McGregor v. Canada Investment and Agency Co.

The will of the late J. McG. contained the following provisions Fifthly, I give, devise and bequeath unto Helen Mabers, of the said parish of Montreal, my present wife the usufruct, use and enjoyment during all her natural lifetime, of the rest and residue of my property movable or immovable

* * * in which I may have any right, interest or share at the time of my death, without any exception or reserve.

To have and to hold, use and enjoy the said usufruct, use and enjoyment of the said property unto my said wife the said Helen Mahers as and for her own property from and after my decease and during all her natural lifetime.

Sixthly, I give, devise and bequeath in full prdperty unto my son James McGregor, issue of my marriage with the said Helen Mahers, the whole of the property of whatever nature or kind movable, real or personal of which the usufruct, use and enjoyment during her natural lifetime is hereinbefore left to my said wife the said Helen Mahers but subject to the said usufruct, use and enjoyment of his mother the said Helen Mahers during all her natural lifetime as aforesaid and without any account to be rendered of the same or of any part thereof to any person or persons whomsoever; should, however, my said son, the said James McGregor, die before his said mother, my said wife, the said Helen Mahers then and in that case I give, devise and bequeath the said property so hereby bequeathed to him, to the said Helen Mahers, in full property to be disposed of by last will and testament or otherwise as she may think fit and without any account to be rendered of :-Strong, Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne and Patterson JJ.

the same or of any part thereof to any person or persons whomsoever.

McGREGOR

THE to the said James McGregor, his heirs and assigns, should he survive his said mother, as and for his and their own property for & ever, and in the event of his pre-deceasing his said mother, unto the said Helen Mahers, her heirs and assigns as and for her and their own property for ever.

Held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) that the will of J. McG. did not create a substitution but a simple bequest of usufruct to his wife and of ownership to his son.

Held, also, that a sheriff's sale (decret) of property forming part of J. McG.'s estate under an execution issued against a person who was in possession under a title from the wife, such sale having taken place after J. McG.'s son became of age, was valid and purged all real rights which the son might have had under the will. Art. 711, C. C. P. Patton v. Morin, (16 L. C. R. 267.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) (1), reversing a judgment of the Superior Court (2), which declared the appellant proprietor of the undivided half of a portion of lot No. 560, on the official plan of the parish of Montreal, and condemning the respondents to abandon to the appellant the undivided half of the said property, and to render an account of the fruit and reven ues since the 7th October, 1886, and in default to pay the sum of $2,000.

The main questions upon this appeal were as to the interpretation of the will of the late James McGregor father of the appellant, the validity of an order for the sale of the property granted on the advice of a family council on the 19th September, 1886, upon the petition of the appellant's mother as tutrix to her minor children, and also the effect of a sheriff's sale of the same property to respondent's auteurs.

The material clauses of the will appear in the head note, and the facts and pleadings are fully reviewed (1) Q.R. 1 Q.B. 197.

in the judgments of the court hereinafter given.

(See also reports of the case in the courts below (M.L.R. 6, S.C. 196; Q.R. 1 Q.B. 197.)

When analysed it will be found that the will con- & tains in reality three distinct provisions: (1) a bequest of the usufruct to the testator's wife; (2) a bequest of the ownership to the son, at first in general terms but subsequently, subject to the limitation and condition that he shall survive his mother; (3) a vulgar substitution in favour of the mother if she should survive the son

It is important to observe that the bequest of the ownership of the property to the son, though at first expressed in general terms, is afterwards restricted to the case of his surviving his mother. The will at first says: " I give, devise and bequeath in full property unto my son James McGregor, issue of my marriage with said Helen Mahers, the whole of the property of whatever nature or kind movable or immovable, real or personal of which the usufruct, use and enjoyment during her natural lifetime is hereinbefore left to my said wife; " and this clause might, if alone, appear to vest the ownership of the property in the son immediately upon the testator's death; but a little further down the generality of the bequest is restricted by the following words:

"To have and to hold the said hereby bequeathed and given property to the said

James McGregor,his heirs and assigns should he survive his said mother as and for his and their own property fore er."

The general rule of interpretation to be followed in this case is that when a will or charter contains a bequest or conveyance in general terms and subsequently in more limited terms, there being no repugnancy between the general and the more limited words of grant or bequest, the specific limitation will prevail over the general expression.

This rule of construction is expressed in the old maxim: " Quando caria continet generalem clausulam, posteaque descendit ad specialia, clausulte generali sunt consentanea, & interpretanda est carta secundum verba specialia Accordingly, the highest title which James Mc- Gregor, jr., could claim under his father's will, was the ownership of the property should he survive his mother, or, in other words, the bequest by James McGregor, sr., to his son, was made under a suspensive condition, and until his mother's death the son had merely the hope or expectation of becoming proprietor. Consequently, under this restriction James McGregor, jr., did not acquire upon his father's death any rights which he could transmit to his heirs. He was not yet at that date the owner of the property, and as the ownership of the property could not remain in suspense pending his mother's usufruct, it follows that during the pendency of the condition the ownership must have vested in the mother.

We have therefore, the following condition of things: first a bequest of usufruct to the mother; secondly a conditional bequest of the ownership to the son if he should survive his mother, the ownership only vesting in him upon such contingency; and thirdly, a bequest of the ownership to the mother if she should survive the son.

Now the combined result of these provisions is exactly what would, by law, take place if the testator had simply used the words, " I bequeath the property to my wife and on her death to my son James." For a fiduciary substitution, such as the one contained in the last mentioned words, would, in fact, give the usufruct to the wife during her life, and would vest the property in the son from the time of her death, and (fiduciary substitutions include vulgar substitutions without any expressions to that effect being necessary art..926 C. would vest the ownership in the mother,

VE -the institute if she should survive her son (the substitute.)

By article 928 C. C. a substitution may exist although the term usufruct may have been employed to express the right of the institute, and the whole.

tenor of the act and the intention which it sufficiently expressed are considered rather than the ordinary acceptation of particular words in order to determine whether there is a substitution or not.

The appellant submits that as the various operative words of bequest contained in the above mentioned clauses of this will have in combination no other result than would be produced by the creation of an ordinary fiduciary substitution, the court must, in interpreting the will, come to the conclusion that the testator intended to create a substitution and did create one by these somewhat.clumsy and inartistic expressions.

To isolate any of these expressipns and derive from them separately an intention of creating a usufruct rather than a substitution.

would, it seems to us, be simply violating the spirit of the whole bequest.

See Joseph v. Castonguay

Th6venot-Dessaules, Substitution (2) ; Roy v.Gauvin (3);

McDonnell v. (4); Planondon v. de Chantal v. Dorion ; Phillips Bain

But even if the will in question were held not to contain a substitution, the sheriffs sale would still be null and void as having been made super non domino et non possedente. This was well established by the testimony of Thomas Craig, and if our view of the facts is concurred in, the sheriffs sale has not discharged the property from the appellant's right of ownership. Art.

708 C.C. The sale was therefore super non domino, and the appellant, even if no substitution existed, could attack the sheriff's sale on this ground and afterward's attack the previous chain of title on the ground & fraud and illegality.

We also submit that according to the well established jurisprudence the lawful owner could assert his right of ownership in a direct action en nullitM de ddcret, even if he had not filed an opposition to the sale. The advertisements of the seizure and sale on Craig, who was neither the owner nor in possession, could not convey any information or warning to the appellant that his rights were in danger. He had at that time sued the ostensible owner and possessor, Devlin, to recover his property, and this action was still pending. See Dufresne v. Dixon

The learned counsel also contended that the sale made by the wife as tutrix to her son, under judicial authorization of the property in question to one Devlin, was null as not having been made in accordance with all the formalities required by law and that judicial authorization was fraudulently obtained, and referred to and cited art. 1278 C.O.P.; arts. 656, ; McTavish v. Pilke ; Rattray v. Larue (3) and Demolombe

The main question is whether the will created a substitution.

We adopt the reasoning of Mr. Justice Boss6 in the court below, and we contend that the will of the late James McG-regor divested of technical phraseology bequeaths in effect:-firstly, a usufruct the property to the wife; secondly, the ownership to the son; and thirdly a substitution from the son in favour of the mother, in case she should survive him or perhaps a conditional legacy of the property to the wife in case she should survive him. The third case was never in fact realized as the wife died before the son; so that whether there was a substitution in favour of the wife, or a conditional legacy, is immaterial, and the two first effects are the only ones to be considered, namely, that there was a legacy of usufruct to the wife, with a legacy of the property to the son.

Merlin Vo

Condition

Rolland de Villargues, Substitutions prohib6es

Now, if we assume that the will contained a usufruct in favour of the wife, with ownership to the son, the effect of the sheriff's deed of sale which took place after the appellant came of age, when he could have demanded the nullity of the seizure and of the anterior titles, under an execution against and upon the person who was in the legal possession of the property, constituted a valid title to the respondent.

Art. 711 C.C.

The learned counsel also contended that the different formalities required by law for the successive sales which had been made of the immovables in question since the testator's death, were complied with, and referred to Davis v. Kerr (3).

Lafleur in reply relied on the findings of fact of the trial judge.

J.-concurred with Fournier J.

J.-Le present appel est interjetO d'un jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine, province de

Qu6bec, infirmant un jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure, rendu a Montr6al par 1'honorable juge Pagnuelo, date du 30 mai 1890, d60larant l'appelant propri6taire de la moiti6 indivise d'une partie du lot nQ 260 du plan officiel de la paroisse de Montr6al et condamnant l'intim6e A faire abandon A 1'appelant de la moiti6 CANADAIN-indivise de la dite propri6t6, & compter du 7 octobre 1886, on & d~faut de ce faire, A lui payer la somme de $2,000.

Fournier J.

Le juge a de plus ordonn6 une expertise pour faire l'&valuation des am6liorations faites sur la dite propri6t6 par la d6fenderesse et Helen Mahers ordonnant aussi de faire rapport si la dite propri6t6 peut 6tre divishe, etc., etc.

Dans sa d6claration l'appelant r~clame cette propri6t6 en vertu du testament de son pare, en date du janvier 1863.

L'intimbe a plaid6 par d6fense au fonds en fait, et all6gue qu'une partie de la proprit6 r6clam6e formant le n 15 du plan de Perreault et maintenant formant partie du lot 560, n'a jamais appartenu James McGregor, phre.

Par son deuxieme plaidoyer l'intim6e allgue que l'appelant est devenu majeur d'ige le juin 1882, et en 6tat de prot6ger tous ses droits r6clamations sur la dite propri6t6 qui a 6t6 vendue par le sh6rif le. 18 novembre 1884, sur Thomas Craig alors en possession ouverte et publique de la dite propriet6; que l'intim6e 1'a de bonne foi achethe a cette vente, qui avait eu l'effet d'6teindre et de purger tons les droits que l'appelant pouvait avoir sur la dite propri6t6.

&

Dans son troisibme plaidoyer l'intim6e donne la longue 6numbration de ses titres et de ceux de ses auteurs.

Elle all6gue que sur les lots 16 et 17 du plan Perrault, acquis par James McGregor, il n'y avait presque aucune am6lioration; et que l'inventaire de sa communaut6 avec la mire de l'appelant a fait voir que le passif excbdait 1'actif ; qu'en cons6quence Helen Mahers, sa mere, se fit autoriser en justice A vendre les dits lots et les vendit apr~s l'accomplissement de toutes les formalit6s voulues. Tous les titres subs6quents sont 6num6r6s en d6tail. Ensuite, il est all6gu6 que Mde McGregor apris avoir acquis les lots 16 et 17 construisit avec de l'argent emprunt6 une s6rie de ma- & gasins et de maisons sur tout le lot 560 comprenant les lots originairement connus sous les et et d'autres constructions, au montant de $20,000 et que la valeur des lots 16 et 17 en fut consid&rablement augment6e.

Apris ces diverses constructions, Mde

McGregor vendit les dites propri~t~s A 0. J. Devlin pour $20,000 dont $5,800 payable a elle-mame et la balance payable aux divers pr~teurs qui avaient avanc6 les fonds pour la construction des dites bitisses. Ensuite le pr~t par l'intim6e A Thomas J. Craig de la somme de $1b,000 avec hypothique sur la dite propri6t6 y est all6gu6 ainsi que la vente de la dite proprit6 par le sh6rif & 1'intimbe.

L'intim6e alligue en outre la prescription de dix ans et la possession par elle-m~me et ses auteurs pendant le temps n~cessaire et dans les conditions pour acqu6rir la prescription; elle plaide aussi qu'elle ne peut

6tre d~poss6d6e A moins d'avoir t6 pay6e de ses am6liorations.

L'appelant a r6pondu sp6cialement, r6it6rant l'all&gation que feu James McGregor 6tait devenu propri6taire du lot 560 avant sa mort et que 1'appelant en 6tait devenu propri6taire de la moiti6 indivise comme appel&

A la substitution cr46e par le testament de son pare.

C'est la premire fois qu'il est fait mention que le testament de son pare contient une substitution, qu'il invoque par exception et non par action. II all~gue que le testament a t dihment enregistr6, qu'il contenait une, substitution dont sa mare 6tait grev6e en sa faveur comme appel6, que cette substitution n'a

6t& ouverte que le I octobre 1886 par le d~cis de sa m~re; et que la vente par le sh6rif u'avait pas eu l'effet de purger la dite substitution.

Dans le mois de mars 1882 1'appelant institua une action contre 0. J. Devlin, sa mare, James Thomas et les repr6sentants de feu William Quinn, auteurs de Thomas Craig, alliguant qu'il ignorait alors Ia vente de Devlin A Craig, et demandant par cette action que tous les actes et proc6dds allgus par l'intimee dans son plaidoyer fussent annules. Cette action 6tait pendante au temps de la saisie et de la vente faite par le sh6rif dont 1'appelant pr6tend avoir 6t6 ignorant.

L'appelant a aussi all6gue que l'inventaire 6tait faux et frauduleux.

I attaque aussi 1'6valuation des propri~t6s faite par l'expert nomm6 par le juge, prealablement 6 l'autorisation de la vente.

II a aussi mis en cause par son plaidoyer tous les auteurs de 1'intim6e ainsi que les h&ritiers et repr~sentants de Mde McGrregor.

L'intim6e a longuement r6pliqu6 A cette r6ponse speciale de l'appelant en niant sp6cialement toutes ses all6gations. Par une des al1gations de sa r6plique, I'intim6e all~gue que l'appelant est un des h6ritiers d'Helen Mahers, sa mare, qu'il n'a jamais renonc6 A sa succession et que si elle a fait aucun acte ill~gal au sujet des propri6t6s en question, I'appelant, comme son h6ritier en est responsable et ne peut aucunement les attaquer. Comme r~ponse A cette partie de la r6plique de l'intim6e, 1'appelant a produit, le 20 mai 1889, une renonciation A la succession de sa m~re, trois mois aprbs l'institution de la pr~sente action et prbs de trois ans apr~s la mort de sa m~re.

L'appelant a aussi all~gu6 la nullite de la vente comme ayaut 6t6 faite super non domino et non possedente. La r~ponse A ce dernier moyen est que lors de la vente par le sh6rif, il a 6 prouv6 que Devlin avait fait opposition A la vente sur le principe que Craig n'6tait pas en possession comme propristaire lors de la saisie etl'opposition a renvoy6e.

ne pent plus

VE 6tre question maintenant de cette pr~tention.

Par cette longue plaidoirie les parties ont soulev6 les questions suivantes: 10 Savoir, si par le testament de James McGregor, il a t6 fait une substitutio4 en Foirier J. faveur de James McGregor, son fils. 20 Si l'ordre rendu par le jugo ordonnant la vente de la proprit6 en question, accord6 le 19 septembre 1886, aprbs avis d'un conseil de famille, est 16gal.

L'effet de la vente par le sh6rif de cette m~me propri6t6 par rapport

& la validit6 du titre de 1'intim6 et de ses auteurs.

Le testament de James McGregor contient-il une substitution en faveur de son fils?

Par l'article 5 de son testament feu James McGregor,

16gue Helen Mahers, son &pouse, l'usufruit et jouissance, sa vie durant, du r6sidu de ses biens meubles et immeubles, A quelque somme qu'il puisse se monter, et sans aucune reserve.

Par P'article 6 du dit testament, il donne , son fils James McGregor, issu de son mariage avec la dite Helen Mahers, tous ces biens de quelque nature qu'ils soient, tant meubles qu'immeubles dont l'usufruit est donn6 & la dito 6pouse, mais sujet au dit usufruit et jouissance de sa mare, Helen

Mahers, sa vie durant, et sans que celle-ci soit oblig6e de rendre compte des dits biens ou de partie d'iceux A qui que ce soit. Dans le cas cependant oi le dit James

McGregor d6c6derait avant la dite Helen Mahers, alors et dans ce cas, il donne et legue les dites propriths & la dite Helen Mahers en pleine proprit6, pour en disposer comme bon lui semblera et sans 6tre tenue d'en rendre aucun compte A qui que ce soit.

Par le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure il a 6t d~cid6 que ce testament contenait une substitution dans laquelle la mare 6tait I'institude et son fils, 1'appelant, substitu6, et que la vente du sh6rif faite le novembre 1884 ayant eu lieu avant le d6cs de la mare, la substitution n'6tait pas ouverte, et qu'en cons6quence les droits de l'appelant comme substitu6 n'avaient pas t6 purg&s par le d~cret.

La Cour du Banc de la Reine a infirm6 ce jugement Fournier J. et j&cid6 an contraire qu'il n'y avait pas de substitution, mais un simple legs d'usufruit en faveur d'Helen Mahers, et un autre legs de la nue propri6t6 en faveur de 1'appelant. C'est 6videmment conforme aux termes m~mes du testament qui ne contient aucune expression faisant voir que l'inteution du testateur 6tait de faire une substitution.

Au contraire on y trouve un legs d'usufruit pur et simple pour la vie durant d'Helen Mahers, avec, an lieu de la charge de rendre les propri6ths, la dispense de rendre, aucun compte de tout ou partie des dites propri6t6s A qui que ce soit. Cette disposition est tout A fait contraire A l'essence de la substitution et A la d6finition qu'en donne le Code civil, art. 925: " La substitution fid6icommissaire est celle celui qui regoit est charg6 de reudre la chose soit a son d6chs, soit A un autre terme," selon Thivenotd'Essaules (1).

Comme on le voit par l'art. du Code et par les autorit6s cit6es, la charge de rendre est le principal caractere de la substitution.

Ici la charge de rendre des biens 16gubs en usufruit n'est nullement impos6e A 1'usufruitiare qui, an contraire, est dispens6e mime § de conserver les biens sujets a l'usufruit. On a vu qu'elle est aussi dispens6e de rendre aucun compte & qui que ce soit, du tout on de partie, ce qui 6quivaut un legs de la propri6t6.

Il y a ensuite un legs de la nue proprit6 son fils, James McGregor, de toutes les propri~ths quelconques dont l'usufruit a t6 donn6 A sa mere, sa vie durant ; Fournier J. suivi d'un autre legs conditionnel, par lequel il legue

& Helen Mahers, dans le cas oil son. fils mourrait avant elle, tous les biens qu'il lui avait 16gu6s en pleine propri6t6. Ce legs ne peut non plus Atre consid6r6 comme une substitution en faveur de la mbre, parce que la charge de rendre n'est pas impos6e au fils. Dans cette mame disposition de la proprit6 en faveur du fils, le testateur r6affirme la d6claration que c'est un legs d'usufruit qu'il a fait sa I le change en un legs conditionnel dans le cas of ce fils prd6cderait. Toutefois il ne pent s'61ever aucune question an sujet de ce dernier legs puisque la mare est morte avant son fils.

II est clair que la pr6tention qu'il y a eu substitution n'est pas fond6e, en cons6qnence la vente par le sh6rif de cette propri6t6, A 1'6poque o l'appelant 6tait majeur, et sans aucune opposition de sa part a eu l'effet de purger la proprith de tous droits reels et de donner un titre complet et absolu A l'intimbe. S'il avait exists une substitution non ouverte comme on 'a pr6tendu, lors de la vente par le sh6rif, d'apr~s Part. 710 P. C.

cette substitution n'aurait pas t6 purg6e, mais cet article n'a aucune application dans le cas actuel, puisqu'il n'y avait pas de substitution.

Je ne consid&re pas qu'il soit utile d'entrer dans la discussion des nombreuses questions soulev6es au sujet de la vente par autorit6 du juge & la requbte de Mde

McGregor, non plus que de celles soulev6es au sujet de l'inventaire car toutes ces proc6dures attaqu6es out

6t6 rgulibrement faites. Mais ind6pendamment de cela, la vente qui a 6 r~gulirement faite depuis par le sh&rif, de la propriWt6 a mis fin A toutes ces questions. Cette vente n'a pas

Wti faite comme I'a pr6tendue l'appelant super non domino non possedente. Au contraire, eeenn

&

Craig, sur qui elle a 6t faite en 6tait alors en possession publique et paisible comme propri6taire en vertu de Fournier J. titres authentiques, enregistr6s et r~guliers, apris m~me une contestation par opposition faite par Devlin aux droits de propri6t6 de Craig.

D'apris la loi et les d6cisions dans la province de Qa6bec la vente judiciaire accompagn6e des formalit~s 16gales donne un titre complet et absolu A l'adjudicataire de la propri~t6 vendue et purge tous les droits dont la propri6t6 peut 6tre grevee, A 1'exception de 1'hypothbque r6sultant de la commutation des rentes seigneuriales, de 1'emphytdose, des substitutions non ouvertes et du douaire coutumier non ouvert.

Par l'art. 711 C..P. C. le d~cret purge tous autres droits.

Comme il a 6t6 d6ji dit plus haut, le testament de McGregor ne contenant pas de substitution, la vente judiciaire a en son plein et entier effet et a purg6 les droits du propri~taire faute d'avoir fait opposition A la vente en temps opportun. On ne trouvera pas de d~cisions de nos cours contraires A ce principe mais on en trouve qui le soutiennent hautement.

Daus une cause de Patton v. Morin oft la demande de la nullit6 d'un d6cret 6tait demand~e comme fait super non domino il a t& jug6 : 1 que le d6cret purge un immeuble de tous les droits de propri&t6, excepth dans le cas of' le propri6taire est lors du d6cret en possession de l'immeuble saisi super non domino; 20 que si au moment de la saisie de l'immeuble le vrai propri6taire n'en est pas en possession, il doit, pour conserver son droit de propri~t6 s'opposer A la vente par les moyens ordinaires. Un des consid6rants de ce jugement est comme suit: " Consid&rant que la vente judiciaire accompagn6e des formalitis 16gales, doit 6tre respect6e et ne peut tre rbvoqu~e en droit sans porter atteinte A l'efficacit d'un titre accord6 par los mains de la justice, la cour maintient la d6fense du d6fendeur et renvoie Faction du demandeur.

Un autre consid~rant affirme le principe que le de mandeur aurait se porter opposant A la saisie vente du dit immeuble, mais qu'au contraire il a laiss6 vendre et adjuger le dit immeuble en justice sans formuler sa plainte et sopposer A la dite saisie et vente.

Je suis d'opinion que l'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

J.-This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench reversing a judgment of the Superior Court which had been given in his favour. The judgment of the Superior

Court is reported in M. L. R. 6 196 and that the Queen's Bench in Q. R. 1 Q. B. 197.

The action of the present appellant was brought to obtain the partition and licitation of an immovable property in the parish of Montreal and to claim from the defendant company the fruits and revenues collected since the opening of the plaintiff's right.

The declaration alleged that the late James McGregor, the appellant's father, was in community of property with his wife Helen Mahers, and that during the marriage the consorts had acquired the immovable in question which, consequently, fell into the community; that by his will of the 28th January, 1863, the late Mr. Mc- Gregor bequeathed to his wife the usufruct of one-half of this immovable property with substitution in favour of his son, the plaintiff; that Helen Mahers died on the

7th October, 1886; that on the last mentioned date the substitution opened in favour of the plaintiff who, in consequence, became the owner of the one-half of said immovable property; that the defendant company, who were lawfully possessed of the one undivided half said immovable as representing Helen Mahers, illegally in possession of the undivided half belonging to the plaintiff. The conclusions of the action prayed that the plaintiff be declared the owner of .

the undivided half of the said property; that the defendant company be ordered to account for the fruits and revenues thereof from the 7th October, 1886, and that a partition or licitation be ordered in the ordinary The defendant company met this action by pleading ing that they were the proprietors of the undivided one-half claimed by the plaintiff and alleged the following chain of title:- A deed of sale of 7th April, 1885, from the sheriff of Montreal to the company, the property having been sold in a case wherein one McDougall was plaintiff against Thomas Craig his debtor, to whom he had advanced, on the 17th September, 1875, a sum $15,000, secured by hypothee on the property in question."

deed of sale of 30th August, 1875, from 0. J. *

Devlin to Thomas Craig."

"3. deed of sale of 11th May, 1875, from Helen Mahers to 0.

" 4 A deed of sale of 25th October, 1876, from William Quinn to Helen Mahers of no. 16, being part of the lot in question, and a deed of sale of 14th January, 170, from James Thomas to Helen Mahers of no. 17, the other part of said lot."

" 5. sale by authority of justice, dated 15th October, 1866, from Helen Mahers, acting on her own behalf and also in her capacity of tutrix, to James Thomas of -lot no. 17, and a sale by authority of justice, dated 15th October, 1866, from Helen Mahers, acting as aforesaid, to William Quinn of lot no

The defendant company alleged-that at the time of TE the sheriff's sale the plaintiff had attained his majority and was in a position to protect his rights, if any he & had; that the sheriff's sale against Thomas Craig had been made against a proprietor in open and public possession; that the defendant company had purchased in good faith at a sale made with all the requisite formalities, and that the effect of the sheriff's sale was to purge the property of any rights which the plaintiff might have had therein.

The plaintiff filed special answers to these pleas attacking the validity both of the sheriff's sale and of the sale by authority of justice to Quinn and Thomas.

He alleged in regard to the sheriff's sale that it could not purge the rights of the plaintiff inasmuch as the substitution did not open in his favour until 1886, two years after the said sale.

He also alleged that even if the will were held not to contain a substitution, the sheriff's sale would be null and void as having been made super non domino et non pnssidente, inasmuch the sale from Devlin to Craig was simulated and

Devlin was the owner and in possession of the lots in question at the time of the sheriff's sale.

He also impugned the sale by the tutrix under the order of the court as tainted with fraud.

The .judgment appealed from holds that the will of the late James McG-regor did not create a substitution, but simply a legacy of the usufruct to the wife and of the ownership to the son.

I unhesitatingly adopt that view of the will. I am also of opinion that, as held by the court below, the plaintiff, being of age at the time of the sheriff's sale to the defendant, though I do not see what difference that makes) was bound then to oppose the sale and assert his right, if he had any;

that his default to do so precludes him from now attacking the validity of the defendant's title, as this sale has been accompanied with all the formalities required by law, and as Craig upon whom it has & been made was then in possession as proprietor of the said lot in virtue of duly registered authentic deeds. The case of Dufresne v. Dixon (1) cited by the appel- .

lant was totally diferent from the present one, as a reference to the report will clearly show.

There the sheriff had sold Mrs. Dixon's property, to which she had a title and of which she was in possession, and so having both title and possession the sheriff's sale thereof against another person was annulled. Here the actual possession was in Devlin, but by the registry office the title was in Craig.

Now, under those circumstances, Devlin's possession was Craig's possession. Upon Craig alone could that property be sold, as it was so sold. If at the period of the seizure of an immovable the proprietor is not in possession thereof he must, for the preservation of his rights property, oppose the sale by the usual means. Such is the law as laid down in the case of Patton v. Morin (2) to which we must give application in the present case. Assuming that he had rights to this property. the appellant has lost them by the sheriff's sale. Vigilantibus non dormientibus subvenit lex.

In Rodidre, Proc. Civ. (3) and Beriat du St. Prix inter alias, the difference between the old and the new law in France on this subject is pointed out.

I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

GWYNNE J.-I concur that the will under which the plaintiff claims did not not create a substitution in his favour, as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, but devised the usufruct to his wife and the ownership to the appellant with substitution over to the wife in case the son should die during his life, and I concur in the opiiion of my brother that, for the reasons which he has stated in his judgment which I have had the opportunity of reading, the title of the respondents which is derived from the sheriffs sale cannot be impeached and that the appeal must,- therefore, be dismissed with costs.

concurred.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Campbell

Meredith.