Draper v. Jacklyn et al.

The judgment of Judson, Hall, Spence and

Pigeon JJ. was delivered by

SPENCE J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario' pronounced on June 27, 1968, whereby that Court allowed the appeal from the judgment of Grant J.

pronounced on November 21, 1967, after trial by jury at Walkerton, Ontario. By its judgment, the Court of Appeal for Ontario directed a new trial limited to the quantum of damages only.

At trial, the jury had awarded the appellant general damages of $15,000.

McGillivray J.A., in giving judgment for the

Court of Appeal, based his conclusion that there should be a new trial solely upon the fact that the learned trial judge had permitted the submission to the jury of two photographs of the appellant which were produced and marked as exhibits at the trial and which, of course, the jury took with them into the room when they considered their verdict.

The accident occurred on September 9, 1966, and the appellant sustained injuries to which reference will be made hereafter. He was removed from the scene of the accident to the hospital at Listowel and on the same day from there to the Victoria Hospital at London. On the same night, he was operated on and the fractures of the jaw and cheekbone as well as the various lacerations were treated surgically. The surgical treatment of the fractures of the jaw, of course, consisted of the insertion of Kirschner wires and these wires protruded from the left cheek. The appellant was discharged from the hospital on

September 17, i.e., eight days after the accident, and the Kirschner wires remained in his cheek for about four weeks. During that period of four

M. Lerner, c.r., pour les d6fendeurs, intim6s. Le jugement des Juges Judson, Hall, Spence et Pigeon a 6 rendu par

LE JUGE SPENCE-II s'agit ici d'un pourvoi A 1'encontre d'un arrit de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario', rendu le 27 juin 1968, par lequel cette Cour accueille un appel du jugement du Juge Grant rendu le 21 novembre 1967 h la suite d'un procks par jury, A Walkerton, Ontario. Dans son arr&, la Cour d'appel d'Ontario a ordonn6 un nouveau procks portant sur le seul montant des dommages.

Lors du procks, le jury avait accord6 A 1'appelant 15,000 dollars, A titre de dommages g6n6raux.

Le Juge d'appel McGillivray, en rendant 1'arrt de la Cour d'appel, a motiv6 sa d6cision d'ordonner un nouveau procks uniquement sur le fait que le savant Juge de premiere instance avait autoris6 la pr6sentation au jury de deux photographies de l'appelant, qui avaient 6t6 produites au procks et retenues comme pieces A conviction et que, naturellement, les membres du jury avaient emporties lorsqu'ils se sont retires pour d6lib6rer.

L'accident a eu lieu le 9 septembre 1966, et l'appelant a subi des blessures dont mention sera faite ci-aprbs. II a 6t6 transport6 du lieu de l'accident jusqu'A l'h6pital de Listowel, et le m8me jour de cet h6pital jusqu'au Victoria Hospital h London. La m8me nuit, il a 6t6 op6r6 et ses fractures de la mAchoire et de l'os malaire, de meme que ses diverses d6chirures, ont fait l'objet d'un traitement chirurgical. Le traitement chirurgical des fractures de la mAchoire comporta naturellement l'insertion de broches de Kirschner, qui sortaient de la joue gauche. L'appelant a quitt6 l'h6pital le 17 septembre, soit huit jours aprbs 1'accident, et les broches de Kirschner sont rest6es dans sa joue environ quatre semaines. C'est pendant cette p6riode de quatre semaines que les weeks, the two photographs of the appellant were taken. His counsel sought to produce these photographs as exhibits during the examination-inchief of Dr. R. W. Granger, the surgeon who had carried out the treatment. Counsel for the respondents objected and after a rather lengthy argument the Court ruled that the photographs might be produced in evidence. During the course of the argument by counsel, Grant J. remarked:

His LORDSHIP: This type of pin is so common that

I would wonder if most of the jury hadn't already seen this type of pin actually holding together the teeth in the face of someone. I understand it thoroughly without the pictures and would understand it thoroughly without the pictures. The face does not display in the photograph any indication of great pain or suffering at the time.

MR. I thought I might have something in my notes but I don't have.

His LORDSHIP: My thought is it depends to a great extent upon the question of whether it is inclined to inflame the jury or not. X-rays are not admitted because of their technical nature and the grave chance that they will be misunderstood. That element is not present here.

His LORDSHIP: I don't think these pictures are offensive in that they will inflame a jury. My thought is that they are more apt, because of the expression shown by the subject of the picture, that they indicate no pain or suffering at the moment. I would think, Mr. McKenzie, you might do better with oral evidence, but that is for you to decide. I am inclined to say I will not stop you from putting these pictures in. You may do so if you want. I do say if they were pictures of the pins only I would say no because they add practically nothing to what the doctor has said, but it is most difficult for the doctor to explain exactly the condition of the scar at that time and it is for that purpose, if you will fix the exact date these pictures were taken. I suppose you haven't the photographer here, have you?

deux photographies de 1'appelant ont 6 prises. Son avocat demanda A les produire comme pieces A conviction au cours de l'interrogatoire principal de son t6moin, le Dr R. W. Granger, qui avait men6 A bonne fin le traitement. L'avocat des intim6s fit objection et aprbs un d6bat assez long la Cour d6cida que les photographies pouvaient 6tre produites et invoqubes A titre de preuve. Au cours de l'argumentation des avocats, le Juge Grant fit observer:

Ce genre de broche est si courant que je me demande si la plupart des membres du jury n'ont pas d6jA vu ce type d'appareil retenant les dents dans le visage de quelqu'un. Je le congois parfaitement sans les photographies et je le concevrais parfaitement sans elles. Le visage ne d6gage dans la photographie aucun signe de grande douleur ou de souffrance, a ce moment-lI.

M. Je pensais avoir quelque chose dans mes notes, mais je n'ai rien.

A mon avis, cela d6pend dans une large mesure de la question de savoir si elles ont tendance A trop impressionner le jury. Les radiographies ne sont pas admises du fait de leur caracthre technique et du grand risque qu'elles soient mal interpr6tes. Ce facteur n'est pas pr6sent ici. photographies soient choquantes, en ce sens qu'elles risquent de trop impressionner le jury. Je dirais plut6t, A la mine de la personne photographibe, qu'elles ne d6notent aucun signe de douleur ou de souffrance h ce moment-lA. Je pense, Monsieur McKenzie, que vous obtiendriez de meilleurs rdsultats avec une preuve orale, mais c'est h vous de d6cider. Je n'incline pas a vous empecher de verser ces photographies au dossier. Vous pouvez le faire, si vous le d6sirez. S'il ne s'agissait que de photographies des broches, je dirais non, car elles n'ajoutent pratiquement rien ce que le m6decin vient de dire, mais il est tris difficile au m6decin d'expliquer exactement I'6tat de la cicatrice A ce moment-lA, et c'est pour cette raison que je permets la production des photographies, si vous pouvez priciser la date laquelle elles ont 6t6 prises. Je suppose que le photographe n'est pas ici, n'est-ce pas?

JACKLYN et al.

After the jury had retired to its room to consider its verdict, it returned to put the following question:

MR. My Lord, some of the jury have asked how far are we to go to the future of these.

I was just taking the present condition of these men or are we to go into the future? Anything what happen might happen in the future or just stop at the present time?

to which His Lordship replied:

His LORDSHIP: If in your opinion the evidence indicates that either of these men will suffer any damage in the future as result of injuries they received you are entitled and should give consideration to that.

As I have said, the jury found general damages of $15,000. In his reasons for judgment in the

Court of Appeal for Ontario, McGillivray J.A.

said:

I am wholly in accord with the trial judge when he says that so far as pictures of the pins are concerned they add nothing to the detail and clear evidence of the medical witnesses, supplemented as it was by the evidence of the plaintiff himself. I am not in accord with his belief that most of the Bruce

County jurymen who were trying the case had observed people, or indeed any person, with pins such as these, and having corks, in the ends protruding from the face. I am satisfied indeed that such a sight would be a shock to many people. I am also of the opinion that a layman with the pictures before him might reach an erroneous opinion regarding the degree of pain and suffering connected with the treatment shown and might overlook, as a consequence, what had been established by the evidence.

I consider the pictures to be inflammatory so I turn to consider whether, notwithstanding that fact, their admission was justified to better explain the evidence or as a necessary addition to it.

The occasions are frequent upon which a judge trying a case with the assistance of a jury is called upon to determine whether or not a piece of evidence technically admissible may be

Le jury, aprds s'8tre retir6 pour d6libfrer, est revenu A la salle d'audience pour poser la question suivante:

Monsieur le Juge, certains membres du jury ont demand6 dans quelle mesure nous devons considbrer l'avenir. Je ne tenais compte que de l'6tat actuel de ces hommes, mais devons-nous envisager l'avenir? Tout ce qui pourra se produire dans l'avenir, ou devons-nous nous limiter au moment pr6cis?

A quoi le Juge r6pondit:

Si, selon vous la preuve indique que l'un ou l'autre de ces hommes subira des dommages dans l'avenir par suite des blessures reques, vous avez le droit et le devoir d'en tenir compte.

Ainsi que je l'ai d6jh dit, le jury estima les dommages gendraux h $15,000. Le Juge d'appel McGillivray de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario a d6clar6, dans l'expos6 des motifs de son jugement: Je suis entibrement d'accord avec Juge de premibre instance quand il dit que les photographies des broches n'ajoutent rien au t6moignage d6taill6 et clair des t6moins m6dicaux, qu'est venu compl6ter le t6moignage d6taill6 et clair du demandeur lui-mime. Mais je ne suis pas d'accord avec lui quand il dit croire que la plupart des jur6s du comt6 de Bruce pr6sents A ce procks, ou mime n'importe qui d'autre, ont d6jh observ6 des gens avec des broches comme celles-li, recouvertes de bouchons de li~ge a l'extr6mit6 qui sort du visage. Je suis convaincu qu'un pareil spectacle peut bouleverser beaucoup de gens. Je pense aussi qu'un profane, mis en face de ces photographies, risque de se faire une fausse ide de l'intensit6 de la douleur ou souffrance provoqude par le traitement qu'elles d6montrent, et peut cons6quemment oublier ce qui a 6t6 6tabli par la preuve. Je trouve que ces photos sont 6vocatrices, et j'aborde donc la question de savoir si, nonobstant ce fait, leur production 6tait motiv6e aux fins de donner une meilleure explication de la preuve ou A titre de compl6ment n6cessaire. II arrive souvent qu'un juge, pr6sidant un procks par jury, soit appel6 A d6cider si un 616ment de preuve, quoique recevable en soi, peut porter un tel prdjudice A l'adversaire que sa valeur so prejudicial to the opposite side that any probative value is overcome by the possible prejudice and that therefore he should exclude the production of the particular piece of evidence. In the case of photographs, this occurs more frequently in the trials of criminal offences and more usually in murder trials. The matter is always one which is difficult for the trial judge and in itself essentially a decision in which the trial judge must exercise his own carefully considered personal discretion.

In the present case, there is no doubt that these two photographs were relevant and were therefore admissible. They show graphically, although I am strongly of the opinion not horribly, the condition of the plaintiff as the result of his injuries and treatment in the few weeks after the accident. The surgeon, in his evidence, stated that he found it difficult to describe in words the appearance of the appellant. Reference was made during the course of the trial to their evidentiary value as showing the condition of the scar at that time, and it was the opinion of the learned trial judge that he understood thoroughly the treatment and the type of pin employed without the pictures. The difficulty, of course, was not whether the learned trial judge would understand the treatment and the type of pin but whether the members of the jury would, and if there were some photographic material which would illustrate that treatment without being overly prejudicial in its effect, then that material should be available to the jury. In the present case, the appellant was entitled to damages not only because of the pain and suffering and any disability continuing in the future but, at any rate, in part, because he went around for some considerable time with these visible wires, their ends covered by large corks, protruding from the left side of his face. He would have all the discomfort connected therewith, for instance, in attempting to sleep, any possible contact with his face even when shaving, and in many other ways. Moreover, as the learned trial judge pointed out, the photographs did show with accuracy the scars as probante en est annul6e par le pr6judice possible et que, par consequent, il doit en refuser la production. Pour ce qui est des photographies, la situation se pr6sente trbs frdquemment A l'occasion des procks criminels, surtout au cas d'homicide. Cette question pr6sente toujours des difficultis pour le juge de premibre instance et elle devient essentiellement une affaire de judicieuse discr6tion personnelle.

II n'y a aucun doute, dans la pr6sente cause, que ces deux photographies 6taient pertinentes et par consdquent admissibles. Elles montrent graphiquement et non pas horriblement, A mon avis, I'6tat du demandeur par suite de ses blessures et des traitements qu'il a regus dans les semaines qui ont suivi l'accident. Le chirurgien a d6pos6 qu'il trouvait difficile de d6crire en paroles l'aspect de l'appelant. On a fait mention, au cours du procks, de la valeur probante des photographies, qui montraient 1'6tat de la cicatrice A ce moment-lA, et le savant Juge de preniire instance a affirm6 qu'il comprenait parfaitement, sans elles, le traitement et le genre de broches utilis6es. La question, naturellement, n'6tait pas de savoir si le savant Juge de premidre instance pouvait comprendre le traitement et le genre de broches, mais bien si les jur6s le pouvaient. S'il y avait un document photographique quelconque qui pouvait illustrer le traitement sans toutefois 8tre trop prbjudiciable dans ses effets, il fallait alors le mettre h la disposition du jury. Dans cette affaire, I'appelant avait droit A des dommages-intdrits non seulement A cause de ses souffrances, de ses douleurs, et de toute incapacit6 future mais encore, du moins en partie, pour 8tre rest6 pendant assez longtemps avec ces broches visibles dont les bouts recouverts de gros bouchons de li~ge lui sortaient du c6t6 gauche du visage. Il a dfi supporter tous les malaises qui en resultaient par exemple, en essayant de dormir, dans tout contact possible avec son visage, m&me en se rasant, et de bien d'autres fagons. De plus, ainsi que l'a signals le savant Juge de preminre instance, les photothey existed at that time. Those scars were as visible to other persons as they were to the camera and the visibility of those scars to such persons from the moment when they were received is an element of damage which the appellant was entitled to have the jury consider.

Therefore, I believe that the photographs were admissible and should have gone to the jury unless their prejudicial effect was so great that it would exceed their probative value.

As I have quoted above, the learned trial judge was of the opinion that such Kirschner wires now were so common that most of the members of the jury would have already seen this type of pin in someone's face. He was of the opinion that they were not inclined to inflame the jury. Mc- Gillivray J.A. in his reasons for judgment, which

I have quoted above in part, was not in accord with that belief and said he was satisfied that such a sight would shock many people. It is my respectful opinion that the decision as to what would and what would not shock members of a jury can best be determined by the trial judge who sits in the court room with them and who charges them and can appreciate their reactions.

I would be slow to express an opinion contrary to that of the trial judge upon the subject.

Few Canadian or Commonwealth cases consider the submission of such material in jury trials.

The respondent cited only two and my research has produced very few additional examples. The reason for such paucity of authority is, I think, plain. The decision must be essentially one for the exercise of the personal discretion of the trial judge in the particular circumstances of each case.

This view is, in my opinion, confirmed by statements made in the authorities.

graphies montraient avec pr6cision les cicatrices telles qu'elles 6taient A ce moment-lA. Ces cicatrices 6taient aussi visibles pour tous que pour l'appareil photographique et le fait qu'elles 6taient ainsi visibles depuis le moment oii elles apparurent, est un 616ment du pr6judice que l'appelant avait droit de faire appr6cier par le jury. Par cons6quent, je suis d'avis que les photographies 6taient recevables et qu'elles devaient 6tre remises au jury, A moins que leur effet nuisible ne ffit tel qu'il puisse d6passer leur valeur probante.

D'apris la citation donn6e plus haut, le savant Juge de premibre instance pensait que ces broches de Kirschner 6taient maintenant si communes que la plupart des membres du jury avaient dti dbjA en voir sur le visage de quelqu'un. II 6tait d'avis qu'elles n'auraient pas pour effet de trop impressionner le jury. Le Juge d'appel McGillivray, dans ses motifs de jugement, que j'ai cit6s ci-haut en partie, n'6tait pas de cette opinion et se disait convaincu que pareil spectacle pouvait bouleverser beaucoup de gens. En toute d6f6rence, je 'suis d'avis que la d6cision sur ce qui peut ou ne peut pas bouleverser les membres du jury, ou ne pas les choquer, est essentiellement du ressort du Juge de premibre instance qui siege a 1'audience avec eux, leur donne ses directives et peut appr6cier leurs r6actions. J'h6siterais longtemps avant d'exprimer A ce sujet une opinion contraire A celle du Juge de premire instance. Tris peu de causes canadiennes ou d'un pays du Commonwealth traitent de la production de tels documents dans les procks par jury.

L'intim6 en a seulement deux, et mes recherches n'ont r6v6l6 qu'un tris petit nombre d'autres exemples. Je pense que la raison de ce manque de pr6c6dents est 6vidente. La d6cision ne doit d6pendre au fond que de l'appr6ciation personnelle par le Juge de premibre instance des faits particuliers A chaque affaire. Ce point de vue me parait confirm6 par ce que l'on retrouve dans les pric6dents.

In Noor Mohamed v. The King , Lord Du

Parcq, at p. 192, in considering evidence of the accused's connection with other alleged offences, said:

It is right to add, however, that in all such cases the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it is proposed to adduce is sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of justice that it should be admitted. If, so far as that purpose is concerned, it can in the circumstances of the case have only trifling weight, the judge will be right to exclude it. To say this is not to confuse weight with admissibility. The distinction is plain, but cases must occur in which it would be unjust to admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused even though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible. The decision must then be left to the discretion and the sense of fairness of the judge.

(The italicizing is my own.)

In Gray v. LaFleche , Williams C.J.K.B., said at p. 349, when considering whether the plaintiff's injured member should be exhibited to the jury when in a jury trial:

When, in a jury trial, the plaintiff seeks to invoke the rule laid down in Sornberger v. C.P.R. (1897),

24 O.A.R. 263, different considerations must be applied. As Chancellor Boyd pointed out, it is purely within the discretion of the trial Judge whether or not he will permit the practice there approved.

In Rex v. O'Donnell , a prosecution for murder which had occurred during a rape, objection was made before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the production at trial of certain photographs of the body of the victim on the ground that that prejudiced the jury against the accused. Mulock

C.J.O. dismissed all the objections in a short statement:

The photographs in question served the useful purpose of corroborating the evidence as to the

Dans Noor Mohamed v. The King , lord Du Parcq dit, a la page 192 au sujet de la preuve d'autres crimes auxquels l'inculp6 aurait particip6: Il convient d'ajouter toutefois que dans tous les cas de ce genre, le juge doit voir si la preuve que l'on veut pr6senter est assez concluante, par rapport au but vis6 ouvertement par sa pr6sentation, pour qu'il soit convenable de la recevoir dans l'int6r8t de la justice. Le juge a raison de la rejeter, si sa valeur probante est insigniflante eu 6gard au but vis6 et aux circonstances de l'affaire. En disant cela, on ne confond pas la valeur probante avec la recevabilit6. La distinction est 6vidente, mais des cas doivent cependant se pr6senter il serait injuste d'accepter un 616ment de preuve de caractbre fortement nuisible A l'accus6, bien qu'il puisse y avoir quelque faible raison de soutenir qu'il est recevable en soi. La ddcision doit alors Stre laissie a la discrdtion du juge et a son sens de la justice. (Les italiques sont de moi.)

Dans Gray v. LaFlche , le Juge en Chef Williams, de la Cour du banc de la reine dit, A la page 349, en consid6rant si le membre bless6 du demandeur devait 6tre montr6 au jury dans un procks par jury:

Quand, dans un procks par jury, le demandeur invoque la rkgle 6tablie dans Sornberger v. C.P.R. (1897), 24 O.A.R. 263, d'autres consid6rations doivent jouer. Ainsi que l'a signal6 le chancelier Boyd, il est entiarement a la discr6tion du juge de premiere instance d'autoriser ou non la pratique approuv6e dans cette affaire-lA.

Dans Rex v. O'Donnell , lors de poursuites pour un homicide commis pendant un viol, une objection avait 6t6 formul6e, devant la Cour d'appel d'Ontario, A l'encontre de la production au procks de certaines photographies du corps de la victime, pour le motif qu'elles auraient pr6dispos6 le jury contre l'accus6. Le Juge en Chef Mulock de I'Ontario rejeta toutes les objections dans une courte d6claration:

Les photographies en question ont eu pour but utile de corroborer les t6moignages Spence I.

treatment to which Ruth Taylor was subjected by her assailant. It was not believable that the sight of these photographs prejudiced the jury against the accused. This ground of appeal should be dismissed.

Masten J. at p. 532 simply excluded any consideration of prejudice if the photographs were admissible.

In Regina v. Creemer and Cormier , McKinnon J.A. said at pp. 154-5:

In my opinion, Ground 1 of the notice of appeal is not tenable. Photographs properly verified on oath by a person able to speak to their accuracy are admissible: Regina v. Tolson (1864), 4 F. & F. 103,

176 E.R. 488. In Canada photographs have been admitted in evidence which showed the charred remains of a murdered person as they appeared at the time of a post-mortem examination: Rex v.

Arthur Bannister, 10 M.P.R. 391, 66 C.C.C. 38,

[1936] 2 D.L.R. 795. And photographs of the body of a woman found murdered as it appeared on the scene of the murder have been held admissible as against the person charged with the crime: Rex v.

O'Donnell, 65 C.C.C. 299, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 517.

All the cases dealing with the admissibility of photographs go to show that such admissibility depends on (1) their accuracy in truly representing the facts; (2) their fairness and absence of any intention to mislead; (3) their verification on oath by a person capable to do so. The photograph here questioned, and others, was taken by Constable

Sulewski, R.C.M.P., who for the past four and one-half years has been engaged in photography, fingerprints and related fields. He testified that the coloured photograph in question is a true representation as he saw it. The defence does not contend that this photograph was inaccurate or that it was introduced with an intention to mislead, but that it was calculated to arouse a sympathetic reaction. For the reasons noted, I would dismiss Ground 1 of the appeal.

A similar view was reached by Baxter C.J. in

Rex v. Bannister", and again in R. v. O'Leary .

relatifs au traitement inflig6 A Ruth Taylor par son assaillant. Il est impensable que ces photographies puissent avoir pr6dispos6 le jury contre l'accus6. Ce motif d'appel doit done 8tre rejet6.

Le Juge Masten, h la page 532, rejette toute consid6ration de prejudice; il lui suffit que les photographies soient recevables.

Dans Regina v. Creemer and Cormier , le Juge d'appel McKinnon dit aux pages 154-155: A mon avis, le motif no 1 de l'avis d'appel n'est pas soutenable. Des photographies attestees sous serment par une personne qui peut attester leur v6racit6 sont recevables: Regina v. Tolson (1864) 4 F. & F. 103, 176 E.R. 488. Au Canada, des photographies repr6sentant les restes carbonis6s d'une personne assassin6e tels qu'ils apparaissaient au moment de l'autopsie ont 6t6 admises en preuve: Rex v. Arthur Bannister, 10 M.P.R. 391, 66 C.C.C. 38, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 795. Et des photographies du cadavre d'une femme trouv6e assassinde, tel qu'il paraissait sur le lieu du crime, ont 6t6 tenues recevables contre la personne accus6e du crime: Rex v. O'Donnell 65 C.C.C. 299, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 517. Tous les arrats traitant de l'admissibilit6 des photographies tendent A d6montrer que cette admissibilit6 d6pend: (1) de leur pr6cision dans la repr6sentation exacte des faits; (2) de leur justesse et de l'absence de toute intention d'induire en erreur; (3) de leur attestation sous serment par une personne comp6tente. La photographie mise en question ici, ainsi que d'autres, a 6t6 prise par l'agent Sulewiski, de la G.R.C., qui s'occupe depuis quatre ans et demi de photographie, d'empreintes digitales et de disciplines connexes. II a t6moign6 que la photo en couleur dont it s'agit ici repr6sente fiddlement la schne telle qu'il l'a vue. La d6fense ne pretend pas que cette photographie n'est pas fiddle ou qu'elle a 6t6 produite en vue d'induire en erreur, mais bien qu'elle avait pour but de provoquer une r6action de sympathie. Pour les raisons donnies, je dois rejeter le motif n* 1 de l'appel.

Le mame point de vue a 6t6 adopt6 par le Juge en Chef Baxter dans Rex v. Bannister6, et A nouveau dans R. v. O'Leary .

Although as McKinnon J.A. pointed out in the

Creemer case the photographs exhibited what might well be regarded as horrible, being admissible, the prejudicial effect was regarded as no bar to their admission. It might well be that those views are too inflexible and that they fail to reflect the balancing of the probative value as against the prejudicial effect.

In Green v. The Kings, Latham C.J. said at p. 172:

It is objected that certain photographs showing the bodies of the murdered women were inadmissible in evidence and should not have been shown to the jury and that certain evidence given by a witness,

Mrs. Brannigan, and another witness, Mr. Hewat, also was inadmissible. I can see no reason for holding that any of this evidence was inadmissible. No principle of law was stated the application of which would result in the exclusion of the evidence in question.

In The King v. Cartman , Fair J. ruled upon an objection made at a trial as to the production of certain photographs. The learned trial judge said at p. 728:

The Crown says that each photograph is necessary in order that the Crown's case may be presented as clearly as possible. It states that the different photographs do not deal with the same aspect of the matter, in that they do not present the same physical facts, and that the facts will not be as fully explained to the jury as they should be unless all the photographs are put in.

So, on the assumption that the nature and number of the photographs nFight prejudice the minds of the jury, it seems that they cannot be excluded because they have considerable probative value.

But, in saying that, I am not saying that I think the presentation of the photographs would have a

8 (1939), C.L.R. (H.C.A.).

0[1940] N.Z.L.R. 725.

Bien que, comme le Juge d'appel McKinnon l'a signal6 dans l'affaire Creemer, les photos produites montraient des scenes que l'on peut qualifier d'horribles, leur effet pr6judiciable n'a pas 6t6 consid6r6 comme faisant obstacle A leur recevabilit6 6tablie par ailleurs. Il se peut bien que cette opinion soit trop rigide, et qu'elle ne tienne pas compte de la n6cessit6 de mettre en balance la valeur probante et I'effet pr6judiciable. Dans Green v. The Kings, le Juge en Chef Latham dit A la page 172:

On 616ve l'objection que certaines photographies montrant le corps des femmes assassindes 6taient irrecevables en preuve et qu'elles n'auraient pas dfi 8tre montr6es au jury, et que certains t6moignages donnis par le t6moin (Mine) Brannigan, et un autre t6moin, M. Hewat, 6taient aussi irrecevables. Je ne vois aucune raison valable de soutenir qu'aucune partie de ces 616ments de preuve 6tait irrecevable. Il n'a 6t6 fait 6tat d'aucun principe juridique en vertu duquel les 616ments de preuve en question auraient pu 8tre exclus. Dans The King v. Cartman", le Juge Fair a tranch6 une objection soulevie au prochs relativement h la production de certaines photographies. Le savant Juge de premibre instance avait dit, A la page 728:

La poursuite pr6tend que chaque photographie est n6cessaire la pr6sentation aussi claire que possible de la preuve de I'accusation. Elle dit que les diff6rentes photographies ne traitent pas le m8me aspect de la question, en ce sens qu'elles ne repr6sentent pas les mimes faits mat6riels, et que les faits ne pourraient 6tre aussi pleinement expliqu6s au jury qu'il se doit si toutes les photographies ne pouvaient Stre produites.

Ainsi, a supposer que le caractbre et le nombre des photographies puissent exercer un effet pr6judiciable sur les membres du jury, il semble qu'elles ne puissent pas 8tre exclues, 6tant donn6 leur grande valeur probante.

Mais, en avangant ceci, je n'affirme pas que pr6sentation des photographies aura un effet nuisible N.Z.L.R.

et al. Le Juge Spence

[19701 S.C.R. prejudicial effect on the jury's impartial judgment.

The circumstances in which the body of this poor woman were found were gruesome, and the photographs record these shocking circumstances; but I think that the jury themselves would separate the purposes for which the photographs are put in evidence from any impression they may have on first seeing them. As the case proceeds, the photographs will be regarded by them in the ordinary and proper way as matters of evidence, to be considered in relation only to the matters which they prove.

I think, therefore, that all the photographs are admissible, should be admitted, and none of them should be made the subject of a suggestion by the

Court that the Crown should not tender them as evidence.

As I have said, McGillivray J.A. based his reasons for directing a new trial upon the submission of these two photographs to the jury. He did, however, say:

With all respect to the learned trial judge, I consider the photographs in question to have been without evidentiary value. Their admission did nothing to assist the jury in its deliberations but might readily have distorted in the minds of the jury the degree of the damages to be assessed particularly as these were the only photographs before them in the jury room. That this has occurred I believe to be evidenced in the sum awarded for general damages. Without underrating in any way the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff when one considers the limited period of disability as well as the remarkable degree of recovery made the general damages awarded are, I am satisfied, substantially above those justified by the evidence.

McGillivray J.A., of course, realized that the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the damages awarded by the jury were "substantially above those justified by the evidence" was not of itself enough to justify interfering with the jury's verdict. Even if the damages had been assessed by a judge without the assistance of a jury then, apart from error in principle, such damages could

A l'impartialit6 du jugement du jury. Les circonstances dans lesquelles le cadavre de cette pauvre femme a 6t6 trouv6 sont horribles, et les photographies reproduisent ces circonstances r6voltantes. Mais je pense que les jurbs eux-mimes sauront distinguer le but dans lequel ces photographies sont produites en preuve de l'impression qu'elles peuvent donner a premiere vue. Dans la suite des d6bats, ils regarderont les photographies comme un moyen de preuve ordinaire et convenable, i prendre en consid6ration uniquement en fonction des faits qu'elles prouvent.

J'estime par cons6quent que toutes les photographies sont recevables, qu'elles doivent l'8tre, et qu'aucune d'elles ne doit amener la Cour A sugg6rer h la Couronne de ne pas les offrir en preuve. Comme je l'ai d6ji dit, le Juge d'appel McGillivray a fond6 ses motifs d'ordonner un nouveau procks sur la remise de ces deux photographies au jury. II a cependant ajout6:

En toute d6f6rence envers le savant Juge de premiere instance, je considbre que les photographies en question n'avaient aucune valeur probante. Leur production n'a pas aid6 les jur6s dans leurs d6lib6rations, mais peut facilement avoir d6form6 dans leur esprit I'6tendue des dommages h 6valuer, d'autant plus que c'6taient les seules photographies qu'ils avaient en main dans la salle des d6lib6rations. Que la chose se soit produite en fait, j'en vois la preuve dans le montant accord6 A titre de dommages g6ndraux. Sans vouloir diminuer en quoi que ce soit la gravit6 des blessures reques par le demandeur, quand on note la courte pdriode d'incapacit6 aussi bien que son r6tablissement remarquable, les dommages g6ndraux qui lui ont 6t6 accord6s d6passent consid6rablement, j'en suis convaincu, l'indemnisation justifi6e par la preuve. tvidemment, le Juge d'appel McGillivray s'est bien rendu compte que l'opinion de la Cour d'appel, h l'effet que les dommages accord6s gddpassent consid6rablement l'indemnisation justifi6e par la preuve>, ne suffisait pas a elle seule pour la justifier d'6carter le verdict du jury. M8me si les dommages avaient t6 accord6s par un juge sans l'aide d'un jury, ils n'auraient pu 8tre modi- [19701 S.C.R. only have been altered by the appellate tribunal

"if the amount awarded is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage": Nance v.

British Columbia Railway Company' , per Viscount Simon at p. 613. That statement has been quoted and adopted in a series of cases in this

Court: Fagnan v. Ure et al."; Widrig v. Strazer et al.12; Gorman v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd. et al.' .

Moreover, in the present case, the assessment was made by a jury. Viscount Simon in the

Nance case, supra, continued:

The last named case further shows that when on a proper direction the quantum is ascertained by a jury, the disparity between the figure at which they have arrived and any figure at which they could properly have arrived must, to justify correction by a court of appeal, be even wider than when the figure has been assessed by a judge sitting alone. The figure must be wholly "out of all proportion" (per Lord

Wright, Davies v. Powell Duifryn Associated Collieries, Ltd., [1942] A.C. 601, 616).

McGillivray J.A. described the appellant's injuries, their treatment, the appellant's condition at the time of the trial, and the prognosis, in these terms:

The plaintiff's injuries were sustained in a motor vehicle accident on September 9th, 1966. He suffered severe injuries to his face and head with less serious injuries to his right knee, right chest and left shoulder. In detail there was a large irregular laceration on the left side of his face, a laceration through the lining of his mouth, complex fractures extending from under the right eye through the bridge of the nose under the left eye to the left cheek bone, described as a floating maxilla, upper jaw displaced downward and outward with the entire fi6s par le tribunal d'appel, A part une erreur de droit, que <si le montant accord6 est si excessivement bas ou si excessivement 6lev6 qu'il doit constituer une estimation entibrement fausse des donmmages> (Nance v. British Columbia Railway Company , le vicomte Simon A la page 613). Ce principe a 6t6 cit6 et adopt6 par cette Cour dans bon nombre d'affaires: Fagnan c. Ure et autres"; Widrig c. Strazer et autres12; Gorman, c. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd. et autresl .

En outre, dans la pr6sente affaire, I'6valuation a 6t6 faite par un jury. Le vicomte Simon, dans l'affaire Nance, pr6cit6e, poursuivait:

La dernibre affaire cit6e montre, de plus, que lorsque le montant est fix6 par un jury convenablement instruit, la difference entre le chiffre auquel il est arriv6 et celui auquel il aurait pu convenablement arriver doit, pour justifier une modification par une cour d'appel, 8tre encore plus grande que dans le cas ofi ce mime chiffre aurait 6t6 fix6 par un juge seul. Le montant doit 6tre tout i fait de toute proportion> (lord Wright, Davies v. Powell Dufiryn Associated Collieries, Ltd., [1942] A.C. 601, 616).

Le Juge d'appel McGillivray a d6crit comme suit les blessures de l'appelant et le traitement appliqu6, ainsi que son 6tat physique lors du procks et les pronostics:

Le demandeur a subi des blessures dans un accident d'automobile survenu le 9 septembre 1966. II a 6t6 gravement bless6 au visage et h Ia tate, et moins gravement au genou droit, au c6t6 droit de sa poitrine et A l'6paule gauche. En termes plus pr6cis, il avait une longue d6chirure irr6gulibre A la partie gauche du visage, une d6chirure de la paroi int6rieure de la bouche, avec des fractures compliqu6es s'6tendant de sous 'ceil droit, h travers l'ar8te du nez, passant sous 'ceil gauche jusqu'A l'os malaire gauche, d6crites comme un maxillaire flotet al. Le luge Spence

Spence I.

face structure displaced and with the lower jaw fractured in three places with displacement.

At the time of the accident the plaintiff was in the process of having all but nine of his teeth removed. Due to remedial measures taken following the accident these remaining teeth have been affected and it is said will also need to be removed.

The plaintiff suffered a mild concussion at the accident. He was taken to the hospital at Listowel and then transferred to the Victoria Hospital in

London. There can be little doubt that his pain was severe during this period. At London under a general anaesthetic his facial bones were replaced as nearly as possible in their anatomical location and were fixed in position with two 'Kirschner' pins which protruded from his face. Fine wires were also put through the gum around the bases of the upper and lower teeth and the upper and lower teeth were wired together. There were also numerous small particles of glass removed from his left cheek and stitches were put in the cheek. The stitches were removed seven days later.

The plaintiff made quite a rapid recovery in view of the serious character of his injuries. At the end of four days he was ambulatory and eight days after admission to the hospital he was permitted to return home. He was examined two weeks after discharge by Dr. Grainer [sic] and again at four weeks after discharge he was seen and the Kirschner pins were removed. He was seen again two weeks later, six weeks after the accident, at which time the wires around his teeth were removed. He never required or sought medical attention thereafter. He resumed work at nine weeks after the accident and has lost no time from work since then.

At the time of the trial, March 20th, 1967, the plaintiff's nine front teeth had yet to be removed.

He had a scar some two inches in length extending from the corner of his mouth into the left cheek. It was said not to be a revolting feature and while quite visible up to 12 or 14 feet away was not readily discernible at 20 feet. Some other minor scars were not very noticeable. He had full movement of his face. He complained of some gagging in swallowing tant; il avait la machoire supbrieure d6plac6e vers le bas et vers 1'ext6rieur, toute la configuration du visage d6form6e, et il avait trois fractures de la machoire inf6rieure avec d6placement.

Au moment de l'accident, le demandeur 6tait en train de se faire enlever toutes les dents sauf neuf. Suite au traitement appliqu6 apris l'accident, ces neuf dents ont 6t6 atteintes et on dit qu'elles devront aussi 8tre enlev6es.

Le demandeur a subi une commotion mineure au moment de l'accident. II a 6t6 transport6 A l'h6pital de Listowel, puis transf6rb A l'h6pital Victoria A London. II fait peu de doute que ses douleurs 6taient grandes pendant cette p6riode. A London, sous anesth6sie g6n6rale, ses os faciaux ont 6t6 remis en place aussi exactement que possible et maintenus en position au moyen de deux broches de Kirschner qui lui sortaient du visage. Des fils fins ont 6galement 6t6 pass6s A travers les gencives, A la base des dents sup6rieures et des dents inf6rieures, pour relier les machoires. Plusieurs morceaux de verre ont 6t6 extirp6s de sa joue gauche, et on lui a fait plusieurs points de suture dans la joue. Ces points ont 6t6 enlev6s sept jours apris. Le r6tablissement du demandeur a 6t6 tout A fait rapide, A considdrer la gravit6 de ses blessures. Aprbs quatre jours il pouvait marcher, et huit jours apris son entr6e A l'h6pital il a 6t6 autoris6 A rentrer chez lui. Deux semaines apris sa sortie de I'h6pital, il a 6t6 examin6 par le Dr Grainer (sic), et de nouveau quatre semaines aprbs avoir quitt6 l'h6pital, alors que furent enlev6es les broches de Kirschner. Deux semaines plus tard, soit six semaines apris l'accident, il a 6t6 examin6 une troisibme fois et on lui a enlev6 les fils m6talliques autour des dents. Aprbs cela, il n'a plus eu besoin de soins m6dicaux et n'en a jamais demand6. Il est retourn6 A son travail neuf semaines apres I'accident et ne s'en est plus absent6. Au moment du procks, le 20 mars 1961, les neuf dents de devant du demandeur n'avaient pas encore 6t6 extraites. II avait une cicatrice longue de quelques deux pouces qui s'6tendait du coin de sa bouche vers la joue gauche. On a dit qu'elle n'6tait pas d'une apparence affreuse et bien que visible A une distance de 12 ou 14 pieds, elle n'6tait pas facilement discernable A 20 pieds. D'autres cicatrices plus petites n'6taient vraiment pas trbs visibles. II avait JACKLYN et al.

but his surgeon who examined him prior to trial could find no condition in the plaintiff's mouth to account for this. The plaintiff also had numbness in two small areas on his face. He stated that there was a continual ache in the neighbourhood of his left cheek bone which became acute in the wind or when the weather was cold. In short he had made a rapid and surprisingly complete recovery from the serious facial injuries which he had suffered. It was fairly obvious as well that he had not sought to prolong his recovery and return to work.

It is difficult to characterize the sum of

$15,000 awarded by the jury for the injuries and disabilities outlined by the learned justice in appeal as being "inordinately high" let alone "out of all proportion". I am of the opinion that there was no justification for any interference with the award based on the amount thereof. Indeed, even if I were of the opinion that the photographs had been improperly admitted I would have thought that the appellant here, the respondent in the

Court of Appeal, would, in that Court, have had a most convincing argument for the application of s. 28(1) of The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, which provides:

A new trial shall not be granted on the ground of misdirection or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or because the verdict of the jury was not taken upon a question that the judge at the trial was not asked to leave to the jury, or by reason of any omission or irregularity in the course of the trial. unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned.

and could well have submitted that the appeal in that Court should have been dismissed.

I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and restore the judgment of Grant J. The appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the

Court of Appeal for Ontario.

le plein usage des muscles de son visage. Il s'est plaint d'6prouver quelque difficult6 A avaler mais son chirurgien, qui l'avait examin6 avant le procks, n'a rien pu trouv6 dans la bouche du demandeur qui puisse expliquer ce mal. Le demandeur souffrait 6galement d'engourdissement A deux petits endroits de son visage. II affirma 6prouver une douleur continuelle A la joue gauche, douleur qui devenait aigue quand il y avait du vent ou par temps froid. En r6sum6, son r6tablissement des graves blessures faciales reques a 6t6 rapide et remarquablement complet. Il 6tait aussi assez manifeste qu'il n'a pas cherch6 A prolonger sa convalescence et qu'il est retourn6 promptement au travail.

est difficile de qualifier la somme de $15,000 accord6e par le jury, pour les blessures et incapacit6s d6crites par le savant Juge d'appel d'cexcessivement 6lev6es>, encore moins de «hors de toute proportion . Je suis d'avis qu'il n'y avait pas lieu d'intervenir dans 1'appr6ciation des dommages en d6coulant. D'ailleurs, m8me si je pensais que les photographies ont 6t6 erron6ment admises, je dirais que 1'appelant dans la pr6sente cause, intim6 devant la Cour d'appel, aurait eu, par devant ladite Cour, un motif des plus convaincants pour 1'application de l'art. 28(1) de la loi intitulde The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, qui d6crbte:

Un nouveau procks ne sera pas ordonn6 en raison de directives inexactes au jury ou du rejet ou de l'admission erronbs d'un t6moignage ou parce que le verdict du jury n'a pas port6 sur une question qu'on n'avait pas demand6 au juge de lui soumettre, ou en raison d'aucune omission ou irr6gularit6 dans le cours du procis, A moins qu'un prejudice sbrieux ou une erreur judiciaire n'en d6coulent;

et il aurait bien pu soutenir que 1'appel devant ladite Cour devait 6tre rejet6.

Je suis d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi, d'infirmer l'arrt de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario, et de rdtablir le jugement du Juge Grant. L'appelant a droit A ses frais en cette Cour et en la Cour d'appel d'Ontario.

et al. Le luge Spence

DRAPER JACKLYN et al.

RITCHIE J.-I have had the benefit of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother

Spence and I agree with him that this appeal should be allowed, but as I have reached the same conclusion for slightly different reasons, I find it desirable to express my view of the matter separately.

This appeal is limited to the question of the amount of general damages which the jury should have awarded to the appellant for the injuries which he sustained and in my opinion on this issue, the oral descriptions given by the doctors as to the effect of the appellant's injuries on his appearance and the nature of the medical treatment to which he was subjected were clearly relevant and admissible. This being the case, I can see no valid ground for excluding the photographs here in question which had the effect of providing the jury with a graphic illustration of the appellant's condition during the course of his treatment as described by the doctors.

My brother Spence has made reference to the judgment of Williams C.J.K.B., in Gray v. La- Fleche' , and to the cases there cited. In that case

Chief Justice Williams held that where a plaintiff in a malpractice suit is claiming damages for bodily injuries, he is not entitled to show to the jury injured parts of the body which are not normally exposed, provided however that in the discretion of the trial judge such parts of the body may be exhibited in order to have the nature and extent of the damage explained by medical witnesses. In my view there is a clear distinction between the display of such injured parts of the body for the sole purpose of having them seen by the jury and the introduction of photographs taken during the course of the medical treatment for the injuries sustained. The photographs in the present case serve to illustrate the nature of the

LE JUGE RITCHIE-J'ai eu Pavantage de lire les motifs de jugement r6dig6s par mon coll6gue le Juge Spence, et conviens avec lui que 1'appel doit 6tre accueilli; cependant, comme je suis arriv6 A la m8me conclusion pour des motifs un peu diff6rents, je d6sire exprimer s6par6ment mes vues sur le sujet.

Le pr6sent pourvoi est limit6 & la question du montant des dommages g6neraux que le jury aurait dfi accorder a 1'appelant pour les blessures subies. Je suis d'avis que les m6decins ont donn6 une description verbale nettement pertinente et recevable des effets sur la physionomie de l'appelant des blessures qu'il a subies et du genre de traitement auquel il a 6t6 soumis. Cela 6tant, je ne vois aucun motif valable pour rejeter les photographies mises en question, qui ont eu pour effet de fournir au jury une illustration graphique de 1'6tat dans lequel se trouvait l'appelant pendant le cours de son traitement tel que d6crit par les m6decins.

Mon colligue le Juge Spence s'est report6 au jugement du Juge en Chef Williams de la Cour du banc de la reine, dans Gray v. LaFlche1 et aux affaires qui y sont cit6es. Dans cette affaireli, le Juge en Chef Williams a d6cid6 qu'un demandeur en dommages pour blessures corporelles, dans une action pour faute professionnelle, n'est pas autoris6 A montrer au jury des parties bless6es du corps qui ne sont pas ordinairement expos6es A la vue, sauf toutefois qu'il est laiss6 A 1'appr6ciation du Juge de premire instance de d6cider si de telles parties peuvent 8tre exhibies en vue de permettre h des t6moins m6dicaux d'expliquer la nature et 1'6tendue des blessures. A mon sens, il y a une distinction nette A faire entre le fait d'exposer des parties bless6es du corps dans le seul but de les montrer au jury, et celui de produire des photographies prises dans 1 D. L. R.

al.

treatment to which the appellant was subjected and in this sense they form a part of the narrative of his illness and recovery and are both relevant and admissible.

There are cases where photographs which are relevant may nevertheless be excluded from the evidence in the discretion of the trial judge on the ground that they are inflammatory, but no basis has been established in the present case for holding that the learned trial judge erred in failing to exclude the photographs on that ground.

My brother Spence has also referred to a number of criminal cases in which photographs were tendered depicting the condition of a victim after murder or bodily assault. In some of these cases the trial judge exercised his discretion to exclude the evidence on the ground that it was of trifling weight and was prejudicial to the accused. In criminal cases where the sole issue is the guilt or innocence of the accused, it is understandable that such photographs should be excluded unless they can be shown to contain some evidence directly connecting the accused with the commission of the crime with which he is charged;

but no such question can arise in the present case where the sole issue depends upon the jury's assessment of the compensation to be awarded for injuries sustained by the appellant. The photographs depicting the condition of these injuries while the appellant was under medical treatment relate directly to this issue and are therefore admissible.

I agree with my brother Spence that the award of $15,000 made by the learned trial judge in le cours du traitement m6dical appliqu6 aux blessures reques. Dans le cas pr6sent, les photographies servent A illustrer la nature du traitement requ par l'appelant, et A ce point de vue, elles font partie de la description de sa maladie et de sa convalescence et sont A la fois pertinentes et recevables.

Il y a des cas oi des photographies pertinentes peuvent n6anmoins 6tre exclues de la preuve, A la discr6tion du juge de premibre instance, pour le motif qu'elles sont trop 6vocatrices, mais rien dans la prdsente affaire ne permet d'6tablir que le Juge de premiere instance a fait erreur en ne rejetant pas les photographies pour ce motif.

Mon collbgue le Juge Spence s'est aussi report6 A un certain nombre d'affaires criminelles dans lesquelles des photos ont t6 produites qui repr6sentaient I'6tat de la victime apris un meurtre ou des voies de faits. Dans certaines de ces affaires, le Juge de premibre instance a exerc6 son pouvoir discr6tionnaire pour refuser leur production comme 616ments de preuve, pour le motif qu'elles avaient une valeur probante n6gligeable et qu'elles 6taient prdjudiciables A l'inculp6. Dans les affaires criminelles, la seule question est la culpabilit6 ou l'innocence de l'inculp6, il est normal que la production de telles photographies soit refus6e h moins qu'il ne soit 6tabli qu'elles constituent une preuve reliant directement l'inculp6 avec le crime dont il est accus6, mais une telle question ne se pose pas dans le cas pr6sent oil la seule d6cision A prendre a trait au montant des dommages que le jury a accord6s h l'appelant pour les blessures subies. Les photographies repr6sentant l'tat de ces blessures au moment oii 1'appelant recevait un traitement m6dical sont en relation directe avec cette d6cision et sont par cons6quent recevables.

Je conviens avec mon coll6gue le Juge Spence que les dommages de $15,000 accord6s par le et al. Le Juge Spence et al. Ritchie J.

this case cannot be said to be inordinately high and I would accordingly allow this appeal with costs.

Appeal allowed with costs.

McKenzie, Plaxton, Little & Jenkins, London.

Lerner, Lerner, Bradley, Cherniak & Granger,

London.

savant Juge de premibre instance dans cette affaire ne peuvent 6tre qualifies d'excessivement 61ev6s et cons6quemment je suis d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi avec d6pens.

Appel accueilli avec ddpens.

Procureurs du demandeur, appelant: Shepherd, McKenzie, Plaxton, Little & Jenkins, London. Procureurs des ddfendeurs, intimis: Lerner, Lerner, Bradley, Cherniak & Granger, London. Francis Stewart Sanders

Appellant;

and

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent.

1969: June 2; 1969: October 7.

Present: Cartwright C.J. and Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ.

Criminal law-Habeas corpus-Certiorari-Sentence of preventive detention-No appeal taken- Whether certiorari available-Whether warrant of committal defective-Accused claiming notice not given seven clear days prior to hearing-Exhibit lost-Onus on accused to prove when notice served-Criminal Code 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss.

661, 662(1)(b), 682, 691.

On April 22, 1958, the appellant was found to be a criminal sexual psychopath and was sentenced to preventive detention. He signed a waiver of his right of appeal. From 1964 to 1967, he made several applications to have the preventive detention order set aside. Finally in 1967, he made the present application for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to quash the warrant of committal. The writ was refused by Wilson C.J. The main ground upon which the appellant relied was that he had not been given seven clear days' notice of the application under s. 661(1) of the Criminal Code and that consequently, the magistrate had been without jurisdiction to enter upon the hearing.

At the hearing before the magistrate, the appellant admitted service of a written notice, which was filed as an exhibit, but no reference was made to the date of the service. That exhibit was lost. The appellant filed a lengthy affidavit, largely argumentative, in which he draws the conclusion that the notice could not have been served seven clear days before the hearing. His affidavit did not state where or when the notice was served upon him. In their affidavits, the magistrate and the Crown prosecutor stated that at the hearing it was proved to the magistrate's satisfaction that the appellant received a notice of seven clear days. The affidavit of the constable who served the notice also stated that he believed he complied with the legal requirements.

The Court of Appeal, by a majority judgment, affirmed the refusal of the application for the writ.

The appellant appealed to this Court and subse- Francis Stewart Sanders Appelant;

et

Sa Majest6 la Reine

Intimde.

1969: le 2 juin; 1969: le 7 octobre.

Presents: Le Juge en Chef Cartwright et les Juges Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence et Pigeon.

Droit criminel-Habeas corpus-Certiorari-Sentence de ditention priventive-Aucun appel-Y a-t-il lieu au bref de certiorari-Mandat de dip6t est-il ddfectueux-Alligation que l'avis n'a pas 9td donni sept jours francs avant l'audition-Pice perdue- Accusd a le fardeau d'itablir quand I'avis lui a 6t signifid-Code criminel, 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, art. 661, 662(1)(b), 682, 691.

Le 22 avril 1958, il a 6t6 statu que l'appelant 6tait atteint de psychopathie sexuelle criminelle et une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive lui fut impos6e. Il signa une renonciation au droit d'appel. De 1964 A 1967, il a pr6sent6 plusieurs requites pour faire rejeter l'ordonnance de d6tention pr6ventive. Finalement, en 1967, il a pr6sent6 une demande de bref d'habeas corpus avec certiorari auxiliaire, qui fut rejet6e par le juge en chef Wilson. Le principal moyen dont l'appelant a fait 6tat est qu'il n'avait pas regu un avis de sept jours francs de la demande pr6sent6e en vertu de l'art. 661(1) du Code criminel, et que par cons6quent le magistrat n'avait pas le pouvoir de proc6der i l'audition.

A l'audition devant le magistrat, I'appelant a admis avoir eu signification de l'avis 6crit, qui a 6t6 produit comme pibce au dossier, mais on ne trouve pas la moindre allusion a la date de cette signification. La piece a 6t6 perdue. L'appelant a produit une longue d6claration sous serment. Cette d6claration consiste en grande partie en une argumentation, dans laquelle il tire la conclusion que l'avis n'a pas pu tre signifi6 sept jours francs avant l'audition. Cette d6claration ne sp~cifie ni oa, ni quand l'avis lui a 6t6 signifi6. Dans leurs d6clarations sous serment, le magistrat et le substitut du procureur g6nbral affirment qu'h l'audition on a prouvb A la satisfaction du magistrat que l'appelant avait regu un avis de sept jours francs. La dclaration sous serment du constable qui a signifi6 l'avis affirme qu'il croit avoir respect6 le dblai. Par un jugement majoritaire, la Cour d'appel a confirm6 de refus de la demande quently obtained leave to appeal from the refusal of the relief sought in the proceedings by way of certiorari.

Held (Cartwright C.J. and Hall, Spence and

): The appeal should be dismissed.

Per Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ.: The circumstances of this case bring it within the application of s. 682(b) of the Criminal

Code which prevents the removal of the magistrate's order by certiorari. If it can be said that the words

"the merits were tried" in s. 682(b) can only be applicable where the Court had jurisdiction, the section ceases to have any real meaning. The writ of certiorari is primarily concerned with the matter of jurisdiction of an inferior Court. The section was intended to apply, and by its terms does apply in a situation where, in the absence of the section, the jurisdiction of the Court might have been questioned on certiorari. The intention of the section is to preclude the coexistence of two remedies. By its terms it applies, in any case falling within its provisions, to any attempt to remove a conviction or order by certiorari. This view of the effect of s. 682 does not run counter to the judgment of this

Court in Smith v. R., [1959] S.C.R. 638.

It is unnecessary to express any view as to whether, in the light of the provisions of s. 691 of the Criminal Code, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a refusal by the Courts to grant certiorari.

There is no requirement that the warrant of committal recite that the accused had been given seven clear days' notice of the application.

Even if s. 682(b) were not to be considered as constituting a bar to proceedings by way of certiorari, the appeal fails on the merits. In the light of the circumstances in this case, it was incumbent upon the appellant, when he applied for certiorari on the ground that he had not received adequate notice, to establish that fact by clear and positive evidence.

He has not discharged that onus.

Per Cartwright C.J. and Hall and Spence JJ., dissenting: Seven clear days' notice not having been given to the appellant as required by s. 662(1) (b)

of the Code, the magistrate was without jurisdiction ab initio and the warrant of committal must fall.

In these proceedings the Court can inquire whether the requisite notice was given. Section 682(b) of the Code does not deprive the Courts of jurisdiction to grant certiorari in this case. The great weight of authority supports the view that s. 682 is not a bar to the issue of certiorari where the proceedings du bref. L'appelant en a appel6 h cette Cour et par la suite a obtenu la permission d'appeler du recours par voie de certiorari.

Arrit: L'appel doit Stre rejet6, le Juge en Chef Cartwright et les Juges Hall, Spence et Pigeon 6tant dissidents.

Les Juges Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson et Ritchie: L'article 682(b) du Code criminel s'applique aux circonstances de l'affaire et empiche d'6carter l'ordonnance du magistrat par voie de certiorari. Si l'on peut dire que les mots l'affaire avait 6t6 jug6e au fondo dans l'art. 682(b) ne s'appliquent que dans les cas oi la Cour a juridiction, l'article n'a pas de sens. Le bref de certiorari porte principalement sur la question de la comp6tence du tribunal inf6rieur. On a voulu que 'article s'applique, et il s'applique de fait A cause de ses termes, aux cas oh s'il n'existait pas, la comp6tence du tribunal pourrait 6tre contest6e par voie de certiorari. L'article vise h empcher la coexistence de deux recours. Par ses termes, il s'applique dans tous les cas qui tombent sous le coup de ses dispositions, h toute tentative de faire r6former une d6claration de culpabilit6 ou une ordonnance par voie de certiorari. Cette opinion ne va pas h 1'encontre de l'arrat de cette Cour dans l'affaire Smith c. R., [1959] R.C.S. 638.

Il n'est pas n6cessaire de r6pondre A la question qui a 6t6 soulev6e, savoir si, h la lumibre des dispositions de I'art. 691 du Code criminel, cette Cour a juridiction pour accueillir l'appel du jugement de la Cour d'appel refusant le certiorari.

La mention que l'accus6 avait regu un avis de sept jours francs de la demande n'est pas une exigence ncessaire du mandat de d6p6t.

M8me en admettant que l'art. 682(b) n'empache pas de proc6der par voie de certiorari, I'appel n'est pas recevable au fond. A la lumibre des faits, il incombait 4 l'appelant, lors de sa demande de bref de certiorari, fond6e sur l'insuffisance de l'avis, d'6tablir le fait par une preuve positive et certaine. Il ne s'est pas d6charg6 de ce fardeau.

Le Juge en Chef Cartwright et les Juges Hall et Spence, dissidents: L'appelant n'a pas regu un avis de sept jours francs ainsi que l'exige l'art. 662(1)(b) du Code, le magistrat 6tait incomptent ab initio et le mandat de dip6t doit 8tre tenu pour invalide. La Cour peut en l'esp&ce rechercher si l'avis requis a 6t6 donn6. L'article 682(b) du Code ne prive pas effectivement les tribunaux du pouvoir d'accorder le certiorari en l'espice. L'opinion pr6pond6rante est fortement a l'effet que l'art. 682 ne fait pas obstacle au certiorari lorsque les proc6dures qu'on veut con-