Prospective Adoptive Parents v. Mugford

Le Juge Martland

Her Majesty The Queen

Appellant;

and

Jean Lupien Respondent.

1968: November 13; 1969: November 17.

Present:

Martland, Judson,

Ritchie,

Hall and

Spence JJ.

Criminal law-Evidence-Act of gross indecency

-Psychiatric evidence of state of mind of accused- Intent-Admissibility-Criminal Code,

1953-54

(Can.), c. 51, s. 149.

The respondent was convicted of attempting to commit an act of gross indecency. He was found by the police in a hotel bedroom in bed with another man, who was a female impersonator, and their respective positions in relation to each other were such as to justify the police in thinking that an act of gross indecency was taking place or was about to take place. The respondent seemed stunned after the entry of the police and during the interview that then took place. His defence was that he had believed his companion to be a woman. He sought to support his own evidence in this regard by the evidence of a psychiatrist. The trial judge excluded the psychiatric evidence based on interviews and tests which was tendered for the purpose of showing that the respondent had a certain type of defence mechanism which made him react violently against any homosexual activity and that he therefore would not have knowingly engaged in the homosexual practices which formed the subject of the charge.

Appel rejetg avec ddpens.

Procureurs des appelants-Les Parents Adoptifs tventuels: Gowling, MacTavish, Osborne & Henderson, Ottawa.

Procureurs de l'appelante-The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa: Burke-Robertson, Urie, Butler, Weller & Chadwick, Ottawa.

Procureurs de l'intimie: Jeffery, Brown, Beattie & Gunn, London.

Sa Majest6 la Reine

Appelante;

et

Jean Lupien Intime.

1968: le 13 novembre; 1969: le 17 novembre. Pr6sents: Les Juges Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall et Spence.

Droit criminel-Preuve-Acte de grossibre inddcence-Preuve psychiatrique sur l'6tat d'esprit du privenu-Intention-Admissibilit---Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 149.

L'intim6 a 6t6 d6clar6 coupable de l'inculpation de tentative de perp6trer un acte de grossibre ind6cence. La police l'a trouv6 dans une chambre d'h6tel, au lit avec un autre homme, un travesti, et leur position respective l'un par rapport h l'autre 6tait telle que la police 6tait justifi6e de penser qu'un acte de grossibre ind6cence avait lieu ou 6tait sur le point d'avoir lieu. L'intim6 a sembl6 stup6fi6 aprbs l'arriv6e des policiers et pendant la conversation qui a suivi. Sa d6fense, c'est qu'il a cru que son compagnon 6tait une femme. A l'appui de son t6moignage A cet 6gard, il a offert celui d'un psychiatre. Le juge de premibre instance a 6cart6 la preuve psychiatrique, fond6e sur les interviews et les tests, laquelle 6tait offerte dans le but de montrer que l'intim6 avait un certain m&canisme de d6fense qui le faisait r6agir violemment a l'encontre de toute activit6 homosexuelle et qu'en consequence, il ne se serait pas engage, sciemment, dans les relations sexuelles qui font l'objet de l'inculpation. La majorit6 en Cour d'appel a jug6 Le luge Martland

{[1970] R.C.S.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held the evidence to be admissible, set aside the conviction and directed a new trial. The Crown appealed to this Court.

Held (Ritchie and Spence JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the conviction restored.

Per Martland and Judson JJ.: The evidence in question was inadmissible. The psychiatrist was being asked for an opinion, not as to whether the respondent was mentall formulating an intent toe crime, but as to whet er he did, on the facts pL -this-case,-for-mulate such an intent.

There is no authority--whtIlFstablishes that the evidence of a -p-yhi-e introduced for a purpose such as this. What is sought to be done here is to enable a professional man to express his view to the jury upon the issue of the intent of the accused, upon evidence which is not before the jury, and which is, in part, hearsay evidence om the accused himself. The decision of this Court in

Wilband v. R., [1967] S.C.R. 14, is not contrary to this conclusion.

Per Hall J.: The trial judge should have admitted all the evidence which. the psychiatrist was prepared to give. Whatever other causes there may be for the condition of homosexuality, psychological factors are of great importance. It follows that the evidence of psychiatrist is particularly relevant in cases involving homosexuality and the admissibility of opinion evidence from psychiatrists must be determined by its relevancy to the matter in issue at the trial. The evidence was relevant to the defence being put forward on behalf of the respondent, it was therefore admissible and the trial judge erred in rejecting it.

However, this was a proper case for the application of 592(1) (b) (iii) of the Criminal Code. The evidence against the respondent was overwhelming and the verdict would necessarily have been the same even if the jury had heard the opinion which the psychiatrist was prepared to give.

Per Ritchie and Spence JJ., dissenting: The trial judge should have admitted the evidence in question.

The fact that the methods pursued by the psychiatrist in reaching his opinion necessitated dependence on information obtained from the respondent and others)

which was not before the jury, does not make his opinion inadmissible although it may well be a fact to be considered in assessing the weight to be attached to it. The admission of the psychiatrist's la preuve recevable, a 6cart6 la d6claration de culpabilit6 et a ordonn6 un nouveau procks. La Couronne en a appel6 A cette Cour.

Arrit: L'appel doit 8tre accueilli et la d6claration de culpabilit6 r6tablie, les Juges Ritchie et Spence 6tant dissidents.

Les Juges Martland et Judson: La preuve en question 6tait irrecevable. On a demand6 au psychiatre de donner une opinion non sur la capacit6 intellectuelle chez l'intim6 de former l'intention de commettre le crime mais sur la question de savoir s'il a, les faits 6tant ce qu'ils sont, v6ritablement eu cette intention. Il n'y a aucun pric6dent qui d6montre qu'un psychiatre peut t6moigner de cette fagon. Ce qu'on veut faire ici, c'est permettre A un expert de donner son avis sur la question de l'intention du prevenu en se fondant sur une preuve qui n'est pas faite devant le jury et qui consiste en partie d'une preuve de ouY-dire provenant de l'inculp6 lui-mime. La d6cision de cette Cour dans l'affaire Wilband c. R., [1967] R.C.S. 14, ne contredit pas cette conclusion.

Le Juge Hall: Le juge de premibre instance aurait dfi admettre toute la preuve que le psychiatre voulait pr6senter. Quelles que soient les autres causes de l'6tat d'homosexualit6, les facteurs psychologiques jouent un tris grand r6le. Il s'ensuit que les t6moignages de psychiatres sont particulibrement appropri6s dans des affaires oa il est question d'homosexualit6. C'est sa pertinence A l'objet du procks qui doit d6terminer I'admissibilit6 du t6moignage d'expert fourni par des psychiatres. La preuve 6tait pertinente a la d6fense qu'on voulait pr6senter pour le compte de l'intimi; elle 6tait alors admissible et le juge de premiere instance a fait une erreur en la refusant.

Cependant, il s'agit ici d'une affaire ott les dispositions de l'art. 592(1) (b) (iii)

du Code criminel doivent s'appliquer. La preuve A l'encontre du pr6venu 6tait accablante et le verdict aurait n6cessairement 6t6 le mime, mime si le jury avait entendu l'opinion que le psychiatre voulait pr6senter. Les Juges Ritchie et Spence, dissidents: Le juge de premibre instance aurait dit admettre la preuve en question. Le fait que les proc6d6s employds par le psychiatre pour se former une opinion d6pendent n6cessairement d'informations obtenues de l'intim6 ou d'autres personnes, hors la pr6sence du jury, ne rend point cette opinion irrecevable, bien qu'il puisse 8tre un facteur A prendre en consid6ration en 6valuant sa force probante. L'on n'aurait pas [1970] S.C.R.