Couture v. Bouchard

The judgment of the Superior Court was delivered on the 81st August, 1891, and was inscribed in review on the 8th of September and argued and taken ddlibdrd on the 30th September,

Judgment was pronounced some weeks later by the Superior Court sitting in review.

From this judgment the appellant appealed direct to the Supreme Court of Canada, under the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Amending Act, 1891, 54 & 55 Vic. ch. 25 s. 3 ss. 3. The section reads as follows:- Provided that such appeals shall lie only from the Court of Queen's Bench, or from the Superior Court in review in cases where, and so long as, no appeal lies from the judgment of that court when it confirms the judgment rendered in the court appealed from, which by the law of the Province of Quebec, are appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Casgrain Q.C., Attorney General of Quebec, for respondent:

The case was argued on the day which the act was passed and upon the principle that actus curice neminem gravabit I contend the judgment must be held to have been delivered on the 30th September, 1891, and if so Hurtubise v. Desmarteau (1) decided by this court, applies.

Moreover the case is not appealable, the amount not being for £500 sterling, as regulated by art. 1178 C. C. P.

The jurisprudence in the Province of Quebec has always been to consider the date of the judgment and not the day of the argument for all purposes of appeal.

See art. 483, C. C. P. As to the amount it is over $2,000, and comes within the very terms of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1. S. ch. 135, and the Parliament of Canada alone has jurisdiction to regulate the amount which is appealable to this court.

stated that he had read Mr. Justice Taschereau's judgment and that he concurred with him.

J.-I1 s'616ve en cette cause une importante question concernant la juridiction de cette cour, c'est de savoir, si 1'on peut appuyer le jugement sur une loi qui n'a 6t sanctionnee que le mme jour que cette loi a 6t6 adopt6e.

Les faits sont ainsi qu'il suit: 1'appelant 6tait demandeur pour la somme de $2,006 devant la cour Sup6rieure . Chicoutimi, qui a rendu jugement pour la somme de $684.14, le 31 aodt 1891.

Port6 en appel devant la cour Sup6rieure si6geant en revision a Qu6bec, le septembre 1881, ce jugement a 6t confirm6 le 30 septembre 1891. Ce mime jour 6tait sanctionn6le statut 54& 55 Vic. ch. 25, amendant la juridiction de cette cour de manibre A permettre 1'appel ici dans des causes d6cid6es en revision qui n'y 6taient pas appelables auparavant, savoir: celles dans lesquelles le jugement en premibre instance avait th confirm6.

En cons6quence du jugement de confirmation cette cause ne pouvait 6tre porte en appel A la cour du Bano de la Reine. Il ne restait que 1'appel au Conseil Priv6 si le montant 6tait suffisant. Mais la demande qui n'6tait d'abord que de $2,006, et le jugement qui d'aprbs la jurisprudence du Conseil Priv6 doit servir de base pour r6gler le droit d'appel, n'6tant que de $684.14, la cause n'y 6tait pas appelable.

* Priv6 du droit d'appel A la cour du Banc de la Reine et an Conseil Priv6 1'appelant a pens6 que la 54 & 55 Vic. ch. 25 lui offrait un moyen de sortir de difficult6 en lui Ouvrant 1'appel A cette cour.

En effet, une disposition de ce statut a introduit un important changement dans le droit d'appel. fallait auparavant que la demande fut an moins de $2,000. Un jugement de cette cour avait mime d6cid6, comme an Conseil priv6, que cc serait le montant adjug6 et non celui demand6 qui servirait de base au droit d'appel.

Mais ce principe a 6t6 rejet6 par le statut cihaut cit6, qui a declar6 (sec. 3 ss. 4,) que lorsque le droit d'appel d6pend du montant en litige, cc montant sera estim6 6tre celui demand6 et non celui obtenu. s'ils sont diff6rents.

La demande de l'appelant 6tant au-delA de $2,000, savoir: de la somme de $2,006, il a cru que la voie lui 6tait ouverte pour 1'appel A cette cour. Mais il se trouve encore un malheureux obstacle dans son chemin, il se trouve trop t6t pour b~ndficier de la loi. Il est de principe qu'une cause soumise la consid6ration de la cour pour jugement et qui est r6serv6e pour consid6ration on prise en d61ib6r4, doit, quelle que soit la date du jugement rendu plus tard, tre jug~e d'apris la loi en force, lorsque la cour, apris audition des parties, a t6 saisie de la cause.

L'application de cc principe ruine les esp6rances de 1'appelant. La cour a t6 saisie de .la cause le 30 septembre et les parties out droit A leur jugement d'apris la loi, telle qu'alors en force; mais c'est ce jour-1A m~me que par la sec. 3 ss. 4 la cause a t rendue appelable en d6clarant que l'appel serait disormais r6gl6 par le montant demand6 et non celui obtenu.

Une cause absolument semblable a &t6 dcide dans cette cour.

C'est celle de Hurtubise v. Desmarteau

D'autres causes out aussi t. jug6es d'apris le m~me principe, comme on le voit par les autorit6s cities dans le rapport.

II est d'autant plus regrettable que 1'appel ne puisse avoir lieu qu'il s'agit d'une cause la libert6 du sujet est mise en question.

L'appelant a

& arrit6 sur cap. ad resp. et sera priv6 de sa libert6, tant qu'il ne pourra payer son jugement.

Ne serait-il pas plus raisonnable d'accorder l'appel 'A dans un cas semblable que dans beaucoup d'autres oi il ne s'agit que de sommes insignifiantes dues & titre J. de rentes annuelles, honoraires d'office, etc.

Il faut esp6rer que cette anomalie va bient6t disparaltre de nos codes.

J.-This case comes up on a motion to quash for want of jurisdiction.

The motion must be allowed.

The ruling in Hurtubise v. Desmarteau (1) applies here.

It is true that the .judgment appealed from here was in fact pronounced in the Court Review after the coming into force of the act 54 & Vic., ch. 25, which allows for the first time appeals from that court; but, as regards this appeal, the case having been put en dgliberd on the 30th September, 1891, on the very day that the act was sanctioned, the judgment is to be treated as if it had been given on that' day, on the principle actus curie neminem gravabit. Nothing that happens after the case is en 6tat can alter in any way the rights or position of the parties. It cannot be that a judge can render a case appealable or not at his will by simply delaying or hastening the judgment thereon.

I refer to the following authorities:

Lawrence v. Hodgson in which G-arrow B. says:

Freeman v. Tranah where Cresswell J. says: And Maule J. says:

And the writer's remarks on Pinhorn v. Sonster (1) in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes See also Evans v. Rees (3); Green v. Cobden (4); and Miles v. Willianms

I rest my judgment on that ground without expressing any opinion one way or the other on the ground relied upon by my brothers Giwynne and Patterson. J.-I agree that this appeal should be quashed but upon the following grounds only, namely, that the judgment from which the appeal is taken was not one which this court has authority to entertain under the provisions of the Dominion statute, 54 & 55 Vic. cb. 125. inasmuch as it was not ajudgment which the appellant had de jure, by the statute lawo f the Province of Quebec, a right of appeal to the Privy Council in England, the above statute of the Dominion authorizing in my opinion this court to entertain appeals from all judgments of the Court of Review thereafter delivered, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court in such cases only as were de jure appealable to the Privy Council.

I cannot concur in the opinion that upon a question of right to appeal a judgment delivered, it may be months after the day upon which the case is argued and judgment is reserved, shall be referred back to the day upon which the argument was closed so as to be deemed to have been delivered on that day. The logical deduction from such holding, would be that the right to appeal might be barred by the time allowed for appealing from a judgment having elapsed before the judgment should be in point of fact delivered.

J.-This appeal being from a judgment of the Superior Court sitting in review cannot be heard by this court, unless the judgment is one which by the law of the Province of Quebec is appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

The law of the Province of Quebec on the subject of appeal to the Privy Council is found in articles 1178 and 1178a of the Code of Procedure, and in cases like thepresent it confines the right of appeal to those wherein the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of £500 sterling.

The sum or value in dispute in this action, which, according to the statute of 1891 we understand to be the amount demanded, or $2,000, is less than £500 sterling. This is a fatal objection to our jurisdiction and upon that ground I agree in quashing the appeal. The other objections, founded on the time when judgment was pronounced in its relation to the 80th of September, 1891, when the statute received the royal assent, have to be dealt with in one or two cases now standing for judgment. I therefore forbear to discuss them now, merely remarking that I do not assent to the proposition that g judgment, given after argument and after time taken for deliberation, relates back to the date of the argument as if given nunc pro tunc.

Appeal quashed with costs.