000 to save the property.
There were continuous negotiations between Runnymede and Mayzel from the date of the notice, May 20, 1964, to the date of closing of the purchase of the leasehold interest, October 6, 1964. Mayzel's object in these negotiations was to come to some kind of agreement with Runnymede about the ultimate disposition of the property. It is admitted that no such agreement was made but on October 6, 1964, Mayzel consented to the sale from Runnymede to Rexdale of his right to acquire the leasehold interest in the hope that he would be able to come to a subsequent arrangement with the person who controlled both Runnymede and Rexdale. He signed a direction, dated October 5, 1964, to Principal Investments to assign the lease to Rexdale Investments Limited in the following terms: On October 6, 1964, Runnymede, for a consideration of $65,000, assigned to Rexdale all the right, title and interest of Mayzel to purchase the leasehold interest in 137 Richmond Street West under the agreement of October 19, 1962, made between Mayzel and Principal Investments. J.
I have mentioned that both Runnymede and Rexdale were under the same control but Mayzel, as appellant, declined to attack the transaction on this ground. He could not very well do so. He had released his interest in the property in favour of Runnymede and Rexdale in the hope that he would be able to make a subsequent agreement with them. This is more than acquiescence. He confines his attack on the transaction to the legislation amending The Mortgages Act in 1964. This legislation came into force, as I have said, on September 1, 1964, over a month before the exercise of the power of sale on October 6, 1964.
The Court of Appeal has held that the proceedings under the power of sale were commenced by the notice of May 20, 1964; that these proceedings were never abandoned and that the right subsisted and continued up to October 6, 1964; and that the negotiations which were running concurrently with the sale proceedings did not constitute a withdrawal or an abandonment of the proceedings. With this conclusion I agree.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.

Statutes and regulations cited

  • Unresolved citations
    • s s. 29 of The Mortgages Act
    • s. 5
    • s. 29(1)
    • s. 8