Benning v. Thibaudeau

the judgment of the Court of Review

The following special case was agreed upon for the decision of the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: On the 13th February, 1882, Alphonse Marcotte the city of Montreal, merchant, being insolvent, made an assigment of his estate, property and effects to the respondent, one of his creditors, for the benefit of the whole of his creditors.

On the 22nd of April, 1882, appellants, creditors said Marcotte, filed their claim duly attested upon oath for an amount of $19,139.83 in the hands of the respondent, and the latter after having realized portion of Marcotte's property assigned as above prepared and advertised a dividend sheet at the rate of 12J cents in the dollar, payable on the 13th July following. Appellants were collocated on said dividend sheet for a sum of $2,392.49, but when they demanded payment of the same on the 13th of July, 1882, the payment thereof *was refused.

Hence the present action by appellants against respondent demanding payment of said sum of $2,392.49.

To this action respondent pleaded that appellants had no claim against Marcotte; that before his insolvency Marcotte had transferred to appellants promissory notes and merchandise for a large amount; and that, in crediting Marcotte with the sums paid out the promissory notes and merchandise transferred as above and of the amounts realized therefrom, appellants claim was paid in full.

By their answer to this plea appellants admitted having realized subsequently to the filing of their claim, out of the promissory notes and merchandise to them transferred as collateral security by Marcotte, certain sums of money very much inferior to the amount of their claim, but they claimed the right to rank for the original amount of their claim until paid in full.

Appellants made advances to Marcotte up to the amount of their claim on his promissory note for a like amount taking as further security a transfer from Marcotte of the notes and goods hereinafter mentioned or referred to.

The collateral securities, so transferred by Marcotte to appellants, consisted of promissory notes endorsed by Marcotte and of a certain quantity of merchandise, the amount of said promissory notes being $23,436.30 signed almost all of them by one Moodie, to the order of Marcotte and endorsed by him.

Moodie had also become an insolvent and appellants realized out of his estate, in virtue of said promissory notes, $9,676.24; of which $8,363.76 was received in May, 1882, subsequent to the filing of their claim but previous to the 13th July, 1882, when the dividend was made payable, $911.57 in May, June and July 1882; and $248.91 in April, 1883.

Appellants also realized out of the goods and merchandise transferred to them by Marcotte a further sum of $490.00, making with that of $9,676.24 a total sum of $10,166.24.

The parties are agreed to submit to this honourable court for its decision as they have done in the court below, the following question, to wit:

" Are appellants entitled to a dividend on the full amount of their claim as filed, to wit on $19,139.83, or only on the balance of said claim after deduction in whole or in part of the $10,166.24 by them realized out of said promissory notes and goods and merchandise." In the Supreme Court of Canada the case was first argued on the 13th May, 1890, the Honourable Mr. Justice Taschereau being absent, but: by order of the .court the case was set down for a rehearing before the full court at the February sessions 1891.

Marcad6 and Daniel on negotiable instruments ; and on the 3rd point: Is the bearer of a joint and several obligation, or the creditor of joint and several debtors by way of suretyship or otherwise entitled to rank on the estate of each of the co-debtors for the full amount of his claim, until he has been paid in full without being obliged to deduct therefrom the amount received from one or the other, by way of dividend, after. the filing of the claim?

Laurent (7);

Benning v. Thibaudeau Judgment of Mr. Justice Jett6 and cases cited by him. Dalloz Vo. Distribution par contribution and Arts. 1II7, 1156, 1157 0.0.

Arts. 605, 741 C.P.C., and Troplong, G-age (10); Ontario Bank v.Chaplin and other cases there cited.

Sir W. RITCHIE C.J.- For the reasons given by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) I am of opinion, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.- I am of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed.

In the joint statement of facts submitted by the parties it is admitted that " the appel- "lants made advances to Marcotte up to the amount "their claim on his promissory note for a like amount taking as further security a transfer from Marcotte "of the notes and goods hereinafter mentioned. The collateral securities so transferred by Marcotte to the appellants consisted of promissory notes endorsed by Marcotte and of a certain quantity of merchandise, the promissory notes being signed almost all of them by one Moodie, to the order of Marcotte and endorsed by him."

From this state of facts it appears that the promissory notes, out of which the appellants obtained the greater. part of the partial payment of their debt which has given rise to this controversy, were held by them by way of pledge, and not absolutely.

Therefore as the pledged notes exceeded in amount the original debt due from Marcotte to the appellants, the appellants, if they had collected the full amount of these notes would have been liable to account to Marcotte's estate for the balance remaining after the satisfaction of their own claim. Under these circumstances it is impossible to say that as between Marcotte and the appellants any new debt was created or liability incurred by Marcotte's endorsement of Moodie's notes. There was but one single debt due from Marcotte to the appellants represented by his promissory note in their favour and not a new joint and several debt for an amount never really due to them from Marcptte. It is always competent as between the immediate parties to securities, such as bills and notes transferred by endorsement, to show that the endorsement was made with the intention and for the sole purpose of effecting J. a pledge of the securities, which was the fact in the present case. Nouguier Alauzet, Droit Commercial There was therefore no joint and several liability on the part of Marcotte, and the question principally argued and which does call for an adjudication in the case of the Ontario Bank v. Chaplin does not arise at all in the present case.

The only question therefore, is whether the moneys realized by the appellants in respect of the pledged notes and property are to be treated as payments pro tanto of the appellants' debt.

Of this there can be little doubt, at least as regards the proceeds of the notes which were placed by the debtor in the hands of his creditor for this very purpose. It is true that the amount arising from the notes was not received by the appellants, until after they had filed their claim, but this can make no difference since the only question can be, what was the amount due to the appellants at the time they were entitled to judgment ? The rule of English bankruptcy procedure, which does not oblige a creditor, who has proyed his debt, to give credit for payments received by him from another party after the date of the proof. is a purely arbitrary rule of procedure and can have no application to a case like the present. The administration and winding-up of the insolvent's estate was not under any statute, but under a voluntary creditors' deed, and no law says that any difference shall be made between payments received before, and those received after the filing of the claim.

I repeat the only question can be, what was due at the time the action was taken or the judgment rendered, and the assignee is on ordinary principles .slni.

entitled to credit for all payments made anterior to that date.

Further, I do not see any reason why any difference should be made between the credit to be given for the amount of the notes collected and the $490 produced by the sale of the goods.

The sale of the goods is not in any way impeached, and must be assumed to have been authorised or acquiesced in by Marcotte; then the price ought, it would seem, to be credited just as is the money arising from the notes. The Court Queen's Bench have, however, made a distinction founded upon the fact that the $490 was not received until after the preparation of the dividend sheet. With great deference, I am unable to see any ground for this distinction. The appellants were only entitled to judgment for the amount actually remaining due to them deducting all payments.

I should, therefore, if it had been open to us to do so have been prepared to have affirmed Mr. Justice Mathieu's judgment in its integrity. There has, however, been no cross appeal, and the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench must consequently be affirmed with costs, subject to the correction of an obvious error in calculation pointed out in the respondent's factum which requires that the sum of $1,550.50 for which judgment has been rendered should. be reduced to $1,214.06.

J.-Les faits ci-dessus 6nonc~s dans l'admission des parties (1) donnent lieu & la question suivante: les appelants ont-ils droit A un dividende sur le montant entier de leur r6clamation telle que produite, savoir, sur $19,139.83, ou seulement sur la balance de cette r&clamation, apr~s d6duction en tout ou en partie de la somme de $10,166.24 qu'ils ont r6alis~s sur les billets promissoires et les marchandises qui leur avaient t transport6s par Marcotte ?

Les appelants pr~tendent que les billets de Moodie qui leur avaient td transport6s par endossement comme garantie de la dette de Marcotte 6taient devenus autant de cr6ances solidaires contre le failli et les signataires on endosseurs de ces billets, et qu'en vertu des regles de la solidarit6 ils out droit de r~clamer la totalit6 de chaque cr~ance de chacun des d6biteurs solidaires jusqu'au parfait paiement. Qu'en cons6quence de la faillite de Marcotte, ils ont droit pour arriver au paiement integral de leur cr6ance, de r6clamer de 1'intim6, son syndic, sur le chiffre nominal de leur cr6auce, an moment de la faillite, sans d6duction des sommes reques subs6quemment des autres d6biteurs des cr6ances transport&es.

L'intim6 pr6tend au contraire que les billets et marchandises transport~s par Marcotte aux appelants n'6tant en leur possession qu'd titre de gage, la r6alisation de ce gage, A quelque moment qu'elle se produise, a pour r~sultat n~cessaire 1'extinction pro tanto de leur cr~ance. En cons6quence, l'intim6 pr6tend que la question de solidarith ne se pr6sente pas et qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'en appliquer les principes.

La cour de premiere instance a donn6 gain de cause A l'intim6 en d6cidant que les r~gles de gage devaient s'appliquer dans le cas actuel, et que les appelants n'avaient le droit de concourir avec les autres cr6anciers. du failli que sous la d6duction des sommes reques de la vente des marchandises et de la perception des billets transport~s.

La cour de Revision pour le district de Montr6al a modifi6 ce jugement en d~clarant que le produit des marchandises devait 6tre imput6 comme un paiement sur la r6olamation des appelants, mais que ceux-ci v _ avaient le droit de concourir avec les autres cr~anciers sur le montant de leur r~clamation, $19,139.83, sous la j. deduction seulement de la somme de $490.00 provenant de la vente des marchandises.

La cour du Bane de la Reine appel6e plus tard A se prononcer sur ces questions, a confirm6 le jugement de la cour de premibre instance et d6cid6 que les appelants n'avaient le droit de concourir avec les autres cr~anciers que sous la d6duction de tout ce qu'ils avaient requ de Marcotte, tant des billets promissoires que des marchandises transport~es.

Par 1'appel A cette cour la mime question nous est pr6sentement soumise.

La position des appelants est-elle v6ritablement celle de cr6anciers solidaires du failli Marcotte et des signataires et endosseurs des billets par lui transporths aux dits appelants ?

C'est un principe incontestable que le faiseur d'un billet promissoire s'oblige directement envers toutes les parties qui peuvent ensuite en devenir porteurs que ces derniers ne se repr6sentent pas les uns les autres, mais sont tons cr6anciers du faiseur en vertu de leurs propres droits.

Mass6, Droit Commercial (1). Les appelants sont devenus les cr6anciers directs de Moodie par le transport que Marcotte leur a fait des billets que Moodie avait souscrits en sa faveur. Ces billets transportis pour assurer le paiement de la dette de Marcotte et faits payables A son ordre ont par l'effet de 1'endossement de Marcotte rendu le faiseur, Moodie, et l'endosseur Marcotte, d6biteurs conjointement solidairement des appelants.

Par l'admission de faits des parties on voit que les billets et les marchandises ont t transport6s aux appelants comme stiret6 collat6rale, as further security, pour assurer le paiement de leur reclamation. C'est sur ce caract~re de sciret6 collat6rale donn6 au trans- IA port des billets et marchandises que 1'intim6 se fonde pour soutenir qu'il ne s'agit pas ici de solidarite, mais Fournier simplenent de gage. Cette pr6tention est Avidemment erron6e quant aux billets, car ils out t6 endoss6s et les appelants en sont devenus propri6taires sans conditions restrictives et out acquis la qualit6 de cr6anciers solidaires contre Marcotte et tons les signataires on endosseurs de ces billets. La solidarit6 6tant 6tablie par la loi, entre eux, il aurait fallu une condition sp6ciale dans le transport pour y d6roger.

Le fait que ces billets out 6t0 transport6s comme garantie collat6rale, m~me s'il avait 1'effet de constituer un gage ne d6truirait aucunement l'effet de la solidarit6. Les solidaires de Marcotte n'en seraient pas moins responsables envers les porteurs.

La signification que 1'intim6 donne aux mots "garantie collat&rale" n'est pas celle qu'ils ont en loi ; elle n'a pas 1'effet de diminuer les obligations 16gales d6coulant de la surete transport6e, mais elle est au contraire une garantie additionnelle.

L'article 1103 du Code Civil d6clare qu'il y a solidarit6 de la part des d6biteurs, lorsqu'ils sont oblig6s A une mAme chose, de manidre que chacun d'eux puisse 6tre s~par~ment contraint A l'ex6cution de l'obligation entiere, et que l'excution par 1'une libbre les autres envers le cr~ancier.

Dans le cas actuel les appelants n'avaient qu'une r6clamation et deux d6biteurs dont chacan d'eux tait oblig6 an paiement de toute la dette, et dont le paiement par 'un avait I'effet d'op6rer la d~charge des deux vis-i-vis des appelants.

Laurent dit (1) :- Il y a deux 616ments dans 1'obligation solidaire, on ne pent les expli- BENNING teurs, qui implique autant de liens qu'il y a de personnes obligies. THIAU- D'autie part, la dette est unique, puisque tous les co-ddbiteurs doivent 1ue seule et mgme chose et la doivent pour Te tout. Il y a done tout Fournier j. ensemble un lien multiple et unit4 de la dette.

Il y a un lien multiple parce qu'il y a plusieurs co-d6biteurs, mais ce lien ne se divise pas entre eux : chaque co-ddbiteur est tenu de toute la dette comine s'il y 6tait seul oblig6.

Marcad6 dit (1)

La solidarit6 pourrait exister entre deux personnes qui se sont obligies avec intervalle et par des actes siparis. Il suffirait pour cela que Pierre eflt d~clar6 d'avance consentir h s'engager solidairement avec Paul, ou que le premier oblig6 vint, aprbs que Paul s'est soumis h la solidarit4, d6clarer qu'il entend s'y soumettre avec lui. En un mot, il y aura obligation solidaire proprement dite toutes les Tois que les volont6s des divers obligs se .sont r6unies pour se soumettre h la solidarit6 d'un commun accord.

Demolombe dit (2):

L'obligation solidaire est une, h la vWrit, par rapport h la chose qui en fait l'objet ; mais elle est compos6e d'autant de liens qu'il y a de personnes diff6rentes qui Pont contractde, et ces personnes 6tant diff&rentes entre elles, les liens qui les obligent sont autant de liens diff6rents, qui peuvent, par consdquent, avoir des qualitis diffirentes. Et plus loin (3) :- Renoncer au bin6fice de division et de discussion, c'est en effet, de la part des dbiteurs qui s'obligent conjointement, s'obliger solidairement.

Pas de division!

Done, chacun d'eux pourra 8tre contraint pour le tout.

Pas de discussion !

Done, chacun d'eui pourra 6tre poursuivi principalement, comme s'il en 6tait seul d4biteur envers le crdancier.

La solidarit4 n'est pas autre chose.

Les auteurs sont d'accord que 1'obligation solidaire implique un mandat donn6 et regu par chacun des co-d6biteurs de se repr6senter l'un l'autre (4).

Dans le cas actuel le mandat r6sulte de ce que la dette (1) 4 vol, No. 606.

Code Civil, art. 1105:- La solidarit6 ne se prisume pas; il faut qu'elle soit express~ment Fournier J. stipulde.

Cette rbgle cesse dans les cas oii la solidarit6 a lieu de plein droit en verta d'une disposition de la loi.

Elle ne s'applique pas non plus aux affaires de commerce dans lesquelles l'obligation est pr6sumbe solidaire, exceptd dans les cas r6gl6s diffbremment par des lois sp~ciales.

Cavanagh, Law of money security (1).

The literal meaning of collateral is " additional" or parallel; it does not mean "ancillary " or "secondary" unless shown by other circumstances.

Where securities are intended to rank in successive order, they should contain express clauses to that effect ; thus when two properties are mortgaged there should be a proviso that one shall be the primary, the other the secondary security if it be so intended.

Il y a saus doute une diff6rence h faire entre le transport des marchandises et le transport des billets. Quant aux premiers, je crois qu'il y a lieu de leur faire application des r6gles qui concernent le gage.

Quant aux seconds, je crois que ce sont les principes de la solidarit6 qui doivent r~gler les droits des parties.

Sbus 1'op6ration des lois de faillite de 1869 et 18175, cette question s'est pr6sent6e dans les causes de Bessette v. La Ban que du Peuple (2), et Rochette v. Louis (3).

La loi de 1875 contenait cette disposition.

Art. 89. Le montant dfi A un cr6ancier sur chaque item s~pard de sa r6clamation, au temps de l'ex6cution d'un acte de cession ou de l'dmission d'un bref de saisie-arrit, selon le cas, et qui restera h '6poque oi cette rdlamation sera prouvie formera partie du montant pour lequel il prendra rang sur les biens du failli, jusqu'h ce que cet item de sa r6clamation soit pay6 en entier.

Pans la cause de Rochette v. Louis, le juge en chef

Meredith d6cida que les cr6anciers, MM. Louis et Cie.,

(1) P. 534.

(3). 3 Q. L. R. 97.

n'6taient pas tenus de d6duire de leur rvclamation contre la faillite de Rochette le dividende qu'ils avaient requ, depuis cette reclamation, de Samson leur oblig6 solidaire avec Rochette. Mais cette disposition a disparu Fournier J. avec la loi de faillite.

De sorte qu'il faut rechercher quelle 6tait avant la loi de faillite, la r~gle de notre droit sur la question soumise.

L'hon. juge en chef Meredith a fait cette tude dans la cause de Rochette v. Louis (1), en mime temps qu'une revue de la loi frangaise, anglaise et 6cossaise, sur cette question, que nous citons ci-aprbs.

The rule according to the law of England appears to be that if at the time of proving the creditor has received a part of his claim, he can then only prove for so much as remains due, and when a dividend has been declared under another commission, under which the holder has already proved his bill, though the dividend has not been received, yet the amount of it must deducted from the bill before it can be proved (2).

La loi 6cossaise, telle que nous la trouvons consign6e dans Bell's Commentaries (3) est tout-A-fait differente. He who holds several bound to him, is entitled to demand the whole from each, to the effect of being paid his debt and no more, or, if the co-obligants are bankrupts, a dividend from each corresponding to the whole, but so as not to derive more than payment of the debt from the amount of the several dividends, and that a payment from a part from any one will pro tanto extinguish the claim against that estate, only leaving the security available to its full extent against the others.

Apris avoir ainsi expos6 la loi d'Angleterre et celle d'Ecosse, I'hon. juge dit que depuis 1775, la jurisprudence en France 6tait conforme A la loi 6cossaise, dont le principe fut adopt6 par 'art. 542 du code de commerce qui se lit comme suit:

Le criancier porteur d'instruments endossds, on garantis solidairement par le failli et d'autres co-oblig6s qui sont en faillite, participera (1) 3 Q. L. R. 97.

(2) 3 Q. L. R. at p. 98.

(3) vol. 2, pp. 338 et 339.

aux distributions dans toutes les masses et y figurera pour la valeur nominale de son titre jusqu'h parfait paiement.

L'hon. juge fait suivre cet expos6 de l'observation suivante

The doctrine of the French code and of the Scotch law is favourable . Fournier .. to commercial credit, and it seems to me the most reasonable that can be adopted ; but it is not in accordance with our common law, and is not sanctioned by our statute law respecting insolvency.

As to our common law, Pothier says:

'Si tons ceux qui sont ddbiteurs de la lettre de change, tant laccepteur que le tireur et les endosseurs, avaient fait banqueroute, le propridtaire de la lettre qui est cr6ancier de chacun d'eux du total, pent se faire colloquer dans la distribution des biens de chacun d'eux, comme crdancier du total ; mais aussitit que par la distribution qui aura Wtt la premisre terminde, il aura 6t pay6 d'une partie de sa cr6ance, puta, du quart, il ne pourra plus rester dans les distributions des autres d6biteurs qni restent h faire, que pour le surplus de ce qui lui est dt (Contrat d'4change No. 160).'

Renouard refers to the opinion of Pothier as being in accordance with that of Dupuy de la Serra, Bournier, Boutarie and Jousse (Renouard, vol. 2, p. 223), and speaks of the doctrine, for which they contended as an improvement upon that maintained by Savary, and as being not the same, but a step towards the modern law of France. It is thought by some persons whose opinions are well deserving of respect, that as to the matter under consideration, there is no difference between the old law and the modern law of France. But a comparison of the above extract from Pothier with the article 542 of the French code, is sufficient to show that opinion to be erroneous ; and Bdarride, Trait6 des Faillites, No. 853, expressly says

'L'article 542 contient done une d6rogation an droit commun.'

L'honorable juge en chef Meredith est d'avis que le principe adopt6 par Particle 542 du code commercial francais n'est pas notre droit.

G'est. aussi l'opinion de l'honorable juge Mondelet qui disait dans la cause de Bessette v. La Banque du Peuple (1) :

The newor present jurisprudence of France is of no application to the present case.

The Scotch law, whatever its wisdom may be, cannot be our rule.

L'honorable juge Jett6 tout en exprimant son respect pour l'opinion de ces savants magistrats d6clare que ces opinions ne lui paraissent pas concluantes:

En effet, dit-il, elles ne se posent que sur une apprdciation comparative de certains textes de kgislation formelle des divers pays mentionns, ce qui pouvait suffire, dans les circonstancess, puisque nous avions alors une loi positive sur la matibre.

Mais aujourd'hui que cette loi est disparue de notre droit, la question doit tre examinde h Fournier J. un autre point de vue, et c'est au d6veloppement de la science thiorique du droit que nous devons en demander la solution.

Il r6sume ensuite les observations de Demolombe sur les cons6quences de la solidarit6 entre d6biteurs: Trois systhmes se sont successivement produits en France, au sujet du secours accord6 aux crianciers de plusieurs debiteurs en 4tat de faillite.

D'apris le premier systhme, le cr4ancier avait le droit de se presenter A l'une des masses en liquidation de ses divers dbbitcurs, la plus avantageuse s'il le voulait, mais une fois son choix fait, il ne pouvait plus rdclamer des autres masses qui se trouvaient absolument lib6rdes A son 4gard.

C'6tait le systhme de Savary, le principal ridacteur de 1'ordonnance de 1673.

Inutile d'apprcier ce systime si contraire aux principes qui prevalent aujourd'hui dans notre droit.

Le second systbme permettait an crdancier de se prdsenter successivement aux faillites de ses divers d6biteurs solidaires, mais A la condition de ddduire, dans les dernibres, ce qu'il avait regu dans les premibres.

C'6tait le systime de Dupuy de la Serra, Boutaric, Jousse et Pothier, comme nous 'avous vu tout-h-P'heure par la citation des notes du juge en chef Meredith, et c'est celui que virtuellement le difendeur vent appliquer aux demandeurs dans 1'espce.

Le troisibme systhme parait avoir le r6sultat de deux arrits rendus en 1776, Pun par le parlement -de Paris, Pautre par le parlement d'Aix.

Le parlement de Paris avait jug6, en principe que le criancier de divers dibiteurs solidaires reut prisenter successivement dans toutes les faillites, pour la valeur nominale de son titre, sans aucune dtduction des dividendes par lui ddj& regus.

Le parlement d'Aix avait jug6 an contraire, mais sa ddcision fat cassie par arrit du conseil, le 24 f6vrier 1778, qui fut lui-mime confirmi par un second arrit du 23 octobre 1781, portant rejet de la requite en opposition, dirigde contre le premier.

Depuis lors, la jurisprudence fut fixie et lorsque les ridacteurs du code de commerce eurent h exprimer Ia loi sur ce point, ils le firent dans le sens de cette jurisprudence par Particle 542 du code de com- B Telle est incontestablement la loi francaise actuelle. Mais dira-t-on, cette loi n'est.pas la n6tre, et il est 6vident que cet article du code de commerce ne peut ktre invoqu6 ici.

Il est vrai que la disposition formelle 6dicthe par cet article 542, ne se trouve pas dans nos codes, mais la r~gle qu'il consacre est-elle 6trangbre A notre 16gislation?

B6darride, cit6 par M. le juge Meredith, dit bien que cet article 542 est une d&rogation au droit commun. Mais le sentiment de ces anteurs me paralt victorieusecombattu par ceux qui soutiennent an contraire que 1'article 542 du code de commerce n'est que 1'expression du droit commun et ne comporte que 1'application du principe de la solidarit6 dont le but est d'assurer au cr6ancier son paiement integral.

O'est en effet la doctrine qui, aprbs de longues controverses a finalement triomph6 et a form6 la jurisprudence en France sur cette question avant 1adoption de 'article 542 du code de commerce.

L'honorable juge Meredith, fait erreur en disant que le principe de la loi ecossaise a 6t adopt6 par P'article 542 du code de commerce.

Cette question faisait depuis longtemps le sujet d'une division d'opinion parmi les jurisconsultes, comme on le verra par l'autorit6 cit6e ci-apris de Dalloz, dans laquelle il fait 1'historique de la question. Non seulement les jurisconsultes 6taient divis6s, mais les parlements l'6taient aussi, ceux d'Aix et de Paris d~cidant en sens inverse. La question fut r6gl6e longtemps avant l'adoption du code de commerce par deux arrdts du Roi en conseil qui reconnaissent au cr6ancier solidaire le droit de se porter r~clamant pour la totalit6 de sa cr~ance dans toutes les masses de ses co-d~biteurs solidaires.

Ces arrits sont la base de la jurisprudence *.

qui a exist jusqu'au code de commerce qui en a adopt6 le principe dans Particle qui fut d'abord Particle 534 Fournier j. et qui est maintenant Particle 542:

Les auteurs qui soutienuent que cet article constitue une innovation sont Avidemment dans l'erreur puisque le principe 6tait d6ja depuis longtemps reconnu par la plus haute autorit6 judiciaire de France, l'arrAt du Roi en son conseil, ainsi qu'ou pent le voir par la citation suivante d'Embrigon, Traith des Assurances (1):

La mime question 6tait alars agit~e au parlement de Paris, au sujet de certaines lettres de change tirdes par M et endossies par L. Ils avaient fait faillite et obtenu une remise de la part de leurs crdanciers respectifs.

Par un 6v6nement singulier, le parlement de Paris rendit le m~me jour, 18 juin 1776, un arrat diam4tralement oppos6 & celui du parlement d'Aix.

Il fut d4clard que le porteur du billet avait droit de figurer dans chaque direction, pour la totalit6 du titre, jusqu'd extinetion de crdance.

Bellon se pourvut au conseil, et obtint du roi un arr~t dont voici la teneur : " Oui le rapport du sieur Moreau de Beaumont, conseiller ordinaire, et au Conseil royal de commerce, le roi 6tant en son conseil, ayant 4gard & la dite requate, a cass6 et casse le dit arrat du parlement d'Aix, du dit jour, 18 juin 1776, et tout ce qui s'en est ensuivi; ce faisant, a 6voqu6 et 4voque les demandes et contestations sur lesquelles le dit arrt est intervenu, circonstances et dependances ; a ordonn4 et ordonne que les parties procderont en son conseil sur leurs demandes et contestations, en la forme port6e par le rbglement, pour 6tre statub ainsi qu'il appartiendra. Fait au Conseil d'6tat du roi tenu h Versailles, le 24 fivrier 1778.

Sign6, Huguet de Montaran.

Autre arrat du Conseil, rendu le 23 octobre 1781, qui d6boute Zacherie B. et consorts de la requite qu'ils avaient pr6sentde en opposition.

Voild done la question prdjug6e en faveur du porteur du papier. Les d6biteurs corrds doivent chacun la mame somme.

Le titre est indivisible vis-h-vis de chacun d'eux : Promittentes singuli in solidum tenentur; in utraque enim obligatione una res vertitur. Inst. de duobus reis. La faillite des dbiteurs corris n'altbre en rien Findividualit6 de la (1) Ch. 10, p. 569.

creance, qui ne cesse d'6tre la mame dans chaque direction, et qui conserve sa force jusqu'h ce qu'elle soit 6teinte par un entier paiement. CONFARENCE.

THIBAU- LIV. Le code de commerce a mis fin & ces longues controverses des auteurs, sur la question pr6sentde.

" Le cr6ancier porteur d'engage- Fournier . ments solidaires entre le failli et d'autres co-oblig6s qui sont en faillite, participera aux distributions dans toutes les masses, jusqu' son parfait et entier paiement." (Art. 534).

Ces principes d6rivent de celui de la solidarit6, car il y a solidarit6 de la part des ddbiteurs, lorsqu'ils sont oblighs de manire que chacun puisse ftre contraint pour la totalit6.

Le titre est indivisible h 1'gard de chacun d'eux.

(Voyez d'ailleurs les art. 1200, 1201, 1202 et 1204 du Code civil, et Part. 140 du Code de commerce ; voyez notre Trait6 des faillites, tom. 2 chapitre I, section 13, No. 279.)

Ces arr~ts, quoi qu'ils n'aient pas pour nous 1'autorit6 16gislative, ni 1'autorit6 judiciaire de nos tribunaux n'en out pas moins r~glM d6finitivement une question soulev6e sur les effets du principe de la solidarit6 qui 6tait exprim6 dans la loi frangaise alors, comme il l'6tait dans notre propre droit.

11 en r6sulte n6cessairement que les arr~ts en conseil doivent valoir au moins pour nous comme raison 6crite, et faire autorit6 dans- nos cours au mame titre que les dcisions de la cour de Cassation, lorsqu'elles portent sur un texte qui est semblable dans le code frangais et dans le n6tre.

Ainsi comme le dit d'Embrigon, voili donc la question pr6jug6e en faveur du porteur du papier. Les d6biteurs corr6s doivent chacun la mame somme. Le titre est indivisible vis-h-vis de cha-un d'eux.

Les autorit~s suivantes 6tablissent toutes que les principe's sur lesquels sont bas6s les arrts sont d6riv~s de celui de la solidarit6 et ne forment pas une innovation dans le droit frangais.

Larombibre sur Particle 1204 du Code, au No. 5 (1), parlant des articles 542 et 544 du Code de Commerce, dit:

Ces sages dispositions, expression du droit commun, doivent 6tre B m appliqudes en natibre civile. Elles ne sont, en effet, que laconsdquence BE de ce principe que chaque co-oblig4 solidaire est tenu de la totalitd. Si le crdancier ne figurait pas dans chaque distribution pour la valeur nominale de son titre, et si criance tait diminude successivement Fournier J. du montant de chaque dividende allou6, il en rdsulterait que le crancier perdrait dans tons les cas, une partie de sa crdance, puisque dans la dernire distribution, si avantagense qu'elle fflt, il n'arriverait jamais h un paiement intdgral et serait ainsi priv6 des garanties .que lui donne la solidarit6.

Car chaque ddbiteur est rput6 seul et unique ddbiteur du total, ce n'est 6videnment que pour mieux assurer 1'int6gralit6 de son paiement au moyen de cette responsabilit rciproque et mutuelle de insolvabilitis de la part des co-d6biteurs entre eux.

Mass6-Droit Commercial (1), dit:

On s'est demand6 si l'article 542 du Code de commerce ne fait que forniuler une application des principes sur la solidarit6 et les effets du paiement par dividendes qui sont les mimes en matire civile et en matibre comnierciale.

Les consiquences de ces principes ne tiennent pas h Porganisation sp6ciale des faillites ; elles en sont inddpendantes et par consdquent elles trouvent leur place dans la d~confiture qui n'est autre chose qu'une faillite civile, bien que sa liquidation ne soit soumise h aucune forne et h aucune organisation particulibre. Locr6 (2), dit:

Toutes ces dispositions puisdes dans les principes

146mentaires et immuables du droit civil, s'appliquent i toutes les matiees et i tons les cas.

Au sujet de l'article .542, Code de Commerce, Dalloz, Rep. dit:

On n'a jamais contest6 aux ereanciers qui avaient plusieursdibiteurs solidaires la facult6 de s'adresser & chacun. d'eux indistincternent, soit pour le montant total de la dette, soit pour parfaire le paiement qui n'avait td effectud qu'en partie.

Mais on a d6battu long: emps la question de savoir si, aprbs que le crdancier avait rdclamd soi aiement dans la faillite de 'un des. co-d6biteurs solidaires, il pouvait encore s'adresser aux autres co-ddbiteurs pour tout ce qu'il n'avait pas effectivement regus ? -Comme l'ordonnance de 1673 ne cantenait aucune disposition h cet 6gard, les anciens auteurs i'taient pas d'accord sur la solution de la question.

Ainsi Savary, soutenait, paragraphes 13 et (1) 3 vol. No. 2023.

(3) No. 993, vo. Faillite.

48, 5me question, que lorsque le criancier s'6tait prdsent4 h la faillite de Pun des co-d6biteurs, son opposition 6tait faite et que 1'acceptation d'un dividende dteignait la dette au regard de tous les oblig's. Dupuys de la Serra s'appuyant sur des avis des avocats Perrin, Pomercy et Chappd combattait cette opinion.

Dans le chapitre de son livre, sur Particle des lettres de change, il 6tablissait ainsi le droit Fournier J. de solidaritd:

En cas de faillite de tous les oblig6s & la lettre de change adopt6e et proteste faute de paiement, comme le porteur a une action solidaire contre tous, il a droit d'entrer dans chaque direction et contribution sans pouvoir tre oblig6 d'en choisir on opter une et abandonner les autres......

Le porteur qui signe le contrat d'un des premiers oblig6s, sans avoir un consentement des derniers oblig6s, que c'est sans pr6judice 4 son action, se rend non-recevable contre eux, faute de leur pouvoir cider Paction entibre......

Le porteur qui est entri dans quelque contribution, ne peut entrer dans les suivantes que successivement pour ce qui lui est en reste.

Un arrit du parlement de Paris, du 18 mai 1706, consacre ce systhme que Boutarie; Jousse, en Part. 33 de 1'ordonnance, et Pothier, du Contrat de change, No. 179, approuvbrent 6galement.

Quoique plus favorable au criancier que 1'opinion de Savary, la thiorie de Dupuys de la Serra le soumettait cependant, en fin de compte, h une perte, puisqu'elle ne 1autorisait h venir dans la dernibre faillite que sous la diduction des dividendes par lui requs dans les autres, et que la dernibre faillite ne payait qu'un dividende du reliquat. Un arrit du parlement de Paris, du juin 1776, accordant tons les effets.de la solidariti, d6cida que le criancier avait druit de figurer dans chaque faillite pour la totalit6 du titre, jusqu'-h cc qu'il efit rega son entier paiement, et un arrit du Conseil, rendu le 24 f6vrier 1778, cassa une dicision que le parlement d'Aix avait rendu en sens contraire h celui du parlement de Paris, par arrit du 18 juin 1766, sur la plaidoierie d'Enuirigon (Contrats h la grosse, ch. 10, sec. 3.) Sur Popposition formie contre Parr&t du conseil, un second arrit, du 23 octobre 1781 maintint sa jurisprudence.

Le code du commerce fut ridigi pendant que la jurisprudence itait dans cette situation, et son art. 534 fut icrit dans le sens des arrits rendus par le conseil en 1778 et 1781.

Aussi malgri Pambiguiti de cet article, qui itait ainsi conu: Le criancier porteur d'engagements solidaires entre le failli et d'autres co-oblig6s solidaires qui sont en faillite, participe aux distributions dans toutes les masses jusqu' parfait et entier paiement. Vincens, T. 4, p. 521 ; Pardessus, No. 1211 ; Locr6, T. 7, p. 33 et suivant; Boulay-Paty, Nos. 381 et 382 ; et nous-mimes, T. 8, p. 196, avions considi6 le criancier comme ayant le droit de se prisenter dans chaque masse pour le total de sa crdance, quels que fussent les 129, dividendes partiels qu'il eit pr6c6demment obtenus, et cela jusqu'h parfait payoment.

Par application de cet article, il avait jug6 .

ainsi que le porteur d'effets de commerce, qui avait payd, en partie, par lun des ddbiteurs solidaires de ces effets, pouvait s'adresser la faillite de Pautre pour la totalit6 de sa cr6ance, mais de maniure Fourr J. cependant qu'il ne pflt recevoir au-deld de ce qui lui 6tait ; que s'il avait 6t pass4 un concordat avec le failli, il pouvait 6galement dans les mimes cas et sous les mames conditions, r6clamer le dividende convenu sur la totalit6 de sa cr6ance.

La Cour, attendu que part. 534 0. Com. spdcial pour la matibre, autorise le cr6ancier porteur de lettres de change qui a plusieurs d6biteurs solidaires en 6tat de faillite, h se remplir de Pintgralit de sa crdance, en se prdsentant pour la totaliti de ce qui lui est dii dans chaque masse de ses d6biteurs faillis, jusqu'k ce qu'il alt obtenu son parfait et entier paiement, et que 1'arrt attaqu4 (de la Cour de Douai) n'a fait que se conformer h cet article qui justifle suffisamment Ea d~cision ; rejette, (Rj. 28 janvier 1817.

MM. Brisson, pr. ; Boyer, rap. Jourde, c. conf. affr. Leblond).

Le nouvel article 542 a fait disparaitre tout 6quivoque, en autorisant le crdancier venir dans chaque faillite pour la valeur nominale de son titre jusqu'h parfait paiement (1). Ces autorit6s me paraissent suffisantes pour 6tablir que le droit du cr6ancier de se pr6senter dans toutes les faillites de ses co-d6biteurs solidaires n'est qu'une cons6quence logique du principe de la solidarit6. Mais la cour d'appel ayant t6 unanime dans la r6pudiation de ce principe je ne crois pas devoir m'en tenir 6 ces autorit6s, je pourrais en ajouter beaucoup d'autres, mais je me contenterai des suivantes qui contiennent les opinions de plusieurs de nos plus savants commentateurs :

Masse, Droit Com. et Droit Civil (2), apris avoir d6montr4 que sous l'ordonnance de 1673 les opinions 6taient partag6es, ayant cit6 les opinions de Savary, Dupuys de la Serra, Boutarie, Jousse et Pothier, ajoute: Aussi le commerce, prioccup6 des ndcessit6s du credit et des dangers auxqucls Pexposait un systbme qui limitait le recours du porteur contre ses ddbiteurs faillis, r~clama-t-il vivement contre Pusage qui s'6tait introduit h la suite de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence. La (1) Voir mime auteur no 994.

(2) 3 vol., Nos. 2021, 2022 et 2023. .130 question fut done de nouveau vivement-agit6e entre des commergants et des jurisconsultes; et de cette discussion, dont on retrouve les traces dans le recueil de Nicodbme, it r6sulta que la faillite des divers cooblig6s ne pouvait paralyser les effets de la solidarit6 et que le porteur d'une lettre de change, dont les divers signataires 6taient en itat de faillite, avait le droit de figurer successivement dans toutes les masses, Fournier J. sans diduction des dividendes qu'il avait pergus, et jusqu'A parfait paiement.

Entraini par ce revirement dans la pratique, le parlement de Paris revint sur son ancienne jurisprudence, et par arrit du 18 juin 1776, il dicida que le porteur d'engagements solidaires avait le droit de figurer dans toutes les faillites des co-obligis pour la valeur intigrale du titre jusqu'a parfait paiement.

Par nine coincidence singulibre, le parlement d'Aix rendait le mime jour, 18 juin 1776, sur la plaidoierie d'Emirigon, qui nous en a conservi le souvenir, un arrit en sens contraire, jugeant que le porteur qui 6tait entr6 dans le concordat de Pun des co-obligis, ne pouvait entrer dans les autres que successivement et pour ce qui lui restait dii. Mais, sur le pourvoi du porteur, cet arrit fut cassi par un arrit du conseil du 24 fivrier 1778, qui fut lui-mime confirmi par un second arrit du 23 octobre 1781, portant rejet de la requite en opposition dirig6e contre le premier.

C'est cette jurisprudence qui a it sagement maintenue par le Code de Commerce.

Plus loin (1):

C'est h cette conclusion que je crois devoir n'arriter, parce que c'est la seule qui se trouve d'accord avec les principes sur la solidariti, qui veulent que les co-obligis soient toujours tenus, quand il reste dI quelque chose, et les effets du paiement sous forme de dividende, qui, si le dividende n'itait calculI que sur ce qui reste dft apris le paiement d'un premier dividende, ne pourrait jamais constituer un paiement intigral.

Et au No. 2023,.il dit:

On s'est demandi si Particle 542 du Code de Commerce ne fait que formuler une application des principes sur la solidariti et les effets du payement par dividendes, qui sont les mimes en matire civile et en matire commerciale.

Les consiquences de ces principes ne tiennent pas h Porganisation spiciale des faillites ; elles en sont indipendantes et par cons6quent elles trouvent leur place dans la diconfiture qui n'est autre chose qu'une failite civile, bien que sa liquidation ne soit soumise h aucune forme et h aucune organisation particulibre.

Sirey, Recueil g6n6ral (1).

L'article 542, Cod. Comm. ; aux termes duquel le cr~ancier porteur d'engagements souscrits, endossis on garantis solidairement par un failli et d'autres co-oblig6s 4galement en faillite, participeaux distributions dans les masses, et y figure pour la valeur nominale de son titre Fournier J. jusqu'h parfait payement, est applicable alors m6me que tons les co-obligs solidaires ne sont pas en faillite. It suffit qu'un on plusieurs d'entre eux s'y trouvent.

Le crancier porteur d'engagements solidaires entre un failli et d'autres co-oblig6s qui ne sont pas en faillite, et qui, depuis la faillite, a regu un h-compte des obligis, doit 6tre compris dans les distributions pour la valeur nominale de son titre, sans qu'il y ait lieu de faire deduction de cet acompte; ici ne s'applique pas la disposition de Particle 544, Cod. Comm ; relativement A la dAduction des acomptes payds avant la faillite.

Et A la page 297.

Le crdancier qui, depuis la faillite, a regu de la caution, la portion de cr6ance garantie par celle-ci, doit ndanmoins, dans la r6partition des dividendes fix6s par.1e concordat, 6tre compris pour la valeur de sa crdance entikre telle qu'elle a 6t0 admise au passif de la faillite. Nmolombe (2):

Dis le moment chacune des faillites est ddclarie, le cr4ancier acquiert le droit h la somme qu'elle pourra payer, aprbs Paccomplissement des formalit6s de la liquidation, dis ce moment les droits de chacun sont irrivocablement fix6s.

O'est un principe bien 6tabli que la d&claration d'un dividende est l'6quivalent d'un jugement. Dalloz (8): Jug6 que le rkglement ddfinitif est une dkcision judiciaire, un vtritable jugement contre lequel est ouverte la voie de Pappel dans les ddlais ordinaires.

(Paris, 20 juillet 1844.)

Voir aussi Dalloz (4).

Les jugements ne sont que d6claratifs et nullement constitutifs des droits qu'ils reconnaissent.

(Cass. 14 Dec. 1840).

Par consdquent, ils ont un effet ritroactif an jour de la demande.

Cass. 25 aohit 1868. Dalloz, 1868,.1, 397.

Ces auteurs font voir, contrairement

'opinion de- (1) 62, 2, 121.

tribution, No. 181.

132 - 1'honorable juge Meredith, qu'en dehors de toute loi de faillite, les demandeurs sont fond6s A invoquer les lois de la solidarit6 et les cons6quences n6cessaires qui en d~coulent

O'est par le droit commun que la solidarit6 est 6tablie et qu'elle donne A chacun des creanciers le droit de poursuivre le d6biteur pour le tout, comme elle impose a chacun des d6biteurs 1'obligation de satisfaire le cr6ancier pour le tout. Puisque 1'obligation solidaire a pour but d'assurer le paiement int6gral de la crbance, et que le cr~ancier conserve la totalit6 de sa cr6ance contre tons les co-oblig6s, il s'en suit in6vitablement que si ceux-ci tombent ensuite en faillite, il a droit de se presenter daus leur faillite pour la valeur nominale de son titre jusqu'A parfait paiement.

S'il en 6tait autrement, si le cr6ancier devait d~duire le dividende recu dans la faillite d'un co-oblig6 pour venir , contribution. il ne pourrait jamais arriver au parfait paiement.

L'obligation solidaire manquerait alors son but qui est d'assurer le paiement inthgral de l'obligation.

Ce droit de venir contribution dans toutes les masses en faillite de ses co-oblig6s a bien t6 reconnu par 1'art. 542 du Code du Commerce, mais il existait de droit commun, avant cela, ainsi que 1'a reconnu 1'arrt du parlement de Paris de 1776.

L'art. 542 n'a fait qu'adopter cette jurisprudence comme n'6tant qu'une des consequences logiques d6coulant n6cessairement du principe de la solidarit6.

II n'est pas n~cessaire pour nous de s'appuyer sur cet article, bien qu'il ne fasse que consacrer l'ancien droit frangais sur cette question, il nous suffit de se fonder sur les principes de la solidarit6 d'o-i d6coule ce droit du cr6ancier de se presenter pour la totalit6 de sa cr6ance dans chaque masse de ses co-d~biteurs, jusqu'h ce qu'il ait requ son paiement entier (1).

J'adopte l'opinion si savamment d6velopp6e par l'honorable juge Jett6 dont j'ai cit6 une grande partie des notes sur cette cauise.

L'honorable juge a encore cit6 un arrkt du 9 d6cembre Fournier J. 1860 in re Bunyard (1) oil la Cour de Chancellerie a fait l'application des principes qu'il soutient dans une cause identique A celle-ci.

Voici comment s'exprimait Lord Justice Cotton en rendant ce jugement:- Each of these appeals (il y avait trois causes r6unies) raised the same question, namely, whether the holder of a bill of exchange taken from the drawer as security for a sum less than the amount of the bill is entitled as against the estate of the bankrupt, who had accepted it for the accommodation of the drawer, to prove only for the amount due to him, (the holder) or for the amount of the bill, with a restriction that he shall not receive dividends on his proof to an amount exceeding the sum due to him on his security. It was conceded that, if the bill bad been accepted for value, the holder would have been entitled to prove for the larger amount. But it was urged on behalf of the respondent that the fact of the acceptance being for the accommodation of the drawer makes a difference.

It was said, and truly, that a man who has taken a bill from the drawer as security only will hold for the drawer any sum recovered from the acceptor beyond the amount due on his security and that when the bill has been accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, he, the drawer, would be liable to repay to the acceptor any part of the sum recovered from him, which may be handed to the drawer by the holder of the bill. But the acceptor has put it in the power of the drawer to make the bill in the hands of a holder for value available against the acceptor for its full amount, and although the holder may have taken it as security for a sum less than the amount of the bill, we are of opinion that such a holder is entitled to make the bill available against the acceptor in the way which will best produce the sum due to him, and that in the event of bankruptcy he is entitled to prove against the acceptor's estate for the full amount of the bill.

D'apr~s tout ce qui pr&de je conclus que les appelants cr6anciers solidaires de Marcotte et des signataires des billets qu'ils avaient regus de lui en garantie collaterale ont droit d'tre colloqu~s sur le chiffre nominal de leur cr6ance, sans d6duction des sommes reques sur (1) 335.

les billets transportis, depuis la production de leur reclamation.

Il n'en est pas de m~me de la somme de $490, pro- s.duite de la vente des marchandises donn6es comme gage aux appelants.

Cette somme devra 6tre deduite du montant de leur reclamation, car cela constitue un paiement sur leur crance.

L'appel devrait 6tre allou6.

J.-I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by the court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side).

J.-Some time prior to the month

February, 1882, the plaintiffs made advances to one

Alphonse Marcotte, then a merchant trading in the city of Montreal, taking as security for the repayment of such advances Marcotte's own promissory note for the amount, and, by way of collateral security, divers promissory notes made by certain persons who were debtors of Marcotte, of whom one Moodie was one, for several amounts payable to Marcotte or order, and endorsed by Marcotte to the plaintiff; and, also, some goods and merchandise belonging to Marcotte and delivered by him to the plaintiffs. In the month of

February, 1882, Marcotte, by a voluntary deed executed by him bearing date the 13th of that month, conveyed and transferred to the defendant Thibaudeau, one of his creditors, all his estate and effects upon trust for the benefit of the whole of his creditors. The plaintiffs as creditors of Marcotte claimed the benefit of this trust deed, and upon the 22nd April, 1882, brought in and filed with the trustee their claim for $19,139.83, which was accepted and recognized by the trustee as being, and which is admitted to have been, the amount then due to them by Marcotte, and for which they were then entitled to rank as creditors entitled to the benefit of the said trust deed. The trustee having subsequently realized from the trust estate an amount which enabled him to pay to the plaintiffs and the j. other creditors of Marcotte the sum of 12) cents in the dollar upon the amounts due to them respectively at the time of their claims having been presented to the trustee, prepared and advertised a dividend sheet upon which the plaintiffs were entered and declared to be entitled to receive the sum of $2,392.49, which sum the trustee promised to pay them upon the 13th day of July then next following such advertisement, that is to say, upon the 13th of July, 1882.

Between the 22nd of April, 1882, and this 18th of July the plaintiffs received from Moodie in respect of the notes made by him to Marcotte and endorsed by the latter to the plaintiffs as such collateral security as aforesaid the sums, as is admitted in the case, of $8,363.76 and $911.57, making together the sum of $9,275.33; and in April, 1883, the further sum of $248.91.

The plaintiffs also received subsequently to the 22nd April, 1682, but when in particular is not stated, the sum of $490 as proceeds of the merchandise left in their hands. There seems to me to be some confusion in the printed case which does not appear to have been noticed; what the case says is: " Moodie had, also, become an insolvent and appellants realized out of his estate in virtue of such promissory notes $9,676.24, viz., $8,363.76 in May, 1882, subsequently to the filing of their claim, but previous to the 13th July, 1882, when the dividend was made payable, $911.57 in May, June and July, 1882, and $248.71 in April, 1883.

Appellants, also, realized out of the goods and merchandise transferred to them by Marcotte a further sum $490, making with that of $9,076.24 a total sum of $10,166.24."

In the argument before us it was admitted that the above statement that " Moodie had also become insolvent" is erroneous and that in point of fact the amount realized from him was realized under an execution issued upon a judgment recovered against him in the Gwnne J. province of Manitoba, so that the case before us is not that of a creditor having a claim against two insolvent estates for the main debt, but simply of a creditor holding collateral security for, his debt claiming under a voluntary deed of assignment made by his debtor in trust for his creditors.

Now as to the above sum of $490 it has been regarded by the Court of Queen's Bench at Montreal in appeal as having been received subsequently to the

13th July, 1882, and for that reason they have held that it cannot be deducted from the amount in respect of which the plaintiffs are entitled to receive a dividend of 121 cents in the dollar under the trust deed while in the Superior Court and in the Court of Review it seems to have been regarded as having been received prior to that date, although the learned judge who pronounced judgment in the Superior Court does not seem to have been of opinion that it made any difference whether it was received before or after the 13th

July, 1882, for he has included the $248.91 admitted to have been received in April, 1883, in the same category as the sums received by the plaintiffs between the 22nd

April and the 13th July, 1882.

In an action brought by the plaintiffs against the trustee of the trust deed of

February, 1882, to recover the sum of $2,392.49, declared by him to be in his hands and payable to the plaintiffs and which he promised to pay to them upon the 13th July, 1882, as their equal share or dividend upon the amount of the plaintiffs' claim as secured, and as recognized by him as being secured under the trust deed, the learned judge of the Superior Court held that the plaintiffs had no right to recover from the trustee the said amount of $2,392.49 so declared to be in his hands and payable to them as aforesaid, and that they could recover only the sum of $1,121.69 for j. which sum he gave judgment in their favour. This sum of $1,121.69 was ascertained by calculating 12) cents in the dollar upon the sum of $8,963.59, being the amount which he found to be due by Marcotte to the plaintiffs after deducting from the $19,139.83 due to them in April, 1882, the above sum of $10,166.24, and which sum of $8,963.59 the learned judge held to be the only sum for which the plaintiffs were entitled to rank as creditors under the said trust deed. The Court of Review set aside the judgment of the Superior Court holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to rank as creditors upon the trust estate for the sum of $18,649.83 being the amount of plaintiffs' claim as it stood in April, 1682, less the sum of $490 realized out of the merchandise, and they rendered judgment for the plaintiffs in the action for the sum of $2,331.23 with interest thereon from the 12th July, 1882.

The Court of Queen's Bench in appeal holding the $490 to have been received subsequently to the 13th July, 1882, adjudged that this sum could not be deducted from the amount upon which the plaintiffs were entitled to a dividend under the trust deed and that they were entitled to rank on the trust deed as creditors only for the sum of $9,712.50.

This plainly ought to have been $9,716.50 for the judgment declares it to be arrived at by deducting from the $19,139.83 due in April, 1882, the sum of $9,423.33, which the court held to be the amount realized from the Moodie notes. How this latter sum was arrived at is not clear, for the only sums admitted to have been received by the plaintiffs from the Moodie notes appear to have been the three sums of $8,363.76, $911.57 and $248 amounting together to $9,524.24, and as the $248.91 was not received until April, 1883, the Court of Queen's Bench must -have excluded that sum for the same reason as they excluded the $490, namely. that money received after the 13th February, 1882. could not be deducted from the amount upon which the plaintiffs were entitled to a dividend; if then the $248.91 be deducted from the $9,524.24 there remained only

$9,275.33 to be deducted instead of the $9,423.33.

The plaintiffs alone have appealed from this judgment and the learned counsel for the resfondent admitted that not having presented a cross appeal the respondents cannot now object to the deduction of the $490, although he contended that in making that deduction the court erred, and he admitted, therefore, that the appeal before us is to be determined wholly upon the question as to the correctness of the judgment as to the deduction in respect of the amount received upon the Moodie notes prior to the 13th July, That is the sole question before us and in determining it we can, I think with great deference, arrive at a sound conclusion without inquiring whether

Moodie, by reason of the plaintiffs having been the holders of his notes payable to Marcotte and endorsed by the latter to them as collateral security for Marcotte's debt, was bound solidairement with Marcotte for that debt; and without inquiring either what was the law of France prevailing in Canada at the time of its cession to the British Crown in relation to the distribution of the estate and effects of insolvent debtors.

The case in my judgment depends simply upon the true construction of the deed of the 13th of February,

1882, construing that deed by the light of the surrounding circumstances the plaintiffs being entitled to the benefit of its provisions to the fullest extent of its terms without prejudice to rights then already held by him, which are not professed to be interfered with by the deed; and the defendant in like manner being bound to execute the trust in favour of the plaintiffs to the fullest extent of the terms of the deed without j. any diminution or variation whatever.

In 1864 the legislature of the late province of Canada passed an act respecting insolvency wherein provision was made for the distribution of the estate and effects of insolvent debtors whether under a voluntary deed of assignment executed by the debtor or under proceedingas in compulsory liquidation.

In that act provision was made for the case of a creditor holding collateral security, prescribing the manner in which, and the extent to which, such creditor should rank the insolvent estate; that act was amended by the 29 ch. 18, and in the same session of the legislature the statute 29 Vic. ch. 41 was passed, which carried into effect the object of the statute 20 Vic. ch. 43 by codifying the laws in force in that part of the then province of Canada previously forming the province Lower Canada in relation to civil matters into one code designated " The civil code of Lower Canada." This code contains no provision upon the subject of the distribution of the estates of insolvent debtors, for the reason, no doubt, that the legislature was of opinion that the Insolvent Act of 1864 as amended by 29 Vic. ch. 18 was sufficient for the purpose. This act of 1864 so amended constituted the sole law in force throughout the province of Canada, regulating the distribution of the estates of insolvent debtors at the time of the passing of the B. A. Act in March, In the new constitution given by that act to the Dominion of Canada and to the several provinces of which it was composed all matters relating to bankruptcy and insolvency, including, therefore, the distribution of the estate and effects of insolvent debtors among their creditors, whether having, or not having, collateral securities for their respective claims, and the manner in which and the extent to which all such creditors respectively should rank on the insolvent estate, were placed under the exclusive jurisdic- J. tion and control of the Dominion Parliament for the purpose, no doubt, of insuring uniformity throughout the Dominion in the law upon these subjects. In the exercise of this jurisdiction the Dominion Parliament passed the act 32 & 33 Vic. ch. 16 making one uniform provision throughout the Dominion of Canada for the distribution of the estates of insolvent debtors, whether under voluntary deeds of assignment or in compulsory liquidation, and prescribing the manner in which, and the extent to which, creditors having collateral securities should rank on the insolvent estates.

This act while repealing the act of 18C4 which had abrogated, annulled and repealed the old

French law relating to the distribution of the estates of insolvents in that part of the late province of Canada, which now constitutes the province of Quebec, where alone it had ever any force, enacted in substitution therefor another law relating to the matter, which continued to be the sole law in force upon the subject throughout the Dominion until 1875 when it was repealed and the Dominion statute 38 Vic. ch. 16 substituted therefor; this latter act as amended by the

Dominion statutes 39 Vic. ch. 30 and 40 Vic. ch. 41 continued in force as the sole law upon the subject in the Dominion until 1880, when the statute 43 Vic. ch.

1 repealing the said three last mentioned statutes was passed.

Now on the 13th February, 1882, Marcotte executed to the defendant one of his creditors accepting, the trust deed, upon the construction of which alone, in my opinion, depends the solution of the question before us on this appeal.

By that deed, Marcotte, after reciting that he was indebted to several persons and firms his creditors, which indebtedness he was unable to pay in full, and that he had agreed with his creditors to transfer and assign to the defendant the whole of his property, movable and immovable estate and effects for the profit and benefit of his said creditors, assigned, transferred and made over to the defendant, accepting thereof as assignee for himself and assigns and for and on behalf and for the sole profit and benefit of said creditors " all and every," enumerating specific properties and concluding thus: " and all assets generally whatsoever without exception or reserve upon trust and to- and for the uses, hereinafter mentioned, that is to say :

" 1st. To pay all costs attending the execution of the trust purposes of the deed: "

" 2nd. All rent and privileged claims," and

" 3rd. To divide from time to time and as said assignee shall deem proper the whole rest and residue of said estate pro rata among said creditors according to their several and respective claims as filed by them with the party of the second part " (The Trustee) " the amounts of which appear and are shown opposite the creditors' respective names set out in the annexed list approved and signed ne varietur by parties and notaries hereto."

Now, as it appears to me, Marcotte by this deed himself determined the precise time, ne varietur when each creditor should become entitled to receive a dividend upon his claim and the respective amounts of such claims, namely upon each creditor signifying his acceptance of the benefit of the deed as expressed therein by filing his claim with the trustee, such claim being that stated in the list annexed to the deed varietur. It is to be observed that there is no provision in the deed to the effect that the claim of any creditor having collateral security shall be diminished or altered in any respect in case, after the filing of his claim and the . acceptance thereof by the trustee, he should realize anything from the collaterals held by him; no provision J. that from time to time as anything should be realized from collaterals, the amount upon which such creditor would be entitled to be collocated for dividend, should be reduced by the amount realized from the collaterals. Every creditor, whether holding collateral security or not, was by the terms of the deed to receive out of the estate and effects which the grantor had power to appropriate for the benefit of all creditors alike an equal ratable dividend proportionate to the amount of his claim as it existed when filed with the trustee, those holding collateral securities until, with such dividends and any sums to be realized from collaterals, they should be paid in full, when what should remain of the collaterals held by them should first come under the operation of the trust deed and for the benefit of all the other creditors not paid in full.

This, as it appears to me, is the true construction of the trust deed. A contrary construction cannot, in my opinion, be given to it without the insertion of a wholly new clause never apparently contemplated by the grantor, and which could not be inserted without detracting in a most essential manner from the rights which had then already been vested by the grantor in such of his creditors as were then holders of collateral securities ; without, in fact, completely altering the trust purposes of the deed.

Prior to the execution of the. trust deed the above plaintiffs had the right to sue Marcotte and to recover judgment against him to the full amount of his debt, admitted to have been

$19,139.83, and they had the right at the same time to sue and recover judgment against Moodie to the full amount of his notes which the plaintiffs held as collateral security, and they had the right to enforce these judgments by executions levied both j. on the property of Marcotte and on that of Moodie from time to time, until the plaintiffs, by moneys realized either wholly from the property of one of them or partly from the property of one of them and partly from that of the other, should be paid in full Marcotte's debt to them.

When, then, Marcotte executed the trust deed he had no power of disposition whatever over the Moodie notes, which had been transferred to the plaintiffs as collateral security, which he could exercise to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; and, indeed, he does not in the deed claim to have, or assume to exercise, any such power.

So far as those notes were concerned Marcotte's interest in, and his power disposition over, them was limited to so much of the amount thereof as should remain after the plaintiffs should be paid in full Marcotte's debt to them; and that was the sole interest in those notes which passed by the trust deed to the defendant.

The trust deed had no operation whatever upon those notes, unless until the plaintiffs should be paid in full Marcotte's debt, but upon the residue of the property of Marcotte the trust deed had immediate operation, and it is plain that out of the proceeds of that property the plaintiffs by the.deed, which is recited as being executed in pursuance of an agreement between Marcotte and his creditors, are declared to be entitled to receive an equal dividend with all the other creditors of Marcotte, upon the full amount of MarcQtte's debt to the plaintiffs which is admitted to have then been $19,- 139.83, without in any manner detracting from the plaintiffs' rights in the collaterals held by them until they should be paid in full, and the trust which the defendant accepted and undertook to execute, in so far as the plaintiffs were concerned, was to pay to them upon the above amount as constituting their claim an I* equal share or dividend ratably with Marcotte's other creditors, out of the moneys to be realized by the trustee J. from the property so transferred to him in trust. It is a portion of this property which has been sold and the trustee, in accordance with the express provisions of the deed, the trusts of which he assumed and undertook to discharge, has collocated the plaintiffs as entitled to receive the sum of $2,392.49, being their equal share or dividend at the rate of 121 cents in the dollar upon the above sum for which they were, as is admitted, entitled to rank when the trust deed was executed, and on the 22nd April, 1882, when they filed their claim with the trustee and thereby signified their acceptance of the benefits of the trust deed.

For this sum $2,392.49 the plaintiffs were, in my judgment, entitled to judgment in the Superior Court with interest thereon from the 13th February, 1882. The only law affecting the present case is, in my opinion, that prevailing in the Province of Quebec in relation to the construction of contracts, and to the obligation imposed upon a trustee to execute the trusts of a deed which he ac cepts and undertakes to execute.

In the absence of an Insolvent Act passed by the Parliament of Canada qualifying the rights of creditors of an insolvent debtor as expressed in a voluntary deed executed by the debtor, and detracting from such rights in the case of a creditor holding collateral securities, there does not, in my opinion, exist in the Dominion any law which can have the effect of depriving the plaintiffs of the benefit of the provisions of the trust deed in his favour as above construed, or of relieving the defendant from the obligation of executing the trusts of the deed as accepted by him according to the precise terms and provisions of the deed.

The case in my judgment is simply resolved into this :-The Insolvent Act passed in 1864 by the legislature of the late province. of Canada abrogated, annulled and repealed, within that part of the province which formerly constituted Lower Canada, the old French law, whatever it was, in relation to insolvency and the distribution of the estates of insolvents. The act of 1864 assumed control over and provided the law relating to that subject. This act of 1864 was the sole law in force in Canada upon the subject at the time of the passing of the B.N.A. Act, which act withdrew the subject from provincial jurisdiction and placed it under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Dominion Parliament. That Parliament by the act of 1869, when repealing the act of 1864, enacted a law upon the subject having uniform force and effect throughout the whole Dominion.

The act of 1875 which repealed the act of 1869 re-enacted another law upon the subject, having in like manner uniform force and effect throughout the Dominion.

The act 43 Vic. ch. 1 repealed the act of 1875 and two other acts which had been passed in amendment of it. Now, what was the effect of this repeal ? Not, in my opinion, as has been contended, to revive the old French law in relation to insolvency and the distribution of the estate insolvents within the province of Quebec, so in effect leaving the province of Quebec with an insolvent law while all the other provinces of the Dominion were without one. The Dominion Interpretation Act enacts that the repeal of any act shall not revive any act or provision of law repealed by such act.

As well might it be contended that 43 Vic. ch. 1 had the effect of reviving the repealed act of 1864 as of reviving the old provision of law which the act of 1864 abrogated, annulled and repealed. The effect of 43 Vic. ch. in my opinion, was simply to leave all the provinces of the Dominion alike in the same condition, that is to say, v* without any law relating to insolvency unless and until one should be enacted by the sole power having J. jurisdiction over the subject.

As to this case now before us, all we have to do as it appears to me is to construe the agreement between the parties as expressed in the deed of February, 1882, the trusts of which the defendant assumed the duty of discharging, and in accordance with the provisions whereof he collocated, in my opinion correctly, the plaintiffs as entitled to receive as their dividend upon their claim as secured by the deed, the sum of $2,392.94 for which sum with interest from the 13th July, 1882, they are, in my opinion, entitled to judgment, and the appeal therefore should be allowed with costs and judgment be ordered to be entered accordingly in the Superior

Court with costs.

J.-Marcotte being insolvent assigned his effects to the respondent, who is defendant in the action, for the benefit of the whole of his creditors, on the 13th of February, 1882. The appellants had made him advances on his promissory note, and he had given them collateral security, to an amount larger than his debt, by pledging some goods and by endorsing to them promissory notes made by one Moodie.

It is not stated in the case agreed on by the parties that Marcotte made himself, or became, personally liable to the appellants as endorser of these notes. The notes may have been endorsed merely for the purpose of transferring them, the power to do which is explained in

Denton v. Peters or it may be. that Marcotte was notnotified of the dishonour of the notes so as to fix him with liability for the payment of them. It was not a necessary part of the transaction that he should, in addition to his liability on his own note, become also liable on these Moodie notes.

We are not even j. informed, nor is it necessary that we should know, whether the notes fell due before the assignment not till afterwards.

We have simply the facts that Marcotte was debtor to the appellants, and that, by way of security for the debt, they held a portion of the assets of their debtor, and had the right which is recognized by article 1969 of the Civil Code to be paid from those assets by privilege or preference before other creditors.

The debt due by Marcotte to the appellants and the debt due by Moodie to Marcotte were entirely distinct debts. The nature of the latter was not changed by the accident of the endorsement over of the notes by Marcotte, which made Moodie directly liable to the appellants, not for the debt which they had proved against Marcotte's estate, but for the several promissory notes.

To constitute a joint and several liability as defined by article 1103 of the Civil Code three things must concur.

The co-debtors must be obliged to the same thing: In such manner that each of them singly may be compelled to the performance of the whole obligation : And that the performance by one discharges the others towards the creditor. These tests are, in my apprehension, fatal to the recognition of a joint and several liability in the present instance.

Moodie's obligation is to pay his notes; Marcotte is to pay his debt to the appellants, which is a different thing. To hold Marcotte compellable, as endorser of the notes, to perform the same obligation as Moodie would be, as we have seen, to assume facts that are not before us. Besides, that is not the obligation on which the claim before the assignee is founded. That claim is made under an obligation to which Moodie is no party. Performance by Marcotte of his obligation by the payment of his debt would not discharge Moodie.

le would still have to pay his notes.

And performance by Moodie discharges Marcotte only as a realization of so much of the security held by Marcotte's creditor. In this particular I do not see my way to follow the learned and instructive judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Jett6 in the Court of Review (1).

I do not think it necessary to discuss or to form a definite opinion as to the effect of Marcotte's being liable as endorser on Moodie's notes, if he had been shown or admitted to be so liable. Two questions would arise. The first, which might not be difficult to answer in the affirmative in view of articles 1103, 1104, 1105 and 2310, would be: Was there a joint and several obligation?

And the second, which would involve more difficulty, would be the conclusion that a joint and several obligation would carry with it the right of the creditor to rank upon the estate of each co-debtor for the whole original amount of his claim until paid in full, without his being bound to reduce his claim on one estate by crediting payments received from the other estate.

On this question there are strongly conflicting opinions, as is evident from contrasting the views of Mr. Justice Jett6 in this case, which is reported as Benning v. Thibaudeau (1),with others commented on by him, particularly those of Chief Justice Meredith expressed in Rochette v. St. Louis and with the later opinion of Mr. Justice Andrews in Chinic v. Rattray The debt for which, on the 22nd of April, 18-2, the appellants filed their claim, was $19,139.83.

Moodie was unable to pay in full, and the amount realized from the collateral security was considerably less than this debt of $19,139.83.

The court of appeal sustained the respondent's contention that the sums so realized were payment pro tanto of the debt out of the property of Marcotte and that the appellants are entitled to share in the fund in the hands of the assignee in respect only of what remains unpaid.

In my opinion that conclusion should be affirmed on the grounds stated in the judgment of the court. With regard to the amounts, I cannot make the details given in the case bring out the results there given, nor can I find in the case exactly the same figures on which the calculations in the judgment of the Queen's Bench are made.

In the court of first instance the computation is made on the gross amounts stated in the case, and, as far as I can perceive, that computation is correct. The figures thus used are as follows - Total debt proved.....................$

19,139 83 amount realized from collaterals......

.........

10,166 24 Balance for which to rank.....$

8,973 59 121 cents per $ on $8,973.59...$

1,121 69 Part of the amount realized was received after the declaration of the dividend on 13th July, 1882. In the Queen's Bench it was held that that part was not to be deducted from the claim proved, and the amount deducted by the judgment of the Queen's Bench was therefore $9,427.33, or $678.91 less than the amount deducted at the trial, leaving $9,712.50 for which to rank. per cent on this amount would be $1,214.06, and not $1,550.50 as erroneously stated in the judg- SUPREME ment.

This correction ought, at all events, to be made, as asked by the respondent at the end of his factum; but I do not understand why the whole amount received from the collaterals should not be deducted.

think the proper correction to be made would be to restore the judgment to the amount of $1,121.69, for which it was first rendered, and with this correction I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed with

Turgeon.

Allan.