Majority
money had and received. Irrespective of the constitutional validity of the Act, the plaintiffs were under a legal obligation to pay back the funds of the defendant which they had received. The plaintiffs were not in a position to demand back the properties which they had transferred to repay or to secure repayment of their lawful obligation to the defendant.
The plea of ultra vires would afford no defence to the defendant's counterclaim, and, that being so, it was unnecessary to determine whether or not the Act was ultra vires of the Alberta Legislature.
It was held, further, that the transfers of the properties that were leased back were given by way of security for payment of the plaintiff's obligation.
was ultra vires; (ii) the conduct of the treasury branches was not an exercise of the royal prerogative;
(iii) regardless of the finding that the legislation was ultra vires, the defendant was entitled to recover back the moneys loaned to the plaintiffs.
Having found that The Treasury Branches Act was ultra vires, it followed that the agreement entered into by the plaintiffs and the Provincial Treasurer had no existence in law. That did not, of course, nullify what was actually done by the plaintiffs at that time when they transferred certain of the properties to the defendant outright. However, because the agreement was a nullity, the plaintiffs could not maintain an action on it either for rescission or damages as claimed.
The agreement, being a nullity, the defendant could not retain title to the properties transferred by way of security under the agreement.
[Re Coltman; Coltman v. Coltman (1881),
Ch. D. 64; In re K. L. Tractors Ltd. (1961),
C.L.R. 318, referred to; Ayers v. The South Australian Banking Co. (1871),
L.R.
P.C. 548, applied.]
APPEAL
CROSS-APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Alberta,
Appellate Division', affirming with variations, a judgment of Primrose J. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting in part.
demandeurs n'avaient pas de d6fense A opposer a l'action en recouvrement des sommes en tant qu'argent requ. Ind6pendamment de la constitutionnalit6 de la Loi, les demandeurs sont 16galement tenus de rembourser les sommes que la d6fenderesse leur a versdes. Les demandeurs ne peuvent pas r6clamer les propri6t6s qu'ils ont c6d6es en paiement ou en garantie de paiement des sommes qu'ils devaient 16galement A la d6fenderesse.
L'all6gation d'inconstitutionnalit6 n'est pas une d6fense A la demande reconventionnelle de la d6fenderesse et, dans les circonstances, il n'est pas n6cessaire de d6cider si la Loi est ultra vires des pouvoirs de l'Assembl6e 16gislative d'Alberta. De plus, les transports des propri6t6s qui ont 6t6 lou6es aux demandeurs 6taient des transports en garantie de la dette des demandeurs.
Les Juges Hall et Spence, en partie dissidents: II faut conclure que The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires; (ii) que le fait d'exploiter les treasury branch ne constitue pas un acte d'exercice de la pr6rogative royale;
Qu'ind6pendamment l'inconstitutionnalit6 de la Loi, la demanderesse a droit de recouvrer les sommes qu'elle a pr8t6es aux demandeurs.
Ayant trouv6 que The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires, il s'ensuit que la convention entre les demandeurs et le tr6sorier de la province n'existe pas en droit. Cela n'annule pas pour autant les actes r6ellement accomplis par les demandeurs, savoir les cessions pures et simples de propri6tis h la d6fenderesse. Toutefois, la convention 6tant nulle, les demandeurs n'ont pas de droit d'action ni en r6solution ni en dommages.
Du fait que la convention est nulle, la d6fenderesse ne peut pas retenir les propri6t6s transporties en garantie en vertu de cette convention.
Arrits mentionn6s: Re Coltman; Coltman c. Coltman (1881), 19 Ch. D. 64; In re K. L. Tractors Ltd. (1961), 106 C.L.R. 318. Arrt suivi: Ayers c. The South Australian Banking Co. (1871), L.R. P.C. APPEL et CONTRE-APPEL d'un jugement de la division d'appel de la Cour supreme de l'Alberta', confirmant avec modifications un jugment du Juge Primrose. Appel et contreappel rejet6s, les Juges Hall et Spence 6tant en partie dissidents.
'(1967), W.W.R.
[19701 R.C.S.
A. G. Macdonald, Q.C., and R. D. Gillespie, for the plaintiffs, appellants.
A. S. Pattillo, Q.C., C. W. Clement, Q.C., and
J. W. Brown, for the defendant, respondent.
C. R. 0. Munro, Q.C., and D. W. Kilgour, for the intervenant.
The judgment of Cartwright C.J. and Fauteux,
Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Pigeon
JJ. was delivered by
J.-The facts of this case have been fully outlined in the reasons of my brother
Hall, and it is not necessary to repeat them.
A brief review of the pleadings is of some assistance in defining the issues in this appeal.
The plaintiffs (appellants), while they alleged that the plaintiff, Green's Garage, had issued cheques totalling $76,031.97 in favour of Consolidated Finance Corporation and certain other finance companies; that the plaintiff, Breckenridge Speedway Ltd., had issued cheques totalling
$36,398.49 in favour of certain finance companies; that the plaintiff, Twin Town Motors
Ltd., had issued cheques totalling $20,000 in favour of certain finance companies; and that, prior to presentation of any of the said cheques, the plaintiff Oscar Green, on behalf of all these plaintiffs, had stopped payment of the cheques at the Calder Treasury Branch, made no claim for relief arising out of such allegations. They were referred to by counsel for the plaintiffs, at trial, as "essential basic history to the whole transaction."
With respect to this aspect of the case I agree with my brother Hall that, whether or not the order to stop payment was given, the plaintiffs ratified the payment of the cheques and the learned trial judge correctly so found.
The substance of the plaintiffs' claim was for rescission of the agreement made on December 8,
1958, by the plaintiffs Oscar Green, Irene Janet
Green and Breckenridge Speedway Ltd., with the Provincial Treasurer, with respect to accounts at the Calder Treasury Branch, whereby those plaintiffs agreed to transfer to the Provincial
Treasurer of Alberta properties described as:
A.
G. Macdonald, c.r., et R. D. Gillespie, pour les demandeurs, appelants.
A. S. Pattillo, c.r., C. W. Clement, c.r., et J. W. Brown, pour la d6fenderesse, intim6e. C. R. 0. Munro, c.r., et D. W. Kilgour, pour 1'intervenant.
Le jugement du Juge en Chef Cartwright et des Juges Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie et Pigeon a 6t6 rendu par
LE coll6gue, le Juge Hall a fait un expos6 d6taill6 des faits en cette cause; il n'est pas n6cessaire de le r6p6ter. Un bref examen des proc6dures 6crites aidera cependant A d6finir les questions en jeu dans le pr6sent pourvoi. Bien que les demandeurs (appelants en cette Cour) aient all6gu6 que Green's Garage a 6mis des chbques A I'ordre de Consolidated Finance Corporation et de certaines autres soci6t6s de financement pour une somme totale de $76,031.97, que Breckenridge Speedway Ltd. en a 6mis pour $36,398.49 et Twin Town Motors Ltd. pour $20,000, et qu'avant la pr6sentation pour paiement d'aucun desdits cheques Oscar Green, pour le compte de tous les appelants, en a contremand6 le paiement A la Calder Treasury Branch, ils n'ont pas pris de conclusions fond6es sur ces all6gations. Au proc6s, l'avocat des appelants les a d6crites comme l'essentiel de l'historique de la transaction dans son ensemble. Sur ce point, je suis d'accord avec mon col16gue, le Juge Hall, que peu importe qu'il y ait eu ou non un contre-ordre de paiement des cheques, les demandeurs en ont ratifi6 le paiement; c'est aussi ce qu'a conclu A juste titre le savant Juge de premibre instance.
Les demandeurs demandent essentiellement l'annulation de la convention dat6e du 8 d6cembre 1958, intervenue entre Oscar Green, Irene Janet Green et Breckenridge Speedway Ltd. d'une part et le Trdsorier de la Province d'autre part, au sujet de comptes A la Calder Treasury Branch, et par laquelle les demandeurs ont convenu de transporter au Trdsorier de la Province d'Alberta les biens suivants:
Le Juge Martand
1. The property known as Green's Garage and fixed chattels situated at Wainwright, Alberta.
2. The property known as Green Garage, Body
Shop and fixed chattels in Edmonton.
3. The dwelling of Oscar Green and Irene Janet
Green in Edmonton.
4. The
Valleyview property at
Valleyview,
5. Glenlyon
Property
Houses, acreage,
Edmonton outskirts.
6. Assignment of lease with North Star Oil Company of Green's Garage in Edmonton, with fixed chattels.
7. Transfer in blank of Green's Garage property and fixed chattels in Edmonton.
8. Assignment of Agreement for Sale, 0.
E.
Campbell, Viking Motors of Viking, Alberta.
The Provincial Treasurer agreed to allow credit on the account of Breckenridge Speedway
Limited, and Green's Garage account with the
Calder Treasury Branch for the amount shown on the transfers of the property at Wainwright, the Green's Garage Body Shop property in
Edmonton, the house of Oscar and Irene Janet
Green in Edmonton, and the Valleyview and
Glenlyon properties. The Provincial Treasurer also agreed to lease back the first three properties above mentioned, for a five-year term, at a rent equivalent to interest at 6 per cent on the values shown in the transfers, plus annual taxes.
The plaintiffs, in respect of these properties, were to have the right to make additional payments, above the stipulated rental, to be applied toward the purchase back of the properties for the amounts set out in the transfers. It was also agreed that operating credits for a period of five years in an amount of $15,000 would be allowed to the plaintiffs.
Transfers of the various were executed in November and December
1958, showing values as follows:
Wainwright property ............
$35,000
Green's Garage property,
16,000
Green's house property,
......
12,000
Valleyview property ............
1,500
Glenlyon property
.
6,000
1. La propri6t d6sign6e sous le nom de Green's Garage situde A Wainwright (Alberta) et accessoires. 2. La propri6t6 d6sign6e sous le nom de Green's Garage Body Shop, situde & Edmonton et accessoires. 3. La maison d'Oscar Green et Irene Janet Green, A Edmonton.
4. La propridt6 Valleyview, h Valleyview (Alberta).
5. La propri6t6 Glenlyon, batiments et terrains, en banlieue d'Edmonton.
6. Droits au bail de North Star Oil Company en faveur de Green's Garage d'Edmonton et accessoires.
7. Transport en blanc de la propri6t6 de Green's Garage d'Edmonton et accessoires.
8. Droits A la promesse de vente & 0. E. Campbell, de Viking Motors, i Viking (Alberta). Le Tr6sorier de la Province s'6tait engag6 a cr6diter aux comptes de Breckenridge Speedway Limited et de Green's Garage, A la Calder Treasury Branch, les sommes mentionn6es aux actes de transport de la propri6t6 de Wainwright, de celle de Green's Garage Body Shop, h Edmonton, de la maison d'Oscar et Irene Janet Green A Edmonton, et de celles de Valleyview et de Glenlyon. Le Trdsorier de la Province s'6tait 6galement engag6 A louer aux demandeurs les trois premieres propri6tis ci-dessus mentionn6es, pendant cinq ans, moyennant un loyer 6gal & l'int6r8t au taux de 6 pour cent l'an sur la valeur des propri6t6s 6tablie aux actes de transport plus les taxes annuelles. Les demandeurs avaient le privildge de faire des paiements sup6rieurs au loyer ainsi d6termin6 pour racheter ces propri6t6s aux prix 6tablis par les diff6rents actes de transport. II 6tait 6galement entendu que les demandeurs se verraient accorder un cr6dit a l'exploitation pendant cinq ans, jusqu'd concurrence de $15,000. Les actes de transport ont 6t6 sign6s au cours des mois de novembre et d6cembre 1958, et en 6tablissent la valeur comme suit:
La propridt6 de Wainwright .. $35,000 La propri6t6 de Green's
Garage A Edmonton ..........
16,000 La maison des Green A
..........................
12,000 La propri6t6 de Valleyview ..
1,500 La propri6t6 de Glenlyon ......
6,000 Le luge Martland
The plaintiffs, in their statement of claim, alleged various breaches of this agreement upon the basis of which they sought rescission of the agreement, the return of the various properties, and repayment of moneys received by the defendant pursuant to the agreement.
The defendant counterclaimed for moneys owing by the plaintiffs Oscar Green and Irene
Janet Green for rentals due under the leases of the properties covered by the agreement, and against Green's Garage and Breckenridge Speedway Limited, on a promissory note given by the former, and for the amounts due on their current accounts by both of them.
It was at this point in the pleadings that the plaintiffs, in their statement of defence to the counterclaim, alleged that all acts performed and agreements entered into by the defendant, relevant to the action, were invalid because they were entered into pursuant to The Treasury
Branches Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 344 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and that the Act was ultra vires of the Legislature of Alberta.
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for rescission, the learned trial judge held:
I have examined all the complaints made by the plaintiffs, but, in analyzing them, find they do not support a claim for damages, nor for rescission.
His decision on this point was supported unanimously by the Appellate Division. In my opinion, this finding should not be disturbed.
With respect to the counterclaim, Smith C.J.A.,
Johnson J.A., and Kane J.A., were of the opinion that the plaintiffs, as borrowers, were not entitled, in answer to a claim for payment by the defendant, to set up the constitutional invalidity of The Treasury Branches Act as a defence. Accordingly, they did not consider it necessary to decide that issue. Porter J.A., and
Allen J.A., both held that the Act was ultra vires of the Legislature of Alberta because it related to banking, a matter assigned exclusively to the Parliament of Canada.
Les demandeurs, dans leur d6claration, ont all6gu6 l'inex6cution de la convention sous plusieurs rapports et, en consequence, en ont demand6 la r6solution et r6clam6 la r6trocession des propri6t6s et le remboursement des sommes qu'ils avaient vers6es A la d6fenderesse en vertu de cette convention.
Par demande reconventionnelle, la d6fenderesse a r6clam6: des demandeurs Oscar Green et Irene Janet Green le paiement des sommes dues en vertu des baux relatifs aux propri6tis vis6es par la convention; de Green's Garage et de Breckenridge Speedway Limited le paiement d'un billet A ordre souscrit par Green's Garage de meme que le remboursement de leur d6couvert de compte.
C'est A ce moment que les demandeurs ont pr6tendu, dans leur d6fense A la demande reconventionnelle, que tous les actes et conventions de la d6fenderesse vis6s l'action 6taient nuls parce que faits en vertu de la loi dite The Treasury Branches Act, S.R.A. 1955, c. 344 (ci-aprbs appel6e ila Loi>) et que cette Loi 6tait ultra vires des pouvoirs la Lgislature d'Alberta.
Sur la demande en r6solution, le savant Juge de premidre instance a conclu:
J'ai 6tudid toutes les pr6tentions des demandeurs et en les analysant je ne trouve pas qu'elles justifient un recours en dommages ou en r6solution.
Sur ce point pr6cis, la Cour d'appel a confirm6 cette d6cision A l'unanimit6. A mon avis, cette conclusion n'a pas A atre modifi6e.
Quant h la demande reconventionnelle, le Juge en chef Smith et les Juges d'appel Johnson et Kane ont 6t6 d'avis que les demandeurs, en tant qu'emprunteurs, n'avaient pas le droit d'invoquer l'inconstitutionnalit6 de la Loi comme moyen de d6fense. En cons6quence, ils n'ont pas cru n6cessaire d'adjuger sur cette question. Les Juges d'appel Porter et Allen ont opin6 que la Loi 6tait ultra vires des pouvoirs de la L6gislature d'Alberta, parce qu'elle se rapporte au ecommerce de banque>, qui est de la comp6tence exclusive du Parlement du Canada.
Martland
Le Juge Martland
All of the members of the Court, other than
Porter J.A., were of the view that some of the transfers of property made pursuant to the agreement of December 8, 1958, represented partial payments of indebtedness, but that the transfers of the Wainwright property, the Green's Garage
Body Shop property and the Green house property, which had been leased back, were given as securities for payment and not as partial payment.
In the result, the judgment at trial dismissing the plaintiffs' claim and allowing the defendant's counterclaim, was varied by striking out that portion of the judgment which had ordered that the defendant recover possession of those three
In my opinion, the judgment of the Appellate
Division was correct, and in reaching that conclusion I do not find it necessary to determine the constitutional validity of the Act. The issues on this appeal are as to the right of the defendant to recover from the plaintiffs moneys advanced to them by the Treasury Branch, and as to the validity of the agreement of December 8, 1958, under which the defendant received title to certain properties from the plaintiffs, either by way of partial payment, or as security for payment.
The plea of ultra vires, in relation to the circumstances of this case, amounts to this, that the Act being unconstitutional, as relating to the matter of banking, the Provincial Treasurer had no legal authority to lend to the plaintiffs the funds which, in fact, were advanced to them.
Even if this contention were valid, the authorities cited by my brother Hall, and in the reasons of
Smith C.J.A. and Johnson J.A., make it clear that, there being nothing illegal about the transaction, but at most, lack of authority in the
Provincial Treasurer to make the advance, the plaintiffs would have no answer to an action for money had and received. I refer only, among the cases quoted in those judgments, to Re Coltman; Coltman v. Coltman , and In re K. L.
Tractors Ltd.3.
Tous les juges de la Cour d'appel, A l'exception du Juge Porter, ont opin6 que les transports de propri6t6s faits en ex6cution de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 constituaient un paiement partiel de la dette des demandeurs, sauf que ceux des propri6t6s de Wainwright, de Green's Garage Body Shop et de la maison des Green, qu'on leur avait loudes, n'avaient 6t6 donn6s qu'en garantie et non en paiement partiel.
En cons6quence, la Cour d'appel a modifi le jugement de premidre instance qui rejetait l'action des demandeurs et accueillait la demande reconventionnelle de la d6fenderesse en biffant du jugement la disposition qui autorisait la d6fenderesse A prendre possession de ces trois propri6tis.
A mon avis, le jugement de la Cour d'appel est bien fond6, et j'en arrive A cette d6cision sans trouver n6cessaire de statuer sur la constitutionnalit6 de la Loi. Les questions A d6cider dans le pr6sent pourvoi sont le droit de la d6fenderesse de recouvrer des demandeurs les sommes que leur a preties la Treasury Branch et la validit6 de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958, par laquelle le titre h certaines propri6tis des demandeurs passait A la d6fenderesse, soit h titre de paiement partiel soit en garantie de paiement.
L'all6gation d'inconstitutionnalit6, dans la pr6sente affaire, est A 'effet que la Loi 6tant invalide parce qu'elle se rapporte au commerce de banque, le Trdsorier de la Province n'avait pas, en droit, le pouvoir de prter aux demandeurs les sommes que de fait il leur a avanc6es. M~me si cette pr6tention 6tait fond6e, la jurisprudence qu'a cit6e mon coll&gue, le Juge Hall, et celle qu'on trouve dans les motifs du Juge en chef Smith et du Juge d'appel Johnson d6montrent clairement que, comme la transaction n'avait rien d'illfgal et que tout au plus le Trdsorier de la Province n'avait pas le pouvoir de faire cr6dit, les demandeurs n'avaient pas de d6fense a opposer A 'action en recouvrement des sommes en tant qu'argents regus. Des affaires cities dans ces motifs, je ne mentionnerai que les deux suivantes: Re Coltman; Coltman v. Coltman ; In re K.L. Tractors Ltd.
f[1970] R.C.S.
Le luge Martland
The position was, therefore, that, irrespective of the constitutional validity of the Act, the plaintiffs were under a legal obligation to pay back the funds of the defendant which they had received.
Having reached this conclusion, I turn now to consider the agreement of December 8, 1958, and the transfers of property made pursuant to it.
This was a contract by the plaintiffs to transfer titles to certain properties to the defendant, either as a part payment of their indebtedness or as security for repayment. The transfers were effected in accordance with Alberta law and title passed to the defendant, as represented by the
Provincial Treasurer. There is nothing in law to prevent the defendant from taking title to Alberta land.
The plaintiffs seek an order to compel the retransfer of the properties from the defendant to them. Their contention is that the agreement was void because it was made in the course of carrying on a banking business, which the Provincial Legislature could not authorize. However, the substance of that agreement, apart from the promise of an additional credit to the plaintiffs, which is not now in issue, was an arrangement for the repayment or the securing of repayment of -an outstanding obligation. For the reasons already given, the plaintiffs do not escape that obligation even if the loans were legally unauthorized. That being so, I do not understand how the plaintiffs are in a position to demand back that which they had transferred to repay or to secure repayment of their lawful obligation to the defendant.
A somewhat similar problem was dealt with by the Privy Council in Ayers v. The South
Australian Banking Company . In that case, a
South Australian statute provided for the creation of a preferential lien upon wool without actual delivery of the wool to the mortgagee.
The bank advanced money to a firm on the faith of receiving such a preferential lien. The action was in trover by the bank against the trustee for the creditors of the firm which had borrowed the money to recover the value of the wool. One ground of defence was that the bank's charter
Il en r6sulte donc que, ind6pendamment de la constitutionnalit6 de la Loi, les demandeurs sont 16galement tenus de rembourser les sommes que la d6fenderesse leur a vers6es.
Aprbs avoir 6tabli ce point, je m'attacherai maintenant A la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 et aux transports de propri6t6 faits en ex6cution de cette dernibre. Par elle, les demandeurs s'engageaient A c6der A la d6fenderesse certaines propri6t6s, soit & titre de paiement partiel de leur dette soit en garantie du remboursement de celle-ci. Les actes de transport ont 6t6 faits conform6ment A la loi d'Alberta et le droit de propridt6 a 6t6 transport6 A la d6fenderesse, repr6sent6e par le Tr6sorier de la Province. Il n'y a rien d'ill6gal & ce que la d6fenderesse devienne propridtaire d'immeubles situ6s en Alberta. Les demandeurs veulent qu'un jugement ordonne A la d6fenderesse de leur r6troc6der les propridtis. Ils pr6tendent que la convention est nulle du fait qu'elle est intervenue dans l'exploitation d'un commerce de banque, ce qui n'est pas de la comp6tence de la Province. Mais l'objet de la convention, sauf la promesse de faire cr6dit aux demandeurs qui n'est pas en litige ici, 6tait de pourvoir au remboursement ou A la garantie d'une obligation en souffrance. Pour les motifs que j'ai d6jA mentionnis, les demandeurs ne peuvent pas se soustraire A cette obligation de rembourser, mime si les prets avaient 6t6 faits sans autorisation 16gale. Dans les circonstances, je ne vois pas comment les demandeurs pourraient r6clamer ce qu'ils ont c6d6 en paiement ou en garantie de paiement des sommes qu'ils devaient 16galement h la d6fenderesse.
Le Conseil priv6 a eu h r6soudre une question i peu prbs semblable dans l'affaire Ayers v. The South Australian Banking Company . Dans cette affaire-ld, il s'agissait d'une loi de
'Australie mdridionale qui permettait le nantissement de laine sans ddlivrance matirielle au cr6ancier gagiste. La banque avait fait A une soci6t6 une avance de fonds garantie par un tel nantissement. La banque a intent6 contre le syndic de la faillite de la soci6t6 qui avait contract6 l'emprunt, une action en d6tournement (in trover) pour recouvrer une somme 6gale A la valeur de la laine. Le Juge Martland contained a provision declaring that it should not be lawful for the bank to advance money on the security of merchandise.
The bank's action succeeded. In dealing with this defence, Mellish L.J., said, at p. 558:
Another objection was taken by Mr. Manisty on the terms of the Charter-the clause in the Charter which says, it shall not be lawful for the Bank to make advances on merchandise. Now, unquestionably, a great many questions might be raised on the effect of that clause in the Charter which may be of very great importance, but which also being of great difficulty, their Lordships do not think it necessary to give any opinion upon. There may be a question as to what are the transactions which come really within the clause, and whether this particular case does come within it. There may be also question whether, under any circumstances, the effect of violating such a provision is more than this, that the Crown may take advantage of it as a forfeiture of the Charter, but the only point which it appears to their Lordships is necessary to be determined in the present case is this, that whatever effect such a clause may have, it does not prevent property passing, either in goods or in lands, under a Conveyance or instrument which, under the ordinary circumstances of law, would pass it. The only defence which can be set up here (there is no plea of illegality) is under the plea of not possessed, that the right of property and the right of possession never passed to the Plaintiffs. Their
Lordships are of opinion, that whatever other effect it has, it cannot have the effect of preventing the property passing.
There are additional circumstances in the present case which are favourable to defendant. There is no question here as to the rights of other creditors of the plaintiffs. But, more important than that, there is in the present case this added feature. If the Act were unconstitutional, as the plaintiffs allege, the Provincial
Treasurer, a minister of the Crown, would be in the position of having exceeded his authority in making advances of money to the plaintiff.
The funds advanced were the property of the
Crown, -and the loan made to the plaintiffs would constitute an unauthorized disposition of Crown property, in which both the Provincial Treasurer and the plaintiffs were participants. The un- Un des moyens de d6fense 6tait que les statuts de la banque renfermaient une disposition lui interdisant de faire des pr~ts garantis par des marchandises.
La banque a eu gain de cause. Voici ce que dit de ce moyen de d6fense le Lord Juge Mellish, A la p. 558:
M. Manisty a soulev6 un autre point au sujet des statuts (de l'intim6e), il a invoqu6 Particle qui stipule qu'il ne sera pas permis ]a Banque de faire des prfts garantis par des marchandises. L'interpr6tation de cet article pourrait sans doute soulever bon nombre de problbmes qui sont sfirement d'un grand intirit, mais 6galement tris difficiles rdsoudre, aussi leurs
Seigneuries ne croient-ils pas n6cessaire de donner leur avis A ce sujet. On peut se demander quelles sont en v6rit6 les op6rations auxquelles la disposition s'applique et particulier si elle s'applique cette affaire-ci. On peut aussi se demander de toute fagon, le fait de passer outre A cette interdiction n'a pas comme seule cons6quence de permettre A la Couronne d'annuler les lettres-patentes. Le seul point que leurs Seigneuries jugent nicessaire d'6claircir en rapport avec la prisente affaire est le suivant: quelle que soit la port6e de cette disposition, elle n'emp&che pas la translation du titre de propri6t6 aux marchandises ou aux immeubles, s'il n'y a pas d'autre cause de nullit6. La seule d6fense qu'on pourrait soulever ici (on ne plaide pas l'ill~galit6) est celle du d6faut de possession, c'est-A-dire que les demandeurs n'ont jamais acquis ni droit de propri6t6 ni droit de possession. Leurs Seigneuries sont d'avis que quelles qu'en soient les autres consequences, la disposition n'a pas pour effet d'empicher la translation du titre de propri6t6.
Il a d'autres circonstances dans la pr6sente affaire qui sont A 1'avantage de la d6fenderesse. Il n'y a pas ici de conflit avec les droits d'autres cr6anciers des demandeurs. De plus, la d6fense a un autre atout encore plus important. Si la Loi est inconstitutionnelle, comme le pr6tendent demandeurs, le Tr6sorier de la province, qui est un ministre de la Couronne, aurait outrepass6 ses pouvoirs en pr~tant de l'argent aux demandeurs. Les fonds ainsi prit6s appartenaient A la Couronne; les pr8ts aux demandeurs constitueraient donc un emploi non-autoris6 des deniers de la Couronne, auquel les demandeurs et le Tr6sorier de la province auraient 6t6 parties. L'acte abusif du ministre de la Couronne ne Le Juge Martland authorized act of the minister in lending the money could not affect the right of the Crown to demand repayment. The transfers of property made by the plaintiffs were not made to the
Provincial Treasurer, but to the Crown. They were made either to repay or to secure repayment of the moneys which the plaintiffs are legally obligated to repay. The Crown has a valid legal title to those properties.
The plaintiffs cannot demand a retransfer of the properties from the Crown unless they can establish that there is no obligation on their part to repay the moneys which the properties were partially to repay, or the repayment of which they were to secure. They cannot establish that fact when, if their contention as to the unconstitutionality of the Act is correct, they are in the position of having received
Crown moneys through the unauthorized act of the Crown's agent, in which they participated.
In the result, I am of the opinion that the plea of ultra vires would afford no defence to the defendant's counterclaim, and, that being so, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the
Act is ultra vires of the Alberta Legislature.
The only remaining issue is as to whether the transfers to the defendant of the lands described as the Wainwright property, Green's Garage Body
Shop property, and Green's house property were outright transfers in part payment of the plaintiffs' obligation or were taken as security for payment.
For the reasons given by Allen J.A., which were approved by Smith C.J.A., Johnson J.A., and
Kane J.A., I would hold that these three transfers were given by way of security.
It is my opinion that the judgment of the
Appellate Division should be sustained and, accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal, with costs, and dismiss the cross-appeal, with costs.
There should be no costs payable to the intervenant.
J. (dissenting in part)-This is an appeal from the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of Alberta from a judgment by pourrait pas empicher cette dernibre d'exiger le paiement des sommes vers6es. Ce n'est pas au Tr6sorier de la province que les demandeurs ont transport6 les propri6t6s mais bien A la Couronne. Ces transports tenaient lieu de paiement ou de garantie de paiement de sommes d'argent que les demandeurs sont 16galement tenus de rembourser. La Couronne a, en droit, un bon titre A ces proprietes.
Les demandeurs ne peuvent pas exiger la r6trocession des immeubles par la Couronne h moins qu'ils ne puissent prouver qu'ils n'6taient pas oblig6s de rembourser les sommes dont les immneubles effectuaient, en partie, le remboursement ou le garantissaient. Si leur pr6tention que la loi est inconstitutionnelle est fond6e, ils ne peuvent pas faire cette preuve parce qu'alors ils ont touch6 de l'argent de la Couronne en vertu d'un acte abusif d'un prdpos6 de la Couronne, acte auquel ils ont 6t6 parties.
En d6finitive, je suis d'avis que l'all6gation d'inconstitutionnalit6 n'est pas une d6fense A la demande reconventionnelle de la d6fenderesse et, dans les circonstances, il n'est pas n6cessaire de d6cider si la Loi est ultra vires des pouvoirs de l'Assembl6e 16gislative d'Alberta.
La seule question qui reste est de savoir si les transports A la d6fenderesse des propri6t6s de Wainwright, de Green's Garage Body Shop et de la maison des Green constituaient des cessions pures et simples en paiement partiel de la dette des demandeurs ou si elles n'6taient que des transports en garantie. Pour les motifs qu'a exprimbs le Juge d'appel Allen et auxquels le Juge en chef Smith et les Juges d'appel Johnson et Kane ont souscrit, je suis d'avis que le transport de ces trois propri6t6s n'6tait qu'en garantie.
A mon avis, il faut confirmer le jugement de la Cour d'appel. En cons6quence, je suis d'avis de rejeter l'appel avec d6pens et le contre-appel avec d6pens. L'intervenant n'a droit A aucun d6pens.
Le jugement des Juges Hall et Spence a 6t6 rendu par
(en partie dissident)-II s'agit ici d'un pourvoi & I'encontre d'un arr8t de la division d'appel de la Cour Supreme de 1'Alberta Primrose J. The action by the appellants was for rescission of an agreement with the respondent dated December 8, 1958, and the return of certain properties transferred by the appellants to the respondent in May 1959 and for an accounting claiming that the Calder Treasury
Branch had wrongfully paid certain cheques after payment thereof had been stopped. The respondent counterclaimed for possession of the properties and for judgment for the amount of certain rentals and loans. Primrose J. dismissed the appellants' action and gave judgment in favour of the respondent for possession of the properties and other relief. In their action the appellants contended that The Treasury Branches
Act of the Province of Alberta was ultra vires.
The Appellate Division, while holding that The
Treasury Branches Act was ultra vires, nevertheless upheld the judgment of Primrose J., refusing rescission and giving judgment for the amounts claimed in the counterclaim, but held that three of the properties in question in the action had been transferred by way of security and ordered an accounting in respect of those properties. The three are known mentioned throughout the evidence and the judgments as
(a) "Green's Body Shop Property"; (b)
dwelling house"; (c) "the Wainwright Property".
The appellants who were plaintiffs in the original action now appeal to this Court, claiming that Primrose J. and the Appellate Division erred in:
1. Failing to hold that the monies paid out by the Calder Treasury Branch in meeting cheques of the Appellants presented for payment after payment had been countermanded were not recoverable.
2. Holding that in these circumstances it was inequitable and unjust for the Appellants to raise the plea of ultra vires on the part of the Respondent in entering into agreements and taking security by way of mortgage to enforce the payment of sums paid out on the said countermanded cheques.
3. Failing to hold that in these circumstances the Appellants could raise the plea of ultra vires.
rendu sur l'appel d'un jugement du Juge Primrose. Par leur action, les appelants, pr6tendant que la Calder Treasury Branch avait pay6 sans droit certains ch~ques dont le paiement avait 6t6 contremand6, demandaient la r6solution d'une convention intervenue entre eux et l'intim6e le 8 d6cembre 1958, la r6trocession de certaines propri6t6s que les appelants avaient transporties A I'intim6e en mai 1959 et une reddition de compte. Par demande reconventionnelle, l'intim6e a r6clam6 la possession des propri6t6s et un jugement pour le montant de certains loyers et prats d'argent. Le Juge Primrose a d6bout6 les appelants de leur action et a donn6 jugement A l'intimbe lui accordant, entre autres choses, la possession des propridt6s.
Dans leur demande, appelants all6guaient que la loi de la province d'Alberta intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires. La division d'appel, tout en jugeant que cette loi est ultra vires, a ndanmoins confirm6 le jugement du Juge Primrose refusant la r6solution de la convention et donnant jugement pour la somme r6clam6e dans la demande reconventionnelle. Cependant, elle a trouv6 que trois des propri6tis dont il est question dans I'action avaient 6t6 transporties en garantie et elle a ordonn6 une reddition de compte a ce sujet. Les trois propri6t6s en question sont d6sign6es partout dans la preuve et les jugements comme (a)
Body Shop>, (b) la <maison>', (c) la <<propridt6 de Wainwright>.
Les appelants, demandeurs dans l'action, par leur pourvoi devant cette Cour, allguent que le Juge Primrose et la division d'appel ont fait erreur:
1. En ne d6cidant pas que les sommes d6boursdes par la Calder Treasury Branch en paiement de chiques des appelants pr6sentis apr~s un contreordre de paiement n'6taient pas recouvrables. 2. En d6cidant que, dans ces circonstances, il n'6tait ni juste, ni 6quitable que les appelants plaident que l'intim6e n'avait pas le pouvoir, du point de vue constitutionnel, de faire des conventions et prendre des garanties sur immeuble pour obtenir le remboursement des sommes paydes pour des chbques contremandis.
3. En ne d6cidant pas que dans ces circonstances les appelants avaient de droit de plaider l'inconstitutionnalit6.
Hall I.
4. Failing to find that the said agreements were made and security taken by the Calder Treasury
Branch in the course of a banking business carried on by the Provincial Treasury of the Province of
Alberta pursuant to, or, alternatively, in excess of the provisions of The Treasury Branches Act, being
Chapter 344 of the Revised Statutes of Alberta, 1955 as amended.
5. Failing to find that the said Treasury Branches
Act was ultra vires the Province of Alberta by virtue of the provisions of The British North
America Act.
6. Failing to find that the said banking business was ultra vires the Province of Alberta by virtue of the provisions of the British North America Act.
7. Failing to find that the said agreements made and security taken were ultra vires the Province of
Alberta by virtue of the provisions of The British
North America Act.
8. Failing to hold that by reason thereof the
Court would not enforce the said agreements made or security taken.
9. Failing to hold that in the circumstances the
Appellants were entitled to rescission of the said
Agreements made.
The respondent gave notice of intention to cross-appeal from the judgment of the Appellate
Division in so far as it related to the Wainwright property by restoring the judgment of Primrose J.
on the grounds that the respondent held this property as beneficial owner free from any equity of redemption by the appellant Breckenridge
Speedway Ltd., and that none of the appellants had been in possession of the said property since
1960. On the hearing in this Court, leave to amend the cross-appeal was granted to include, in addition to the Wainwright property, the other properties known as "Green's Body Shop" and
"the dwelling house".
On October 30, 1967, Cartwright C.J. made the following order:
IT Is that notice of the constitutional question in the above appeal, together with a copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Supreme Court of Alberta, Appellate Division and of this Order be served forthwith upon the Attorney General of Canada and upon the Ottawa agents for the Attorneys
General of the Provinces, except the Attorney Gen- 4. En ne concluant pas que la Calder Treasury Branch avait fait les conventions et pris les garanties dans l'exercice d'un commerce de banque, que le Tr6sorier de la Province de l'Alberta exploitait en vertu, ou par abus, des dispositions de la loi dite The Treasury Branches Act, ch. 344 des Statuts revis6s de I'Alberta, 1955 et amendements.
5. En ne concluant pas que ladite loi The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires des pouvoirs de Province d'Alberta en vertu des dispositions de l'Acte de l'Amirique du Nord britannique. 6. En ne concluant pas que ledit commerce de banque est ultra vires des pouvoirs de la Province d'Alberta en vertu des dispositions de l'Acte de l'Amirique du Nord britannique.
7. En ne concluant pas que les conventions faites et garanties prises sont ultra vires des pouvoirs de la Province d'Alberta en vertu des dispositions de I'Acte de l'Amrique du Nord britannique. 8. En ne concluant pas que, pour ces motifs, la Cour ne peut rendre lesdites conventions et garanties ex6cutoires.
9. En ne concluant pas que, dans les circonstances, les appelants avaient droit h la r6solution desdites conventions.
L'intimde a donn6 avis de son intention de se pourvoir par contre-appel A l'encontre de l'arr8t de la division d'appel & 1'6gard de la propri6t6 de Wainwright pour faire r6tablir la d6cision du Juge Primrose. L'intim6e pr6tend avoir droit A cette propri6t6 comme propri6taire r6el, libre de tout droit de rachat en faveur de l'appelante Breckenridge Speedway Ltd. et soutient qu'aucun des appelants n'en a eu la possession depuis 1960. Lors de l'audition devant cette Cour, permission a 6t6 accord6e de modifier le contre-appel et d'y inclure, outre la propri6t6 Wainwright, les autres propri6t6s d6sign6es comme 6tant <Green's Body Shop> et cla maison>>.
Le 30 octobre 1967, le Juge en chef du Canada a rendu l'ordonnance suivante:
de faire signifier imm6diatement au Procureur g6neral du Canada, et aux correspondants A Ottawa des Procureurs g6neraux des Provinces, sauf le Procureur g6n6ral de l'Alberta qui est ddjh partie, un avis de la question constitutionnelle soulev6e dans ce pourvoi, avec une copie des motifs de l'arrit de la division d'appel de eral of the Province of Alberta, already a party herein, which constitutional question may be stated as follows:
1. "Is the Treasury
Branches
Act, being chap. 344 of the Revised Statutes of Alberta, as amended, ultra vires the Province of Alberta as being legislation in relation to 'banking' contrary to the provisions of the British North America
Act?
2. Is the business carried on by the Treasury
Branches of the Province of Alberta ultra vires the Province of Alberta by reason of being a business not duty authorized by legislation?"
that all applications to intervene must be made returnable before the
Honourable Chief Justice of Canada in Chambers on Monday the 27th day of November, 1967 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon.
The Attorney General of Canada applied to intervene and was given leave to intervene and to be represented by counsel and to file a factum.
No province applied to intervene.
The facts giving rise to this litigation and to the determination of the constitutional question as aforesaid are involved and in the initial stages in dispute. The appellants Oscar Green and
Irene Janet Green are husband and wife. At all times material to the litigation, Mrs. Green was proprietor of an automobile garage business in
Edmonton, Alberta, known as "Green's Garage".
appellant
Breckenridge
Speedway
Ltd.
(hereinafter called "Breckenridge") carried on a garage business at Wainwright in the same province. Both Green's Garage and Breckenridge were managed by Oscar Green.
CIn 1956 Green's Garage was selling new and used cars in Edmonton and at other places in
Alberta while Breckenridge was selling new and used cars in Wainwright. New cars were obtained by Green's Garage from a sales agency known as "Waterloo
Motors"
while in Wainwright
Breckenridge obtained new cars directly from the Ford Motor Company. The transactions with which this litigation is concerned involved cars financed by a company referred to in the evidence as "Consolidated Finance"
(hereinafter called
"Consolidated"). When Green's Garage ordered la Cour Supr8me de l'Alberta et une copie de la pr&sente ordonnance, laquelle question constitutionnelle peut tre 6nonc6e comme suit:
1. aLa Loi dite The Treasury Branches Act, ch. 344 des Statuts revis6s de I'Alberta et amendements, est-elle ultra vires des pouvoirs de la province de l'Alberta en tant que loi relative au commerce de abanque>> en contravention des dispositions de l'Acte de l'Amgrique du Nord britannique?
2. Les affaires transig6es par les Treasury Branch de la province d'Alberta sont-elles ultra vires des pouvoirs de la Province d'Alberta parce que ces affaires ne sont pas autorisdes par la loi?> que toutes les demandes d'intervention soient rapportables AL l'hon. Juge en chef du Canada, en chambre, le 27e jour de novembre 1967, A 10 heures du matin.
Le Procureur g6n6ral du Canada demanda h intervenir dans la cause. a 6t6 autoris6 & le faire, ainsi qu'd se faire repr6senter par avocat et A produire un factum. Aucune province n'a demand6 h intervenir.
Les faits qui ont donn6 lieu h ce litige et A la question constitutionnelle sus-mentionn6e sont compliqu6s et ils furent contest6s au d6but. Les appelants, Oscar Green et Irene Janet Green, sont mar et femme. Pendant tout le temps oil se sont d6roul6s les faits pertinents au litige, M e Green 6tait propri6taire d'un garage a Edmonton connu sous le nom de <Green's Garage>. Un autre appelant, Breckenridge Speedway Ltd. (ci-aprbs nomm6e <Breckenridge>>) exploitait un garage A Wainwright, dans la mime province. Green's Garage et Breckenridge 6taient tous deux g6r6s par Oscar Green. En 1956, Green's Garage faisait la vente d'automobiles neuves et usag6es, A Edmonton et ailleurs dans la province, tandis que Breckenridge exploitait le mime commerce a Wainwright. Green's Garage achetait ses voitures neuves d'un concessionnaire connu sous le nom de <Waterloo Motors> tandis qu'd Wainwright, Breckenridge les achetait directement de la compagnie Ford. Les op6rations en cause dans ces proces impliquaient le financement des achats d'automobiles par une soci6t6 qui, dans la preuve, est d6sign6e sous le nom de <<Consolidated Finance UE alJ
17]SCR a car from Waterloo, it would be delivered subject to a chattel mortgage for the wholesale price given by Consolidated to Waterloo. Consolidated would then pay out Waterloo and deliver the car to Green's Garage, subject to a chattel mortgage given to secure Consolidated. Such a car was designated as being on "wholesale finance". When Green's Garage sold the car on time under -a conditional sales agreement to a customer,
Garage would deliver to
Consolidated its cheque to clear the wholesale finance, discharging the chattel mortgage. Consolidated would then give Green's Garage a cheque to cover the proceeds to be received from the customer under the conditional sales agreement in its favour. If purchasers defaulted under their conditional sales agreements, the cars would be repossessed and put back on wholesale finance pursuant to the terms of a master agreement between Green's Garage and Consolidated, and the balance would be deducted from the amounts payable to Green's Garage on other conditional sales agreements delivered to Consolidated. This procedure involving many cars resulted in a dispute or controversy between
Green's Garage and Consolidated as to Green's
Garage's indebtedness to Consolidated.
In September 1956 Green's Garage concluded that Consolidated was improperly holding back
$11,600 in respect of repossessed vehicles. To strengthen its position vis-a-vis Consolidated,
Green's Garage retained conditional sales agreements covering cars sold instead of delivering them immediately to Consolidated as had been the practice. Each such agreement had attached to it a cheque from either Green's Garage or
Breckenridge to Consolidated for the amount of the "wholesale finance" due in respect of that agreement.
The appellant Oscar Green testified that
Green's Garage intended to hold these conditional sales agreements -and cheques until the dispute over repossessed vehicles was settled with Consolidated. He further testified that during his absence one weekend about the end of
September 1956, a representative from Consolidated came to Green's Garage and took away
(ci-apris appel6e
<Consolidated>). Lorsque Green's Garage commandait une voiture A Waterloo, la livraison 6tait faite A charge d'un nantissement donn6 A Consolidated par Waterloo pour le prix de gros. Consolidated payait alors la voiture A Waterloo et la livrait & Green's Garage, grev6e d'un nantissement pour se garantir. On disait de ces voitures qu'elles 6taient financement de gros>. Quand Green's Garage vendait la voiture h cr6dit par contrat de vente conditionnelle, il 6mettait un cheque h Consolidated pour acquitter le financement de gros et r6gler le nantissement. Consolidated remettait alors A Green's Garage un chbque A l'ordre de celui-ci repr6sentant le montant A recevoir du client en vertu du contrat de vente conditionnelle. Si l'acheteur manquait A ses engagements en vertu du contrat de vente conditionnelle, on reprenait I'automobile qui 6tait remise sur le financement de gros en vertu d'un contrat gneral intervenu entre Green's Garage et Consolidated. Le solde dft 6tait alors d6duit des sommes payables en vertu des autres contrats de vente conditionnelle c6d6s h Consolidated. Cette m6thode, A cause du nombre de voitures qu'elle impliquait, finit par donner lieu & une dispute ou misentente entre Green's Garage et Consolidated quant au montant de l'endettement de Green's Garage envers Consolidated.
En septembre 1956, Green's Garage jugea que Consolidated retenait sans raison la somme de $11,600 en rapport avec des v6hicules repris. Pour renforcer sa situation vis-A-vis Consolidated, Green's Garage retint les contrats de vente conditionelle relatifs aux nouvelles ventes au lieu de les livrer imm6diatement & Consolidated comme il avait eu l'habitude de le faire. A chacun des contrats, on trouvait attach6 un chbque de Green's Garage ou de Breckenridge en faveur de Consolidated pour le montant du financement de gros sur le contrat en question.
Oscar Green, l'un des appelants, a t6moign6 que Green's Garage voulait retenir les contrats de vente conditionnelle et les chbques jusqu'A ce que le diff6rend avec Consolidated au sujet des voitures reprises soit r6gl6. Il a aussi d6clar6 que, vers la fin de septembre 1956, alors qu'il 6tait absent pour la fin de semaine, un repr6sentant de Consolidated est venu au Green's Garage et a boxful of conditional sales agreements and the cheques attached thereto. Green said he learned of this on his return on Sunday evening. The cheques in question were drawn on the Treasury
Branch established at Calder (a subdivision of by the Provincial Treasurer of
Alberta under the provisions of The Treasury
Branches Act, R.S.A. 1942, c. 29. Throughout
1956 Green's Garage was a depositor at the said
Calder branch and had been a depositor from
1950. In 1956, when Breckenridge was incorporated, that company became a depositor at the
Calder branch. In 1955 Mr. and Mrs. Green had borrowed money from the Treasury Branch at Calder and had signed promissory notes for
$2,600 and $10,500 in April and November of that year respectively; in effect, the appellants and Green's Garage, as well as Breckenridge, were doing their banking business at the Calder branch of the Treasury Department.
Oscar Green testified that on the morning after he learned that the representative from
Consolidated had taken the conditional sales agreements and the cheques, he notified one
Skelton who was manager of the Treasury
Branch in Calder to stop payment of the cheques which had been taken away by Consolidated.
Green further testified that despite the explicit stop payment order, Skelton cashed the cheques, remitting the money to Consolidated. The total amount of these cheques was testified to by
Green as being $198,985.86 and this produced a large overdraft in Green's Garage account. This overdraft as of October 5, 1956, was $123,- 322.99. On October 3, 1956, cheques totalling
$36,398.49 were charged against the Breckenridge account, but as that account had a substantial credit balance no overdraft resulted.
It is clear from the evidence that Skelton did not have authority to extend credit to Green's
Garage in the amount represented by the overdraft of October 5, 1956. Skelton continued to honour cheques for Green's Garage so that as of
October 20, 1956, Green's Garage was indebted to the Treasury Branch in the sum of $142,546 and Breckenridge owed $6,680.67.
s'est empar6 d'une boite pleine de contrats de vente conditionnelle avec les cheques y attach6s. Green a d6clar6 avoir 6t6 mis au courant de ce fait h son retour le dimanche soir. Les cheques 6taient tir6s sur la Treasury Branch de Calder (une agence de celle d'Edmonton) 6tablie par le Tr6sorier de la Province d'Alberta en vertu des dispositions de la loi dite The Treasury Branches Act, S.R.A. 1942, c. 29. Green's Garage d6posait des fonds A l'agence de Calder tout au long de 1956 (il 6tait un d6posant depuis 1950). En 1956, au moment de sa constitution, Breckenridge est devenu un d6posant A l'agence de Calder. En 1955, M. et M Green avaient fait des emprunts A la Treasury Branch de Calder et ils avaient souscrit en avril et en novembre 1955 des billets au montant de $2,600 et de $10,500 respectivement. De fait, les appelants, Green's Garage et Breckenridge faisaient leurs operations bancaires h 1'agence de Calder du Treasury Department.
Oscar Green a affirm6 dans son t6moignage que, le lendemain du jour oix it a appris que le repr6sentant de Consolidated avait pris les contrats de vente conditionnelle et les cheques, il a dans la matin6e avis6 un nomm6 Skelton, g6rant de la Treasury Branch A Calder, de refuser le paiement des cheques pris par Consolidated. II a igalement d6clar6 que, malgr6 le contre-ordre de paiement, Skelton a honor6 les chbques et remis 1'argent A Consolidated. D'apris le t6moignage de Green, le montant total de ces chbques 6tait de $198,985.86, d'oii un d6couvert consid6rable dans le compte de Green's Garage. Le 5 octobre 1956, ce d6couvert se chiffrait A $123,322.99. Le 3 octobre 1956, des chbques pour une somme de $36,398.49 ont 6t6 d6bitis au compte de Breckenridge; le solde cr6diteur de ce compte 6tant important, il ne se trouva pas A d6couvert.
La preuve montre clairement que Skelton n'6tait pas autoris6 A faire cr6dit A Green's Garage h concurrence du d6couvert au 5 octobre 1956. Skelton a continu6 a honorer les chbques tires par Green's Garage, de sorte que le 20 octobre 1956 ce dernier devait $142,546 A la Treasury Branch. Breckenridge devait $6,680.67 A la mime date.
The matter of Green having stopped payment of the cheques taken away by Consolidated is of vital importance in so far as the appellants are concerned. The stop order as testified to by
Green was a verbal one. The learned trial judge found as a fact that the stop payment order was given. He said in this regard:
The matter came to a head when the plaintiffs issued cheques to the finance company and then instructed Skelton to stop payment. I have no doubt he was given these instructions, but a few days later, he went to the plaintiff Green and told him he had put through the cheques for payment.
The appellants rely upon this finding of fact as
"the key finding, the cornerstone of appellants' case".
The evidence supporting this finding is meagre.
Skelton did not give evidence at the trial, and it would appear from the evidence of M. H.
Pitcher, liquidation officer in the head office of the Treasury Branches at Edmonton, that Green did not put forward his charge in this respect until December 1960. Green, on the other hand, testified that he told Pitcher and a Mr. Olive who was a superintendent with the Treasury
Branch in or about October or November 1956 at a meeting in the office of the supervisor that he had stopped payment of the cheques but that
Skelton had cashed them anyway. Nothing more is heard or said about this very important matter until Green referred to it in a letter to Pitcher dated December 17, 1960. However, be that as it may, I am unable to give the finding the effect contended for by the appellants. The evidence clearly establishes that whether or not the "Stop
Payment" order was given and disobeyed, the appellants ratified the payment of the cheques and the learned trial judge correctly so found.
The appellants continued to do business with the
Calder Treasury Branch on the basis that the moneys represented by these cheques had been received by them and were owing to the Treasury Branch. On October 20, 1956, they signed notes to the Treasury Branch for $140,000 representing the overdrafts in the Green's Garage and Breckenridge accounts as of that date. The
Pour les appelants le contre-ordre de paiement des chiques pris par Consolidated est d'une importance capitale. Selon le t6moignage de Green, le contre-ordre a 6t6 donn6 verbalement. Le savant Juge de premiere instance a trouv6 qu'en fait le contre-ordre a r6ellement 6t6 donn6. Voici ce qu'il dit A ce sujet:
L'affaire a abouti quand les demandeurs, apres avoir 6mis des cheques h la socit6 de financement, ont donn6 ordre & Skelton d'en refuser le paiement. Je ne doute pas que Skelton ait regu cette directive mais, quelques jours plus tard, il alla trouver le demandeur Green, pour lui dire qu'il avait pay6 les chbques.
Les appelants se fondent sur cette conclusion de fait comme sur la conclusion cl6, la pierre angulaire, de leur cause.
La preuve A Pappui de cette conclusion est mince. Skelton n'a pas t6moign6 au procks. Il ressort du t6moignage de M. H. Pitcher, administrateur des liquidations au bureau-chef des Treasury Branch A Edmonton, que Green n'a pas parl6 de cela avant le mois de d6cembre 1960. Green, de son c6t6, a t6moign6 avoir dit A Pitcher et A un nomm6 Olive, surintendant h la Treasury Branch, lors d'une entrevue au bureau du directeur vers octobre ou novembre 1956, qu'il avait contremand6 le paiement des chbques mais que Skelton les avait paybs quand mime. On n'entendit plus parler de cette question si importante jusqu'A ce que Green en fasse mention dans une lettre, dat6e du 17 d6cembre 1960 et adress6e A Pitcher. Quoi qu'il en soit, je ne peux donner A la conclusion sur ce point l'effet que les appelants pr6tendent qu'elle doit avoir. Peu importe que le paiement des chbques ait 6t6 contremand6 et qu'on ait pass6 outre h cet ordre, la preuve 6tablit clairement que les appelants ont ratifi6 le paiement des chbques, conclusion a laquelle le savant Juge de premiere instance 6tait bien fond6 d'arriver. Les appelants ont continu6 A transiger avec la Calder Treasury Branch, en prenant pour acquis qu'ils avaient requ les sommes que repr6sentaient les cheques et qu'ils les devaient A la Treasury Branch. Le 20 octobre 1956, ils ont souscrit en sa faveur des billets au montant total de $140,000, soit le d6couvert total, a date, des evidence as of December 8, 1958, and the books of the Treasury Branch showed an indebtedness by appellants of $150,668.10.
At this time an agreement was entered into which will be dealt with later as it has a very important place in determining the rights of the parties, and in particular the rights of the respondent in respect of certain properties which were dealt with at that time. This agreement reads as follows:
In consideration of the following documents, duly signed by the proper signing officers of the above named parties, to be transferred to the Provincial
Treasurer of Alberta by Mr. Oscar Green and Mrs.
Irene Janet Green, and Breckenridge Speedway Ltd.
1. The property known as Green's Garage and fixed chattels situated at Wainwright, Alberta.
2. The property known as Green's Garage,
Body Shop and fixed chattels in Edmonton.
3. The dwelling of Oscar Green and Irene
Janet Green in Edmonton.
4. The Valleyview property at Valleyview,
5. Glenlyon Property and Houses, acreage,
Edmonton outskirts.
6. Assignment of lease with North Star Oil
Company of Green's Garage in Edmonton, with fixed chattels.
7. Transfer in blank of Green's Garage property and fixed chattels in Edmonton.
8. Assignment of Agreement for Sale, 0. E.
Campbell, Viking Motors of Viking, Alberta.
The Treasury Branches will undertake to arrange a separate lease back to Oscar and Irene Janet
Green and Breckenridge Speedway Limited all the above named properties, with the exception of
Glenlyon; Viking Motors and Valleyview properties, on a five year lease with payments for such lease to be established in an amount sufficient to cover interest at 6% on the value set out in the Transfer and Assignment of these properties to the Provincial
Treasurer, plus an amount equal to the yearly taxes comptes de Green's Garage et de Breckenridge. D'aprbs la preuve et les livres de la Treasury Branch, les appelants devaient $150,558.10 au 8 d6cembre 1958.
C'est h ce moment-1A qu'est intervenue la convention que j'6tudierai plus loin, car elle a une trds grande importance dans la d6termination des droits des parties, notamment ceux de l'intimde A certaines propri6t6s dont on a alors dispos6. Cette convention se lit comme suit:
En consid6ration des actes suivants, dfiment sign6s par les repr6sentants autoris6s des parties susnommbes, M. Oscar Green, M Irene Janet Green et Breckenridge Speedway Ltd. pour transporter au Tr6sorier de la Province d'Alberta:
1. La propri6t6 d6sign6e sous le nom de Green's Garage situ6e A Wainwright (Alberta) avec accessoires immobilis6s.
2. La propri6t6 d6sign6e sous le nom de Green's Garage Body Shop, situ6e & Edmonton avec accessoires immobilis6s.
3. La maison d'Oscar Green et Irene Janet Green, A Edmonton.
4. La propri&t6 Valleyview, A Valleyview (Alberta).
5. La propri6t6 Glenlyon, batiments et terrains, en banlieue d'Edmonton.
Cession du bail de North Star Oil Company en faveur de Green's Garage d'Edmonton avec accessoires immobilis6s.
7. Transport en blanc de la propri6t6 Green's Garage A Edmonton avec accessoires immobilis6s. 8. Droits A la promesse de vente 0. E. Campbell, Viking Motors, a Viking (Alberta). La Treasury Branch s'engage h louer A Oscar et Irene Janet Green et Breckenridge Speedway Limited toutes les propridt6s ci-dessus mentionn6es, sauf celles de Glenlyon, Viking Motors et Valleyview, par bail distinct pour un terme de cinq ans, en considbration d'un loyer h d6terminer et qui devra 8tre suffisant pour couvrir l'intdrft au taux de 6 p. 100 sur la valeur des propri6t6s 6tablie A l'acte de cession-transport au Tr6sorier de la province en outre des taxes annuelles sur chaque propri6t6. M. Oscar allJ.
on each property. Privilege will be arranged in each lease for Mr. Oscar and Irene Janet Green and
Breckenridge Speedway Limited to make a payment over and above the monthly rental payments covering interest and taxes toward purchase back of the said properties for the amount set out in the said
Transfer and Lease Assignment.
The Valleyview and Glenlyon properties will not be leased back, but will be put up for sale giving
Mr. Oscar Green and Mrs. Irene Janet Green first option to buy these said properties at the same sale price that the Provincial Treasurer is offered for them.
The Provincial Treasurer will further undertake to arrange an operating credit for a period of five years in an amount of $15,000.00 and will receive from Oscar Green and Irene Janet Green and
Breckenridge Speedway Limited, Chattel Mortgage covering all stock and movable equipment and book depts as security for the operating credit.
Credit will be allowed by the Treasury Branches on account of Breckenridge Speedway Limited and
Green's Garage Account with Calder Treasury
Branch for the amount shown on the Transfers on
Breckenridge Speedway Limited property at Wainwright, Green's Garage Body Shop property in
Edmonton, House of Oscar and Irene Janet Green,
Valleyview property and Glenlyon property.
Any default in payments of Lease rental amounts to the Provincial Treasurer will cause such Lease in Default to be null and void giving authority to the Provincial Treasurer to cancel said Lease and dispose of said property to apply on account at will. Default is made if payment is not made within
60 days of due date and after a 30 day notice of such non-payment is mailed to the Leasee.
All Lease rental payments to begin on May 1st,
(sgd.) M.
M. H. Pitcher, for Superintendent.
Pursuant to this agreement, four option leases were executed in May 1959 covering items 1, 2,
3 and 7 referred to in the agreement and were delivered to the appellants. These lease option agreements are to be read as part of the agreement of December 8, 1958. Without referring specifically to the leases, each one called for a fixed rental. For some time the appellants paid rents on the various properties covered by the leases, but ultimately ceased doing so and they
Green,
M"
Irene Janet Green et Breckenridge Speedway Limited auront le privilige de faire des paiements plus blevbs que le loyer mensuel 6quivalant h l'int6r8t et aux taxes pour racheter lesdites propri6t6s au prix fix6 dans lesdits transports et cession de bail.
Les propri6t6s de Valleyview et de Glenlyon ne seront pas lou6es auxdits Oscar et Irene Janet Green mais elles seront mises en vente et ils auront le privilige de racheter lesdites propri6t6s par pr6f6rence, au prix que le Tr6sorier de la Province se verra offrir.
De plus, le Tr6sorier de la Province s'engage a fournir un cr6dit A l'exploitation pendant cinq ans jusqu'h concurrence de $15,000 moyennant nantissement par Oscar Green, Irene Janet Green et Breckenridge Speedway Limited de l'inventaire, de l'6quipement et des cr6ances actives, en garantie dudit cr6dit l'exploitation.
Les comptes de Breckenridge Speedway Limited et de Green's Garage h la Calder Treasury Branch seront cr6dit6s des sommes mentionnies aux actes de transport de la propri6t6 de Breckenridge Speedway Limited h Wainwright, de la propri6t6 Green's Garage Body Shop A Edmonton, de la maison d'Oscar et Irene Janet Green, et des propri&t6s de Valleyview et de Glenlyon.
Tout d6faut d'effectuer au Tr6sorier de la Province le paiement du loyer en vertu d'un bail rendra celui-ci nul et non-avenu et autorisera le Tr6sorier de la Province h r6silier ledit bail, a disposer de ladite propri6t6 et & en imputer le prix comme il l'entendra. Il y aura d6faut si un paiement n'est fait dans les 60 jours de son 6chdance et 30 jours s'6coulent apris qu'un avis de cette absence de paiement aura 6t6 exp6di6 par la poste au locataire. Tous les paiements de loyer devront commencer le 1" mai 1959.
(sign6) M. H. Pitcher M. H. Pitcher pour le surintendant. Pour donner suite A cette convention, les parties signbrent, en mai 1959, quatre baux avec option d'achat se rapportant aux articles nos 1, 2, 3 et 7 de la convention et ces baux furent remis aux appelants. On doit consid6rer que ces baux avec option d'achat font partie de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958. Sans analyser les baux euxm~mes, on doit dire que chacun d'eux stipulait le paiement d'un loyer d6termin6. Pendant quelque temps, les appelants ont pay6 le loyer des J~e all193 were not, at the date of the trial, paying rent although still in occupation of the various properties pursuant to the leases. The "Wainwright"
property was sold after the trial and by agreement (see formal judgment) of the parties the proceeds were placed in trust and are to be treated as the "Wainwright" property. On receipt of these lease option agreements, the respondent wrote Green's Garage on May 15, 1959, as follows:
propri6tis vis6es par les diff6rents baux mais ils ont fini par cesser de le faire. Au moment du procks, ils ne payaient aucun loyer bien qu'ils. eussent encore la jouissance des difi6rentes propri6t6s en vertu des baux. La propri6t6 de Wainwright a 6t6 vendue apris le procks et, du con-sentement des parties (voir la minute du jugement), le produit de la vente a 6t6 plac6 en' fiducie pour qu'on en dispose comme s'il s'agissait de la propri6t6 de Wainwright. Sur r6ception des conventions de bail avec option d'achat, l'intim6e adressa la lettre suivante A Green's Garage: Edmonton, Alberta,
May 15th, 1959.
Greens Garage,
Greens Garage
Edmonton (Alberta) Le 15 mai 1959. Dear Sirs:
The following will give a breakdown of total amount outstanding on Greens Garage and Breckenridge Speedway Limited accounts at the office of the
Treasury Branches. This whole amount has been set up under the following headings with separate amounts making up the total liability as of May 15th,
1959, interest to May 1st, 1959.
Breckenridge Speedway Ltd.,
Wainwright property Account
Greens Garage, Edmonton, Body
Shop Property Account ..........
Greens Garage, E. C. Campbell,
Viking Motors Account ..........
Greens Garage, Edmonton
Account
.................
Greens Garage, Edmonton
Glenlyon Property Account ....
Greens Garage, Edmonton,
House Property Account........
Greens Garage, Valleyview Property Account Clair Johnston, of Purves & Johnston, Solicitors, Edmonton
.........
$ 37,343.60
16,977.48
3,294.09
71,219.27
6,009.50
13,074.16
2,750.00
$150,668.10
Messieurs,
Vous trouverez ci-apris un 6tat d6taill6 des montants dus aux comptes de Greens Garage et de Breckenridge Speedway Limited A la
Treasury Branch. Le montant total a 6t6 divis6 en diff6rents postes indiquant le montant dfi A chaque compte; I'ensemble forme la dette totale au 15 mai 1959, avec intirit calculI jusqu'au mai 1959. Breckenridge Speedway Limited, Compte de la propri6t6 de W ainwright .................... $ 37,343.60 Greens Garage Body Shop,
Edmonton, Compte de cette propridt6 ..............................
16,977.48 Greens Garage, E. C. Campbell,
Compte
Viking
Motors
....................
3,294.27 Greens Garage, Compte d'Edm onton ................................
71,219.27 Greens Garage, Edmonton,
Compte de Ia propridt6 de
Glenlyon .................
6,009.50 Garage, Edmonton,
Compte de la maison ........
13,074.16 Greens Garage, Compte de propri6t6
Valleyview,
Clair Johnston, de Purves
& Johnston, avocats,
Edmonton .......
...........
2,750.00 $150,668.10 The Treasury Branch in consideration of Agreements now entered into hereby agree to release guarantees now held against:
G. K. Green
K. P. Lindsay
Breckenridge Speedway Ltd.
Twin Town Motors.
We also agree to release guarantee now held by
Greens Garage, signed by Irene Janet Green and
Oscar A. Green, when a new guarantee is completed on Treasury Branch form to be signed by Irene
Janet Green and Oscar A. Green covering the amount due Greens Garage Edmonton Account.
It is necessary to have Mr. Green obtain authority from Breckenridge Speedway Limited to transfer
$3,126.62 from Breckenridge Speedway Limited to the credit of Greens Garage Edmonton. This was an oversight in setting up the account to the credit of Greens Garage.
(Signed)
"M.
M. H. Pitcher, for Superintendent.
As will be seen, the total indebtedness claimed by respondent at this time was $150,668.10.
The validity of The Treasury Branches Act is directly challenged in this Court by the Attorney
General of Canada and the question is also relevant to the contention by the appellants that notwithstanding their liability to repay the moneys borrowed, the fact that The Treasury Branches
Act is ultra vires requires a finding that the securities obtained by respondent under the agreement of December 8,
1958, must be returned to the appellants.
I will deal firstly with the question of the validity of The Treasury Branches Act, secondly with the liability of the appellants to repay the moneys received from the Treasury Branch even if the legislation is ultra vires, thirdly with the contention of the appellants respecting the validity and effect of the agreement of December 8,
1958, and lastly with the claim for rescission
.and damages.
The question of the validity of The Treasury
Branches Act was dealt with in the Appellate
En raison des conventions intervenues, la Treasury Branch consent par les pr6sentes A renoncer aux engagements en garantie de:
G. K. Green
K. P. Lindsay
Breckenridge Speedway Ltd.
Twin Town Motors.
Nous consentons 6galement h renoncer a l'engagement en garantie de Greens Garage, souscrit par Irene Janet Green et Oscar A. Green, i condition que ces deux personnes signent un nouvel engagement suivant la formule de la Treasury Branch pour la somme due au compte d'Edmonton de Greens Garage.
Il est n6cessaire que M. Green se fasse autoriser par Breckenridge Speedway Limited A transporter la somme de $3,126.62 de Breckenridge Speedway Limited au cr6dit du compte de Greens Garage, Edmonton. II s'agit d'un oubli dans le transport du compte au cr6dit de Greens Garage.
(Signature) M.
Le Procureur g6nbral du Canada conteste directement devant cette Cour la constitutionnalit6 de la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act. De plus cette question est 6galement A consid~rer en regard de la pr6tention des appelants que, nonobstant leur obligation de rembourser les sommes emprunt6es, si la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires, les garanties et les propri6t6s qu'ils ont transport6es A l'intim6e par la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 doivent leur 8tre remises.
Je vais traiter premibrement de la question de la constitutionnalit6 de la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act, deuxibmement de l'obligation des appelants de rembourser les sommes qu'ils ont reques de la Treasury Branch, mime si la loi est ultra vires, troisibmement de la pr6tention des appelants quant A la validit6 et aux cons6quences de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958, et finalement de leur demande de r6solution et de dommages.
La Cour d'appel a d6jh examin6 la question de la constitutionnalit6 de The Treasury Branches Division. Smith C.J.A., with whom Johnson and
Kane JJ.A. concurred, did not find it necessary to deal with the issue, holding that the appellants could not in any event raise the question of ultra vires in this action. This was, of course, before the Attorney General of Canada intervened to challenge the validity of The Treasury
Branches Act. Johnson J.A. agreed with Smith
C.J.A. and Allen J.A. that the agreement of
December 8, 1958, created equitable mortgages in respect of "Green's Body Shop Property", dwelling house"
and "the Wainwright
Property". Porter and Allen JJ.A., in separate judgments, held The Treasury Branches Act to be ultra vires. Both held that the appellants were not precluded in this action from raising the question of ultra vires. Allen J.A. said in this regard:
It is, of course, obvious from the disposition which I would make of this appeal that I do not consider the plaintiffs are in any way precluded from raising the question of the ultra vires nature of their transactions with the treasury branches in this action.
Porter J.A. said:
But it is urged by the defendant that the plaintiffs are precluded by law from raising as a defence to the counterclaim as it affects the so-called conveyances the invalidity of the statute creating the treasury branches.
If this be so, we arrive at the anomalous position that the defendant may have judgment for the money, keep the conveyed property and enforce its security. What has the subject done that this court should say to him and to his creditors, if any, that the Crown can keep his property as a benefit in a transaction it could not make?
I agree with these views. The respondent can recover the moneys loaned not because the appellants cannot raise the ultra vires issue but because regardless of that issue they must return the moneys they received.
Act. Le Juge en chef Smith de la division d'appel, avec lequel les Juges d'appel Johnson et Kane ont 6t6 d'accord, n'a pas trouv6 n6cessaire d'aborder ce point, ayant jug6 que les appelants ne pouvaient soulever le probl6me de l'inconstitutionnalit6 dans leur action. Evidenment, cette d6cision a 6t6 prise avant que le Procureur g6n6ral du Canada n'intervienne pour contester la constitutionnalit6 de The Treasury Branches Act. Le Juge d'appel Johnson, comme le Juge en chef Smith et le Juge d'appel Allen, a trouv6 que la convention du 8 dicembre 1958 cr6ait des hypothbques en 6quit6 (equitable mortgages) sur le <Green's Garage Body Shop>>, <1a maison> et la <proprit6 de Wainwright>.
Les Juges d'appel Porter et Allen, dans des motifs distincts, ont conclu que The Treasury Branches Act 6tait ultra vires. Tous deux ont reconnu aux appelants le droit d'invoquer, dans leur action, I'inconstitutionnalit6 de la loi. Voici ce que dit le Juge d'appel Allen A ce sujet:
Il est bien 6vident d'aprbs la fagon dont je disposerais de cet appel que je considbre que rien n'empichait les demandeurs de soulever dans leur action l'inconstitutionnalit6 de leurs conventions avec les Treasury Branch.
Le Juge d'appel Porter dit:
La d6fenderesse pr6tend cependant que la loi empche les demandeurs d'invoquer comme d6fense A la demande reconventionnelle au sujet des transports, l'invalidit6 de la loi cr6ant les soidisant Treasury Branch.
Si tel est le cas, nous en arrivons A la conclusion 6trange que la d6fenderesse peut obtenir jugement pour les sommes d'argent, garder les propri6t6s qu'elle s'est fait transporter et r6aliser ses garanties. Qu'est-ce que ce justiciable a bien pu faire pour que la Cour lui dise, de mime qu'a ses cr~anciers, que la Couronne a droit de garder ses propri6t6s obtenues A la faveur d'une convention qu'elle n'avait pas le droit de faire?
Je suis aussi de cet avis. Ce n'est pas parce que les appelants ne peuvent soulever la question de l'inconstitutionnalit6 de la loi que l'intimbe peut recouvrer l'argent qu'elle a pr8t6 mais bien parce que, ind6pendamment de cette question, les appelants doivent remettre les sommes qu'ils ont reques.
[19701 R.C.S.
I do not think that I can usefully add anything to the reasons of Porter J.A. in this regard. He went fully into the history of the legislation and its relationship to banking, and concluded by saying:
In my view The Treasury Branches Act is invalid as trenching upon a legislative field into which it is prohibited from entering by reason of the assignment of the exclusive legislative right therein to
Canada.
I am also in agreement with Porter J.A.'s view that the operation of the treasury branches cannot be upheld as being an exercise of the royal prerogative and valid regardless of the statute being ultra vires. Porter J.A. dealt with this argument as follows:
As will be seen from the subsequent discussion of the Treasury Branch legislation, the power of the Crown to conduct the treasury branches sprang from legislation, namely, The Treasury Branches
Act. The operation of the treasury branches cannot therefore be an exercise of the prerogative which is created and limited by common law and does not flow from statute. 7 Halsbury's Laws of England,
3rd ed., p. 221:
463.. . The royal prerogative may be defined as being that pre-eminence which the Sovereign enjoys over and above all other persons by virtue of the common law, but out of its ordinary course, in right of her regal dignity, and comprehends all the special dignities, liberties, privileges, powers and royalties allowed by the common law to the
Crown of England.
464. . . . The prerogative is thus created and limited by the common law, and the Sovereign can claim no prerogatives except such as the law allows, nor such as are contrary to Magna Carta, or any other statute, or to the liberties of the subject.
Moreover, the prerogative of the Crown in the right of the Province is co-extensive with the division of the legislative powers made by the British
North America Act as between federal and provincial power, and the prerogative of the Crown in the right of the Province could not extend to the operations purporting to be authorized by The Treasury
Branches Act unless The Treasury Branches Act is within the legislative authority of the Province.
Je ne crois pas pouvoir utilement ajouter quoi que ce soit sous ce rapport aux motifs du Juge d'appel Porter . II a fait l'historique complet de la loi et il a examin6 A fond ses relations avec le commerce de banque. II a termind son expose comme suit:
A mon sens, la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act est nulle parce qu'elle empikte sur un domaine 16gislatif oii elle ne peut s'appliquer h cause de la comp6tence 16gislative exclusive dans ce domaine d~volue au Canada.
Je suis aussi d'accord avec le Juge d'appel Porter lorsqu'il affirme qu'on ne peut dire que les op6rations des Treasury Branch constituent des actes d'exercice de la prerogative royale et sont donc valides mime si la loi est ultra vires. Voici ce que dit le Juge Porter A propos de cette pr6tention:
on le verra dans l'6tude ciapris de la 16gislation sur les Treasury Branch, le droit de la Couronne de les exploiter d6coule de la 16gislation, c'est-?-dire de la loi The Treasury Branches Act. Cons6quemment I'exploitation n'en peut pas constituer un acte d'exercice de la prbrogative royale, qui d6coule de la common law et non du droit statutaire. Halsbury, Laws of England, 3* 6d. vol. 7, p. 221:
463... . La pr6rogative royale se d6finit comme 6tant cette pr66minence dont jouit le Souverain sur toute autre personne en vertu de la common law, non en tant que personne ordinaire mais en raison de sa dignit6 royale. Elle comprend toutes les dignit6s, libert6s, privilfges, pouvoirs et droits royaux sp6ciaux que la common law attribue h la Couronne d'Angleterre.
464.... En cons6quence, la pr6rogative d6coule et relbve de la common law, le Souverain ne peut en r6clamer d'autres que celles que lui reconnalt la loi, et il n'en peut r6clamer aucune A l'encontre de la Grande Charte, d'un autre statut, ou des libert6s des citoyens.
De plus, la pr6rogative de la Couronne du chef de la province est correlative de la division des comp6tences l6gislatives 6tablies par l'Acte de l'Amirique du Nord britannique, entre le f6d6ral et les provinces. La prerogative de la Couronne du chef de la Province ne peut s'appliquer aux affaires que la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act est cens6e autoriser A moins que cette loi ne soit elle-m8me de la comp6tence l6gislative de la province. In Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. Rex, [1916] 1 A.C. 566, at p. 580, Viscount
Haldane said:
". . . the distribution under the new grant of executive authority in substance follows the distribution under the new grant of legislative powers."
With respect, I cannot agree with the learned trial judge that the conduct of the treasury branches is an exercise of the royal prerogative.
The fact that The Treasury Branches Act is ultra vires cannot deprive the respondent of the right to recover the moneys loaned to the appellants as moneys had and received. The law in this regard is aptly stated by Lush J.
in
Brougham v. Dwyer . This was an action to recover moneys as had and received a loan made by a company by way of overdraft when the company was not permitted to loan in this manner. Lush J. said at p. 505:
When one considers the real meaning of the expression that it was ultra vires on the part of the building society to enter into this transaction, the whole case becomes plain. The directors of the society purporting to act on behalf of the building society, and to make a contract on its behalf, lent the society's money to the defendant by way of an overdraft. It turned out that in point of law the building society were incompetent to make such a contract, and it followed that the contract which the directors thought they were making was not a contract at all, but was simply a transaction which in point of law did not exist. The consequence was that the defendant had received moneys belonging to the building society under a transaction which had no validity of any sort or kind. If the matter stood there, I should have thought it plain that there being no contract an action for money had and received would lie.
and later:
But when one remembers the meaning of ultra vires the position is different. The contract was only no contract because the building society were unable to enter into it. There was nothing wrong in the contract itself or anything illegal in its nature, but the society being incompetent to make it, it did not exist in point of law. That being so the action
Dans l'affaire Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. Rex [1916] 1 A.C. 566, le vicomte Haldane dit, h la p. 580:
e. selon la nouvelle constitution, la rdpartition du pouvoir ex6cutif suit la r6partition du pouvoir 16gislatif.>
En toute d6f6rence, je ne suis pas de l'avis du savant Juge de premibre instance que l'exploitation des Treasury Branch constitue un acte d'exercice de la pr6rogative royale.>
Le fait que la loi intitul6e The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires ne peut priver l'intim6e du droit de recouvrer les sommes qu'elle a prtes aux appelants A titre d'argent regu. Le droit sur ce point est bien d6fini par le Juge Lush, dans Paffaire Brougham v. Dwyer'. II s'agissait d'une action intent~e par une soci6t6, en recouvrement d'un pret A titre d'argent regu. Le prt avait 6t6 fait au moyen d'un d6couvert, alors que la soci6t6 n'6tait pas autoris6e A pr~ter de cette fagon. Le Juge Lush dit, A la p. 505:
Si l'on considbre le sens v6ritable de I'affirmation que la soci6t6 de construction n'avait pas le pouvoir de faire cette operation, toute l'affaire devient claire. Les administrateurs de la soci6t6, croyant agir en son nom et conclure un contrat pour son compte, ont pr8t6 son argent au d6fendeur au moyen d'un dbcouvert. Il s'est trouv6 qu'en droit, la soci6t6 n'avait pas le pouvoir de conclure un tel contrat. Il s'ensuit que le contrat que les administrateurs croyaient avoir conclu n'en 6tait pas un, mais constituait une operation qui, aux yeux de la loi, 6tait inexistante. En cons6quence, le d6fendeur avait regu des sommes d'argent appartenant h la soci6t6 de construction en vertu d'une op6ration sans aucune validit6. Si tel 6tait le cas, j'aurais di conclure que, faute de contrat, il y avait lieu h une action pour argent regu.
Plus loin, il dit encore:
Mais si I'on se rappelle le sens de l'expression ultra vires, I'affaire est tout autre. Le contrat n'6tait inexistant que du seul fait que la soci6t6 de construction n'avait pas le pouvoir de le conclure. Il n'y avait pas d'autre cause de nullit6 de ce contrat et il n'6tait pas ill6gal de sa nature; mais, parce que la soci6t6 n'avait pas le pouvoir de le Le Hall
UE alJ
17]SCR was maintainable, and the defendant had no answer to it. It was an action brought for money lent under a transaction which was thought to be valid but which was in fact not valid. On principle I can see no possible reason why such an action should not be maintainable, and the Court of Appeal in Re
Coltman; Coltman Coltman (1881),
19 Ch. D.
64, clearly decided that in a case such as the present assuming the contract not to be illegal, there would be no answer to the action. I am therefore of opinion that there was no defence to the present action, and the appeal must accordingly be allowed.
I am accordingly in agreement with Smith
C.J.A. when, in his reasons, he said:
I have no doubt that money lent by the Province of Alberta in the course of carrying on the business of a treasury branch may be recovered with interest even though the carrying on by the Province of the business of operating the treasury branch and the lending of money in that operation was beyond the powers of the Province under the British North
America Act.
It should be noted that the appellants do not dispute this proposition. They say in their factum:
It has never been suggested that if the transactions are set aside, the Appellants seek to defeat repayment of monies properly paid out for their use and benefit.
Obviously a borrower cannot be allowed to cheat his lender by saying the lender had no power to loan. No court is so powerless as to permit itself to be used as a vehicle to defraud a creditor. Although the terminology has not been settled the principle seems clear. It simply could not be done.
The doctrine of ultra-vires is raised here to set aside an agreement for the purpose of restoring the parties to their original position each party accounting to the other for money had and received.
The appellants were seeking to avoid payment only of the amount of the cheques which
Primrose J. found had been paid after payment thereof had been countermanded. Payment of the amount of these cheques was being resisted, not on the ground of ultra vires but on the ground conclure, il n'avait pas d'existence en droit. Dans les circonstances, on pouvait accueillir l'action, le d6fendeur n'ayant pas de d6fense. s'agissait d'une action en recouvrement de sommes pr8ties en vertu d'une op6ration qu'on croyait valide, mais qui de fait ne l'6tait pas. En principe, je ne vois pas pourquoi on ne devrait pas accueillir une telle action. La Cour d'appel, dans l'affaire Coltman, Coltman v. Coltman, (1881)
19 Ch. D. 64 a statu6 clairement que, dans un cas tel que celui-ci, si le contrat n'est pas ill6gal, il n'y a pas de d6fense A l'action. Je suis donc d'avis qu'il n'y avait pas de d6fense a la prbsente action et qu'en cons6quence Pappel devrait 8tre accueilli.
Par consequent, je suis d'accord avec le Juge en chef Smith lorsque, dans ses motifs, il dit: Je ne doute pas que la Province d'Alberta peut recouvrer, avec int6rit, les sommes qu'elle a pr&6es dans le cours de l'exploitation d'une Treasury Branch, mime si le fait pour la Province de l'exploiter et de faire des pr8ts d'argent dans le cours de cette exploitation est hors de sa comp6tence, en vertu de l'Acte de l'Amrique du Nord britannique.
Il est A noter que les appelants n'ont pas contest6 cette assertion. On trouve ce qui suit dans leur factum:
Il n'a jamais 6t6 pr6tendu qu'advenant l'annulation des transactions, les appelants pourraient 6viter de rembourser des sommes dfiment versdes pour leur compte et a leur avantage. Il est 6vident qu'un emprunteur ne peut frauder son prateur sous pr6texte que celui-ci n'a pas pouvoir de priter. n'y a pas de tribunal qui soit impuissant au point de permettre qu'on s'en serve pour frauder un cr6ancier. Bien que la terminologie ne soit pas encore fix6e, le principe semble 6vident: c'est tout simplement impossible. La question constitutionnelle est invoquie ici pour faire annuler une convention et faire remettre les parties dans leur situation ant6rieure, chacune d'elles devant rendre compte A l'autre des sommes h titre d'argent requ. Les appelants cherchaient A se soustraire seulement au remboursement des sommes que repr6sentaient les ch6ques qui, d'apr~s le Juge Primrose, avaient 6t6 pay6s aprbs que le paiement en eut 6t6 contremand6. Us refusaient de rembourser ces sommes, non pas parce que la loi 6tait ultra that where a banker pays a cheque, the payment of which has been countermanded, he cannot recover from his customer. That issue has been resolved against because as
Primrose J. correctly found the appellants ratified the payment of the cheques.
Having concluded:
that The Treasury
Branches Act of Alberta is ultra vires; (2) that the conduct of the treasury branches is not an exercise of the royal prerogative; (3) that regardless of the finding that the legislation is ultra vires, the respondent is entitled to recover back the moneys loaned to the appellants, including the amount of the countermanded cheques, the question remains as to the effect and consequences arising from the agreement of December 8, 1958, and the securities transferred pursuant to that agreement. Two matters require decision in this regard: (1) were any or all of the properties transferred to the respondent pursuant to the agreement of December 8, 1958, so transferred as payment pro tanto on the appellants' indebtedness to the respondent or as security for the said indebtedness; (2) the rate of interest the moneys advanced should carry from time to time.
Allen J.A., with whom the majority of the
Appellate Division concurred, held that three of the properties transferred in May 1959 were transferred as payment pro tanto on the appellants' indebtedness existing at that time. I agree with this finding. The language of the agreement of December 8, 1958, is quite clear on this point. Being in possession of moneys belonging to the respondent, the appellants were under an obligation to return the moneys loaned to them and it appears to me that repayment could be made in kind as well as in cash. Title to these properties being items 4, 5 and 8 as set out in the agreement of December 8, 1958, will remain in the respondent free of any claim thereto by or on behalf of the appellants or any of them. The appellants are, of course, entitled to be given credit for the value agreed upon at the time for these properties as shown in the letter of May 15,
1959, totalling $12,053.59.
As to the other properties being those which, under the agreement of December 8, 1958, were vires mais pour le motif que si une banque paie un chbque dont le paiement a 6t6 contremand6, elle ne peut en recouvrer le montant de son client. Les appelants ne r6ussissent pas sur ce point parce que, comme 'a conclu a juste tire le Juge Primrose, ils ont ratifi6 le paiement des chiques. Apris avoir conclu: (1) que The Treasury Branches Act de l'Alberta est ultra vires; (2) que le fait d'exploiter les Treasury Branch ne constitue pas un acte d'exercice de la pr6rogative royale; (3)
qu'ind6pendamment de l'inconstitutionnalit6 de la loi, l'intim6e a droit de recouvrer les sommes qu'elle a pr8t6es aux appelants, y compris le montant des cbques pay6s apris contre-ordre, il reste a d6terminer la port6e et les consequences de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 et des transports en garantie faits en ex6cution de cette convention. Il y a deux questions A d6cider sous ce rapport: (1) le transport des propri6t6s a l'intimde en ex6cution de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 constituait-il, a l'6gard de toutes les propri6tis ou de quelques-unes, un paiement partiel A l'intim6e de la dette des appelants, ou un transport en garantie; (2) quel taux d'int6rt doivent porter les diff6rentes avances d'argent?
Le Juge d'appel Allen, exprimant l'opinion majoritaire, a d6cid6 que trois des propri6tis transporties en mai 1959 l'avaient 6 en paiement partiel de la dette de l'appelant comme elle existait alors. Je suis d'accord avec cette conclusion. Les termes de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 sont trbs clairs sur ce point. Jouissant de sommes d'argent appartenant h 1'intim6e, les appelants
6taient oblig6s de rembourser sommes que celle-ci leur avait prties. Il me parait certain que ce remboursement pouvait se faire en nature aussi bien qu'en esp~ces. Le droit de propri6t6 aux biens mentionn6s aux articles nos 4, 5 et 8 A la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 restera donc a l'intimbe, libre de tout droit de revendication de la part des appelants ou d'aucun d'eux. Les appelants auront, bien entendu, droit d'6tre cr6dit6s de la valeur convenue de ces biens telle qu'indiquie a la lettre du 15 mai 1959, soit en tout $12,053.59.
Quant aux autres propri6t6s, soit celles qui d'aprbs la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 de- TE allJ.
to remain in the possession of the appellants and leased back to them and which were, in fact, so leased back, the formal judgment in the Appellate Division provided in part that the judgment of the learned trial judge should be varied by striking out the orders for possession of the following properties:
(a) the property known as "Green's Body Shop"; (b) the property known as "the dwelling house"; (c) the property known as "the Wainwright property" and also striking out directions for the removal of the caveats against Green's Body Shop and the dwelling house. The formal judgment also gave effect to an agreement entered into between the parties staying execution pending the appeal to this
Court and providing for the sum of $25,000 which had been realized from the sale of the
Wainwright property should be paid into an interest-bearing trust account and dealt with as the Wainwright property. The formal judgment also provided that there should be no costs to any party.
Having found The Treasury Branches Act to be ultra vires, that fact and finding cannot then be ignored. I agree with Porter J.A. when he said:
The cases on ultra vires are all founded on the principle that the person who deals with an entity of limited capacity cannot take advantage of its limitations for his own profit. The law does not enforce the contract; it treats it as non-existent, and compels payment or return of property on the basis that it would be unconscionable to enrich a receiver of the benefit. The contract being non-existent, the law precludes the plaintiffs from keeping the money regarding such conduct as unconscionable that would result in unjust enrichment. But it is urged that though the plaintiffs cannot keep the money the Crown should be able to keep the security and thus take the benefit from and be enriched by a transaction which in law it did not make. Surely the transaction is a nullity for all purposes and not just a nullity against the subject.
but I differ from him and agree with Allen J.A.
as to the three properties transferred as payment vaient rester en la possession des appelants et leur 6tre louses et, de fait, leur ont 6t6 ainsi loudes, la minute du jugement de la division d'appel ordonne notamment que celui du Juge de premibre instance soit modifi6 en r6voquant l'ordonnance de mise en possession des propri6t6s suivantes:
(a)
la propri6t6 connue comme <Green's Garage Body Shop>, (b) la propri6t6 connue comme <da maison>,
(c) la propri6t6 connue comme <1a propri6t6 de Wainwright>, et en annulant l'ordre de lever les oppositions (caveats) inscrites contre les deux premibres. La minute du jugement donne 6galement acte de la convention des parties de surseoir A l'ex6cution du jugement jusqu'h l'issue du pourvoi devant cette Cour et de d6poser dans un compte en fiducie portant int6ret la somme de $25,000 provenant de la vente de la propri6t6 de Wainwright pour qu'il en soit dispos6 comme tenant lieu de la propri6t6 de Wainwright. La minute pr6voit 6galement qu'il n'y aura aucune adjudication de d6pens ni en faveur ni h 1'encontre d'aucune partie.
Ayant trouv6 que The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires, je ne puis pas tenir aucun compte de cette conclusion ni du fait lui-m8me. Je suis d'accord avec le Juge d'appel Porter, quand il dit: Dans les affaires d'inconstitutionnalit6, le principe est toujours qu'une personne qui traite avec un corps dont la capacit6 est limit6e ne peut faire tourner cette limitation h son avantage. La loi ne rend pas la convention ex6cutoire; elle la considbre inexistante et oblige A la restitution des sommes ou des biens regus parce qu'il serait immoral de permettre A la partie avantag6e de les retenir. Comme la convention est inexistante, la loi empiche les demandeurs de garder les sommes reques parce qu'elle juge immoral tout acte dont le r6sultat serait un enrichissement injuste. On pr6tend cependant que, bien que les demandeurs ne puissent retenir l'argent, la Couronne devrait pouvoir retenir les garanties et ainsi tirer profit et enrichissement d'une transaction qu'en droit elle n'a pas faite. Il est clair que la transaction est nulle i toutes fins que de droit et non A 1'6gard seulement des justiciables.
Cependant je ne suis pas de son avis et me range plut6t A celui du Juge d'appel Allen pour ce qui pro tanto and not by way of security in May
1959. As previously stated, if the appellants had made a cash payment of $12,053.59 at the time instead of transferring the three properties they could not, by any process, recover back moneys so paid, and I see no difference from the fact that the payment was made by an outright transfer of properties at agreed valuations. Being under obligation to repay, their act in repaying is a valid one notwithstanding that the agreement itself has no legal effect and is in law a nullity.
In the accounting now ordered the appellants should be charged interest at the legal rate of five per cent per annum regardless of the rate stipulated in the promissory notes or other securities taken when the moneys were received by the appellants because the respondent does not recover on the securities but as moneys had and received. The moneys in the hands of the appellants, the borrowers, as a result of the ultra vires loans are in reality moneys belonging to the respondent and are recoverable by the respondent not as in an action in contract or tort but in an action for restitution for moneys had and received:
Brooks & Co. v. Blackburn Benefit Society .
There should be a full and complete accounting to determine the amount payable by the appellants to the respondent in respect of the moneys loaned to the appellants from time to time which have not been repaid with interest as aforesaid, allowing credit for all payments made by the appellants under the lease option agreements and charging the appellants for all amounts properly expended by the respondent for taxes, upkeep and maintenance of the said properties including interest thereon, and the respondent should have judgment against the appellants severally for the amounts of their respective indebtedness to the respondent arrived at pursuant to the accounting and allowance of interest as above provided. The accounting should begin as of the date in September 1956 when the disputed cheques to
Consolidated were cashed and the proceeds remitted to Consolidated.
est des trois propri6t6s transport6es en paiement partiel et non en garantie, dans le cours du mois de mai 1959. Comme je 1'ai d6jh dit, si, h ce moment-lA, les appelants avaient effectu6 un paiement en argent de $12,053.59 plut~t qu'un transport des trois propri6t6s, ils ne pourraient d'aucune fagon r6p6ter les sommes pay6es. Je ne vois aucune diff6rence du fait qu'ils ont effectu6 le paiement au moyen d'un transport pur et simple des propri6t6s, pour une valeur fix6e par entente. ttant oblig6s de rembourser, le remboursement est valable mime si la convention elle-m~me n'a pas d'effet juridique et est nulle en droit. Dans la reddition de compte qui est ordonn6e l'int6rt que les appelants auront A payer sera calcul6 aux taux 16gal de cinq pour cent l'an, sans 6gard au taux stipul6 dans les billets ou autres effets souscrits par les appelants lorsqu'ils ont regu les sommes d'argent. En effet, ce n'est pas en vertu de ces engagements que l'intimbe a droit A ces sommes mais & titre d'argent regu. Les sommes que les appelants comme emprunteurs, ont en main, par suite de pr8ts invalides appartiennent en r6alit6 & l'intim6e qui peut les recouvrer non par une action sur contrat ou ddlit mais par une action en restitution d'argent regu: Brooks & Co. v. Blackburn Benefit Society . Il faudra rendre un compte complet et d6taill6 pour 6tablir les sommes que les appelants doivent A l'intimbe A raison des prits qui leur ont t6 accord6s de temps h autre et qu'ils n'ont pas encore rembours6s, avec int6r8t calcul6 comme susdit. Dans ce compte, il faudra cr6diter les appelants de toutes les sommes qu'ils ont vers6es en vertu des baux avec option d'achat et les d6biter de toutes les d6penses faites a bon droit par l'intimbe pour le paiement des taxes, 1'entretien et les r6parations desdites propri6t6s, avec int6r~t sur toutes ces sommes. L'intim6e aura jugement contre chacun des appelants s6par6ment pour le montant de leur dette respective envers elle, d6termin6e par le compte et le calcul des intbrits tel qu'ordonn6 plus haut. Ce compte devra remonter A septembre 1956, au moment oii l'intim6e a pay6 les cheques qui ont fait l'ob jet de la contestation et remis 1'argent & Consolidated.
Hall I.
The agreement of December 8, 1958, being a nullity, the respondent cannot retain title to the properties transferred by way of security under the agreement. The respondent will reconvey these properties (other than "the Wainwright property" which has been sold) so that title thereto may vest in the appellant from whom title was received in May 1959.
I have lastly to deal with the claim of the appellants for rescission of the agreement of
December 8, 1958. In this connection the appellants, having succeeded in their contention that
The Treasury Branches Act is ultra vires, it follows that the agreement of December 8, 1958, has no existence in law: Brougham v. Dwyer
(supra). That does not, of course, nullify what was actually done by the appellants at that time when, as I have found, they transferred properties to the respondent outright at an agreed valuation of $12,053.59. However, because the agreement is a nullity, the appellants cannot maintain an action on it either for rescission or damages as claimed. The learned trial judge dismissed the claim for rescission and damages on the merits. On the basis that the agreement has no existence in law, I do not find it necessary to go into the merits on these issues.
In the result, there will be a declaration that
The Treasury Branches Act is ultra vires. There will be an accounting as aforesaid and fixing the rate of interest in the said accounting at the legal rate of five per cent per annum from the date the various amounts were received by the several appellants. The respondent will have judgment for the amounts and interest thereon which the said accounting will show was received by individual
Breckenridge
Speedway Limited, Oscar Green and Irene Janet
Green. Title to the properties known as "Green's
Body Shop" and "the dwelling house" will be transferred back to the transferors thereof and the sum of $25,000 and interest accruing thereon being held in trust as representing "the Wainwright property" will be credited to Breckenridge Speedway Limited in the said accounting.
As to costs, the appellants have failed in their main claim to have deleted from the moneys owing by them the amounts of the disputed
Du fait que la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 est nulle, l'intim6e ne peut retenir les propridt6s transporties en garantie en vertu de cette convention. L'intim6e devra r6troc6der ces propri6t6s (exception faite de <da propri6t6 de Wainwright>, qui a 6t6 vendue) A celui des appelants qui les lui a remises en mai 1959.
J'ai enfin A statuer sur la demande des appelants en r6solution de la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958. Sur ce point, comme les appelants ont gain de cause dans leur pr6tention que The Treasury Branches Act est inconstitutionnelle, il s'ensuit que la convention du 8 d6cembre 1958 n'existe pas en droit: Brougham v. Dwyer (d6ji cit6). Cela n'annule pas pour autant les actes r6ellement accomplis par les appelants, et d6ji mentionn6s, savoir les cessions pures et simples de propri6t6s A 1'intim6e pour la valeur convenue de $12,053.59.
Toutefois, la convention 6tait nulle, les appelants n'ont pas de droit d'action ni en r6solution ni en dommages. Le savant Juge de premiere instance a renvoy6 l'action en r6solution et en dommages comme mal fond6e. Consid6rant la convention nulle, en droit, je ne vois pas la n6cessit6 d'6tudier ces questions au fond. En cons6quence, il y aura une d6claration A 1'effet que The Treasury Branches Act est ultra vires. Il y aura une reddition de compte, tel que susdit, le taux d'int6r&t sur les diff6rentes sommes qu'ont reques les appelants 6tant calcul6 au taux de cinq pour cent I'an, A partir du jour oil les diverses sommes ont 6t6 reques par chacun des appelants. L'intim6e aura jugement pour les sommes qu'6tablira le compte comme 6tant ce que chacun des appelants, Breckenridge Speedway Limited, Oscar Green et Irene Janet Green, lui doit. Le titre des propri6t6s connues comme le <<Green's Garage Body Shop>> et la <<maison> sera r6troc6d6 au c6dant et la somme de $25,000 et int6r&s accumul6s, d6tenue en fiducie pour tenir lieu de <da propri6t6 de Wainwright>, sera cr6ditde A Breckenridge Speedway Limited dans ledit compte.
Quant aux d6pens, les appelants n'ont pas rdussi dans leur demande principale, c'est-A-dire de faire d6duire de leur dette le montant des cheques to Consolidated and they have also failed in respect of the three pieces of property transferred in May 1959 as payment on account.
The respondent has failed in her cross-appeal.
In the circumstances, there should be no costs to the appellants or the respondent in this Court.
Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed with costs,
Hall and Spence J. (dissenting in part)
.
Solicitors for plaintiffs,
Macdonald, Spitz and Lavallee, Edmonton.
Solicitors for the defendant, respondent:
Clement, Irving, Mustard and Rodney, Edmonton.
Solicitor for the intervenant: The Attorney
General of Canada.
Boris Netupsky and Netupsky Engineering Company Limited (Plaintiffs)
Gerald Hamilton, carrying on business in the firm name and style of Gerald Hamilton and Associates, and the said Gerald Hamilton and Associates (Defendant)
Respondents.
1969: October 8, 9, 10; 1969: October 21.
Present: Cartwright C.J. and Martland, Judson,
Spence and Pigeon JJ.
Contract-Partial performance by plaintiffs-Action for damages for breach of contract-Counterclaim for loss sustained-Repudiation by plaintifs and acceptance of repudiation by defendants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia,' allowing an appeal from a judgment of Gregory J. Appeal dismissed.
W. J. Wallace, Q.C., and I. T. Law, for the plaintiffs, appellants.
ch6ques payds h Consolidated qui ont fait 1'objet de la contestation, non plus qu'd se faire remettre les trois propri6t6s donn6es en paiement partiel. L'intim6e a perdu son contre-appel. Dans les circonstances ni les appelants, ni l'intimbe n'auront droit A des d6pens en cette Cour.
Appel et contre-appel rejetis avec ddpens, les Juges Hall et Spence 9tant partiellement dissidents.
Procureurs des demandeurs, appelants: Macdonald, Spitz et Lavallie, Edmonton.
Procureurs de la ddfenderesse, intimde: Clement, Irving, Mustard et Rodney, Edmonton. Procureur de l'intervenant: Le Procureur gindral du Canada.
Boris Netupsky et Netupsky Engineering Company Limited (Demandeurs) Appelants; et
Gerald Hamilton, faisant affaires sous les nom et raison sociale de Gerald Hamilton and Associates, et ladite firme Gerald Hamilton and Associates (Difendeurs) Intims.
1969: les 8, 9 et 10 octobre; 1969: le 21 octobre. Pr6sents: Le Juge en Chef Cartwright et les Juges Martland, Judson, Spence et Pigeon.
Contrat-Exdcution partielle par demandeurs- Action en dommages pour violation de contrat-Demande reconventionnelle pour perte subie-Ripudiation par les demandeurs acceptie par les ddfendeurs. APPEL d'un jugement de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique', infirmant un jugement du Juge Gregory. Appel rejet6.
W. J. Wallace, c.r., et J. T. Law, pour les demandeurs, appelants.
et al. et al.
Cartwright C. J.
John G. Alley, for the defendants, respondents.
Judgment of the Court
JUSTICE-This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia' pronounced on May 16, 1969, whereby an appeal from the judgment of Gregory J.
given on May 31, 1968, was allowed, the action dismissed and the counterclaim upheld.
The action was for damages for breach of contract; the defence and counterclaim were based on the allegation that when the contract had been but partially performed it was repudiated by the plaintiffs and the repudiation was accepted by the defendants.
The reasons for the unanimous judgment of the
Court of Appeal were delivered by Maclean J.A.
We find ourselves so completely in agreement with those reasons that we are content to adopt them and have nothing to add.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the plaintiffs, appellants: Bull,
Housser & Tupper, Vancouver.
Solicitors for the defendants, respondents:
Davis, Hossie, Campbell, Brazier & McLorg,
Vancouver.
John G. Alley, pour les d6fendeurs, intim6s. Le jugement de la Cour a 6t6 rendu par LE CHEF-Le pr6sent pourvoi est A l'encontre d'un arrat de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britanniquel, prononc6 le 16 mai 1969, par lequel un appel du jugement du Juge Gregory, rendu le 31 mai 1968, a 6t6 accueilli, I'action rejet6e et la demande reconventionnelle accueillie.
L'action 6tait en dommages-intrts pour violation de contrat. La d6fense et la demande reconventionnelle 6taient fondies sur Pall6gation suivante, savoir qu'alors que le contrat n'6tait que partiellement ex6cut6, il a 6t6 r6pudi6 par les demandeurs et cette r6pudiation a 6t6 accept6e par les d6fendeurs.
Le Juge d'appel Maclean a ridig6 les motifs de I'arrit unanime de la Cour d'appel. Nous sommes si compltement d'accord avec ces motifs qu'il nous suffit de les faire n6tres sans rien y ajouter.
Le pourvoi est rejet6 avec d6pens.
Appel rejetg avec ddpens.
Cases cited
- Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. Rex 1 A.C. 566 p 580