Judgment of the Court
he appellant. e respondent. J.:-By agreement in writing made as contemplated in sub-para. (g) of s. 18 (1) of the Exchequer Court Act, the parties, after stating that "the transportation and storage of goods commonly described as household goods, being goods owned by householders and used in their households, is a substantial business...", have submitted to the Exchequer Court of Canada the following question: The question was answered in the affirmative by Gibson J. An appeal is now brought to this Court by leave granted by Fauteux J. under s. 83 of the Exchequer Court Act as relating to a "matter or thing where rights in future might be bound".
At the hearing, argument was heard first on the question of jurisdiction because, as far as could be determined, this appeared to be the first case of an appeal under such circumstances.
A declaratory judgment. is undoubtedly binding on the parties as res judicata, not merely by application of the doctrine of stare decisis. As a direct result of the judgment of the Exchequer Court it is no longer open to the appellant to contend in other judicial proceedings that the storage or transportation of household goods does not come within the purview of s. 32(2) of the Combines Investigation Act. In considering whether such a result binds "rights in future", it must be observed that when what is presently sub-para. (b) of s. 83 of the Exchequer Court Act was first enacted (1887, 50-51 Vict., c. 16, s. 52), it read as follows:
The words "such like" explicitly required the application of the noscitur a sociis rule as they did at that time in s. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 135. However, Parliament amended in a different manner the two provisions after Taschereau J. (as he then was) had said of s. 29, in Gilbert v. Gilman :
By s. 8 of 54-55 Vict., 26, the provision in the
Exchequer Court Act was made to read as it now does,
Parliament adopting substantially the wording indicated as not implying a restriction, namely:
But concerning the jurisdiction of this Court, the amendment made two years later (56 Vict., 29) consisted in substituting the words "and other" for the words "or such like". It is the provision as thus amended that was held to require the application of the noscitur a sociis rule in O'Dell v. Gregory', a decision which was followed in a long line of cases culminating in Greenlees v. Attorney General of
Canada .
In view of the difference between the two enactments it seems clear that these decisions can have no application to the instant case. It is moreover obvious that the rights in future of the appellant that are bound by the decision appealed from are substantial. As a result of the decision it is unlawful for it to conduct its business otherwise than subject to the prohibitions enacted in the Combines Investigation Act, whereas in the absence of such a decision it would be open to it to contend that as respects the storage or transportation of household goods, it is not subject to such prohibitions. It is also apparent that in those matters it, is subject to the exercise of the powers of investigation contemplated in that Act without any possibility of contending that these matters are not within its proper scope. On the merits, the argument submitted by appellant is essentially that household goods are not "articles" within the definition of that word in para. (a) of s. 2 of the Comj. bines Investigation Act:
It is contended that the general intention of the Act is that it shall apply only to commodities in the stream of commerce. The fatal weakness of this argument is that it really invites us to construe the definition as if it read "that is" instead of "that may be". It is true that the result of the literal reading is that the definition embraces every conceivable commodity but it is no reason for departing from the clear meaning of the Act. If Parliament had intended that commodities that are actually in the stream of commerce only would be articles within the meaning of the definition, we would expect to find the word "is" instead of "may be". There is no basis for not presuming that the wording used was intended precisely to make it certain that commodities not actually in the stream of commerce would be covered.
Our attention was drawn to s. 33 of the National Transportation Act (14-15-16 Eliz. II, c. 69) whereby provision is made for the filing of a tariff of tolls by an association of motor vehicle operators on their behalf subject to the authority of the Canadian Transport Commission. Nothing in that provision, which is not yet in force, lends any support to the contention that the Combines Investigation Act should be construed otherwise than as above indicated. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellant: Gowling, MacTavish, Osborne & Henderson, Ottawa.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
- s. 83 of the Exchequer Court Act
- s. 52
- s. 29
- s. 8
- s. 2
-
Unresolved citations
- para. (g)
- s. 18
- s. 32(2) of the Combines Investigation Act
- para. (b)
- s. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act
- para. (a)
- s. 33 of the National Transportation Act