On the 21st April, 1877, an election petition was fyled in the Prothronotary's office 6at Murray Bay, District of Saguenay, against the Respondent.
The latter pleaded by preliminary objections that this election petition, notice of its presentation and copy of the receipt of the deposit had never been served upon him. Judgment was given maintaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the petition with costs. The petitioners, thereupon, appealed to the Supreme Court under 38 Vic., cap. sec. 48. Held,-That the said judgment was not appealable and that under that section an appeal will lie only from the decision of a Judge who has tried the merits of an election petition.
[Taschereau and Fournier, J. J. dissenting.]
Per Strong, J., (Richards, 0. J., concurring,) That the hearing of the preliminary objections and the trial of the merits of the election petition are distinct acts of procedure (1).
(1) By The Supreme Court "tion to an Election Petition, the Amendment Act of 1879, sec. 10, allowance of which shall have it is provided that " An appeal been final and conclusive, and " shall lie to the Supreme Court which shall have put an end to " from the judgment, rule, order the petition, or which would, if "or decision of any Court or allowed, have been final and "Judge on any preliminary objecconclusive, and have put an end *PRESENT:-Sir William Buell Richards, C. J., and Strong, Taschereau, Fournier and Henry, J.J.
V OL. 11.])
THE question to be decided in this appeal, was whether a judgment maintaining preliminary objections and dismissing an election petition was appealable under the 48th section of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act.
The facts appear sufficiently in the head note and the judgments.
Mr. A. F. McIntyre, for Appellant:- The petition has been virtually tried, for the judgment of the Court amounts to a final judgment against the petitioners. We must read section 25 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act in connection with section 48. If this Court has not jurisdiction in such a case as this, then it is in the power of any Judge to oust the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in every controverted election case. The policy of the law has not been to diminish the right of appeal but to extend it. The judgment in this case is final and therefore appealable. See Freeman onjudgments (1); Powell on the law of appellate proceedings (2).
Mr. I.
The judgment is final and without appeal.
The 8th section of the Statute 38 Vic., chap. 11, (the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act) says positively: " Any party to an election petition under the said Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition, &c.," may appeal from said judgment. In the present case, we have not to consider 320 a decision given at the time of the trial of an election petition, but a judgment given on preliminary objections.
If an appeal is allowed from every decision of ajudge, it would be impossible to proceed with a petition. " Trial " means the examination of witnesses, &c. See Hardeastle, Laws and Practice of Election Petitions (1); and Wolferstan, Law of Election Petitions (2).
J.:- This was an appeal from ajudgment rendered by His Honor Mr. Justice Routhier, of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec for the District of Saguenay, in the matter of a petition filed by the Appellants, under the Controverted Elections Act 1874, against the return of the Respondent as member of the House of Commons for the Electoral District of Charlevoix. The return of the writ of election to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery in which the Respondent was declared to be duly elected a member of the House of Commons, was published in the Canada Gazette on the 7th April, 1877. The Appellants filed their petition against the return on the 21st April, 1877.
A copy of the petition is alleged to have been served on the Respondent on the 27th April. On the 28th April, 1877, an application was made on behalf of the Respondent to Mr. Justice Routhier to extend the time for filing preliminary objections to the petition until the 22nd May following, which application was allowed.
On the 22nd May, the Respondent filed his preliminary objections against the further maintenance of the Appellant's petition. The objections material to be noticed here (being those which the learned judge sustained) are the first and fourth. The first objection is, " That no certified copy of the "said petition has been served on the Respondent;" and the fourth, " That no notice of the presentation of the "petition and of the security was served on the Respondent."
The Appellants inscribed these objections for proof and hearing for the 12th July last, when counsel for both parties appeared before Mr. Justice Routhier, and, no evidence being entered into by either side, the objections were argued and taken en delibird.
On the 24th of July the learned Judge gave judgment, holding the first and fourth objections to be well founded, and dismissing the Appellant's petition with costs.
The appeal to this Court is from that judgment. The grounds of the appeal are, that the judgment is wrong and cannot be maintained. First, Because there was no proof of any kind establishing the objections. Secondly, Because the burthen of proving the objections was upon the Respondent.
The first objection in answer to this appeal, set up by the Respondent in his factum and in argument at the Bar, was, that the decision of the Court below was final, as having been pronounced by a Court of last resort, and that this Court has no jurisdiction.
The procedure for the trial of Controverted Elections under the Act of 1874 (37 Vic., Cap. 16) may, so far as it is material here, be succintly stated as follows :- The petition must, subject to some exceptions not applicable here, be presented not later than thirty days after the day of publication in the Gazette of the receipt of the return to the Writ of Election by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery.
The presentation is to be made by delivery to the Clerk of the Court. At the time of the presentation a deposit of $1,000 is to be made, for which the Clerk is to give a receipt, which shall be evidence of the deposit. Within five days after presenting the petition and making the deposit, or within such other time as the Court or a Judge may allow, a notice of the presentation of the petition and of the security, together with a copy of the petition, is to be served on the Respondent. Within a like delay, after service of the petition, the Respondent is to present any preliminary objections which he may have against the petition, or the petitioner, or against any further proceedings. The Court or any Judge thereof is to hear these objections, and is to decide them in a summary manner. After the expiration of five days from the decision of the preliminary objections, or from the expiration of the time for presenting them, if none be presented, the petition is to be deemed to be at issue, and the Court is to fix a time and place ol trial.
So far, all the proceedings are to take place in or before the Court in which the petition. has been presented, or before one of the Judges of that Court. By section 13 the petition is to be tried by one of the Judges of the Court without a jury. The trial is to take place, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, in the electoral district the election or return for which is in question.
At the conclusion of the trial the Judge must determine whether the member whose election or return is complained of, or any and what other person, was duly returned or elected, or whether the election was void, and other matters arising out of the petition, and requiring his determination; and shall, except only in the case of an appeal, immediately after the expiration of eight days from the day on which he shall have given his decision, certify in writing such determinaation to the Speaker, appending thereto a copy of the notes of the evidence; and the determination so certified is to be final to all intents and purposes.
If any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, the Judge is, in addition to such certificate, and at the same time, to report in writing to the Speaker: (a) Whether any corrupt practice has or has not been found to have been committed by or with the knowledge and consent of any candidate at the election, stating the name of the candidate and the nature of the corrupt practice. (b) The names of any persons who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice. (c) Whether corrupt practices have, or whether there is reason to believe they have, extensively prevailed at the election. The Judge may, at the same time, make a special report to the Speaker as to any matters arising in the course of the trial, an account of which, in his judgment, ought to be submitted to the House of Commons.
Section 54 of the Act contains a provision recognizing a distinction very pertinent to the question raised here; it relates to the withdrawal of a petition and enacts, " That a petition shall not be withdrawn without the leave of the Court or Judge according as the petition is then before the Court or before the Judge for trial, upon special application," to be made as prescribed by general rules.'
This clause recognizes and carries out very clearly a distinction which runs through the whole Act, as to the separation of the powers and jurisdiction of the Court and those of the Judge at the trial.
After the petition is set down for trial the functions of the Court are at an end, for no provision similar to that embodied in section 23 of the Controverted Elections Act of 1873, authorizing the Judge who tries a petition to reserve a case for the opinion of the Court, is contained in the Act of 1874. There is, therefore, a well defined line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions, that of the Court and that of the Judge who tries the petition. It appears, then, that a Judge who is called upon to decide a " preliminary objection " presented under section 10, exercises the jurisdiction of the Court in which the petition is filed.
This jurisdiction is not restricted as to locality, but the objections may be heard and determined at any place within the jurisdiction of the Court, whilst the trial of the petition in the absence of an order of the Court, founded on some special circumstances, must be had within the Electoral District. Again, whatever may be the proper construction of the words " preliminary objections," whether they are to be taken as applying to every irregularity or failure to comply with the procedure laid down by the Act of Parliament and the rules of Court, as well as to objections which might be taken to the qualification of the petitioner, or to the latter class of objections only, it is plain, that their determination does not comprise any such decision as the Judge at the trial is bound to come to. In deciding preliminary objections, the Judge cannot determine whether the member whose election or return is complained of, or any other person, was duly returned or elected, or whether the election was void. He can have no evidence before him to enable him to enter into the merits of the petition, and, consequently, he cannot make the report to the Speaker required by the 30th section of the Act of 1874.
In determining preliminary objections, although the Judge may have to hear evidence he is in no 'sense "trying the petition."
The 10th section, and the .whole context of the Act, indicates that the two proceedings of hearing preliminary objections and the trial of the petition are separate and distinct, to be taken before different tribunals, at different times, and possibly at different places. The determination of the preliminary objections has for its object an adjudication upon such exceptions as the Respondent to a petition may take to the status of the Petitioner and to his compliance with the statutory pre-requisites to being permitted to proceed to trial.
If the decision of the Judge on the objections is against the Respondent, his functions are terminated; he cannot proceed to enquire into or try the merits of the petition.
On the other hand, the decision which section 29 of the Act of 1874, makes it incumbent on the Judge at the trial to pronounce is one, on the grounds of law and fact, upon which the validity of the election is impugned, and upon those grounds also on which by way of recrimination the Respondent may seek to in validate any claim to the seat made by the Petitioner on his own behalf, or on that of some other person. Manifestly, this is a very different process from that to be gone through with by the Court or a Judge dealing with preliminary objections only. In short, the word " preliminary " imports that these objections are to be precedent to some proceeding in which the merits of the election and of the petition are to be enquired into, and the Statute authorizes no other proceeding for that purpose than the trial of the petition.
The words " preliminary objections " are, therefore, to be construed as an elliptical expression for objections preliminary to the trial.
The convenience of such a division of the enquiry under the petition is very obvious. It is calculated to save large expenditure in summoning and paying witnesses, generally very numerous, to testify for and against the merits of the petition which would be useless and wasteful, if the preliminary objections were reserved until the trial and should then appear to be well founded. It relieves the Judge from the inconvenience and loss of time which might be occasioned in going to the Electoral District to hear mere technical points of law argued, and it tends to disembarrass the trial on the merits, when it comes on, from collateral issues, and to save time which might otherwise be consumed in long arguments as to the qualification of the Petitioner or the regularity of his proceedings, whilst the witnesses on the merits were uselessly kept in attendance.
This practice of disjoining the hearing of preliminary objections from the trial, which does not correspond with any similar proceeding provided for by the English Act, was probably suggested by the course of proceeding formerly adopted by the Election Committees, who, though bound by no prescribed rules, but being free to regulate their procedure in each case according to convenience, were accustomed to hear and determine in limine, objections taken to the qualification of the Petitioner, and others of the same class, before proceeding to investigate the merits of the petition. These considerations appear sufficient to demonstrate that the Controverted Elections Act of 1874 deals with the hearing on preliminary objections and the trial of the petition as two distinct acts of procedure, having for their objects different results, and which it was the policy of the Act to keep separate. Parliament has, indeed, in so many words recognized the separation between the jurisdiction of the Court before trial and that of the Judge after the petition is set down for trial, when, in the 54th section it requires the withdrawal of the petition to be with the leave of the Court or Judge,
Then, the Respondent's proposition is, that the appeal to this Court is limited to one from the decision of the Judge who tries the petition, and does not include an appeal from the determination of the Court or Judge on the hearing of preliminary objections.
Section 48 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act is the enactment which confers the jurisdiction on this Court, and it repeals sections 33, 34 and 35 of the Act of 1874, which had provided for appeals in the Province I v.
of Quebec to the Superior Court sitting in Review, and in the other Provinces to the Court in which the petition was presented sitting in banc. These repealed clauses in themselves shew that they were meant to confer the right of appeal from the Judge at the trial only.
Section 33, which has reference to appeals in Quebec cases, requires the Court of Review to determine and certify its determination and decision to the Speaker upon the several points and matters, as well of fact as of law, upon which the Judge might otherwise have determined or certified his decision, in the same manner as the Judge would otherwise have done at the trial, and declares that the determination of the Court thus certified shall be final to all intent and purposes
Section 35, which relates to appeals from the Provinces other than Quebec, is to the same effect, and contains even stronger indications that the appeal was intended to apply only to the substance and merits of the petition.
These sections, however, are repealed by section 48 of the Supreme Court Act, which contains express words not found in the repealed clauses of 37 Victoria, Cap. 10, limiting the appeal to one from the Judge at the trial. After enacting a repeal of the sections just mentioned, to take effect so soon as the Supreme Court should be organized, and in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it proceeds as follows:may do so by adopting the mode of procedure which had been provided for by the repealed section 35 of the Act of 1874, and it requires the Registrar to certify the decision of this Court to the Speaker in the same manner as the Judge at the trial is required to do by the provisions of the former Act already referred to, and it lastly declares that the judgment and decision of the Supreme Court shall be final to all intents and purposes.
Applying this section to the case in hand, it cannot possibly be said, having regard to what appears to be the proper construction of the Act of 1874, as already stated, that Mr. Justice Routhier, when he heard these preliminary objections, " tried the petition," nor would it be possible for the Court, if it came to the conclusion that the preliminary objections ought to have been overruled instead of allowed, to pronounce a decision which would have been final on the merits of the petition, nor could this Court in any aspect pronounce a judgment upon this appeal which would warrant such a certificate as in every case of appeal this Court is imperatively bound to send to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Therefore the inevitable result of the construction I have placed upon the Controverted Elections Act of 1874, in treating the hearing of the preliminary objections and the trial as distinct acts of procedure, requires me to hold that the decision complained of is not a proper subject of appeal.
The language of the 48th section of the Supreme Court Act, already quoted, seems so explicit that it scarcely requires the aid of any extrinsic argument to support the construction I uphold, but it may well be thought that an enactment which would have made every decision upon preliminary objections or upon interlocutory or incidental motions or applications in litigated election proceedings appealable, would have been most undesirable, since it might have been used vexatiously and oppressively, both as regards delay APRIL SESSION, and expense. If from every incidental decision in the proceedings in a controverted election, the parties were to be at liberty to resort to this Court by way of appeal to be remitted back upon the determination of the appeal against the objection to the primary Court, there to resume the contestation of the merits, the litigation would be prolonged to the prejudice not merely of the parties to the petition but to the detriment also of the constituency whose representation was in dispute. It cannot be presumed, that the Legislature intended to authorize such appeals, for it may be truly said that there is no class of litigation in which judicial despatch is more desirable than that arising out of controverted elections. The interests of all concerned, those of the parties, the Courts and the public alike, require reasonable promptitude of decision in such cases. There may, no doubt, be exceptional cases in which the rights of parties to petitions may be seriously affected by erroneous decisions on preliminary points and motions, but the balance of convenience greatly preponderates in favor of confining appeals to the merits. Were this Court to concede the right to take an appeal in the present case, an equal process of reasoning in construing the Act would require it to admit an appeal from the most insignificant motion which could be made. There is, therefore, every argument to be drawn from convenience in favor of restricting the appeal, as the Legislature has done to one upon the merits of the petition, the decision of which must be conclusive.
But supposing I am wrong in this opinion as to the policy of the law, and even though in particular instances the interpretation of the Statute restricting appeals to the merits of the petition might seem to leave parties without relief against erroneous decisions, such consequences would afford no ground for wresting the plain words of the 48th section of the Supreme Court Act from their obvions primary meaning and extending them so as to include such cases as the present.
Where the language of a Statute is doubtful, arguments drawn from unjust and inconvenient results may be of force, but where there is no ambiguity of language they cannot affect judicial construction, whatever weight they may have as reasons for Legislative amendment.
A majority of the Court agreeing on the question of jurisdiction, there is no necessity for discussing the second point argued on this appeal; that involving the correctness of the judgment which is called in question. In my opinion, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, which should, therefore, pursuant to section 37 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act, be quashed, with costs to be paid to the Respondent. THE CHIEF concurred with Strong, J. J
Je dois donner un court aperqu des faits de la cause en ce qui concerne le pr6sent appel.
lo. Le 21 avril 1877. Les appelants, contestant 1'61eetion de 1'Intim6, produisent leur p6tition et en d6posent une copie au bureau du protonotaire de la Cour Sup& rieure du district de Saguenay, qui sous sa signature en date du mime jour reconnait en avoir requ copie, et de plus les appelants d6posent la somme de mille piastres en un billet de la Puissance du Canada. Cette p6tition ne porte aucun certificat de sa signification ni d'avis du jour de sa pr6sentation A l'Intim6, et on ne trouve pas au dossier un certificat d'avis du d6p6t des mille piastres et de leur destination, ou d'aucun cautionnement quelconque.
2o. Le 9 mai 1877. Les p6titionnaires, pr6sents appelants, produisent au greffe du bureau du protonotaire du district de Saguenay un avis informant l'Intim6 que le douze de ce m~me mois de mai 1871 ils demanderont au Juge du district de fixer jour pour l'instruction m.* de la p6tition.
8o. Le 12 mai 1877. L'Intim6 pr6sente une requ~te pour extension de d6lai pour produire ses objections pr61iminaires, et ce d6lai lui est accord6 jusqu'au 22 mai, et le 21 mai l'Intim6 produit ses objections pr6liminaires, et le 12 juillet la cause est inscrite au r6le pour preuve et audition sur les objections pr6liminaires. La cause est mise en d6lib6r6 devant M. le juge Routhier qui, le 21 juillet, renvoie la p6tition sur le principe qu'aucune copie certifi6e de la p6tition, non plus qu'aucun avis de la pr6sentation de cette p6tition et du cautionnement n'ont 6t6 signifi6s au d6fendeur.
Maintenant la premibre question qui est soulev6e en cette cause par l'Intim6, I'honorable M. Langevin, est celle de savoir si la d6cision du Juge, sous les circonstances que je viens d'exposer, est on n'est pas susceptible d'appel, en un mot, si une d6cision sur les objections pr61iminaires est susceptible d'appel. L'Intim6 le pr6tend, et il a en sa faveur l'opinion de mes deux honorables confrbres qui viennent d'exposer leur vues a ce sujet. L'Intim6 se fonde sur la section 48 de la 38e Vic., ch. 11, (Acte constitutif de la Cour Supreme) pour y trouver une distinction entre le droit d'appel d'une d6cision sur les objections pr6liminaires et le droit d'appel de la d6cision du m6rite de la p6tition m~me. Je ne trouve rien dans cette section pour justifier cette distinction.
La section est en ces termes:
better at Je ne trouve rien en cette section pour justifier la pr6tention de 1'Intim6.
Au contraire j'y vois qu'il y a appel de toute question de droit ou de fait. Or, en la pr6sente cause le Juge qui en a t6 charg6, a adjug6 sur les questions de droit et de fait, lo. de droit, en d~cidant que les appelants devaient commencer 1'enqu~te et faire la preuve, 2o. de fait, en decidant qu'ils avaient failli de prouver leurs objections pr6liminaires. Une contestation d'6lection est soumise au mime Juge qui peut ab initio la conduire jusqu'& jugement final; il est oblig6 de d6cider 6galement les objections pr61iminaires aussi bien que le m6rite meme, et il y a dans 1'un et 1'autre de ces cas une importance et une responsabilit6 4gales, et de la d6cision de ces objections pr6liminaires, comme de celle du m6rite de la p6tition, d6pend le sort de cette p6tition ; les int6r~ts d'une division 61ectorale peuvent en Atre 6galement et fatalement affect6s.
Je ne vois aucun motif 16gal ni rationel pour justifier une telle distinction du droit d'appel sur des questions 6galement importantes quant au r6sultat. Au contraire, je trouve un argument s rieux dans le danger de laisser A un seul homme le pouvoir d'adjuger en dernier ressort sur des objections pr61iminaires. YOL. II.]1
Je ne puis me reconcilier A l'id6e que la 16gislature an moyen de cette section 48, et de l'emploi des mots: " Judge who tried the petition," ait voulu dire que le Juge charg6 d'adjuger sur une contestation d'61ection et qui la renvoie in toto sur des objections pr6liminaires n'y a pas complatement mis fin et n'a pas jug6 la p6tition d'une manibre substantielle, " did not try the election." Il 1'a tellement jug6e cette contestation d'61ection qu'il Pa renvoy6e A toutes fins que de droit, et sans laisser aux p6titionnaires 1'espoir de renouveler cette contestation.
Sous un autre aspect, on peut dire que la prise en consid6ration d'une contestation d'61ection par un juge commence avec la lecture et 1'6tude de la p6tition, des moyens de dbfense, et se termine avec la preuve, si on n'y met fin auparavant par le renvoi sur objections pr&liminaires.
Tout cela forme le trial, savoir: la preuve et l'adjudication sur tous les points en litige, et c'est IA la seule interpretation plausible A donner A cette section Quant A cette premibre question relative at droit d'appel, je considbre que les pr6tentions de 1'Intim6 sont non fond6es.
Mais il y a dans les autres objections que l'Intim6 6nonce en son factum, quelque chose que je considbre comme tr~s srieux.
Les appelants pr6tendent que 1'Intim6 comme excipant, devait commencer sa preuve sur les objections pr6liminaires, et 'Intim6 soutient le contraire, etje considbre que l'Intim6 a raison sur ce point. Il est le d6fendeur, il se tient donc sur la d6fensive; il dit A ses adversaires, vous m'accusez, montrez A la Cour que vous m'avez assign6 conform6ment aux r6quisitions du statut, et que vous m'avez signifi6 un certificat 16gal du cautionnement et un avis du jour de la pr6sentation de la p6tition. Les appelants on n'ont pu, on n'ont pas voulu faire cette preuve et Son Honneur le juge Routhier, devant qui elle devait se faire, a renvoy6 la p6tition, ]SSRD faute par les Appelants d'avoir 6tabli ce qui 6tait la bAse, la fondation de la p6tition, savoir, que les p6titionnaires avaient signifi6 A l'Intim6 une copie certifi6e de la p6tition, un avis de sa pr6sentation, et du cautionnement fourni tel que la loi l'exige.
Mais comme je 1'ai dit, les Appelants pr6tendent que c'6tait A l'Intim6 A prouver ces n6gatives, vi qu'il 6tait l'excipant. Je congois qu'il peut y avoir des cas o-h l'excipant puisse tre tenu de prouver un plaidoyer affirmatif qui attaquerait une pr6somption 16gale. Dans le cas pr6sent la loi ne pr6sume pas que les Appelants se soient conform6s aux requisitions du statut en ce qui concerne la signification des documents exig6s comme assignation de l'Intim6.
O'6tait done aux Appelants A commencer cette preuve et non A 'Intim6 qui n'avait qu'd attendre les bras crois6s la preuve de ces significations.
I lui faudrait prouver une n6gative, ce qui dans la plupart des cas est impossible, cette preuve incombait aux Appelants comme ayant on devant avoir en mains les documents n6cessaires pour 1'6tablir, d'apras la section 40 du statut des 6lections de l'ann6e 1874 qui 6nonce que le service de la p6tition et des avis de sa presentation, et d'une copie du requ du d6p6t ou du cautionnement doivent tre effectu6s autant que possible en la m~me maniare qu'un bref de sommation en matibre civile, on en toute autre manibre qu'il pourrait tre prescrit. Or, A d6faut de toute autre injonction A cet 6gard, le Code de Proc6dure Civile de la province de Qu6bec doit r6gler, et de fait rbgle, ce mode de signification par les articles 56, 57, 77, 78, 80. Ces articles exigent que les significations de sommations soient effectu6es par un huissier on par une personne quelconque qui en donnera un certificat sous forme d'affidavit.
Les Appelants pr6tendent que l'Intim6 a admis avoir reu une copie de la p6tition, mais il n'admet pas qu'il ait requ avis de sa pr6sentation, ni d'une copie du cantionnement, ou du requ du dp6t pour en tenir lieu. Si cet aveu de l'Intim6 quant A la r6ception d'une copie de la p6tition pent tre interpr6t6 contre lui (ce que je ne crois pas), tonjours est-il vrai que son objection quant A l'absence d'un certificat de signification de 1'avis de sa pr(sentation et de la copie du cautionnement subsiste en son entier et doit tre fatale aux Appelants. Le dossier en cette cause ne d6montre nullement l'accomplissement d'aucune de ces formalit6s essentielles exig6es par le statut et sans lesquelles la p6tition ne peut exister. Je le demande, comment 6tait-il possible au Juge qui a prononc6 le jugement de passer pardessus de telles irr~gularit~s. Je crois de plus que M. le Juge Routhier ne pouvait exercer aucune discr6tion A cet 6gard, et de son propre mouvement, sans y 6tre requis par les Appelants, accorder un d6lai ult~rieur aux Appelants pour rectifier leurs erreurs ou omissions. Les Appelants ne paraissent pas avoir aucunement essay6 ce moyen d'y rem6dier, et s'en sont tenus A leurs pr6tentions que j'ai signakes. Ils ont eu grand tort; pour ces raisons, je suis d'opinion, lo. Qu'il y avait en faveur des Appelants un droit d'appel du jugement renvoyant les objections pr6liminaires.
2o. Qu'au m6rite de 1'appel, le jugement doit Atre confirm6 avec d6pens contre les Appelants.
J.
Le pr6sent appel est de la d6cision rendue en cette cause, le 24 juillet dernier, maintenant des objections pr6liminaires produites par l'Intim6, et renvoyant la p6tition produite par l'Appelant contre son 6lection. L'Intim6 a soulev6 devant cette cour une question au sujet de la comp6tence de celle-ci a entendre le present appel. C'est de cette question qu'il faut d'abord s'occuper, car de sa d6cision dans la n6gative d6pend le sort de la cause.
L'Acte des Elections Contest6es de 1873, see. 14, admettait, dans les memes termes que celui de 1814, sec. 10, les objections pr6liminaires A la p6tition. Ces objections sont d6finies d'une manibre g6n6rale dans l'un et 1'autre acte, comme 6tant toutes les objections ou raisons d'insuffisance que le d6fendeur pourra faire valoir contre le pdlitionnaire, ou la pdtition, on contre toute proc6dure ultdrieure sur la p6tition, et la Cour ou le Juge doit en decider sommairement.
Mais la constitution de la Cour n'est pas la mAme dans les deux actes.
Le statut de 1873 6tablissait une Cour d'61ection compos6e de trois juges, dont chacun, individuellement, ainsi que tous les autres juges qui pouvaient y si6ger, exergaient au sujet des p6titions d'6lections des pouvoirs diff6rents de ceux de la Cour.
Ainsi, un seul juge pouvait d6cider de la validit6 des objections faites au cautionnement et de tout ce qui s'y rapportait, et exercer les pouvoirs de la Cour d'61ection, except6 lorsqu'il 6tait d6clar6 que la Cour seule pouvait decider, ou quant aux points de droit soulev6s par la p6tition, ou dans un cas sp6cial (spicial case), ou dans les questions r6serv6es par le Juge pour la d6cision de la Cour. Le Juge avait le pouvoir de rbserver sans distinction tous les points de droit soulev6s dans les proc6dures faites en vertu de l'acte.
Quant aux objections prliminaires qui devaient Atre d6cid6es sommairement, il y avait juridiction concurrente entre le Juge et la Cour.
L'Acte de 1874 a fait disparaitre ces differences de pouvoir entre un seul Juge et la Cour telle que compose auparavant.
Aujourd'hui, la Cour ne consiste plus que d'un seul juge qui decide sur toutes les proc6dures qui peuvent avoir lieu au sujet d'une p6tition d'blection, ainsi que sur toutes les questions de faits et de droit **I.
qui peuvent y 6tre soulev6es.
II doit d6cider finalement, sans pouvoir les r~f6rer A la Cour; car la Cour c'est lui-seul, la distinction entre les pouvoirs de la Cour et du juge n'existant plus.
Au lieu du pouvoir qu'avait le Juge en vertu de l'acte de 1873, simplement de r6server la d6cision des questions de droit pour la Cour, compos6e de trois juges, la loi de 1874 avait substitu6 l'appel, pour la province de Quebec, A la Cour de R6vision. Toute partie A la p6tition pouvait, dans les huit jours de la d6cision, faire transmettre le dossier A cette Cour. Les proc6dures devaient y etre conduites comme dans une cause en r6vision, et la Cour devait prononcer sa d6cision sur les matiares de fait et de droit sur lesquelles le juge aurait pu luim~me prononcer, et de la mame manibre qu'il aurait pu le faire.
Les pouvoirs exerc6s A cette 6poque par la Cour de R&vision ont t6, en vertu de la 38me Vict., ch. 11, sec. 48, transf6r&s A cette Cour qui doit prononcer, tant sur les questions de droit.que sur les questions de jaits, le jugement qui aurait d-h Atre rendu par le juge de la d6cision duquel appel est interjet6.
La principale objection que l'on fait au droit d'appel en cette cause provient de ce que dans cette sec. 48 l'on emploie, pour d6signer le jugement dont il y aura appel, les expressions suivantes : "the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition; " et aussi de ce que plus bas dans la m~me section, le r6gistraire est requis " to set down the matter of the said petition for hearing." On pr&tend que ces expressions ne peuvent s'entendre que du. m6rite de la p6tition, et non pas d'une d6cision sur des objections pr6liminaires; que partant cette Cour n'a pas droit de prendre connaissance du pr6sent appel, bien que le jugement dont on se plaint mette fin A la p6tition. C'est en donnant au mot trial une signification restreinte qu'il ne me semble pas avoir dans cet acte, qu'on arrive & cette cons6quence.
Ce terme (trial) ne doit pas s'apv* pliquer seulement A l'examen des faits concernant le m6rite de la p6tition, puisque d'aprbs la loi il peut y avoir plusieurs trials dans la meme contestation, savoir: trial sur les objections pr61iminaires, et trial sur le m6rite de la p6tition.
L'examen de la mati~re de fait en issue 6tant un trial d'aprbs la d6finition technique, ce terme devait done s'appliquer A 1'instruction de la contestation soulev6e par les objections pr6liminaires aussi bien qu'A l'examen dum6rite de la p6tition; laloi en se servant de cette expression indique 1'un aussi bien que 1'autre, puisque, dans les deux cas, il y a lieu & 1'examen (trial) des questions de faits.
Mais on dira, peut-6tre, que dans le cas actuel les objections pr6liminaires, n'6tant fond6es que sur des moyens de forme attaquant la r6gularit6 de la signification de la p6tition et des avis requis par la loi, elles ne font pas r6gulibrement la matibre d'une telle proc6dure. Cependant d'aprbs la section 10, toute raison suffisante pour emp~cher toute procidure ult6rieure sur la p6tition est indiquie comme pouvant faire le sujet d'objections pr6liminaires sur lesquelles il peut tre prononc6 un jugement qui met fin A la contestation.
Or, il n'existe pas, je crois, d'autre manibre de prendre avantage de ces irr6gularit6s que par objections pr6liminaires. De tout temps cette manibre de procder a 6t6 admise, et de tout temps aussi, on a consid6r6 que les expressions try the merits of the petition, try the matter of the petition s'appliquaient au jugement rendu sur ces objections comme au jugement d6cidant le m6rite de la p6tition. O'est par des objections pr6liminaires que dans la cause de Honiton, (1) le membre si6geant prenait avautage, lo.: du fait que la p6tition produite n'6tait pas de bonne foi une p6tition renouvel6e, ainsi que la loi 1'exigeait & cette 6poque, lorsque la proc6dure n'avait pas t termin6e dans la session, mais un duplicata de celle qui avait t6 pr6sent6e dans une session pr6c6dente; 2o : que les p6titionnaires s'6taient rendus coupables de corruption.
Le Conseil du membre si6geant argumentait ainsi: it. trial of of it try; the Le comit6 adopta cette manibre de voir et d6clara que le membre si6geant pouvait faire la preuve de la nullit6 de la p6tition, et prouver aussi 1'irr6gularit6 dans la signature et la pr6sentation de la seconde p6tition. Le r6sultat final fut le renvoi de la p6tition pour les motifs invoqu6s dans les objections pr6liminaires. La cause de Bedford en 1728 tait du m~me genre. Ces d6cisions ont 6t6 rendues en vertu de l'acte 10 Geo. 3, ch. 16, commun6ment appel6 le Grenville act lequel contient au sujet de la r6f6rence d'une p6tition d'61ection A un comit6, les m~mes expressions que celles employ6es dans la 38 Vict. ch. 11., sec. 48.
La section 72 de cet acte d~orbtait que le comit6 g6n6ral auquel 6tait r6f6r6e la formation des comit6s sp6ciaux pour la d6cision des p6titions d'6lection ferait rapport A la Chambre des noms des membres " of such select committee appointed to try the merits."
Par la section 73 il 6tait exig6 des membres ainsi iiomm6s qu'ils prtassent le serment de of at Cependant, en d6pit des expressions si souvent r6p6t6es " to try the merits, to try the matter of the petition, to determine the merits of the return of election," on a de tout temps divis6 la contestation d'une 6lection et admis des moyens de forme plaid6s par objections pr6liminaires, dont la d6cision avait 1'effet de terminer la contestation. J'oserais dire sans craindre de commettre une grave erreur, qu'il a t6 jug6 autant de p6titions d'61ections sur des objections pr6liminaires, que sur le m6rite meme de ces p6titions.
Cependant les r6ferences, faites aux comit6s charg6s de les decider, 6taient " to try the merits," malgr6 cela on n'a jamais eu l'id6e que c'tait forfaire au serment " to try the merits " que de d6cider finalement du sort d'une p6tition sur des moyens de forme.
Telle a toujours 6t6 la jurisprudence tant en Angleterre qu'ici, depuis que la d6cision des 6lections contest6es a 6t6 transf6r6e de la Chambre des Communes A des comit6s sp6ciaux asserment6s pour cet objet, c'est A dire pendant un si~cle.
On ne doit done pas h6siter A conclure que ces expressions " try the merits " signifiaient dans l'acte imp&rial des 61ections - contest6es de 1770, et dans notre statut provincial de 1861, le proc6s (trial) sur les objections pr6liminaires aussi bien que le procks (trial) sur le m6rite de la p6tition.
En r6p6tant les mimes expressions dans 'acte des 6lections contestbes de 1873 et 1874 ainsi que dans la 38e Vic., ch. 11, sect. 48, la l6gislature est cens6e d'aprbs les rgles ordinaires d'interpr6tation des statuts, avoir adopt6 et conserv6 l'interpr6tation donn6e ant6rieurement ces expressions.
Dans la section 48, conform6ment A la jurisprudence 6tablie, les expressions " try the petition " on " try the matter of the petition " doivent avoir la mime signification qu'auparavant.
Cons6quemment l'appel donn6 dans ces termes doit aussi comprendre l'appel d'un jugement qui, quoique rendu sur des objections pr61iminaires d6cide en m~me temps le m6rite de la p6tition et an6antit la contestation. D'ailleurs les termes de la section 48 donnant le droit d'appel me semble ne laisser aucun doute sur ce sujet; " any party to an election petition under the said Act, who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the judge who has tried such petition, on any question of law or of fact, and desires to appeal against the same etc." O'est de la decision que l'appel a lieu, non pas du procs (trial) et cette d6cision pent tre rendue " on the trial of a question of law or offact." Dans le cas actuel il y avait l'un et l'autre; et c'est de la d6cision sur les questions de fait et de droit que 1'appel est donn6, sans distinction d'appel sur le m6rite on sur les objections prbliminaires. La loi ne fait A cet 6gard ni restriction ni distinctions, et l, oi elle n'en fait pas, il n'est pas permis au juge d'en faire.
Pour ces raisons, je suis d'avis que 1'appel devrait 6tre re9u.
Quant aux questions soulev6es sur le m~rite, il serait inutile d'entrer dans leur consid6ration, puisque la majorit6 de la Cour est d'opinion qu'il n'y a pas d'appel du jugement dont on se plaint en cette cause.
HENRY, J. :- The points in this case I have found not to be so easily resolved as, at the hearing, I was inclined to think They were raised by two issues, numbers one and four, in the shape of preliminary objections, by the Respondent as follows
The Respondent asked to have the petition dismissed because, as he alleges,
1st. No certified copy of the petition was served upon him, and
2nd. No notice of the presentation of the petition and ,of the bail (cautionement) was served upon him. The learned Judge before whom the matter came decided in favor of the Respondent on both points ; and dismissed the petition with costs. From that judgment the Petitioners appealed to this Court; and, in addition to the claim of the correctness of that decision, the Respondent takes the ground that, inasmuch as the merits .of the petition were not heard and adjudicated upon by the learned Judge, no appeal will lie.
I will deal with the latter objection first, as it touches the jurisdiction of this Court to try the merits of the judgment given on the other points at issue.
The appeal directly to this Court in controverted election cases is given by section 48 of the Dominion Act of 1875, entitled: " An Act to establish a Supreme Court and a Court of Exchequer for the Dominion of Canada."
It provides for the repeal of sections 33, 34 and 35 of the Controverted Elections Act of 1874, and enacts that: of of fact, It also empowers' this Court to make orders as to the money deposited; as to the costs of the appeal; and also [VOL. fl. for the taking of further evidence when improperly rejected, and it further provides
That the Registrar shall certify to the Speaker of the House of Commons the judgment and decision of the Court upon the several questions, as well of fact as of law, upon which the Judge appealed from might otherwise have determined and certified his decision in pursuance of the said Act, in the same manner as the said Judge should otherwise have done, and with the same effect, &c.
The thirty-third section of the Act of 1874, so repealed, provided for appeal from the Judge to the Court of Review in Quebec or Montreal, as the case might be, as follows:
Provided also that in the Province of Quebec, any party to the petition may, after depositing the neccessary sum of money as security, &c., file in the same office an inscription for review, notice of which must be given to each of the opposite parties, &c.,
* * * and all other proceedings shall be had as in a case of review. And the Court shall determine and certify its determination and decision to the Speaker upon the several points and matters, as well of fact as of law, &c.
as in section 48 of the other Act hereinbefore first quoted.
Section 34 provides for the appeals to be made to the Court of Review at Quebec or Montreal, as the case might be.
Section 35- Provided, also, that in any other of the Provinces any party to the petition who may be dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge on any question of law or of fact, and desiresto appeal against the same, may, within eight days from the day on which the Judge has given his decision, deposit in the Court of which the said Judge is a member, with the proper officer of the Court, &c., the sum of one hundred dollars, &c., by way of security for costs, &c.
The matter of the petition is then to be set down " for hearing before the full Court."
And the said appeal shall thereupon be heard and determined by the said full Court, and the judgment shall be pronounced both upon questions of law and of fact, as should, in the opinion of the said Court, have been delivered by the said Judge, with the same conclusion as to the power to dispose of the deposit and the costs of the appeal, the certificate to the Speaker, and the finality of the judgment in substance as in the section which gives the appeal to this Court.
Under the circumstances in this case, then, could a party, dissatisfied with the decision of a Judge of the Superior Court of Quebec as to the preliminary objections, appeal to the whole Court?
By the Act the preliminary questions may be tried by the Court or a Judge, and sections 3 and 7 declare what " the Court " and " theJudge," when used in the Act, shall mean. Section 3 provides:- And section 7 provides:- Section 10 provides for the filing of preliminary I have no doubt that the objections taken were legitimate ones in this case, which, if proved, would be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the petition, but the consideration of which I consider unnecessary.
By the Act of 1874 no part of the proceedings in regard to preliminary objections need necessarily come before " the Court "; for section 3 makes a Judge " the Court," with plenary powers. The Judge who tries the preliminary objections is, for the time being, " the YOL.
Court," and, if so, no appeal to the whole Court would lie, unless expressly provided by the Statute. I think, therefore, no appeal would lie to the whole Court.
Section 7 says that " the Judge " shall mean not only the Judge trying the petition, but a Judge performing any duty to which the enactment in which the expression occurs has -reference.
Section 33 provides for an appeal to the whole Court within " eight days from the day on which the Judge has given his decision," and for the hearing of the appeal, and enacts, that all other proceedings shall be had as in a case of Review.
It has been contended that an appeal will only lie from the decision of the Judge who tried the merits the petition, and not from the Judge who tried the preliminary objections.
Section 33, however, gives an appeal from the decision of " the Judge," without any distinction, as between the Judge trying the preliminary objections and the Judge trying the merits of the petition. The words " performing any duty," would, no doubt, in some respects, and for some purposes, apply to and include the Judge trying the preliminary objections. The section in question says, in substance, that " the Judge " shall mean and include a Judge other than the Judge trying the petition, but it may not still be applicable to " the Judge " trying the preliminary objections and still have abundant application otherwise. If it be considered wise or necessary that the party against whom a decision is given on a trial of the merits should be entitled to an appeal, why should there not be an appeal when an erroneous judgment on the preliminary objections deprives the petitioner of a trial on the merits, and leaves the Respondent illegally in his seat. I cannot conclude the Legislature intended to leave parties interested and the status of the Legislature itself dependent to such an extent on the decision of any one Judge with out appeal. The question here is however not so much, what the intention was, but whether an appeal in such a case is, by legisla- E. tion, provided. That it is not by express provision is clear, and I must confess I find no -little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that it is necessarily to be implied.
The words of the clause giving the appeal to this Court provide for such appeal only from " the decision of the Judge who has tried such petition; " and the five latter words, being clearly words of limitation, we cannot extend the provision beyond them, unless by other parts of the Act it is patent they were not intended to be so construed.
I have sought in vain for anything in any of the enactments to justify the conclusion that the restrictive words in question were not intended to have their full effect.
If the Legislature intended an appeal should be had from the judgment on the preliminary objections, the restrictive words were unfortunately used; but I feel myself bound to interpret the several Statutes as I find the wording of them requires irrespective of results.
What is meant by the words " tried the petition " ? They are, to my mind, intended to distinguish between the Judge who has tried the merits of the petition from a Judge who may have tried the preliminary objections. Section 13 of the Act of 1874, provides that every election petition shall be tried by one of the Judges, &c., without a jury; and settles where the trial shall take place.
" The Judge who has tried the petition," is here pretty plainly indicated, and certainly does not, in my opinion, include the Judge who tries the preliminary objections.
It is not necessarily the same Judge who tries both; and although it may be asserted that the Judge who tries the preliminary objections does indirectly, as in this case, determine the election, and in that way try the petition, is such a tral what the Statute refers to ? I have had no small difficulty on that point* but I cannot see my way clear, after a studious con- sideration of all the legislation upon the subject, to the conclusion that -such should be the proper legal interpretation of the words by which an appeal is provided.
The clause giving the appeal to this Court, as also those giving the appeal to the other Courts under the Act of 1874, clearly point to a final judgment and report to the Speaker; and if it was intended that the judgment on preliminary objections should be the subject of an appeal, no final judgment could in many cases be given, and the matter would, in case of reversal, have to go back to a Judge to try the merits of the petition. For such there is no statutory provision; and when considering the words of limitation I have mentioned in connection with that fact, and the provision for the peculiar and final judgment to be given on appeal, and report of the same to the Speaker, I feel myself bound to conclude, either that no appeal in such cases was intended, or, that if it was, the legislation for it is defective.
Section 29 of the Act of 1874 provides that the Judge shall, after eight days from the time of his decision, unless in case of an appeal, certify his determination to the Speaker, and it shall be final; and the same provision for eight days' time for an appeal is given in section 32, where provision is made for a decision upon a " special case " agreed upon.
Section 10, which provides for the trial of preliminary objections, has no such time given, but says that
The distinction that thus appears as to the judgment in the latter case from those under sections 29 and 82, would lead to the conclusion that on the trial under section 10, no appeal was contemplated.
There are,
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- section 25 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act
- section 23 of the Controverted Elections Act
- Section 48 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act
- section 37 of the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act
- section 48 of the Dominion Act
- sections 33
- 34
- 35 of the Controverted Elections Act